

THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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Art. 1.—IMMORTALITY AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF.

THE Religion of Christ has in all ages been bound up with the belief in the power of the human soul to survive death. Whether we consider the substance of this faith or its history, the connexion appears to be intimate and indissoluble. If the belief in personal survival were to vanish, Christianity would have broken with its history, and lost its original likeness.

The Gospel in its earliest form was the proclamation of the speedy advent among men of a Kingdom of God. The acceptance of the hope thus raised involved a belief in survival as soon as it became clear that the hope would not be realised within the lifetime of the existing generation. Christians, no doubt, like other men, formed various and conflicting conceptions of the future existence they desired. Where knowledge is not possible, hope must assume the varying and elusive colours of the rainbow. The soul projects itself outwards and finds its own strength or weakness in the unknown world of its dreams. The powerlessness of the imagination, however, did not weaken the hope. No early disciple of Christ, we may be convinced, thought of the extinction of his personal being at death or its absorption in some larger whole as a possibility. He had no doubt that he would survive death, just as a swimmer may plunge beneath the waters and reappear upon the shore beyond.

When the preachers of the faith began to appeal to listeners other than Jews, their teaching about death was, perhaps, the strongest weapon in their armoury. They came to a world longing for a personal deliverance from the power of death, and they offered what was

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universally sought. They were more successful than the priests of Isis or the soldiers of Mithra, because they invited discipleship to one who had actually shared the human lot, tasted the full bitterness of death, and risen in literal truth from the grave. The hope of immortality seemed thus to be placed by the Gospel upon a far surer and simpler foundation than that assigned to it by these other eastern faiths, in which the object of worship was not a human being but a mythological figure or a philosophical abstraction. Thus the religion of Christ unquestionably asked the unbelieving world for its allegiance, and received what it asked, largely on the ground of the unearthly hopes which it offered. It opened a way of escape through the gate of death from a hardly tolerable present into a world where existing conditions would no longer prevail, and where life would be a joy instead of a burden.

To these simple hopes all the familiar words of the Christian vocabulary bear witness. 'Judgment,' 'salvation,' 'heaven,' 'hell,' may indeed be understood of experiences within our present reach, but it will not be contended that this was their primitive meaning. Originally they pointed to occurrences or states of being in a world other than the one we know. No early believer, we may be sure, thought that any present judgment of men would replace the final reckoning, or believed that any happiness now known to him was anything more than a foretaste of that awaiting him beyond the tomb.

No doubt the present life began to awaken greater interest when the Church settled into the slow and deliberate stride characteristic of every long march, and it became clear that she was destined to take her place among the permanent institutions of this world. She was thus called upon to provide for her own stability, and to formulate rules of life for her children. Thus the faith of Christ gradually but inevitably lost the unworldliness which had at first been stamped upon it, and assumed the appearance of a law governing men's present conduct. The hopes and fears it had originally awakened lost something of their early distinctness and potency; and the conditions of salvation began to be more thought of than salvation itself. The future life was regarded as something about which there was universal agreement

and which was beyond the reach of discussion and controversy. The way to the goal obscured the goal itself.

The transcendental hopes and fears, however, were not suppressed nor abandoned. They still remained as the sanctions of the Church's law. They formed her weightiest arguments by which to convince the world of sin, righteousness and judgment. The instability of life, the nearness and certainty of death, the folly of sacrificing an immeasurable happiness for a few moments of illusive pleasure, the terrors of penalties to which no limits could be set—these were always the motives of the Church's appeals, arguments whose force no one questioned.

Thus the present life was rated from the first at the low value which has ever since been assigned to it in Christian teaching. The Church's great teachers have never thought this life desirable for its own sake. If they weighed its joys against its sorrows, it was to bring out the heavy balance on the side of pain. If their vision had been confined within our present horizons, they would have pronounced 'human life to be a poor thing at the best.' The Christian view of life is only redeemed from pessimism by the fact that it refuses to regard our actual existence as anything but a probation or a prelude. No doubt particular teachers may be pointed to who have tried to relieve the sombreness of the traditional picture and have dwelt much upon the joy of living. They stand apart, however, from the general company of their fellow-labourers. We miss the pathos of the distinctively Christian note in teaching which invites us to find our satisfaction in our present good things, to count up our joys and rejoice that they are so many. We feel instinctively that such teaching has departed from the Church's 'great tradition,' and fallen away from the heroism which spurned the joys of this world in comparison with those to be hereafter revealed. The value of life to the Christian has ever lain in its promise. He prizes it because it points upwards like the spire to a more glorious world out of sight.

These hopes have indeed repeatedly assumed forms so perverted or misleading that the Church was compelled to disavow them. There were periods when self-destruction ran the risk of being mistaken for martyrdom.

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Death was not merely accepted with joy ; it was courted. The present was not only valued at a low price in comparison with the future ; it became quite valueless, and was regarded as a mere obstruction to be removed at the earliest opportunity. These tendencies, of course, compelled the Church to assert the claims of the present life, to insist upon the value of its discipline, and to mark as impious the desire to hasten its close.

Another and less noble perversion was that known as otherworldliness. The present life was depreciated, not because its pleasures failed to satisfy the soul, but because they were precarious and shortlived. An hereafter was pictured where they could be enjoyed without fear of their loss or danger of satiety. The future was conceived as a reproduction of the present without its disturbing features. Here was another dangerous distortion. The Church had to declare that this was not what she meant by a future life ; that this life was not, for her, the present stamped with perpetuity, but the present transformed and ennobled. In making this disavowal her teachers elaborated the doctrine of what they called a 'present salvation.' By this was meant, not a blessedness coextensive and conterminous with our present existence, but a foretaste, here and now, of the joys which after death were to be in full measure the portion of the soul. For a time this doctrine was ardently preached ; and no doubt some of its upholders occasionally used language which might suggest indifference to any pains or pleasures outside our present experience.

These, however, were but the overstatements of the controversialist. What was intended was to assert the moral continuousness of present and future. It is obviously this which can alone make the hope of survival religious. I am not necessarily cherishing a religious hope when I trust that my days may be indefinitely prolonged, no matter where the scene of such prolongation may be. It is not my desire for life which is in itself religious, but my craving for some ampler and nobler existence than I at present know. Thus to repudiate the teaching that the future was only an infinite prolongation of the present, but without its pains and dangers, it was necessary to show that the future salvation presupposed a present moral health.

These exaggerations and corrections cannot hide the persistent association of the belief in personal survival with Christianity. It has been the silent assumption of every Christian creed. No great Christian teacher can be pointed to who has ever successfully preached the faith of Christ without it. The very suggestion that this faith could survive its denial would sound as the most startling of paradoxes. Yet various forces seem to be at work around us to extinguish the belief, or at least to reduce it to impotence.

The attempt to decide how many of our countrymen at present believe in a future life, or to gauge the strength of such a belief where it is professed, is beset by almost insuperable difficulties. The great majority would beyond doubt avow themselves believers. A number, larger perhaps than most of us suppose, would hesitate, while a small but weighty minority would profess positive disbelief. It is plain, however, that mere profession is a very insufficient evidence either of the existence or non-existence of such a hope as this. A variety of reasons readily occur to us why men should be reluctant to make an avowal which might well seem to them impious even if they had reached a negative conclusion. The question is obviously not what they would say, but what they think in the recesses of their hearts, and allow to influence their conduct.

Ruskin, in his Preface to the 'Crown of Wild Olive,' expressed himself at a loss to know with which of the two opposite opinions he should credit the mass of his countrymen.

'If you address any average modern English company as believing in an eternal life, and endeavour to draw any conclusions from this assumed belief as to their present business, they will forthwith tell you that "What you say is very beautiful, but it is not practical." If, on the contrary, you frankly address them as unbelievers in eternal life, and try to draw any consequences from that unbelief, they immediately hold you for an accursed person, and shake off the dust from their feet at you.'

Perhaps this great writer, however, did not sufficiently consider that the perverseness of his listeners might

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arise from their inability to express what they really felt. The fact that I am not able to formulate my belief on a subject such as this is no evidence that I have ceased to believe. I cannot, it may be, describe my belief, or I may reject a description of it offered to me, yet it may none the less move within me, and impel me to actions for which, without it, I could find no justification.

Still, there are reasons why the belief in immortality may now especially appear to be threatened with extinction. Hope of any kind leans heavily for its support upon the imagination. If we are quite unable to realise some desired contingency, we are apt to dismiss it from our minds and to place it outside the range of our present interests. Now, it cannot escape us that we have been engaged for many years past in removing one after another of the supports upon which, in the popular imagination, this belief had hitherto rested. If we persist in closing, one by one, the avenues by which a man seeks to reach his destination, he will at last give up the attempt and turn in some other direction.

So, if men are nursing a hope, and we continue to tell them that its realisation cannot possibly take any of the forms which they have hitherto thought it must take, they will at length turn round and pronounce the hope itself to be visionary. Such seems the actual consequence of our demolition of the scenery of a future life, the majestic drapery which hung round it. In removing these accessories we have left little except vacancy behind. Let it be fully granted that the removal was imperative. The scenery was incongruous; the imagery used to bring a future life more near tended in the long run to make it more remote and incredible. When the destructive artillery of the critical reason began to play upon the structure raised by the imagination it was soon, bit by bit, reduced to a shapeless ruin.

It may not be superfluous to observe how far the work of demolition has actually proceeded. It is now some thirty years since our religious world was stirred by the controversy regarding the eternity of future punishment. We may feel reasonably certain that this controversy could not now be revived. The interval has emptied it of its actuality. Sermons may, indeed, still occasionally be heard protesting against the old conceptions; but a

note of unreality seems for the most part audible through the protest. The preacher appears to consider his task superfluous, and to feel that he is warring with the dead. He knows that few, if any, of his listeners are any longer visited by such fears. Discussion has almost ceased as to the meaning of the word 'eternal,' or the fewness of the elect, or even as to the possibility of a future state of purgation. It is, indeed, true that death remains, as it has ever been, the most moving word in the preacher's vocabulary. It continues, as it always will, to be a subject of universal and pathetic interest. We strain our eyes to catch if it only be a glimpse of what it hides or reveals. No disappointment wearies our curiosity, no failure arrests our search. While death, however, thus keeps its fascination, the authoritative, or at least the traditional, explanation of its mysteries finds us almost at every point incredulous.

Consider, e.g., what a breach is made in our defences by the disappearance of the sharp division of mankind into good and bad. We cannot tell where goodness ends or badness begins, nor do we find the division any longer maintained by the trusted exponents of religious thought. Its disappearance, however, leaves us face to face with many bewildering questions. If we refuse to make but one division of men, we must make as many divisions as there are individuals. It is, however, the greater solidarity of men in a future state which has formed one of its most attractive prospects. This solidarity seems more consistent with the old conception than with the new one. We can suppose a multitude of men, each preserving his own individuality, united by a common purpose and uplifted by a common hope. Such was the traditional conception of the future life of the blessed. In our love of individuality we have made such solidarity less thinkable. Each separate individual seeks his own heaven, and declares that one acceptable to his neighbour would have no attractions for himself.

Another silent dissolvent lies in our changed views of punishment. As long as we could look with any confidence upon punishment as necessarily, or even generally, remedial, belief in purgatory or even hell was easy. The character of the punishment to be inflicted might gradually lose its early grossness. Spiritual anguish might

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replace bodily torment. Still, the belief in the efficacy of punishment would remain unshaken. It is this belief the modern world is gradually losing. Punishment, in the case of mature men, has almost ceased to be regarded as anything but a deterrent. We do not expect the criminal to come out of prison a reformed man; we know that such transformations are very exceptional. The normal effect of any punishment hitherto tried is an increasing hatred on the criminal's part towards a social order which he regards as tyrannical and vindictive.

These experiences add greatly to the difficulty of any conception we can form of future retribution. It is not the duration of future punishment which engages our thoughts, nor is it the forms such punishment may assume. Such things we are quite ready to leave in suspense. It is the justice and consequently the possibility of retribution in any form or of any length that we are driven to call in question. The punishments we know appear to be of the earth, earthly; thus they serve to discredit the whole conception and drive the mind back when it attempts to find a way of access, by the moral sense, into an eternal world.

It is not, indeed, suggested that iniquity awakens less abhorrence now than it formerly did. We may look with more indulgence upon some sins, but others awaken greater detestation. Cruelty and oppression would probably meet with less mercy from a modern than from a mediæval tribunal. It will not, however, be questioned that our modern habits of accounting for things and tracing them back to their sources, possibly remote ones, tend to dissuade us from punishment except as a deterrent. We have learned the futility of blame. Instead of denouncing sinners we pity or call them mad. So the only penal fires we can think of are those which utterly consume their prey so that it loses its identity and ceases to be recognisable.

Our present-day views of the Bible and its inspiration tend towards a similar result. We find our traditional notions broken up, and there are no very stable moulds left in which thought can shape itself. Throughout the greater part of the period covered by the Old Testament the individual merges his life in that of the nation. In its eternity he finds his own. When the hope of personal

survival begins in the Maccabean period to assume distinct shape, its form is not consonant with our ideas. Immortality is not thought of as a quality inherent in the soul, but as a reward reserved for a faithful remnant. Thus the Old Testament does not give us, either in its earlier or its later sections, any great assistance when we attempt to give concrete shape to our hopes of future life. It either tends to dissuade us from such attempts or it offers us what to our ideas are impossible realisations.

Our present interpretation of the New Testament has the effect of substituting earth for heaven as the centre of human interest. The immortality anticipated in its pages is a participation in the Divine kingdom, whose earthly appearance the infant Church impatiently expected. Immortal life was life in this divinely governed society. Sometimes the kingdom was thought of as lasting for a limited although a prolonged interval; and sometimes its duration was pictured as stretching on into a limitless future. In either case 'everlasting life' was only a feature or property of the situation of its citizens. The exact results of biblical research are of course only known to a few scholars. Information on these subjects is, however, now being rapidly diffused. The actual result seems to be a widespread popular belief that what is promised in the Gospel is an ideal society, like the perfectly ordered community of Socialist thinkers, in which there shall be neither poverty nor disease. The vital differences between such conceptions and those of primitive Christianity are ignored, and the points of likeness are alone heeded. The mass of men disdain qualifications and reserves and have a passion for simple formulas. Thus the glad tidings of the Gospel are identified with the hopes of the social reformer, and regarded as a Divine summons to labour for the regeneration of the earth. The consequence is the displacement of the traditional hope of immortality by a vision which, however noble, is yet of the earth.

The Resurrection of Christ still conveys its confident assurance to the soul of the believer. The figure of his deathless Lord is the one luminous point in what might otherwise be an oppressive obscurity. He asks for nothing better than to follow his Master up to death and beyond it. The assurance, however, is only for him. It leaves

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the doubting world incredulous. No one not already possessed by the hope of immortality would be convinced by the Church's Easter message. 'If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.'

Such are some of the particular reasons why men should show greater hesitation than they once did when they are questioned upon their beliefs or hopes regarding a future life. The traditional scenery of such a life has been uprooted. We find ourselves encompassed by negations. There is, moreover, the undoubted fact of the increased value which this present life acquires, as education and the opportunities it confers become more evenly and widely distributed. No doubt there are many like F. Myers' acquaintance, who supposed he would enter into eternal bliss after death, but found the prospect none the less depressing. He was quite content to go on as he was. Even worry is better than vacancy. So we are not surprised to be told that if, in an address to working men, the speaker throws scorn on the other world, and bids them refuse to sacrifice substance for shadow, they applaud at once, but as soon as ever he begins to speak of immortality their interest flags and their approval is chilled.* I do not interpret these signs of the times to mean that the human heart has ceased to be in the 20th century what it was in the first century. I regard them as indications that the traditional moulds have been found wanting and that new ones are imperatively needed. We need to be released from the humiliating position of offering men a heaven which no one desires, and threatening them with the penalties of a hell which 'every one believes to be reserved for people a great deal worse than himself.'†

A situation such as this may well excite alarm in religious minds. The central citadel of religion may appear to have fallen to the enemy. Thus Frederick Myers tells us 'that the educated world—that part of it, at least, which science leads—is waking up to find that no mere trifles or traditions only, but the great hope

* 'True and False Ideals of Progress,' by the Dean of St Paul's.

† Quoted by Schiller, 'Humanism,' p. 325.

which inspired their fathers aforetime, is insensibly vanishing away.* Such prophecies, however, lose their impressiveness when we remember how often we have heard their like before. We cannot see how we are worse off in our hold upon this hope than what are called the ages of faith. We analyse our feelings more closely than they did, and we are not afraid, as they were, of the reproach of heresy. Indeed orthodoxy, among large sections of the laity, has become almost a term of reproach. Authority, too, counts for less with us than it did with them. They gave credit to extravagant stories to which we pay no heed, because we know how easily such stories originate. Still, the pains and pleasures held before them as deterrents or inducements cannot have weighed upon them very persistently, or they would not have been as reckless transgressors as we know many of them actually were. We do not trifle in this way with prospects which we deliberately regard as serious. At all times men must have been conscious of the defective light in which we pursue our journey, and of the thick wrappings we must strip off before we can reach reality.

The writer I have quoted thought that the question of human immortality admitted of scientific proof. He believed that doubt must cease if it could be conclusively shown that the dead were in a position to communicate with the living. Many eminent men, worthy of the highest respect, have shared this opinion. They would, however, themselves admit that they have been unable so far to convert any considerable number of their countrymen. An influential member of the Society for Psychical Research informed us a few years ago that the membership of the society after twenty years of strenuous and not unfruitful labour remained stationary at something less than 1500. He drew the conclusion that there were only 1500 persons in the whole wide world who took an annual guinea's worth of scientific interest in finding out whether they had anything to look forward to after death, and if so, what! Surely, however, the fact may mean, not that the abstaining

* 'Science and a Future Life,' p. 2.

† Schiller, 'Humanism,' p. 318.

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multitude lacked interest, but that they believed the particular avenue proposed to them to be fallacious.

For my own part I cannot identify 'immortality' with any such life as these researches have disclosed or indicated. When I affirm my belief in immortality it is not of such a survival I am thinking. On the other hand, I could imagine myself believing in such a survival while yet I did not believe in immortality. The life we desire is not our present existence under other conditions, but a better life, a life changed not in duration but in quality; and of such a transformation these researches have hitherto brought us no evidence.

My own belief—and when we speak of hope we must needs be personal—is not the result of any reasoning process. Nor can I find that the belief historically considered has originated in the conscious reason. It precedes the action of the conscious reason. We find it in some shape in the infancy of the world. It makes its appearance almost at the dawn of history. Nor does it to-day seem to rest upon arguments or the operations of the logical faculty. People who already hold it, or whom it holds, bring arguments, sometimes powerful ones, in its support. But it is not the arguments which have brought it to them. Perhaps no one whom it did not already possess was ever reasoned into it. No one whom it did possess was ever shaken in his assurance by reasonings. The belief is a craving of the whole soul, of which the reason is only a part. We justify it but we do not create it by reasonings.

If I now turn from the belief itself to the expression given to it in different times and places I find myself amidst infinite variety. Question the nations of the earth as to what they mean by this their faith, and they give us answers marked by every degree of childishness or sublimity. We are in the presence of the changing pictures of the kaleidoscope. Each nation may indeed have its authoritative creed. But the creeds do not keep pace with the movements of the living soul. They come in time to be left behind, and to appear as monuments representing what was rather than what is.

Look, e.g., at the people of whose early religious experience we know most, the Jews. It is customary to

say that the hope of immortality is absent in the earlier of the two sections of the Christian Bible and present in the later. We think we see it clearly in the New Testament, while we miss it in the greater part of the Old. This summary distinction can hardly satisfy any reflecting reader of the book. The ordinary inscription upon Jewish tombstones is the prayer that the soul of the dead man may be bound up in the same bundle of life with the Lord his God. Could there be any clearer expression of the hope of immortality than this simple quotation from the Old Testament (1 Sam. xxv. 29)? The early Hebrew believed that his nation's survival embraced and assured his own. It was not that he was content to perish if only it endured. He thought that he and it were bound up in the same bundle of life. Beneath the whole company, and enfolding the great aggregate and each of its constituent units, were the Everlasting Arms. Within this sheltering embrace he rested in security, asking, with no note of self-pity, that God might show him His work, and reserve His glory for future generations. No doubt the most fervent piety did not, then any more than now, overcome the shrinking from death or light up the unimaginable future with assuring radiance :

• While earnest thou gazest,
Comes boding of terror,
Comes phantasm and error,
Perplexes the bravest
With doubt and misgiving. *

We should, however, be doing the holders of a hope such as is revealed in the 90th Psalm a grievous injustice if we were to say that they had no anticipations of immortality, and place them in consequence upon a lower religious level than their descendants who looked forward to an individual resurrection. The difference was one rather of expression than of vital belief. The hopes were essentially the same although they assumed different forms. Indeed, many Christian conceptions of immortality may well seem inferior to some of the Hebrew hopes to which we refuse the name.

In truth, wherever we follow the hope of future life, we are confronted by wavering images and pictures that

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will not abide our scrutiny. The soul is reaching forward towards a reality which is beyond its present grasp. It is moved by a desire which it cannot express in stable language or adequate imagery. It feels, but it cannot describe its feeling. It hopes, but cannot delineate its hope. Question those in whom the hope is strongest and most unwavering, and they are unable to tell you what it is they desire. Do they wish for an endless continuance of their present existence? No. Do they desire to meet their friends and associate with them on the same terms as heretofore? Alas for us! the most cherished relationships generally present to us some characteristic for which we are forbidden to desire permanence. The great Augustine, although he loved his mother passionately, was obliged to entreat God for her sins. The truth is, it is not life in time that is desired, but life above time, untouched by its vicissitudes, free from its imperfections.

It will, indeed, be urged that, amidst all wavering hopes and shifting fancies, the desire for the preservation of personal identity remains constant. We may be willing to leave all else in suspense if only we can have the assurance that we can recognise ourselves and our friends hereafter. The question thus propounded is final and irreducible only in appearance. The Gospel assures us of a 'change' by which the new life will be preceded or initiated, but it does not enable us to circumscribe this change or to settle its limits. Our affections are certainly as noble and indestructible as anything within our present experience. They constitute a prophecy of which we may have a good confidence that it will not remain unfulfilled.

The question, however, 'Shall we see and know our friends in heaven?' is one which the deepest piety will hardly dare to ask. It will be restrained by the refusal of Christ to answer directly a similar question, and His assertion of the transient and provisional nature of earthly relationships.* Those who put such questions are only endeavouring to lift earthly weights and measures into a region where they have become valueless. What the Apostle points to in his memorable chapter on the

* Matt. xxii, 30.

Resurrection is the placing of whatever is worthy of life in a position of permanent security. What is good in human lives is gathered up and assured of perpetuity. Flesh and blood and all that they imply are left behind. What is worthy is taken up into some larger and better state of being. Death is thus robbed of his apparent victory and becomes the gate of an enduring life. Such assurances may not wholly avail to overcome the bitterness of bereavement; what assurances can? They do, however, abound in sober, stable consolation, because they deliver us from the fear of death and clothe our last enemy with the garb of a beneficent friend who opens before us a welcome prospect.

We conclude, then, that the hope of future life is a craving implanted within the soul, but that the thoughts and images of every-day life, no less than the reasonings of the metaphysician, fail us when we attempt to picture the satisfaction towards which this craving reaches. We perceive a light which we have the strongest reason for believing to be a light from heaven, although the earth-born mists hide the goal to which it leads.

So the great hopes of the past have led humanity to satisfying but unexpected destinations. They may have been frustrated to the eye, but they have been fulfilled to the heart. The race which has given its religion to Europe has in one sense been the victim of a long series of cruel illusions. It has had to mourn through the centuries over the graves of its shattered hopes. In another aspect it is the most startling example of hope fulfilled. An outcast among the nations, despised and rejected of men, it has become the religious teacher of its revilers and persecutors. History, while it seldom realises our express predictions, does yet bear witness that God does not betray the soul that trusts Him.

We have the firmest confidence in the ultimate solution of problems which now baffle our utmost efforts, although we cannot tell what form the solution will take. So we may have a firm assurance that there is a destined haven for the human soul, a haven which it would ardently desire, could it analyse and express its aspirations, although we cannot describe the haven nor settle its boundaries. This is precisely what I understand religious faith to be. Faith is fidelity to the soul's best

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instincts. It is the disposition which makes a man exercise his will, and persevere when the goal is not in sight. Action is thus a better gauge of the hope of immortality than profession. Perhaps we should do well if, instead of saying that we hope for immortality, we were to say that we disbelieve in death.

What the New Testament calls eternal life is life in which a man overcomes death by looking beyond it. He takes his stand among the eternal things, and thus commits himself to aims and enterprises which exceed the short term of his earthly existence. The immortality in which he believes is his already. He gives the most conclusive evidence that he holds it as an inalienable possession. The brave men who have found their graves by the Belgian canals or in the French valleys might have given us surprising answers, had we questioned them upon their beliefs in a future life. They have, however, offered a more convincing evidence of their faith in immortality than any verbal profession they could have made. They held their lives to be of little price when weighed against a nation's fidelity to its engagements. The human soul thus obeying its best instincts, and surrendering its all without thought of personal recompense, makes a claim upon God which we may trust Him not to repudiate.

Symbols will change and fashions of thought wax old, as doth a garment, to the very end; but the hope of life beyond death will always remain an inseparable fibre in the texture of the human soul. It may be most strong when it is least able to express itself. It is often inarticulate or voiceless. But its fruits are unmistakeable. It raises men into an eternal world even while they remain among things temporal. It is their response to the Divine claim upon their unreserved and perpetual allegiance.

J. GAMBLE.

Art. 2.—THE WAR AND THE RACE.

1. *Les Selections Sociales.* By G. Vacher de Lapouge. Paris: Fontemoing, 1896.
2. *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen.* By Otto Ammon. Ed. 2. Jena: Fischer, 1896.
3. *The Races of Europe.* By William Z. Ripley. Kegan Paul, 1900.
4. *Eugenics and Militarism.* By Prof. V. Kellogg: *Problems in Eugenics*, p. 220 *et seq.* Eugenics Education Society, 1912.
5. *War and the Breed.* By D. Starr Jordan. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1915.
6. *The Main Illusions of Pacifism.* By G. G. Coulton. Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1916.
7. *On the Statistical Enquiries needed after the War in connection with Eugenics.* By Major Leonard Darwin. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, March 1916.
8. *The Declining Birth-Rate.* *Report of the National Birth-Rate Commission.* Chapman and Hall, 1916.
9. *How to Pay for the War.* (Fabian Research Department.) Edited by Sidney Webb. Allen and Unwin, 1916.

SINCE the general acceptance of Darwin's theory of natural selection, the effect of war on the racial qualities of mankind has been the subject of frequent discussion. Unfortunately definite evidence of its racial effects is difficult to obtain, and little has been done to attack the problem by scientific methods. Hence, for the most part, each writer has emphasised those obvious considerations which tell in favour of his own predispositions. The militarist has enlarged on the elimination of the unfit individual or nation, and the pacifist on the destruction of the best by battle or barrack life, each in the happy confidence of finding plentiful facts to warrant either a policy of ruthless conquest and destruction, or of complacent and mean-spirited surrender of national ideals or obligations.

For the first time since Darwin's work, his conceptions and phraseology, have been absorbed into the heritage of thought of the chief nations of the world, we have raging in our midst a war in which almost the whole

manhood of Europe is involved—a conflict between nation and nation and between man and man, which seems comparable to the incessant and universal struggle going on between species and individuals in the realms of animal and plant life.

How far, we may ask ourselves, does war, especially such a war as this, produce effects on the races of mankind similar to those contemplated by Darwin in the 'Origin of Species'? Does it favour the survival of one set of qualities at the expense of another, and if so, what qualities are of survival value and what tend to be eliminated? Does the survival of the fittest mean more than the fittest for the particular environment? Can we correlate qualities of survival value in individuals or nations under the ordeal of war, with qualities of worth on the physical, mental or moral plane? Will war, to put it shortly, benefit or injure the innate bodily, intellectual or spiritual character of our nation or mankind?

In natural conditions, all life exists in a continual struggle against similar or different types, and against the rest of the environment—an environment, be it remembered, which in the case of man is largely the creation of the living beings themselves, striving, often unconsciously, to mould the conditions of their lives more nearly to their hearts' desire. In this struggle for life, those individuals or species who possess some variation which is of advantage in existing circumstances, or, especially in the case of mankind, can be used to modify conditions in ways favourable to themselves, tend to survive at the expense of others, and to leave more offspring. Having increased chances of survival, by the action of heredity the qualities which ensure survival tend to reappear more freely in succeeding generations, and to become a characteristic of the race. That, in its essence, is the theory of Natural Selection.

It is impossible to overlook the analogy between the struggle for life in nature and the state of warfare in which primitive man often exists. If the natural struggle tends to the survival of the fittest, the presumption is that like effects will be produced by war among mankind. The strong and skilful hunter gets more food; the mighty warrior kills his enemies and takes possession of their wives. The fierce, warlike and well-disciplined

tribe overcomes the timid, peaceful and unorganised, and inherits the earth. And we may continue the analysis. When war ceases to be an affair of the individual, or even of the family or the tribe, and large armies come into being, the qualities of combination, of willing obedience, of unhesitating self-sacrifice, become necessary for success. They acquire biological 'survival value,' and thus, by heredity, become ingrained in the race. Hence, it is argued, war tends to develop these qualities; and it is to war that their increase, even their existence, is due.

It is perhaps natural to find the idea of the racial benefit of war most developed among the German nation, who, as has been well said, have made of war a national industry, and openly regard it as a periodic and legitimate extension of diplomatic action. Thus Otto Ammon says:

'In its collective effect war is a blessing for humanity, since it offers the only means of measuring the powers of nations against each other, and of adjudging victory to the most capable. War is the highest and most majestic form of the struggle for existence; it cannot be dispensed with, and therefore cannot be abolished.'

There is no doubt that such readings of the doctrine of natural selection, deliberately inculcated in the ordered teaching of the German nation, have played a large part in their recent psychological development. They have become a substitute for the principles of life and conduct based on Christian ethics, which were perhaps never wholly acceptable to the North German temperament. One sees, too, the common confusion of thought which so often follows the ambiguous use of the word 'fittest' in this connexion. With characteristic want of lucidity, German writers often assume that a survival of the fittest for war or for organised industry and commerce would secure the survival of the fittest for the Art of Life as a whole. They proceed to acclaim themselves the noblest achievement of the ages, in terms which have excited to mirth or pity that part of the civilised world which is gifted with a sense of humour, or recognises a divine purpose in human affairs. By a process of conscious or unconscious suggestion, they have taken a selection of their own qualities as their ideal, and intensified them by moulding their lives in the distorted image of

themselves, as, in Dyson's cartoon, the Kaiser Wilhelm kneels in adoration of a gigantic caricature of himself, in whose likeness he has fashioned his God.

Even if, in accordance with her expectation, Germany had swiftly triumphed in a war sprung on Europe at the moment of her choice, it would merely have shown that she was fittest among the nations to survive in the treacherous, clumsy and brutal environment into which she has turned a department of human activity that, if always dreadful, used to have in it some elements of the picturesque and chivalrous. It does not follow that she would have been the more fit to be trusted with the government of the world and the final control over the bodies and souls of the inhabitants.

And yet another caution may be given about German racial pretensions. There are three chief races of Europe: (1) the northern—tall, fair and long-skulled—found in greatest purity in Scandinavia and along part of the southern shores of the Baltic; (2) the southern or Mediterranean race—short, dark and long-skulled—inhabiting the shores of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; (3) the Alpine race, of medium stature and colouring, distinguished by a round bullet-shaped head, living in East Central Europe and probably representing an Asiatic influx.

Now, the northern race possesses certain valuable characters in a high degree, and in history has often appeared as the conqueror of its neighbours. German writers have become accustomed to annex the northern race by calling it Teutonic, and then, regardless of physical facts, have assumed that Germans are of pure-bred northern stock, and therefore, by right of birth as well as of success in war, entitled to the overlordship of the world. But, as a matter of fact, Germany has no more northern blood than England or northern France. In France and England the northern race is mingled with the southern, in Germany chiefly with the Alpine—south Germany especially is full of round-skulled people. Even in parts of Prussia, which more even than other German States likes to pose as a natural conqueror, the population consists merely of a northern element overlying and intermixed with a substratum of eastern origin.

As Prof. Ripley pointed out in 1900 in his great book 'The Races of Europe':

'To an American the apparent unwillingness of some of the Germans boldly to own up to the radical ethnic differences which exist between the north and south of the Empire is incomprehensible. It seems to be not improbable that the Teutonic (i.e. northern) blond race has so persistently been apotheosised by the Germans themselves as the original Aryan civilizer of Europe, that to acknowledge any other racial descent has come to be considered as a confession of humble origin. . . . At all events the attempt is constantly being made to prove that the ethnic contrasts between north and south are the product of environmental influences, and not a heritage from widely different ancestry' (p. 221).

Now let us turn to the other side of the case, and examine some of the arguments which are adduced to prove the harmful racial effects of war. We may begin with the summary of these arguments given by Charles Darwin. In the 'Descent of Man,' Darwin says:

'In every country in which a standing army is kept up, the fairest young men are taken to the conscription camp or are enlisted. They are thus exposed to early death during war or are often tempted into vice, and are prevented from marrying during the prime of life. On the other hand, the shorter and feebler men with poor constitutions are left at home, and consequently have a much better chance of marrying and propagating their kind.'

This statement is of course not a complete analysis. It ignores the undoubted benefits of military training, benefits less spoilt by counterbalancing evils than when Darwin wrote. Moreover, as Mr Coulton points out, Darwin confuses the evils of a conscript system, which in modern times means short service, with those of a 'standing' or long-service army.

Nevertheless, here we have clearly set forth the chief cause which must lead in the direction of racial degeneration in any nation which is exposed to the long drain of its manhood imposed by the present war. Whether it conquers its enemies or is itself defeated, Darwin's statement remains a true expression of an unavoidable tendency, which has been enlarged on but not made

more clear by the superficial treatment of Mr Norman Angell, Chancellor Starr Jordan, and others. The army needs our best, and, when national existence is at stake, we give it our best freely. In a serious war, a large proportion of the best are killed, and the next generation has a larger proportion than it should have of fathers who have been rejected as unfit for military service. Heredity does the rest. While a group of congenitally defective fathers may have a number of satisfactory children, conclusive evidence shows that that number will be less than if the fathers had been chosen from good stock. On the whole the quality of the next generation is lowered even though the mothers are sound; and the nation is for ever the poorer in an unknown degree by the loss of the continually broadening stream of descendants of the noble lives sacrificed to war.

This process of bad selection must necessarily occur. It only remains to estimate its importance; to weigh it, if we can, against the effects of the tendencies in the better direction insisted on by the advocates of war as of racial value; and finally to point out some ways by which the harmful process may perhaps be rendered less destructive. It is not enough to insist on the undoubted fact that such racial loss is a necessary consequence of war. It is as easy for Mr Norman Angell and other pacifists to enlarge on this theme as it is for a German professor to wax eloquent on the benefits to be inflicted on an unwilling world by German conquest. For a pacifist to proclaim his hatred of a soldier and state some of the obvious evils of war, is not to prove that the total effect of war is bad for the human race, or even if it is, that war can be avoided with either safety or honour.

What definite evidence is available of the effects of war on mankind as a race? Can we obtain any quantitative estimate of its results? Are we in a position to calculate any of its future influences on the innate qualities of the human species?

Several observers, especially de Lapouge, have investigated the question by considering the very full details which are accessible about the French conscripts of different years. Such results have been summarised recently by Prof. Kellogg. From five to ten million men were probably lost to Europe during the wars of the

French Revolution and Empire. Perhaps one-third of the losses were suffered by France, then containing a population of some twenty-five millions. A serious proportion of the men of military age were destroyed, and a much larger proportion of those sound and fit for military service. Thus from 1792 onwards an increasing number of the best of Frenchmen were removed from family life, and the average quality of those left behind to become the fathers of children steadily fell. How did this affect the physical characters of the children born? We can try to answer this question by examining the data of the French Government concerning the number of men examined, and accepted or rejected for military service each year. Prof. Kellogg says:

'From these figures it may be stated with confidence that the average height of the men of France began notably to decrease with the coming of age, in 1813 and on, of the young men born in the years of the Revolutionary wars (1792-1802), and that it continued to decrease in the following years with the coming of age of the youths born during the Wars of the Empire. Soon after the cessation of these terrible man-draining wars, . . . a new type of boys began to be born, boys indeed that had in them an inheritance of stature that carried them, by the time of their coming of age in the later 1830's and 1840's, to a height of one inch greater than that of the earlier generations born in war time. The average height of the annual conscription contingents born during the Napoleonic Wars was about 1625 millimetres; of those born after the wars it was about 1655 millimetres.

'Running nearly parallel with the fluctuation in number of exemptions for undersize is the fluctuation in number of exemptions for infirmities. These exemptions increased by one-third in twenty years. Exemptions for undersize and infirmities together nearly doubled in number. But the lessening, again, of the figure of exemptions for infirmities was not so easily accomplished as was that of the figure for undersize. The influence of the Napoleonic Wars was felt by the nation, and revealed by its recruiting statistics, for a far longer time, in its aspect of producing a racial deterioration as to vigour, than in its aspect of producing a lessening of stature.'

These results, as they stand, do not prove the case with the completeness Prof. Kellogg seems to think. The quick recovery of stature after the cessation of war

suggests that the evil effect may be transient; and further analysis is necessary. Of the fathers of children born after 1815, some were soldiers returned from the wars, and some were young men newly married. Of the latter some were born before the Revolutionary Wars began; and both these men and also the returned soldiers were not selected for their bad qualities, as were the parents left behind by conscription during the years 1792-1815. We have, therefore, as explaining the recovery, a valid reason which is consistent with a continued inheritance of evil effects from the war; but whether that reason is enough of itself to explain the facts cannot be determined with certainty. Another possibility must also be faced. It might be said that the conditions of life were unfavourable to the nurture of infants during the war, and that anxiety and distress were a bad preparation for childbirth, so that, heredity apart, children born during those years had a bad start. This may well explain some of their defects when they came to be examined as recruits twenty years later.

Could we disentangle all these causes and trace their exact effects, it is possible, nay probable, that we should still find clear proof of permanent racial degeneration. But the problem is too complex for solution with the data at our disposal, and we are inclined to think that, on the evidence of the French Revolutionary Wars, the case is not proven. The same conclusion follows a study of the figures which represent the similar results of the war of 1870-1. Lapouge points out that the 'class' summoned to the colours in 1891, and born in 1871, was lower in average stature than that of 1887. There was again a recovery after the war. But, once more, while it is certain that children born during the war were inferior to those born before and after, there is no conclusive evidence of lasting racial deterioration from the data available. In this instance, too, the case is not proven. But this, it must be emphasised, does not mean that war is not guilty. The presumption is that continuing harm is done to the race; deductive reasoning from the known facts of heredity leads to that conclusion; and the onus of proof rests on those who hold that the evil is transient.

There is one other consideration which must not be

overlooked in an analysis of the problem. Any biological race seems to possess a normal type; and divergencies from that type of a merely fluctuational character tend to diminish as generation follows generation. A father four inches above the average height tends to have sons who exceed it by perhaps only two inches, while his grandsons revert still more nearly to the normal. The same is true if he is of low stature, and it is probable that some hereditary defects which exclude a man from the army may work out slowly in the same manner, especially as the selection of war does not touch women as it does men. Moreover, many defects which unfit a man for active service are not hereditary at all.

But it is not likely that all hereditary qualities are of a fluctuational nature. If a good character is a true mutation and Mendelian phenomena appear, it might well be that the premature death of its possessors in one generation would deprive the race of its benefits altogether until the shuffling and reshuffling of Mendelian units produced it once more in future ages. Even if we grant the possible re-establishment of normal racial qualities in the course of many generations, who can measure the inestimable harm and loss meanwhile? Who can estimate the evil of there being fewer able or competent people left to control the environment and make it fit for the nation to develop in on sound lines? A bad environment means that bad racial qualities tend to survive, and in this way means also indirect harm to the race. Moreover, who can say that another and still more dreadful war may not be upon us before we have recovered from the racial injury of this?

At the best, then, it is probable that the deterioration of race from a great national war may be lengthy; at worst it is permanent. In either case, unless countervailing tendencies are brought into play, its effects may be disastrous for our own and many succeeding generations. It does not follow that great wars must not be faced. Racial questions are not the only ones involved. National safety, national honour may be at stake. It might even be that a nation must sacrifice its own racial future for the sake of humanity itself. But let us count the cost, and seek a possible remedy.

In some respects the present war has been especially

disastrous to Great Britain. Nations with conscript armies prepared in peace and drawn from the whole people suffer a loss of life roughly distributed over all classes. That is not so with us. The old standing army of the United Kingdom supplied the whole of the original Expeditionary Force, which endured the great retreat from Mons and helped to turn the German tide at the Marne. Of that Force but little remains. Its proportional casualties up to the present have been far higher than those of the new armies which succeeded it. Our old Regular Army depended on the spirit of public service. It was officered chiefly from the class of the landed gentry, reinforced by families of professional soldiers among whom the calling of arms was almost hereditary. For them the loss of life has been appallingly heavy. The roll of honour of the first year of war contained name after name renowned in the history of the country; and family after family of proved value has been almost or quite destroyed in the male line. It is a known fact that in the last forty years the average number of children in the families of distinguished military officers had decreased more than in almost any other class. The number of only sons was exceptionally great; and hence it is probable that more of the regular army families have been wiped out than of those of almost any other kind.

To the old Regular Army succeeded the Territorials, comprising a wider range of classes, but again, within those classes, selected from the men who had enough spirit of public service to give up their time and energy through long years of unadventurous peace and prosperity. And then came the New Army. The present writer had something to do with selecting and recommending for commissions present and past members of one of the old Universities. In eighteen months some three thousand applications were dealt with. In the rush of the first few weeks came the brightest and best of the young men; in the 'First Hundred Thousand' they went to the front, and many of them have already fallen. Once more we see that our old voluntary system led to the exposure of the best to the heaviest risk. The men of spirit, of imagination, of patriotism, rushed forward first; and from them the heaviest toll of life

has been taken. By the second winter of the war, while service was still voluntary, a miserable remnant of the University alone was left in residence, made up of the war-useless old, the unsound in body rejected by the doctors, and the unsound in spirit, who, for one reason or another, had no stomach for the fight—a true survival of the worst.

And here we may note that even inside the Army, from our own present standpoint, the casualties have been comparatively heaviest among those of special racial value. Firstly, the death-rate among officers has been nearly double that among privates and N.C.O.'s; and among officers it is especially young company officers who have suffered. For the immediate needs of the army a General may be of transcendent value, and the comparative security of divisional head-quarters of real military importance. But the General has probably a middle-aged wife at home, and is unlikely to have many more children to inherit the qualities which won him his position. The future fathers are to be found in the trenches; and every promising subaltern killed may racially be worth many Generals.

When we turn to the other argument which is used by the pacifist—the alleged evils of military training and barrack life—we get a subject much more susceptible of definite conclusions. Here we have to distinguish sharply between the racial effects of a standing, long-service army, and of a scheme of general national service in which all sound men are trained for two or three years and then return to civil life to form the enormous reserve with which alone modern wars can be waged. In the passage we have quoted, Darwin refers to conscription; but his arguments are chiefly valid, not against universal conscription, but against a long-service standing army, the soldiers of which are discouraged from marriage during all their best years. In a short-service army the period of absence is too brief to do more than postpone the average age of marriage by a year or two. Yet much of pacifist denunciation of armies, such as that of Starr Jordan, rests on a blind confusion between these two quite different things.

A more serious evil is the prevalence in some armies,

especially in the past, of contagious diseases. But, as the recent Report of the Royal Commission on these diseases shows, the admissions to hospital from this cause in the Army in the United Kingdom fell from 275 per thousand in the year 1885, and 224·5 in 1888, to 212 in 1890 (from which date the figures are strictly comparable), and in 1912 had fallen to 57 per thousand. It is worth noting also that admissions to hospital from all diseases fell from 700·9 per thousand in 1888 to 346·4 in 1912. Thus it is clear that the health of the army had rapidly and continuously improved before the Great War began.

As to the beneficial general effect of military training there can hardly be a doubt. One has only to watch the improvement that occurs in a batch of recruits to see its good results. The improvement in physique, in mental alertness, in self-respect—and consequently, one must add, in manners—cannot be overlooked. Even from the point of view of national economics, it is probable that the country gains by putting a man through military training more than it loses by the intermission of his industrial activity. These benefits are not solely due to better physical conditions. The unreserved dedication of a man's self to the service of King and country, the offer of his life, if need be, at the call of duty, has a definite and cumulative ennobling effect. Honour paid to the soldier has a very real basis, and is of special value in a country like England, where a sordid commercialism has far too much influence. But these considerations, conclusive though they be against some of the more foolish pacifist illusions, have perhaps little bearing on our immediate subject. Acquired improvements, like most acquired disabilities, while worthy of all effort for other reasons, are not hereditary, and have no direct, though perhaps a very real indirect, effect on the race.

It is, of course, impossible to get or use statistical information of final value about the present war till we know the full tale of our losses. Major Darwin has outlined to the Royal Statistical Society the enquiries which should then be put in hand. The racial damage to the nation should be estimated by examining not only the deaths but also the probable number and quality of children that would have been born had those deaths not occurred; by examining the death-rate as a

rough measure of the physical state of the nation till other physical measurements become available; by examining the changes in the birth-rate produced by the war in different strata of society. Then the indirect economic effects produced by the ascertained deterioration of the average innate qualities of the nation should be a subject of statistical study. Not only are the totally incompetent a burden on the rest of the community, but the less competent tend to reduce the efficiency of the more competent, as, for instance, when the normal rate of day wages depends largely on the value of the day's work possible to the least effective workman employed.

The difficulties in the way of such statistical research, though great, are not insuperable; and the Government should see to it that they are put in hand when peace comes and the data can be obtained.

We must now pass to the consideration of possible remedies for the loss and destruction of life caused by the war. How can its wastage be replaced?

To a certain extent the remedy is in our own hands. The voluntary restriction of the birth-rate, which has been going on since 1876, has deprived us of many more lives than the war will cost. We may estimate that in Great Britain at least ten million more children would have been born had the natural birth-rate continued; at the present time about half a million more births a year would be expected. With this limit, our population is expansible at will.

The voluntary restriction of births is chiefly responsible for the number of families who are now mourning the loss of only sons. To individuals—even to families—it may be too late to undo the mischief. But to the classes affected as a whole the lesson is plain. And to some extent it has been learnt. 'War-weddings' are in the experience of all of us, where parental consent would not have been forthcoming in peace time. The desire for pecuniary safety in the present and expectations in the future has become a less insistent motive when the failure of heirs and the extinction of the family is seen to be a very real peril, which no accumulation of capital can avert. In other classes, war excitement and plentiful employment produced a similar effect. This is shown

by the fact that for the quarter ending Sept. 30, 1915, the marriage-rate was the highest ever recorded for England and Wales—21.8 per thousand as compared with 17.3, the average figure for the past ten years. The birth-rate continued to fall until the last quarter of 1915, when it reached 19.5 per thousand, the lowest point on record. But since then it, too, has begun to rise, and for the quarter ending Sept. 30, 1916, was 21.7 per thousand.

The restriction of the birth-rate is not solely or even mainly an economic question. A psychological attitude of mind is also involved; in many circles it is largely an affair of mere fashion. Nevertheless, economic causes are largely at work; and it is through economic action, and its reflex effect on psychology, that the State can chiefly work. *Laissez faire*, in this as in other directions, will produce its natural results. Children, like wheat, have been considered an affair for the individual, and the State has not stepped in to encourage their production. When it is to the interest of the individual, the acreage of wheat diminishes and fewer children are born. But we are coming to realise the incompleteness of the theory that the State is best served by allowing individual interest free play. In many cases the interests of the individual and those of the State are sharply divergent. If the State wants more wheat or children than the interest of the individual will supply, the State must pay an adequate price, or inflict a sufficient penalty. In all discussions on the economic causes of the fall in the birth-rate certain facts must be borne in mind. At present, one of the classes with the largest birth-rate is that of the unskilled labourer with low and uncertain wages. As we rise to the class of the skilled and highly paid artisan, the birth-rate falls, while it is also exceptionally low in the higher professional classes enjoying comparatively large incomes. Hence it is often argued that all economic action is useless, that a higher and more regular standard of life leads to a fall in the birth-rate, and therefore that an improvement in the lot of parents affords no hope of more children.

But, if the State decides to subsidise the production of children, it must, as in other cases, take the common-sense precaution of seeing that the goods are delivered. It is useless to improve wages or housing accommodation

with no stipulations or conditions. More wages and more rooms are needed for other reasons, and will not of themselves lead to more children; in fact, as statistics show, added comfort and security are associated with more caution and foresight, and the average number of children in the family tends actually to diminish.

It is clear, then, that the increase of income must somehow be closely correlated with the number of children to be supported, if we are to exert effective pressure by means of economic influences. The obvious and simple plan of paying so much per child has certain equally obvious dangers. Even an addition of a fixed sum to the family income must be criticised. The chief difficulty is this. The payment which will cover the reasonable cost of a child varies largely with the status and standard of life of the parents. What would suffice in the case of an unskilled workman or an agricultural labourer would not be adequate for a trained artisan, and still less adequate for a professional man, who would expect to educate his children for a life similar to his own. All this may be stigmatised as class distinction. But facts are facts; and, since differences of standard must always exist, it is useless to shut our eyes to the consequences, if we wish to make it worth while economically for people of different standards to satisfy the nation's needs. The inevitable cost of children depends on the class of family we have to deal with; and the subsidy (whatever form it takes) through which we hope to encourage the production of more children must be adjusted in some rough relation to that cost. If not, we shall merely stimulate production in the lowest paid class; and the hereditary aptitudes of the skilled artisan and the professional man will tend to be swamped even more than they are at present.

Now, there are two directions in which economic influences can be brought to bear on this problem in ways for which the time seems already ripe. In the first place, a large number of soldiers and sailors will receive pensions when the war is over. These men will be above the average of the community as desirable parents. Even those maimed for life or broken in health will not transmit their infirmities (save in certain very special and known cases) to their descendants. Hence they should

be given every encouragement to beget offspring; and, to that end, their pensions should increase not only with the number of their existing children, as now allowed, but with the number also of their children afterwards born. Secondly, the upper and middle classes can best be influenced by a readjustment of direct taxation. It should be made clear at the outset, that there is no desire to decrease the total amount raised in this manner; in fact, it might probably be increased. But, while maintaining the total amount unchanged, there is, irrespective of the subject now under discussion, a crying need for a readjustment of incidence. A reform of the income tax and death-duties has long been needed. A small allowance of income tax has for some years been made for each child when the total income is below 500*l.* a year, and that limit has now been raised to 700*l.* But the allowance, the remission of tax on 25*l.* of income, is quite inadequate as a contribution to the cost of the child's maintenance and education, while the financial burden of children is felt heavily with incomes much beyond 700*l.* a year.

It must not be forgotten that, in the classes which use the elementary schools, part of the cost of children is already borne by the community. Free education, free meals when needed, free medical and dental treatment, and increasing facilities for technical training, are a valuable subsidy towards children and a very real help in their upbringing. On the other hand, scholarships and other educational endowments, which go chiefly to benefit other classes, are a help only to the few children of exceptional ability. The probability of obtaining such help is too incalculable to act as a motive for parenthood. Something more general, more like the universal help of the elementary school, is needed for the income tax paying classes.

A complete change is needed in the point of view from which this question is regarded. Sound and able children are a real contribution to national wealth; indeed no form of wealth is available till there are men and women to develop it. The production, maintenance and education of children, then, instead of being regarded as a form of luxury and extravagance, as too often is the attitude now, should be taken as a contribution towards

the capital wealth of the community. Parents with dependent children are paying their taxes, partly at all events, in kind; and this fact should be acknowledged and acted upon in placing additional burdens upon them.

So long as income tax rates were low, the injustice and the inefficient nature of the present system were not so harmful as they are now. The financial burdens we have undertaken during the war will not cease with its end; and, after all possible indirect taxes have been imposed, it will be necessary, in all probability, to raise some hundreds of millions a year in direct taxation. Unless something drastic is done, the effect on the output of children among the classes paying income tax will be disastrous. Moreover, a tax cannot be made to yield its full revenue unless we follow the old and sound principle of adjusting its incidence in proportion to ability to pay. A bachelor, a spinster, or a childless couple with 1000*l.* or 2000*l.* a year are able to bear without injury to the community a far higher tax than a family with the same income and a large number of children to be supported. It is impossible to raise the income tax to the scale necessary in war-time, or to maintain it at the level which will be necessary for some time afterwards, till the unavoidable cost of children is fairly and adequately allowed. It is often said that the Treasury cannot afford to make allowances on an adequate scale. Government spokesmen in the House of Commons are always willing to confess that the Exchequer is not willing to do justice if the cost rises beyond a convenient figure. But in this case we believe that justice may be combined with expediency. It is not true that the Chancellor cannot afford to make proper reductions of tax on account of children. On the contrary, he cannot afford to continue the present wasteful and inequitable system. More could be obtained from the income tax if the extreme severity of its incidence on families of many persons was mitigated by adequate rebates. The nominal rate could be maintained at a higher level if it bore only on those who could best afford it.

The unfairness of existing arrangements is not confined to families with children. While a brother and sister living together can treat their incomes as separate entities, and get the reductions, if any,

appropriate to each, the incomes of husband and wife are regarded as one by the Treasury. But husband and wife are once more reckoned as distinct individuals when it is a question of extracting death-dues from the survivor on the property of the one who dies first. So the Exchequer gets the best of both theories of the marital relation, and contrives in both ways to penalise marriage as well as children. Now, the most elementary considerations of justice point to the fact that it is right to deal with the family income with some regard to the number of people it has to support. Moreover, the need of the British Empire for population makes an overwhelming case for treating marriage, and especially fertile marriage, not only with justice but with generosity.

It must not be supposed, as is generally thought, that special favour shown to families, while well known in other countries, is a new thing in England. During the Napoleonic Wars Pitt had resort to a similar expedient, in a small way, and also to a true graduated scale of taxation. Thus, by virtue of the Statutes 48 Geo. III, c. 55, and 52 Geo. III, c. 93, a duty was imposed on every man-servant. If one was kept, the duty was 2*l.* 8*s.*; if two, 3*l.* 2*s.* on each, and the scale rose with the number, till for a household employing eleven men-servants the duty was 7*l.* 13*s.* for each. For bachelors who kept men-servants these charges were raised, and 2*l.* more for each servant was exacted all up the scale.*

The financial pressure tending to diminish families among the middle and upper classes will survive any readjustment of taxation; and, to relieve that pressure at all appreciably, substantial changes must be made. Till the present war had taught its lesson, the reasons for limiting the family seemed conclusive to cautious but short-sighted parents. To counteract this tendency, strong inducements must be held out. Remission of taxation on a large scale will produce a certain direct effect. But it may do even more in proclaiming in an unmistakable way that the nation has need of sound and able men and women, and is prepared to give all consideration and honour to those who will supply the want.

How, then, is the problem to be solved? We believe

* See 'The Country Gentleman's Lawyer and the Farmer's Complete Law Library.' London, 1817; p. 135.

it can best be faced by following the path of obvious justice. Husband and wife are, in some ways at all events, still two individuals. Let us treat them as such, and consider their joint income, whether derived from one or both, as two incomes, each with the right of claiming its appropriate allowance or rebate. And so with children, let each count in its share of the family income as a separate individual. A family of six persons—husband, wife, and four children—would then count for purposes of taxation as six persons, each with an income one-sixth of the whole. The family income, however derived, would be treated as six separate incomes, and be able to claim reduction or allowance of income-tax accordingly. If each of the six hypothetical separate incomes were small, the reduction or allowance would be large compared with the income; as the total family income increased, the allowance which could be claimed on each separate income, though larger absolutely (for moderate incomes), would relatively decrease, and finally, for very rich families, be extinguished.

Let us, merely by way of example, take some figures to illustrate the result of this principle when applied according to the present scale of allowances and abatements, and with the income tax at its present level of five shillings in the £. The present allowances are:

When income does not exceed 130*l.*, total exemption.

”	”	”	400 <i>l.</i> , abatement 120 <i>l.</i>
”	”	”	600 <i>l.</i> , ” 100 <i>l.</i>
”	”	”	700 <i>l.</i> , ” 70 <i>l.</i>

On these allowances, by the scheme we advocate, a man with 400*l.* a year would pay in income tax when

Single	70 <i>l.</i>
Married	40 <i>l.</i>
Married with 1 child	10 <i>l.</i>
Married with 2 children or more	nil.

With 1000*l.* a year he would pay when

Single	250 <i>l.</i>
Married	200 <i>l.</i>
Married with 2 children	130 <i>l.</i>
Married with 4 children	70 <i>l.</i>
Married with 6 children	nil.

With 4000*l.* a year he would pay when

Single	1000 <i>l.</i>
Married	1000 <i>l.</i>
Married with 3 children	1000 <i>l.</i>
Married with 6 children	800 <i>l.</i>
Married with 8 children	700 <i>l.</i>

These allowances are, of course, independent of other reductions, such as those for earned income or life-insurance. Indeed to these an allowance for house rent might be added, since more house room is a necessity for large families. Super-tax and excess profit tax would remain.

The figures given are meant simply to illustrate the working of the principle in present conditions. By changing the rate of tax deducted at the source, or the scale of abatements, the sum lost by these allowances could be recouped or any other required result could be obtained.*

With such equitable allowances for children as are suggested above, the income tax, which must be kept at a high nominal rate to meet the interest on our huge national debt and the cost of reconstruction which peace will make urgent, will do much less harm to the nation. It will be better to make reductions in direct taxation, when such become possible, by lowering death-duties rather than income tax. Owing to the inevitable chances of family life, death-duties are often grossly unfair to one family as compared with another; and anything which would lessen the real hardships they inflict, and the feelings of injustice they engender, would be of benefit to the community. The death of a father is a bad opportunity to rob his widow and orphans.

When all possible readjustment of taxation has been

* Since this article was written, the Fabian Research Department has issued a book called 'How to Pay for the War.' In this work, besides schemes for increased national efficiency and economy, about some of which opinions may differ, an interesting and valuable summary of income-tax figures and practice is given. The present injustice and inefficiency of the tax are well brought out, and a scheme of readjustment outlined which is similar in principle to that here advocated, though it is elaborated in greater and somewhat different detail.

carried out, it remains true that economic causes are not the only ones at work in our diminished birth-rate; and a change of psychological attitude in the classes affected is needed. We must educate potential parents of sound stock to their importance for the future of the nation and of mankind. Patriotism, as the war has proved, remains one of the strongest motives; and, when it is clearly understood that the welfare of the country and the Empire depends on an adequate supply of satisfactory men and women, we may hope that the supply will be forthcoming. As we have already said, signs of a change of attitude are not wanting.

Early marriages benefit the population in two ways. They increase the number of years of potential parenthood, and thus, in natural circumstances, the number of children in the family. And they also shorten the interval between succeeding generations and thus bring the new crop of children sooner into the world. Hence the marriage, of men of twenty-three or twenty-four, who in peace time might have remained bachelors till the age of thirty or forty, may do much to recuperate the ravages of war in the upper and middle classes. Such marriages, then, should be warmly encouraged.

A corresponding change of outlook remains to be effected in the minds of the older generation—of us who are no longer potential soldiers or potential parents. Let us not blame the mote in the eye of the young, and ignore the beam in our own. Improvements in environment have greatly increased our probable length of life; and that alone may, unless we are careful, entail a heavy additional charge upon the generation which is following us. We need more services through longer years, and we are by no means inclined to reduce our standard of living in proportion to the inevitable reduction in our powers of social usefulness. Members of the civil service perforce retire at an age of sixty-five; and it would be desirable to extend the rule to other public offices and appointments. Why should not some such similar accepted age become a customary point at which those in possession of family estates or fortunes retire on a fraction of their revenues, and place in the hands of their sons and daughters of thirty or forty, who are in effect the principal acting members of the family, a

proportionate share of the accumulated family resources?

However that may be, in the interests of the many young households we desire to see establishing themselves around us, it is most desirable that we of the older generation should learn to moderate our demands on the time and attention of our children, and, if it be in our power, should hand over permanently, and not merely in occasional and capricious gifts, a large part of the capital which they need more and can use better than ourselves. It is in this way that we older people can best make our own contribution towards inaugurating the new era of social and racial reconstruction. We have called on the young to offer their lives, let us not grudge this far smaller sacrifice in order to extend the utility and promote the happiness of those who return to us.

With daily casualty lists proclaiming the death of the young and vigorous, we cannot but feel acutely the loss our race is suffering. But, whatever the cost, in racial qualities as in other things, this war must be fought to such a finish that Germany can never again attempt to dominate the world with Prussian ideals. To count the cost is not to doubt that it should be incurred. Indeed we shall be better able to continue to face with stern composure the loss which is inevitable before we overthrow the enemies of humanity, if we know its full meaning, and, in this as in other ways, bethink ourselves in time how to make every effort to repair the ravages of war.

W. C. DAMPIER WHETHAM.

Art. 3.—JOHANN ZOFFANY, R.A.

1. *Reminiscences of Henry Angelo.* Bentley, 1828-30.
2. *Oriental Memoirs.* By James Forbes. White and Cochrane, 1813.
3. *Court and Private Life in the Time of Queen Charlotte.* By C. L. H. Papendieck. Edited by Mrs V. D. Broughton. Bentley, 1887.
4. *Calcutta Old and New.* By H. E. A. Cotton. Calcutta: Newman, 1907.
5. *Old Kew, Chiswick and Kensington.* By Lloyd Sanders. Methuen, 1910.

ZOFFANY's position among the British artists of the 18th century is a peculiar one. His name is inseparably connected with the greatest era of the British stage, with Garrick its proudest name and with the worthiest of Garrick's successors during the thirty years which succeeded his death—even including some like King, Parsons, and Jolly Jack Bannister, whose personalities still live for us in the immortal pages of Elia. In this genre, which he made peculiarly his own, reaching in his best examples a brilliance and animation far beyond any of his rivals, he established a school destined to be carried on in the hands of de Wilde, Clint, Harlowe and others to the middle of the 19th century. He was, moreover, a fashionable portrait painter in the classical age of English portrait painting; and, if his larger portraits do not show him at his best, nothing could be more delightful than those little full-length figures and family groups, small in scale, sometimes almost too neatly and precisely executed, sometimes uninteresting in colour, yet always broad and vital in conception, which (though our public galleries contain no examples of them) are to be found in so many private houses throughout the kingdom. In these the artist seems to raise the curtain for a moment and to show us his generation as it lived and moved. The vivacity of the scene may perhaps be a little heightened, the pose a little self-conscious; the spectator may feel that he is looking not at actual life but at the representation of it by some inimitable band of drawing-room comedians, but

the representation is none the less real and marvellously alive. Truly Zoffany was blessed with a remarkable talent and remarkable opportunities for its exercise; yet he has left behind him only the scantiest traditions of his wayward and adventurous career; and his art, in spite of its eminently human qualities, enjoys even now only a limited reputation.

That he was wholly devoid of imagination was remarked by Walpole, and may be seen in the few subject-pictures of his which still survive. He painted Garrick in tragedy, but the result is always a little stiff and ridiculous. He painted religious works, such as that now at Brentford, and historical pictures, like his death of Captain Cook at Greenwich; but his religion never rises above a milk-and-water sentimentality which affects even his drawing with weakness, and his scenes of blood are as perfunctory as a stage-battle in an empty theatre. In all these one can see that his interest was never really engaged. There is no observation and no vivacity. These were qualities which nothing could arouse but the thing which was his chief interest—the life of every day, of the tavern, the drawing-room, the music-room, the playhouse, the daily contact with his fellow-men. For, throughout the very scanty records of his life which still survive to us, we can see at every point his insatiable zest and curiosity for life. However successful he might be, he could always spend more than he had, and was always ready to leave an assured position for the promise of novelty and adventure. And it is through these qualities that, although he never rises to be more than *petit maître*, his work attains that ease, vivacity and neatness, which give it so enduring a charm. Something perhaps of this constantly fresh and dramatic quality in his observation may be due to the fact that Zoffany came to England as a foreigner and obtained his first introduction to English life through the medium of the stage. Or, again, we may perhaps attribute something to the romance of his parentage and earlier life, still dimly discernible through the mist of conflicting traditions.

Zoffany's father seems to have been a remarkable man, for, after beginning life as a carpenter at Prague, he had, before the birth of his son (some time between

1725 and 1730), migrated to Ratisbon, where he rose to become Court Architect to the Prince of Thurn and Taxis.* Johann himself must have displayed a precocious talent, for he was at a very early age placed as a pupil with Michael Spier, a religious and historical painter of his native city, who had been a pupil of L'Abate Ciccio. The studio and tradition of Michael Spier, however, evidently proved uncongenial to Zoffany's restless and adventurous spirit, for we are told that at the age of thirteen he ran away from Ratisbon to Rome. In Italy he stayed twelve years, though no records remain of his activities during that time, and at some date between 1750 and 1755 returned to Germany and settled in Coblenz, where he married. Fortune, however, did not smile on the young couple; and in 1758 they embarked for England, where Zoffany was destined to find at least a *pied à terre* during the remainder of his long and adventurous life. At first the new country was no more kindly than the old. Zoffany settled in Short's Gardens, Drury Lane; and tradition says that he was near starvation when he secured, through a chance acquaintance, an engagement to decorate dials for one Rimbault, a celebrated clock-maker, who traded to Holland in 'Twelve-tuned Dutchmen.' He did not, however, apparently stay long with Rimbault, and we next find him employed to paint draperies for Benjamin Wilson, the eccentric chemist and portrait-painter, at 40*l.* a year. The engagement was not a very hopeful one, and it was made even less so by the character of Zoffany's employer, for Wilson was notoriously avaricious, and, realising the capacity of his assistant, took care to allow him no opportunity for a public display of his talents.

The master's jealousy was, however, unavailing. One branch of Wilson's activities included the manufacture of theatrical groups; and this connexion with the stage was the very thing needed to set the young artist on the road to fortune. In no other field could the neatness and

* In the signed statement deposited by Zoffany at the Uffizi Gallery on March 30, 1778, with the portrait of himself which the gallery still possesses, he describes himself as a German, aged 43. This statement of his age is hardly consistent with other traditions as to his early life, and may perhaps be attributed to that rather feminine vanity, of which we shall find occasion to speak later.

vivacity of his talent, with its noticeable lack of imaginative qualities, have found so apt and profitable a field. Moreover, Wilson's studio served to introduce him to Garrick, who was greatly struck by a picture of himself and Miss Bellamy in 'Romeo and Juliet,' exhibited under the name of Wilson (possibly that afterwards engraved as Wilson's by Laurie), but obviously too good to be the work of its supposed author. Investigation disclosed the authorship of Zoffany; and Garrick, it is said, immediately took him up and introduced him to his friends. A long succession of portraits and character pictures of the great actor followed.

The connexion led to other stage pictures; and by 1764 the painter's prospects were so good that he was able to move to the Piazza, Covent Garden. Here he became intimate with many of the artists who were later to be the founders of the Royal Academy. Probably his closest friend was his neighbour John Hamilton Mortimer, whose studio formed a rendezvous for all the best-known men and women connected with the stage; and another friend and neighbour was Richard Wilson. The three artists helped each other in their work, Wilson, whose portrait of Mortimer hangs in the Diploma Gallery, painting the backgrounds for at least two groups of Zoffany's, while Mortimer (who also painted a number of stage pictures) was, it is said, responsible for the figures in Wilson's 'Niobe' (now at the National Gallery) and in others of his larger compositions. There seems to be no record of Zoffany having assisted the other two, but we know that he painted figures for Wilson's pupil, William Hodges, who was later to exercise an indirect but important influence on his life.

The three artists had undoubtedly much in common. Zoffany, who was already, one may surmise, displaying symptoms of that 'incontinence of the purse' with which Northcote credits him, had not been fortunate in his domestic life; and his German wife soon left him and returned to her native land, leaving her husband to lead the bachelor life of Bohemian London, of which Mortimer was past-master. At this time of Mortimer's career, writes Allan Cunningham, 'to be reckoned a first-rate cricket-player, to be the last to yield in the circulation of the bottle, to rule in a loose frolic and to conquer in a

wrestling bout, were still among the prime objects of his ambition'; and one can well believe that his handsome person, free and easy manners, and the laziness and profligacy which prevented him from ever maturing his undoubted talents, must have been very congenial to the foreign artist. The pair of them were genuinely devoted to crusty, disappointed, unconventional Wilson. 'Come, come, my old Trojan,' Mortimer would say to him, rubbing him down the sleeve and pointing to his favourite tabby cat, 'come, old boy, I wish I could set you purring like puss here.' But even success came too late to set poor Wilson purring. Zoffany was less tactful in his friendship, and (it is said) mortally offended Wilson by painting him in the famous Academy picture with a pot of porter at his elbow. Indeed, Wilson's aggravation was so real that Zoffany had to delete the offending vessel under threat of a cudgelling.

Zoffany's own portrait of himself at the National Portrait Gallery, painted in 1761, shows a thin, sallow-faced man, with pale eyes, long brown ringlets and sensitive features suggesting not a little restlessness and irritability of temper. A contemporary writer describes him as tall, ugly and much marked with smallpox; and, although the portrait does not betray these defects, it supports to some extent the same writer's charge of weakness and vanity. Angelo, in his *Reminiscences*, tells a story which illustrates agreeably these characteristics of our artist, and shows too an unexpected strain of John Bull rectitude in reckless, rattling Mortimer. Mortimer was, it seems, sitting to Zoffany for his portrait in the famous picture of the Life School at the Royal Academy (exhibited in 1772), when the painter, by way of beguiling the monotony of the proceedings, began to 'play off his wit against the authority of Scripture.' Mortimer, 'though a *bon-vivant* and choice wit,' having too much sense of propriety to endure such a proceeding, called him an ass, 'which,' says Angelo in his jaunty fencing-school English, 'abstracted of his professional talent, was not far from the truth.' 'Why, Sir Godfrey Kneller thought upon the subject as I think,' said Zoffany, with the air of one advancing an unanswerable argument. 'Perhaps so,' replied the other, 'and when you can paint half as well as he, then you may prate. To

be a bad painter and a fool to boot is rather too much to bear, Master Zoffany.'

Elsewhere we get a pleasanter picture of our artist leading the bidding at an extempore coffee-house auction organised by Mortimer (famous for the swiftness of his execution) of some rapid drawings with which he had decorated the subscription list opened for a poor widow at the 'Turk's Head' in Gerrard Street.* Generosity was always one of Zoffany's characteristics; and it is pleasant to think that the sale realised a good round sum for the old widow. Doubtless Zoffany found many congenial spirits among his theatrical sitters. Such a one was the wild comedian, Ned Shuter, whom Johann used to describe (rather unkindly) as a dull dog when sober, but when drunk the most amusing of all the fraternity. Alas! there was seldom a night when Ned was not to be found (as William Hickey describes him) 'immoderately drunk,' at 'Wetherby's,' or 'Marjoram's' off Drury Lane, where he would stay entertaining the company with all manner of tricks and buffoonery till, in the very middle of his antics, he would suddenly fall headlong from his seat as if he had been shot, and those who had been roaring at his humours would raise him and carry him off like a hog to his lodgings.

But Zoffany had a shrewd eye for the main chance, and soon made more profitable friendships than these. Very early in his career the second Lord Barrington sat to him; and the portrait gained him Lord Bute's favour as well as Barrington's. Moreover, his theatrical work attracted the eye of George the Third, no great connoisseur of painting but an ardent devotee of the stage. In 1760 he received a royal commission to paint King and Mrs Baddeley in 'the Clandestine Marriage' (the picture, now at the Garrick Club, is perhaps his finest in this *genre*); and in the same year he was, partly it seems through the King's influence and partly perhaps through that of Reynolds, nominated one of the first members of the Royal Academy. At the first exhibition he scored a remarkable success with a picture of Garrick as 'Abel Drugger' in the last Scene of the

* An artists' club met here, as well as the famous Literary Club founded by Reynolds and Johnson.

Second Act of 'The Alchemist,' which was bought by Reynolds himself for 100 guineas, the very respectable price asked by the painter. No sooner was the bargain complete, however, than the Earl of Carlisle, who had been greatly struck with the picture, began to importune Sir Joshua to sell it to him; and eventually it changed hands at 120 guineas. But so high was Reynolds' opinion of the work that he handed over the odd twenty guineas to the painter, saying that he had paid him too little for it originally—a generous act,* which, in one so fond of money as Sir Joshua, seems to argue a genuine friendship for its object.

This period probably marked the highest level of Zoffany's fortunes. For the next few years he shared the King's favour equally with Gainsborough and Benjamin West. In 1770 he exhibited a picture of the royal family in Vandyke dresses, which Walpole dismisses in his annotated catalogue as 'ridiculous'; and in the next year he showed a half-length of the King, while in 1772 he seems to have painted the King again (the picture is now at Windsor) and also the Queen (engraved by Houston). To this year too belongs the famous picture of the Life School at the Royal Academy, in which all the male members are shown in characteristic attitudes grouped about the naked model, with framed portraits of Mary Moser and Angelica Kaufman looking down discreetly from the wall. This extraordinarily neat and vivacious work is said by Walpole to have been entirely painted by candle-light without any preliminary study, the likenesses of the artists being clapped in as they came to the painter's mind. This statement, however, must not be accepted without reserve, for there are records that two at least of those represented gave him sittings.

In 1773 we find another group of the Queen in conversation with her two brothers and other members of the royal family and household. The completion of this picture is said to have given the artist an infinity of trouble. He had continual difficulty in getting the group together; and the intervals between the sittings

* Reynolds is said to have done the same for Gainsborough on one occasion, but the story is not well supported.

were so long that he was constantly finding the numbers of the party increased by one of those events so happily frequent in the domestic annals of our Royal House. These royal commissions of course brought a flood of other work; and during these years many famous people must have sat to Zoffany.*

He found another important patron in the fourth Earl of Sandwich, the notorious 'Jemmy Twitcher,' whose favours proved as inauspicious to the painter as those of Garrick and Barrington had been profitable. 'Jemmy' had given assistance to Captain Cook, who named the Sandwich Islands after him, and he persuaded Zoffany, who had painted three pictures of him, including that now in the National Portrait Gallery, to accompany Cook's second expedition in the suite of Sir Joseph Banks. It is curious to think of an artist so distinguished and prosperous as Zoffany going on this remote and dangerous voyage, to play the part which would at the present day probably be borne by the photographer. But Zoffany was always to be tempted by adventure, and no doubt saw in the proposed expedition an opportunity of combining pleasure and profit. At any rate he seems to have found no difficulty in collecting commissions for pictures from his numerous patrons. At the last moment, however, he and Sir Joseph Banks, being dissatisfied with the accommodation provided, withdrew from the enterprise; and Zoffany's friend Hedges took his place. It is said that the painter had spent in preparing for this expedition over 1000*l.*, all of which of course he lost.

Moreover, his refusal seems to have alienated many of the influential persons who had given him orders; and, in spite of his growing fame, he soon began to find his commissions for portraits falling off. It is probable too that his extravagance and careless manner of life had led him into some pecuniary embarrassment. One is, therefore, not surprised to find that when, later in the same year, the King suggested that he should go to Florence and paint a picture of the Tribuna, he accepted the offer with alacrity. It was arranged that Zoffany was to receive 300*l.* a year while he was employed on the picture;

* His portraits of Dr Johnson, George Steevens, and Benjamin Stillingfleet probably all belong to this time.

and the smallness of the figure seems to show that he was in some need of money or had special reasons for wishing to leave the country; or perhaps one may infer (and subsequent events also point to this view) that he had other inducements to travel, and did not intend to confine himself solely to the subject of his commission. Whatever his aim, the undertaking proved in many ways a most unfortunate one for him; and he never in all the long life that remained to him materially improved the position, which, during the first years of his residence, he had won for himself in English art.

One excellent thing, however, his new venture gave him—the girl who was to prove a faithful and affectionate wife to him during the last thirty-eight years of his life. Mrs Papendieck tells a romantic story of his courtship, which (in spite of one conflicting statement) one cannot but believe to be substantially true. It seems that, when the Italian visit was decided on, he was conducting an intrigue with a poor girl of only fourteen years old. She, finding herself to be with child, and in danger of losing all hold of her betrayer, concealed herself on board the ship which was to carry him to Italy, and only disclosed herself when they were well upon their way. Zoffany was evidently touched by her situation and her courage. At any rate he lost no time in amending the injury he had done her. Immediately on landing he caused enquiries to be made as to his first wife, and, on discovering that she had died in Germany, straightway married the mother of his child. The second Mrs Zoffany seems to have been a good and faithful wife, and to have lived happily with her erratic husband, who did his best to atone for his first usage of her and always made a point of seeing that his friends treated her with proper respect. Indeed she and her husband soon became favourites at the Court of the Duke of Tuscany. She was beautiful, and, though greatly his inferior in station, quickly picked up enough education to hold her own in any society.

Unfortunately their married happiness was early blighted by the loss of their little boy, a blow from which the poor sensitive painter never wholly recovered. The immediate result seems to have been that he threw himself feverishly into his work and the social life of Florence.

Sir Horace Mann was English Minister there at the time; and, through his influence and that of the Duke, the Zoffanys were able to share in the best social life of the capital. The painter himself travelled widely and was made a member of the Academies of Tuscany, Parma and Bologna. The Duke introduced him to his cousin, the Emperor Joseph II, when the latter came to visit Florence; and Zoffany painted the Emperor so much to Joseph's satisfaction that the entire Royal Family were also ordered to sit to him (the picture is now in the Royal Gallery at Vienna), and he was in 1778 rewarded with the title of Baron of the Holy Roman Empire.*

But the strain of these various labours told on Zoffany's health. He had a stroke of paralysis and a complete breakdown, which lasted for some time; and in the end, partly by reason of his illness, but also partly, it would appear, owing to the remarkable popularity of his art, his stay in Italy was protracted to seven years.† When at last he returned to England, the King was not unnaturally angry: he disapproved of his subjects accepting foreign orders, and was indignant at the suggestion that the 300*l.* a year should be allowed for the whole period of Zoffany's absence. It was vain for the artist to protest that the intense cold of the Gallery, which was the subject of his picture, made it impossible for him to work there for any length of time at a sitting, and that as it was he had worked himself into a paralysis. He had to give up his claim to the 300*l.* a year altogether and fall back on a request for the travelling expenses of himself and his wife. Even this suggestion was unfavourably received, the King objecting that, when he gave the commission, there was no Mrs Zoffany on the *tapis*. How the dispute ended is not known; but it is certain that, so far as the King was concerned, the journey resulted in very little pecuniary profit to the artist.

The next four years, however, seem to have been prosperous ones for Zoffany, although it must have

* The portrait in the Uffizi Gallery, already mentioned, is a further proof of the esteem in which he was held in Italy.

† An example of his work in Florence is the Cowper group shown at the Grosvenor Gallery in 1913-14.

taken him some time to reassemble his *clientèle*. He bought a house at Strand on the Green, Chiswick, which is still standing, and bears his name. There his wife and the two daughters who had been born to them in Italy settled down; and close by he established Mrs Zoffany's aged mother, whom he maintained till the end of her life. He also had rooms in Albemarle Street, where many amateurs came to see his work. Walpole tells us that he saw there 'a delightful piece of Wilkes looking—no, squinting—at his daughter . . . a caricature of the devil acknowledging Miss Sin in Milton.' 'Horridly like' is the more laconic comment jotted down on his programme when this 'delightful piece' was exhibited at the Academy in 1782. From the same source we hear of Zoffany being robbed on the highway on the same evening as Walpole and Lady Browne, who were on their way to dine with the Duchess of Montrose. Lady Browne had the presence of mind to hand the thief a purse of bad money which she always carried with her in case of accidents, while Walpole slipped his watch up his sleeve and escaped with the loss of a few guineas.

Nor is this the only evidence we have of the artist's prosperity and position. He found a valuable new patron in Charles Townley; and Reynolds and Zoffany were familiar figures at the Connoisseurs' Sunday dinners. It was during this time that he painted the well-known picture of the Townley Library, showing its owner, D'Ancarville, Charles Greville and Thomas Astle surrounded by the famous marbles. It was probably at this time too that he became intimate with Gainsborough and painted the charming little head of him that now hangs in the National Gallery. He also formed a close friendship with Johann Christian Bach and his partner in the Cornelius Concerts, Karl Friederich Abel. Both these men were *virtuosi*, Bach on the piano-forte and Abel on the viol de gamba. Indeed, the latter was such a master of his instrument that he was appointed chamber-musician to Queen Charlotte, and used to maintain with mock solemnity that there was only 'one God and one Abel.' Both, however, seem to have been jolly, good-natured, humorous, unassuming fellows; and Bach at least was cursed with a Bohemian improvidence which Zoffany must have found congenial. He

and his circle used to repair often to Angelo's fencing school and to the elder Angelo's coffee-house at Acton.

The younger Angelo tells a story pleasantly illustrative of Zoffany's rapidity of execution. There was in the garden of the Acton house a tall blank wall which had been decorated by an Italian artist named Calze with a painting eighteen feet high, depicting an Italian scene with a Roman arch and avenue of cypresses. This painting had become damaged, and Zoffany was engaged in restoring it on one of the 'Fast days' or days of intercession and mourning during the early years of the American War. The Bohemian fraternity of London did not, it seems, take these 'fast days' very seriously; and Bach and Abel had come down to Acton to celebrate the day of intercession in their own fashion. As they were sitting in Angelo's parlour window, they saw coming along the road that bordered the garden two other gentlemen even stouter and more comfortable than themselves, Captain Grose, author of the famous slang dictionary, and Alexander Greese,* teacher of drawing to the young princesses, and, by a corruption which needs no explanation, familiarly known as 'Jack Grease.' Zoffany, too, saw them over the hedge, and on the spur of the moment dashed off their portraits under the Roman arch with such happy inspiration that Angelo, Bach and Abel, as they escorted the newcomers down the garden walk a few minutes later, started in amazement, as though actually confronted with the wraiths or doubles of their two fat friends. Grose, a jolly fellow, took it capitally, but 'Jack Grease' was very touchy on the subject of his size, and the joke went near to ruin his 'fast day' for him.

Poor Bach's end was a sad one. In spite of his talents as a *virtuoso* and composer, and in spite of his wife's popularity as a singer, his extravagance ruined him. He fell into bad health and died in the year 1782. Zoffany proved a faithful friend to him, and with Abel and one or two others supported him entirely during the last months of his life, supplying him regularly with food cooked in his own kitchen. No doubt the jolly musician and his wife had often been guests of his at Strand, or

* Some admirable drawings by Greese are to be seen at S. Kensington.

on the neat decked sailing vessel which the artist kept on the river at Kew, and on which he entertained a constant flow of distinguished visitors.

Yet, in spite of the cheerful exuberance of his life at this time and of the number of theatrical and other portraits that may be traced to it, work does not seem to have been quite so plentiful with Zoffany as before his travels. It seems too that his finances were not in a prosperous condition and that the fortune, which he had acquired during the preceding fifteen years, began, after his return from Florence, gradually to melt away. We know no details, but we do know that in 1783 he suddenly decided on a journey to the East. His friend Hodges, who had taken his place with Cook's expedition in 1772, had for the last six years been in India, where he had secured the patronage of Warren Hastings; and it is probable that accounts of his success had reached Zoffany. At any rate the latter made up his mind to follow Hodges' example. The house at Albemarle Street, where he had his studio, was let; Mrs Zoffany and her daughters moved down to Strand; and by the end of the year everything was ready for his departure.

Lucknow, the city of his destination, had but recently been brought under British rule (1781), and was still regarded by English adventurers as a mine of almost fabulous wealth. His friend, Paul Sandby, used to say that Zoffany went out 'expecting to roll in gold dust'; and indeed many adventurers did in fact contrive to make their fortunes out of Asaf-ud-Daula, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, in whose dominions Lucknow was the principal city. There is little doubt that Zoffany's hopes tended in the same direction. With a view, apparently, to making an impression on Indian society, he began to reassert his claim to the title of Baron of the Empire; and, though he failed to get the royal approbation of this claim, he was, according to Mrs Papendieck, allowed by the King to call himself 'Sir John Zoffany.' So far as the King's permission is concerned, the story is almost certainly without foundation, but there is independent evidence that he used the title in India; and it is curious to find in his obituary notice in the 'Gentleman's Magazine' some twenty-seven years later a statement that he was 'often called Sir John Zoffany.'

Before the end of the year in which Lamb saw his first plays, 'Sir John' left England; and our only evidence of his fortunes during the next seven years is to be found in stray allusions and questionable tradition. He seems to have become Painter to the Court of Oudh almost immediately after his arrival, although it is said that he encountered difficulties at first, owing to the prejudice of the natives against the artistic representation of living persons. The India Office possesses portraits by him of Asaf and his chief minister, painted in 1784;* and he also executed at least two pictures for Warren Hastings during the winter of the same year. The first was a little group of Hastings with his wife and ayah in an Indian landscape, the second a large portrait of Mrs Hastings in a grandiose style of execution, which belonged to the artist as little as the title with which he hoped to dazzle Indian society. Hastings, however, was delighted with the portrait, and wrote enthusiastically of it to his wife after her departure for England in the end of January 1784.

It is also said that the famous picture of 'Colonel Mordaunt's Cockfight' (now in the possession of Lord Tweeddale) was painted on commission for Hastings, though this is to some extent in conflict with the statement on Earlam's print which gives 1786 as the date of the fight; for Hastings, though he was in Lucknow for five months from March 1784, left India in 1785. It is certain, however, that Lord Tweeddale's version came from Warren Hastings' possession; and it seems on the whole most probable that the original picture was painted for the Nawab, one of whose birds was engaged in the contest, and that Hastings heard of its fame and ordered a copy. If this was the case, one can also accept the tradition which states that the original was destroyed in the Royal Palace during the Mutiny, as no doubt were others of the artist's Indian paintings.† Some of those that survive throw a little light on Zoffany's life in India. In that of the Tiger Hunt, for instance, the artist himself is depicted seated on an elephant and

* Miniatures painted from these portraits by native artists also exist.

† A portion of the original picture is said to be preserved in India, and there is also a second copy by the artist in this country.

grasping the gun to which the tiger has just fallen. Zoffany also figures in his own picture of the Embassy of Hyderbeck from the Vizier of Oudh to Calcutta. This, too, was engraved; and the 'key' with which the publishers furnished it is both entertaining and instructive. It runs as follows:

'1. A male baggage elephant irritated by his driver, who is taken from his seat and destroyed, and by the violence of the elephant's action are seen the women and children fallen from his back, which was the moment when Mr Zoffany took his design for the picture. . . . 6. John Zoffany, Esq. 7. Horsekeeper to Mr Zoffany. 8. An attendant who always keeps pace with his horse. . . . A Facquier. . . . A Radish Girl. . . . An Hindoo. . . . A Young Person. . . . A girl selling vegetables. . . . A Facquier who always keeps in the same position. . . . A Portuguese Doctor, his wife and son. . . . A Granary for preventing famine erected by order of Warren Hastings, Esq. . . . A native sepoy pacaloning or compelling a peasant to carry his arms.'

The description is a 'key' to more than the actual facts of the picture, the chief motives of which seem to be a desire to glorify John Zoffany, Esq., and a determination to omit no curious detail which might tickle the palate of the stay-at-home British public.

Characteristic too are the traditions which have gathered round the altar-piece (a Last Supper) presented by the artist to the Church of St John at Calcutta. Hastings had laid the foundation-stone of this church in 1784; and the artist, although his views on religion were, as we have seen, inclined to laxity, no doubt thought the presentation would not be unbecoming to his dignity. Possibly also he hoped that the enterprise might bear more solid fruit, but in this he was disappointed, for the Church Committee, after proposing to present him with a ring worth 5,000 rupees, failed to carry out their proposal. This was a little niggardly after the glowing terms of the letter of thanks in which they acknowledged the presentation of 'so capital a painting that it would adorn the first Church in Europe, and should excite in the breasts of its spectators those sentiments of virtue and piety so happily portrayed in its figures.' Tradition still preserves the names of those who are supposed to have acted as models for the

picture; and it is said that the 'Iscariot,' an auctioneer called William Tulloch, sued the painter for libel. The Court records, it is true, supply no confirmation of the story; but, unsupported as it is, the myth has contrived to beget another, for the historian who records the tale adds that Zoffany had a habit of introducing people whom he disliked into his pictures, and that he had been compelled to leave England in consequence of his having taken this liberty with a royal personage.

There are, however, even stranger traditions of Zoffany's life in India, for a writer in 'Once a Week' tells, with apparent solemnity, the following story. Zoffany, he says, was one day with the Wazir, when the latter was being shaved by his barber. The barber let his razor slip and cut the despot's chin, who immediately gave orders that the offender should be baked to death in a slow oven. Zoffany, to save the man from so terrible a fate, began to deery this form of punishment as being altogether too commonplace and *démodé* for so distinguished a Court as the Wazir's, and suggested instead that the culprit should be sent up in a balloon which a French traveller had recently brought into the country. The barber, horrified at the proposal, fell upon the floor and begged to be allowed to perish by the familiar oven; but the idea tickled the Wazir's humour. The balloon was fetched (we hear nothing of its owner, who must have been a whimsical fellow to fall in so readily with the joke), and the barber, gibbering with terror, sailed up alone in it amidst the applause of a delighted court. He came down again within a few miles, and (continues the story in the vein of true romance) lived to secure a high place in the monarch's favour.

On the whole it does not seem likely that the Indian visit did Zoffany's art very much good. One instance exists of a picture painted by him in the Indian manner (probably to match a similar subject already in the possession of the commissioner of the work), but this seems to have been an isolated example; and, although the large and strange subjects which his new surroundings threw in his way may have added some breadth of handling and composition, nothing could alter the artist's nature. Large subjects and serious subjects did not suit him; and, although practice could give him dexterity in

them, it could not make his treatment really interesting. He could construct a large picture out of small details with unrivalled skill, but his conception remained small.* Typical of him is the description of his picture of the wreck of the 'Brilliant' painted in India, into which he contrived to introduce portraits of forty persons who perished in the catastrophe.

Whatever the other results of his Indian visit, there seems no doubt that Zoffany came back to England with a second fortune; and he had probably kept Mrs Zoffany well supplied with money during his absence. She had been able to send their daughters to the excellent school of Mrs Roach; and it is on record that on the night of the Royal progress through London on March 10, 1788, the Queen stopped to admire the magnificent joint illumination which had been prepared by Mrs Zoffany and her two next neighbours. Unhappily, all the consequences of his travels were not so fortunate. On the way home he had another stroke of paralysis, from which, it is said, he never really recovered.

Zoffany settled first in Keppel Place, Fitzroy Square, but he soon found that his long absence had seriously injured his position as a portrait-painter. The supposed picture of Jane Austen must have been painted in 1790, if at all; but Mrs Papendieck says that, on her first visit to his studio, she found no portraits there except a small full-length of his old friend, Miss Farren,† in a light green satin dress and black velvet Spanish hat, the fashionable costume for dinner-parties at that time. The same writer here records yet another instance of the painter's generosity, for she tells us that he kept this picture back from the exhibitions in order to enable the young Thomas Lawrence to make his full effect with the famous picture of the same subject, which he had just completed, and which was in fact exhibited in the Academy in this year. Of Zoffany's other work during this time we know little, but he was soon involved in domestic troubles which may well have prevented close application to his profession. According

* An exception should be made in favour of the large group at Vienna referred to on a previous page.

† The large portrait of Miss Farren as Hermione (engraved by Fisher) was painted in the following year.

to Mrs Papendieck, Colonel Martin, an officer of distinction, who had served at the siege of Gibraltar, proposed soon after the painter's return for the hand of his daughter, Cecilia, then a beautiful girl of seventeen. The Colonel was then heir-apparent to his brother, the Rev. Denney Martin, who had inherited the Castle and manor of Leeds from the Fairfaxes by his marriage with a daughter of that house, and one may well believe that Zoffany, with his taste for spending money, would have welcomed a closer connexion with such a suitor. The Colonel was, however, well over sixty years of age at this time, and Cecilia refused him. According to Mrs Papendieck, the rejected suitor was so affected by this disappointment that he retired straightway to Leeds Castle and spent the rest of his life there in romantic seclusion. The disappointment, however, did not prevent him living to attain to the ripe age of eighty-eight.

Cecilia herself took bolder measures, and, to prevent her father 'marrying her to someone she could not bear,' contrived (says Mrs Papendieck) to fall in love with Mr Thomas Horn, the middle-aged son of a Chiswick school-master, an amiable man but extremely plain and otherwise unprepossessing. Thomas Horn was unable to resist the flattering assault; and in spite of the opposition of both families, the couple married in 1799. The resulting quarrel between the Horns and the Zoffanys seems to have continued after the marriage; but the painter, who, poor man, had had his fill of family dissensions, made the first step towards reconciliation, and before long we hear of him executing a portrait of old Dr Horn (the father) in full canonicals, which was by all accounts a capital likeness in the painter's neatest manner. It was now arranged that the Doctor should retire and let the young couple take on the school, and for a time all promised to go smoothly; but it was not long before the home of the young Horns was broken up by internal dissension. Cecilia had, it seems, an ungovernable temper; her younger sisters shared the defect; and, when the Misses Zoffany and Miss Horn began to interfere in the domestic arrangements of the school-house, the result was fatal to domestic peace. Before long Cecilia left her husband. Her violent temper was not the only fault she inherited from her father.

She was vain as well as passionate; and, as (according to Mrs Papendieck) 'her beauty never faded with increasing years, her vanity kept pace with them.' She never returned to the Manor House School and died in early middle age.

However, in spite of these misfortunes, Zoffany soon found his way back to his old style and apparently to royal favour. The Garrick Club possesses several pictures of Elia's favourites which must have been painted by him at this time; and in 1795 he executed, at the King's request, a scene from 'Speculation' (now at the Garrick Club), but nearly forfeited royal patronage by his dilatoriness in completing the commission. We may be certain too that he quickly resumed his old style of living, and took a prominent part in the social life of Kew and Chiswick. In 1792 he acted as pall-bearer to Aiton the botanist, with his old friend Sir Joseph Banks, Jonas Dryander (Aiton's assistant) and others. And it was probably about this time that he executed two pictures for churches of the neighbourhood, a St David playing on the harp for Chiswick, and a Last Supper, painted as an altar-piece, for the old proprietary chapel at Brentford. This latter picture, now housed in St George's Church, Brentford, is interesting as the largest accessible example of Zoffany's serious painting. Nothing more perfunctory than the angels and cherubs of the top and surviving wing of the triptych can be imagined; and in the main body of the picture the only part that is painted with any of the artist's usual conviction is the negro boy in the foreground. The Christ is conceived in a vein of the most lamentable sentiment. None the less, the picture has always enjoyed a considerable local reputation. The figures of the apostles are said to have been painted from local fishermen; and tradition (which here reminds one of the legends of the Calcutta picture) says that local interest in the work was so great and the likenesses so good that the models were ever afterwards known by their apostolic names, a circumstance which greatly irritated the gentleman who had the misfortune to act as the model for Judas.

Nor did Zoffany's activities end here. In 1794 he was on the Council of the Royal Academy, and he continued to exhibit until 1800, by which date he must have been

at least seventy years old. Between 1790 and 1795 he showed nothing; but in the latter year there was hung at the Academy a large, crowded and very lively canvas of the plundering of the royal cellars in Paris on May 10, 1793. His last really prolific year would seem to have been 1794, for the Exhibition contained, besides some theatrical portraits, the Hyderbeck picture and a 'Susannah and the elders' from his hand. In 1804 he should have acted on the Council again, but the Academy records show that he was abroad. I have been able to discover nothing about this journey, but it is a remarkable evidence of his vitality, for he must have been nearly seventy-five years old, and his health had been enfeebled by two strokes of paralysis. In 1810 he died and was buried in Kew Churchyard near the grave which contains the bodies of his friend Gainsborough, and also those of Gainsborough's wife and of his nephew Gainsborough Dupont.

Mrs Zoffany lived on till 1832, and must have retained much of her charm, for it is recorded that her husband's old friend, the indomitable Nollekens, actually proposed marriage to her in 1817, the eightieth year of his age. Possibly the offer was partly a charitable one, for there is a strong tradition that Zoffany succeeded before he died in dissipating the money which he had made in India. Moreover, it seems probable, from Seguier's scanty records of the prices paid for his work about the time of his death, that he had experienced a considerable falling-off in popularity. At any rate, gallant old Nollekens left the widow 300*l.* in his will, and she survived him to enjoy the legacy sixteen years. Poor lady, let us hope that her decline was reasonably peaceful. There can have been but little peace in her existence with Johann Zoffany, R.A.

CHARLES TENNYSON.

Art. 4.—SOME TIBETAN ABBEYS IN CHINA.

THE maps of China are neatly, clearly coloured, definitely outlined; so far go Yunnan, Szechuan, Kansu, and then, at a tidy red boundary line, begins Tibet, also considered as a Chinese province. This pleasing precision of statement is, however, a very false guide; only when he nears the spot does the traveller realise that, for effective purposes, Tibet is far indeed from being a Chinese province, and that half of Kansu, half of Szechuan, half of Yunnan, form the Tibetan Marches, a debateable belt of land more than a hundred miles deep and a thousand miles in length, composed entirely of tremendous Alpine systems, and quite impervious to such weapons of conquest as China has at her disposal. For all up this vague vast frontier the Kwenlun fades away eastwards into China from supporting the Roof of the World, in a rippling series of mountain ranges and profound river valleys so abrupt, so corrugated, so complicated, that even the resources of the British Empire might well take half a century to reduce to real submission a territory so much vaster and so much more difficult than anything with which we have had to do along the comparatively simple line of the Himalaya. The position of China to the Tibetan Marches is, in fact, very much the same, on a gigantic scale, as that of Edward the First's England to the Welsh, or Henry the Seventh's to the Scottish. And it is of no use for China to pursue King Henry's policy: no Margaret Tudor will meet the case, though Imperial Princesses have occasionally been tried for the part; for there is no valid secular authority in Tibet or its Marches, either central or local: the whole country is under the spiritual supremacy of the Church, an organism as impregnable as Rome's, even though Chinese Emperors have from time to time been able to displace a Dalai Lama, as Theodora was able to displace one Pope, and Napoleon another.

Chinese methods, however, and Chinese requirements, are different from ours. Where mountains begin, there utilitarian China's interest leaves off. Land that cannot be cultivated is land with which China does not care to concern herself. But, for the sake of her prestige, and

of the rare profitable patches that may occur in the Alpine valleys, China both asserts and maintains a certain sovereignty over the Tibetan Marches. That sovereignty, though, depends for its existence on its limitations, and the tactfulness of its methods. All that China exacts from the March Provinces, in fact, is a reasonable amount of safety for Chinese subjects, engaged in trade or cultivation along the comparatively open districts and routes. There is a tacit convention that, if this state is attained, China will not trouble the mountains and their inhabitants with any vexatious and unprofitable assertion of authority. Tibetans and Chinese accordingly keep asunder, parted by acute mutual dislike and contempt; and half of Yunnan, Szechuan, and Kansu, nominally Chinese, are in fact purely Tibetan territories, where the Chinese exist and trade only on sufferance in the richer portions, a solitary Chinaman hardly being safe, after Tatsien-lu, even on the great Imperial highroad to Holy Lhasa. Such limited authority, however, is all that China needs: her practical spirit sees no profit in the effective conquest of wild and barren mountains, even if such a conquest could be attained without a disproportionate and ruinous expenditure of money and men, and without rousing against her the whole force of the hierarchy, from Urga to Lhasa, an overwhelming popular power which the Empire has always had the good sense to respect and conciliate and take under its wing, even to the conferring of the 'Great-Ocean-of-Wisdom' title by which the Supreme Pontiff is known all over the world to this day.

Now and then, however, troublesome friction occurs on the Marches: the Governors of Sungpan, Tatsienlu, Batang have little more effective power beyond their own Yamens than the Amban at Lhasa himself; and often there arises trouble from raiding Tibetan villagers, or from some turbulent abbey, contemptuous of China's temporal authority, and secure in its spiritual affiliation to remote Lhasa. Accordingly, in the last days of the Grand Dowager, the Manchurian Line roused itself to a real effort at reducing the Marches effectively under Chinese sway. A drastic General was despatched, with efficient forces, and did so ably conduct his campaigns as to succeed in thoroughly subduing the March of Szechuan,

executing monks by the thousand, and treating abbeys with no more veneration than ale-houses. And at this date it was that the March was added on the maps to Szechuan, and still appears there. But the Grand Dowager died, and the Manchurian Dynasty went down in the long-gathering storm that only her personal prestige had held at bay; the conquering General of Szechuan was a Manchu, and accordingly (but like a Chinese gentleman, after dinner) was beheaded by his troops; and matters gradually returned to their former condition all up the vague fringes of Tibet—an armed and hostile truce between the two races in which the various Chinese towns had hardly any power beyond their own walls.

And so it holds; China is reluctant to stir up the double wasp's nest of the Tibetans and their Church, while the Tibetans are deterred from giving too much trouble, by their inner dread of China's uncanny and pervasive force. For China does not go out on expeditions and incursions; she moves, like the Church of England, with a leaden foot in a velvet shoe. But she invariably gets there all the same. With the weight of her incalculable millions, quiet, frugal, persistent, she overflows resistance and rebellion in a calm oceanic tide. Bloody rebellions and massacres may strip her of a whole province, depopulated and ruined: she retreats before the storm, and then flows forward again unper-
turbed until the elements of trouble are once more submerged, even as the Mahomedans are again for the moment submerged in Kansu, despite their fearful devastations wrought in the first rebellion, and despite the certainty that another will ere long ensue, to be accompanied, no doubt, with the same annihilation of the Chinese, and a similar tranquil return of their tide a few decades later. So that the surrounding races are not anxious to provoke the advance of China. China has for the present lost Manchuria and Mongolia; China will soon lose Kansu and Turkestan; China may even lose Tibet, and herself be split into two Empires, North and South of the Yang-dzü Jang. But China's Empire does not depend on names and titles: silently her population flows and flows, irresistible in its power of living contentedly, and multiplying inordinately, where all other

races would perish, rebel, dwindle and go sterile. Even now the process is at work again: the unacknowledged tide goes rippling further and further over lost Manchuria and Mongolia: thousands may be massacred at Blagovestchenk, but there will once more be thousands there in ten years' time; and to-day, in Lhasa itself, there is a perceptible movement towards achieving a more real grip upon the hierarchy and their country.

As you go further north, however, the mountain ranges become fewer and farther between; with the result that China's sway is more felt, and the monks less independent. It is in the extreme north-west corner of Kansu, too, that are found the three most important religious foundations between Urga and Lhasa—the venerable and ancient Gumbum, birthplace of Tsong Kavá the Saint; rich and splendid Labrang, its younger offspring; and the princely abbey of Jô-ni, exempt from all jurisdiction but that of the Supreme Pontiff, and sharing with Urga and Lhasa the monopoly of printing the Scriptures.

Jô-ni, though situated actually in China proper, is the capital of a wealthy Tibetan kingdom stretching far across the river, whose Prince, alone of all the border sovereigns, pays no tribute to China, and is, in theory, a virtually independent autocrat, though luckily, in practice, at the mercy of the Chinese Governors at Minchow and Taochow, and within easy handling distance of the Viceroy at Lanchow. For, though sumptuous and stately to behold, he is a young man of evil nature, detested by his subjects owing to his excessive belief in the persuading power of red-hot irons, and his general pitiless policy of extortion; spiteful, cowardly and weak in character, surrounded only by advisers of kindred age and nature (with whom he replaced the veteran counsellors of his predecessor immediately after his elevation), and, now that he has lost the help of the wise and experienced missionary who cured him of opium and generally controlled his excesses, an unrestrained and reckless autocrat in his own town and territory, snapping his fingers at the new little meek subservient occupant of the Mission-house, and, by suspicious intrigues with the seething Mahomedans, preparing, it is thought, to do the same by the Chinese Empire itself. It is

fortunate indeed that his capital is actually on Chinese territory; for he is very wealthy, and his regiments well-armed with Remingtons. It is fortunate, too, that his personal courage is not adequate to his purposes. In the crisis of the White Wolf Scare, he hurried his princely person into ragged old clothes, and hastily conveyed himself away across the river to a village where he has a summer palace, leaving the town and the abbey to look after themselves, while their sovereign, having destroyed the bridge, sat quite secure in Tibet. To save his prestige he also ordered the local missionary to flee, and the missionary duly fled accordingly, while most of the monks also scattered to their several homes in the hills. And after all the White Wolf never appeared; and, when the Prince and the missionary returned, it was to find that the palace and the mission had meanwhile been neatly and thoroughly burgled by thieves in the town itself.

Jô-ni is a squalid and tumbling little place, huddled into a gully beneath huge high downs of grass. It contains a sumptuous Wizard Temple, indeed, of the primitive Tibetan cult, and the Prince's fine palace, on the model of a Chinese Yamen, and a few characteristic Tibetan houses, great blank blocks of mud-wall, strangely Egyptian in effect, with all their windows looking inward, upon their beautiful interior court and galleries of carved wood. But poverty and neglect are the ruling marks of the town; its miserable wall is all in breaches, with crumbling battlements and gates disused; its only claim to reputation lies in the big abbey up above. Sprawling along a ledge of the *löess* hill, and itself enclosed within an independent wall, Jô-ni Abbey enjoys a high prestige; it is a foundation of the reigning House, designed to provide the younger son of the sovereign with a comfortable seat as Abbot. The present Prince, however, has no brother, and is himself a creature of China, elevated to the throne to avert the troubles of a disputed succession. Moreover, he has but one son, heir-apparent: so that it seems likely to be long before Jô-ni Abbey again has an Abbot.

The last Prince-Abbot died some fifty years ago; since then his throne has been vacant, and his private apartment is still kept exactly as it was, with flowers and holy water perpetually renewed before the little seated

statuette of his late Eminence, robed and mitred, holding the Wheel of the Law in his hand. It is a low long chamber of soft lights and glints of gold, cool and quiet after the glare of the sunlit court outside; the dais is richly carpeted, and all about are the Abbot's personal belongings and pontificals. Here stands the ewer of old enamel, and there the Yak-tail whisk that dispels the Powers of the Air; on one side of the room are the volumes in which he read, and along the other runs the gilded relic-cupboard, from which, through the rows and rows of little glazed pigeon-holes peer small Buddhas and Bodhisattvas innumerable, all undreamt of by the Perfect One. Scrolls of sacred or imperial characters hang from the walls; and close by the statuette itself is hung a small pearl-coloured roll of satin, on which a Princess of Chen Lung has wrought a sad and lovely little figure of Our Lady of Mercy. She hovers over a sea of silken ripples, attended by angels; of silk, too, are the fine stitches of her vesture, pale and faded with the years. But the faces of Gwan-Yin Pusa and her angels are painted on the satin in delicate evanescent colours, and the jewels of pity that she bears are wrought in corals and minute seed-pearls. And the name of the Princess who made this present for the holy man is duly written down one corner. There is something strangely haunting and pathetic about this deserted sanctum, so long empty and yet so sedulously tended and swept and garnished, and for ever sweet with the scent of fresh flowers daily set. One seems everywhere to feel the presence of its owner, whose wise old face, thin and humorous and ascetic, still presides in miniature over what were once his properties, and, with worn gentle smile, mocks at the vanity of such possessions, from beneath his towering official mitre of the Five Points.

It is difficult to arrive at the precise economy of these Tibetan abbeys. The Abbot's rôle seems to be easily dispensed with. His office appears to mean the general sovereignty of the establishment in all its branches: and, where no Abbot is found, his functions can be divided among subordinate prelates, whose authority does not clash when they become independent, in the lack of a central head. The Prior undertakes one department, the

Almoner another: and in every religious foundation there is always a distinct Prior or business manager, who undertakes the secular affairs of the abbey, the collecting of rents, the entertainment of pilgrims, and so forth, leaving the higher dignitaries to unruffled study. At Jô-ni, indeed, the Prince has a certain jurisdiction, and sits in judgment, flanked by great whips, on such offences in the abbey as do not touch religious matters; though he would not, of himself alone, have power to deal with such grave cases of immorality as result in the sinner's being ignominiously dismissed from the place for ever, through the little side-gate of shame reserved for such. But generally the various prelates appear to run the abbeys quite well without an Abbot; and often, where an Abbot exists, he is comparatively young and un-influential. The one thing clear, so far as I have observed, is that the abbey is regarded as a sort of mundane collegiate establishment, with the management of which the Living Buddhas within its walls are far too sacred to have any immediate concern. They remain wrapped in their celestial contemplation apart, except when they emerge to pontificate in special services, or take their place in those sacred mystery-mummings that early travellers used to describe as Devil Dances. So far as I have seen, this appears, at least, to be the rule. The Buddhas are co-ordinate dignitaries in a monastery, often in antagonism to the regular resident prelates; and themselves, as it were, only there by accident, itinerant holinesses going up and down the country on religious affairs, without earthly tie to any particular abbey, though of course the position of a conspicuous Living Buddha is one of enormous importance in the abbey where he chiefly resides, even though he play no direct part in its management.

The institution of these Living Buddhas is the chief difference between Lamaism and Christian monasticism (except, indeed, that even Lamaism admits of no eternal Hell). The notion is of late development, and barely Buddhist at all. With the success of the early missions, the Dharma, in its tolerance, embraced the older faiths it found, as local and antecedent forms of itself; many a strange divinity and fantastic legend were admitted as previous paraphrases of the Truth; and, as Buddhahood is attainable by any being at any point of its apparent

progress, an enormous hagiology was soon compiled, of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas beyond number, multiplications of each other, promotions of old gods, personifications of primitive legends. The process has but gone on more rapidly through the centuries, as the Church grew stronger; and now, new Buddhas are recognised, for cash, with a recklessness that has quite become a scandal. The word generally used for these personages is 'Incarnation'; the term is yet more anti-Buddhist than the idea it is intended to convey. A less misleading one would be 'Manifestation': in such and such a body the Spirit or a portion of the Spirit (one cannot venture here into the appalling jungle of Lamaist theology) of Gwan-Yin or Avalokita is temporarily made manifest, and, on cessation of that body's activities, will be found somewhere manifest in a new one.

It is obvious what a tremendous weapon is thus forged in the hand of the Church, what a convenient source of income is this possibility of spiritual promotion. Here is a rich abbey wanting prestige, a new one requiring a good start; immediately, on consideration of money or policy, the Church discovers that an important Buddha is manifest in one of the monks. Or it is a wealthy clan in a village, as anxious to have a Buddha in the family as any devout Italian one to have a Pope. Negotiations proceed; and, when the local Manifestation dies, its continuance is duly recognised in a son of the house. So valuable is this power, indeed, that the Chinese Empire has felt bound to claim it; the Supreme Manifestations of Urga and Lhasa have to have their recognition rectified by the Emperor of China, who has further, for political purposes, ordained, and successfully ordained, that the Taranath Lama, Pope of Mongolian Urga, can only be made manifest in the body of some remote Tibetan. And again, the weapon can work in the reverse direction. The Emperor, if strong enough, can refuse to recognise a Manifestation; the Church, always strong enough, can always do so. Let an abbey or a village offend, and the Church decrees that its Manifestation has determined, and will be continued no more. This vengeance was wreaked on the sainted Buddha under whose auspices an Indian Service explorer visited Lhasa. Not only was the Buddha put

to death, and his servants tortured, but the Manifestation was declared at an end, to the intense indignation of his town, where the continuance of it is known and recognised to this day, though unacknowledged by the Church. Mr Landon has told us this, and how even the desire to retain an able medical adviser in a place has sometimes brought about his recognition as a Manifestation. But, if the possession or production of a Buddha is a fine plume for village or monastery, the boon is an expensive one; and it often happens that the abbey or hamlet comes upon such evil days that at last it can no longer support it, and the Manifestation fades out, unable to find a new Sacred Body; while, even when villagers and monks have got their Buddha, rivalries for precedence still go on as in a peerage. Some new wealthy abbey has only got a brand-new Manifestation of two lives or so, and is bitterly jealous of its ancient and decadent neighbour, where the Buddha is a Norfolk Howard of fifteen or twenty continuations. The long descent looks down on the new promotion; and, unless the matter can be set right in high quarters, the older creation will be a sharp thorn in the side of its rival, and a richer source of profit.

In Jô-ni there are some five Living Buddhas, not counting a very old and holy one, now in retirement, who dwells secluded in a golden palace aloft in a fold of the fir-clad forest-ranges across the river, practising meditation, and enjoying great influence and reputation in the Marches, as one who knows the future, as a Buddha should; better, indeed, than those eight ill-fated Sacred Bodies of Gumbum, on whom a tyrannical Chinese Governor, come down to quell a sedition, pounced with the ominous question: 'You that are re-born know all things to come, and your own deaths. Tell me, then, on what day will you die?' To which, with some lack of tact, they answered, 'To-morrow'; thus provoking the obvious rejoinder, 'You are wrong—to-day'; and summary decapitation on the spot. May no such doom befall the Sacred Body of Nâlang, who sits at meditation in his little upstairs parlour of pitch-pine in Jô-ni Abbey, swathed about in glistering golden silk, an immovable cross-legged figure on his dais at the end of the low room, with its latticed window on his right to read by.

His door is kept downstairs by an attendant monk, strapping and splendid as the chuck-out of a music-hall; when it is convenient, he shows up the visitor to have an audience of the Buddha, thus safely guarded from intruders. The Sacred Body of Nālang has some forty years; he is of alert face and prominent eye; all day he sits in his place, reading the Scriptures and meditating on them, unless he rides out on some pastoral visit, or takes part in some special service. His influence and correspondence spread far and wide; he is in constant touch with Labrang and Lhasa; he has an eager movement when he hears I have visited the Holy Places of Singhala (Ceylon) and actually possess leaves from that sacred tree which is an offshoot from the yet more sacred one of Buddha-Gaya, beneath which Gautama Buddha became the Wholly Perfect One. Perhaps it was this consideration that prompted a compliment of unique occurrence in the experience of the missionary who accompanied me, and had made himself the channel of our communications with a broadmindedness so rare that it defeated its own end, by making one feel too heavy-laden with scruples about taking full advantage of a spirit whose very considerateness demanded a corresponding consideration in return. So, unwilling to make my escort too long the channel of communications he was bound to dislike, and feeling, anyhow, that an interview so fettered with chivalries on all sides could only be unsatisfactory, I ere long rose to say goodbye. And, when I did so, the Buddha actually rose also to his feet, and accompanied us to the door, a tribute that such Sacred Ones are rarely, if ever, allowed to pay.

For etiquette presses hard upon the Living Buddha, from the day of his recognition to that of his release. He is first proclaimed when he is quite a little child; wherever a re-birth is suspected or wanted, they take the personal articles and pontificals of the late Manifestation, and lay them, mingled with many others, before the baby, who, if indeed the continuation of their late owner, immediately marks out his former property from among the rest. Often, no doubt, there is trickery here, and the required baby is poked into picking up the right articles. At the same time, once a Manifestation has been started, to deny the genuineness of *all* such

recognitions altogether would be to underrate the marvellous memory of the East, and its marvellous training, besides putting a dangerously narrow and arbitrary limit to the powers of the continuing being, which it is both right and wrong to call the human personality. Such memories are too common in the far East, and not confined to Buddhas. Lafcadio Hearn has given a famous instance. 'Of course I recognised the things,' says the Mina Buddha. 'How should I *not* recognise them? They had been mine.' He remembers perfectly his recollection, and his conscious selection of his former property, that proved him the continuance of his predecessor in that Manifestation. And so the child makes his choice, whether of his own deliberate memory, or prompted from outside. He is proclaimed the Buddha and removed to the abbey for training; and from that day, through infancy, boyhood, youth and manhood to old age, he continues the prey of his position. No playing about or folly for the child, but a hard, stern training in the Scriptures and in the etiquette of his sacrosanctity, as unbending for the boy as for the man. Such and such a thing he may do, in such and such a way; many and many another he must never do in any case. So he must stand, so walk, so sit; at this point or that, he may rise or smile; the discipline of his deportment, the countless minutiae of his procedure suggest precisely that elaborate Imperial ritual in which the Augusta Pulcheria so successfully trained her brother, and on which the gentle and learned old Constantine VII wrote such voluminous treatises in vain, for the benefit of his handsome harum-scarum heir.

The Sacred Body of a Buddha, too, is wrapped about in the endless precautions and ceremonies due to its sanctity as the vessel of a divine manifestation. Above everything, it must not bleed, it cannot bleed, nor shed itself in fragments. So that, if a Buddha chance to fall off his mount and get a bloody nose, he must wait there in hiding till dark, and then ride on to town or village with his head muffled up, that no one may suspect that the impossible has happened. And, if a Buddha be troubled with a toothache, and proceed to the nearest missionary to have the offence removed, the utmost precautions must be taken against publicity. At dusk,

very secretly, in the innermost corner of the inmost yard, with watchers posted against spies on every wall, the operation is at last performed, and every drop of blood wiped up, and the uprooted relic itself immediately buried beneath a turf.

Of the five Living Buddhas in Jô-ni one or two were absent when I was there, and one was quite a boy. On leaving the Sacred Body of Nalang, I did not want to risk an anticlimax, so declined to see any inferior Manifestation, and contented myself with wandering up and down the whitewashed streets of the large village or small town which is the unvarying form of such abbeys. The big churches were shut, and so were the doors of the tower which contains the colossal Invocation Wheel (always called prayer-wheels even by those who should know better) of three tiers or tall storeys—the largest on the Border, and Jô-ni's special pride; for the place had not yet recovered the scare of the White Wolf, and its streets wore still an empty and deserted air, a large number of the monks not having yet returned from their flight. In point of fact the Wolf attacked none of the Border abbeys, though Jô-ni stood closest to his track, and had the narrowest escape. Gumbum and Labrang lay too far away, and were too well protected by numbers and situation, though the golden roofs of Gumbum and the copious riches of Labrang might well have roused his desire. But the big Tibetan abbeys are hives of bees with a sting. During the Mahomedan rebellion not the most vehement efforts of cupidity and fanaticism combined could prevail against the monks of Gumbum; while at this moment the larger and more turbulent foundation of Labrang is coquetting with those same Mahomedans against the Chinese Empire in such a fashion that the Government cannot yet handle matters there, and the stately abbey is unapproachable in the fastnesses of its remote mountain valley.

Its name, Labrang (in Chinese, Labülang—for China is as uncertain of R as Japan of L), means the gathering of cells round the central one of a teacher, and is pretty clearly the same word that we find in early Christian Egypt, where monasticism developed out of the far earlier Buddhist monasteries that seem to have been flourishing up the Nile by the Alexandrian period. Does

not the Mahavansa record that at the founding of Ruanwéli Dágaba in the second century B.C. there was present, under a holy Abbot, some enormous number of monks (no doubt to be safely divided by ten) from 'Alasanda in the Yona country,' which can hardly stand for anything else but Alexandria as the capital of the Græco-Egyptian kingdom, Yona (Ionia) being the general oriental term for Greek. And, as when the early ascetics of the younger faith developed in Egypt along the lines of the older, they found the name and notion of the Lavra pre-existing and ready to their hands, just so, when a small colony of monks, remarkable for purity and learning, departed from Gumbum into a lone valley of the Alps, they founded yet another Lavra, which is now Labrang, a seat of wealth and high prosperity and many Living Buddhas.

But, though Labrang has now in size and splendour outstripped its mother-Abbay, Gumbum still retains the higher prestige and sanctity. There is the famous Golden Roof, and there the cauld and the birthplace of Tsong Kavá the Saint; and there, above all, the sacred tree on whose leaves are holy characters imprinted by nature, though often visible only to the eye of faith. This eye is usually lacking in modern travellers and missionaries, but seems to have been unexpectedly present in the fathers Huc and Gabet, who surely ought never to have been guilty of such an aberration. The tree is *Ligustrina amurensis*, an arborescent lilac in habit, with the silvery flaking bark of a cherry, and the flower-trusses of a colossal privet; the miraculous character, in point of fact, is a variegation in the shape of the Greek ε, which seems occasionally to appear on either side the midrib of the oval foliage. In any case, charactered or no, never a leaf is plucked from the tree, and those that fall are distributed with jealous care to the faithful, as with the foliage of the sacred *Ficus* at Anuradhapura. Gumbum, lying less remote from the secular arm than Labrang, is of a temperament much friendlier to foreigners, and has Living Buddhas of special breadth and eagerness of mind. But Gumbum lacks an Abbot, for, when the Supreme Pontiff was on his famous flight from Lhasa to Urga, he passed from abbey to abbey up the Border, and, skirting Jô-ni, made a settlement

of some time in Gumbum. But when His Holiness moved on, it was found that he was strangely niggard of vails and benefactions ; he had been an expensive guest ; and, when no sense of the fact was shown, the presiding pontiffs felt a grievance. Meanwhile the Dalai Lama was now gradually on his return journey from Urga to Lhasa, and, nearing Gumbum, he sent ahead the announcement that he meant to honour the Abbey with a second visit. This was too much ; polite messages came back from the Abbot and his coadjutors, to the effect that they infinitely regretted not having now the means to entertain His Holiness adequately in their poor foundation. And so the Dalai Lama had to stay in Sining instead. But first he stretched forth his hands, and laid an ill-wish upon that Abbot of Gumbum ; and the Abbot of Gumbum withered up and died accordingly within the year.

I hope he will never take a similar step against Abbot Squint-eyes, a very much smaller and quite inconsiderable prelate of the Border, for Abbot Squint-eyes is a plain and portly old scoundrel, with an engaging gutta-percha smile, who presides over a tiny crumbling temple outside a poor Tibetan village on a slope of the Alp. Steeply up behind it rises the inviolable forest, with here and there a sacred ring of spruces towering above its verdure. Below it the ground falls away in cultivated fields to a grey little brawling beck ; and on the other side, in wall over wall of darkness, a-flicker with the golden tapers of larch in autumn, and all a haze of rose and violet and purple in the spring, the virgin forest rises higher and higher till at last it gives place to a titanic embattlement of dolomitic crags and castles, shutting out the day. The little place is very poor ; were it not for his jug of hot fermented liquor, and the two ladies who do not even pretend not to be his concubines, Abbot Squint-eyes would have but a barren life. No one comes to church, often not he himself ; all the monks there ever were have long since abandoned the tiny collapsing cloister. One or two, indeed, still linger in a new comfortable cottage at the top of the main street ; but there is as a rule but little vitality in the place, unless it be when there is a 'quickenning of Church Life' enjoined by pastoral letters from Gumbum, and assisted by a

reinforcement of fresh monks. For then Abbot Squint-eyes has a goodly store of food and drink carried up to one of the abandoned rooms in the cloister, and thither removes his ample bulk, more voluminous yet in flowing murrey-coloured petticoats, to be readier at hand for the three or four daily services that continually proceed, though occasionally they have to be postponed till the Abbot's potations have a little lost their effect and left him less liable to stumble over the litanies and responses of the liturgy, interspersed as they are at intervals by sudden braying choruses of drums, bells, conches, cymbals and trumpets.

Or else it is the annual blessing of the fields that gives the Abbot work to do. Forth to some shoulder of the slope, now all dead and bare in the approach of winter, proceeds the whole male population of the place (while the women stay congregated behind on a wall) to where certain mysterious haycocks and symbolic scarecrows are dressed. Crackers explode in volleys, and guns go off disorderly in dropping salvoes. And now forth proceeds the Abbot at the head of his few monks; he is swathed in a cope of golden silk, and on his head is a huge mitre resembling a cocked hat worn very far back upon his nape, and heavily crested with dingy mustard-coloured fringe. Ill-dispelling whisk in hand, he advances to the haycocks, and there solemnly pontificates in the inevitable deep sonorous intonation of the priest all the world over; psalms are sung, responses chaunted, vibrating upwards in the pale and deathly calm of the wintry air. And then the compilations are consumed with fire, and the whole population, monks and laity, return joyously together to the monastery, there to prolong the hours till far into the twilight, with wine and merriment and gossip, for they are all a jolly cordial crew in that poor little starveling place, simple and kindly and honest, true Tibetan, though their land is actually the territory of China. Not but that they can be fierce on occasion. An 'old lady' of the place once went to sleep imprudently on her hot-bed; it smouldered, took alight, and the whole hamlet of wooden chalets was burned out. When one thinks of the desperate struggle that its inhabitants have to get a bare living anyhow, squeezed as they are between Tepo raiders on

the west and Chagolese enemies on the east, with China behind them always avid of tribute, they are hardly to be blamed for laying hold of that disastrous old lady and putting her to death.

But it must not be thought that monks and abbeys and villages are always so wild. These things happened on the uncontrolled borders of Kansu and Tibet: further north, above Lanchow, there is a big peninsular boss of mountainous country which accordingly has been left to itself, an offshoot of wild Tibet, but jutting far out into Kansu, and shut in on all sides by Chinese rule. Here, under the shadow of the Capital, there is nothing but peace and goodwill in the monasteries, and the stranger is made welcome as a friend. Especially delightful are the Halls of Heaven. Here a big village of white-washed, low monastic houses huddles cosily into a bay of warmth beneath an engirdling amphitheatre of torrid precipices, along whose crests the shy Big-horn sheep of the mountain freely harbour and browze, magnificent animals as large as donkeys, perfectly secure of their lives, even within call of the passing pilgrims, so stringently is the Holy Law observed in the abbey domains. The place is large and populous and popular, a centre of devotion for all the country round. Stately churches rise here and there from garden-courts of peony and lilac, daily presented fresh upon the altars of the Buddhas. There are some four hundred monks attached to the place, and daily services are three or more in number in the big main edifice, from the roof of which, at the appointed time, a monk in a crested helmet summons to worship with long wistful wailings on a conch. Soon the crowd gathers in the stone-paved square in front, with all the jolly little acolytes, each in a mitre almost as large as himself, with which it is a great game to cuff your neighbour, or pluck off his and throw it down the steps for a general scrimmage. But now the main doors open, and the congregation pours into the darkness of the church, which exhales an icy breath of incense and old wax. In long transverse rows they kneel, while a busy monk goes hurrying up and down the aisles aspersing each as he goes with holy water from a dragon-mouthed ewer; and after him comes the tall and magnificent figure of the Prior, in pleated cloak

of scarlet, and a gigantic fringeless mitre of yellow, so exactly like a great crested Roman helmet that he looks as if he were rehearsing for a centurion in 'Julius Cæsar' at His Majesty's, as back and forth he solemnly proceeds, censing each worshipper from a long fat candle of incense. Meanwhile the service proceeds, with chaunt and psalm, till at a given interval other monks come hurrying in, with big beautiful buckets full of tea, hot from the smoke-blackened abbey-kitchen just outside, with which they run up and down the rows of kneeling figures, filling the wooden bowls that every monk has ready there in his place. And so the service continues; the earliest is at dawn, and the latest about dusk.

In front of the abbey stretches a wide plain of finest turf, level as a racecourse, all a rippled sea in May with a soft lavender-and-white Iris, whose intoxicating fragrance floats sweet as hyacinth in the sunny air. Beyond this, again, is a park of filmy poplars overshadowing a level stretch of soundless soft sand; it fringes the stony tracts of the river, and on its further side rises up a mountain-range of forest, pine, and spruce, the only woodland of the region, the property of the abbey, and sedulously preserved. It is pleasant, indeed, in the later afternoon, to sit upon the sward in a knot of friendly questioning monks, and watch the procession of devotees making the round of the whole place, and performing the stations of devotion, turning the Invocation wheels, and saluting each Chorten of pious relic and memory. Often these pilgrims are women, in hopes of a baby, having bound a volume of the Scriptures on their backs, and now advancing heavily in their best clothes, of purple and crimson, with broad Byzantine stoles of leather back and front, beset with round white plaques of porcelain, and diversified with a score of jingling silver chains across the breast. And sometimes they make a yet more arduous pilgrimage, in a series of prostrations, falling flat upon their face with outstretched arms, and making the next prostration from the point to which their finger-tips had reached before, unless there should chance to be nobody looking, in which case they may perhaps jump forward a yard or so. It reminds one of the Santa Scala.

It must never be forgotten that there is nothing of

all the many hard things said about the superstitions and practices of Lamaism that cannot be said with at least equal force against the only two branches of Christianity that have any historical right to call themselves orthodox, authoritative and traditional. A faith in which a Queen of Spain cannot bear a baby without recourse to miraculous 'Girdles of the Virgin,' a faith in which a Russian Grand Duke openly ascribes his escape from shipwreck to a miraculous Ikon, cannot possibly throw a stone against another for carting copies of the Scriptures round a field to ensure fertility, or prompting the prostrations of a would-be mother round a sacred shrine; to say nothing of the fact that possibly the Grand Duke, and the Queen of Spain, may have had chances of a better education than my lady Aoo of Tibet. And who is to say, anyhow, in any creed, that an act of faith, if sincere, is necessarily powerless to react upon the material world? Many travellers, indeed, spoon-fed by the missionaries with whom they stay, have nothing but bad words for Lamaism and its monks. But missionaries are not qualified for tolerance, either by education or profession; it is curious to find how even the more candid of them will only admit the virtues and sanctities of their rivals, when native honesty leaves them no other choice, in the face of close questioning. Otherwise, they are anxious to continue the old stale wholesale condemnation of the monks as an utterly worthless crew in bulk, and never confess a more favourable truth until compelled by cross-examination.

Now, wholesale condemnations are invariably misleading; and, if the traveller looks at these things with his own eyes, he will soon see that the Lamas are a set of monks little better or worse than any other set of monks. There are all sorts in every monastery, saints and sinners too, all the world over; the mitre does not make the monk, least of all where one son (if not more) of every family is claimed for the religious life, vocation or no vocation. But learning and goodness can thrive as freely in the Halls of Heaven as in any little house of Christian sectaries; and perhaps at yet ampler leisure in the Abbey of Chebson. For this is a very different foundation from the last—much smaller, much richer, much less popular, and much more select, for here the

monks are chosen only from among the 'best' people: admission is difficult, and the foundation exclusive as that of a German Chapter. Each monk dwells apart in a spacious house of his own; no life and little bustle of devotion stir the tranquillity of the place; its atmosphere stands to that of the Halls of Heaven rather as that of a wealthy Oxford college to a poor and populous parish. Very stately and splendid are the successive guest-cloisters, filled with a sumptuous silence; the abbey nestles into a fold of high grassy downs, fronting the south, and in its midst rises the huge main church, with golden roof adorned with dragons. Its walls are of soft red brick diversified with a band of cut brush-wood ends, packed together till the effect is of a rich brown velvet. It is hedged all round with a wide precinct of cloisters, frescoed from end to end, and railed off, by a screen containing hundreds of Invocation wheels, from the smooth emerald expanse of turf, in the middle of which stands the church. At present a Buddha of much importance is on a visit to Chebson, fresh from Peking, and with a guard of smart Peking soldiers in attendance. His mere visit should be an asset to the place, whose Manifestation, just now in abeyance, is but crude and new; however, he makes no appearance, and does not stir from his allotted residence, unless it be to carry the last consolations of the Faith to a dying dignitary. But Chebson, rich and stately, is a more sophisticated place than the Halls of Heaven; and it is there, amid its Iris fields and friendly crowds of monks and novices and pilgrims of devotion, that one's memory most fondly lingers, rather than in the leisurely and expensive emptinesses of Chebson Abbey, despite the charm of its fat old Prior, a typical ecclesiastic, full of unction and twinkles (with heavy artificial-looking eyebrows, and the great mobile face of a Coquelin), as placidly the equal of his guests as any College Dean assured and portly.

REGINALD FARRER.

Art. 5.—THE WORKS OF PAUL CLAUDEL.

1. *Works.* *Théâtre Complet*, four vols (1910-12); *L'Art Poétique* (1904); *Connaissance de l'Est* (1907). Paris: Société du Mercure de France. *Cinq Grands Odes* (1910); *L'Annonce faite à Marie* (1911); *L'Ôtage* (1911); *Cette Heure qui est entre le Printemps et l'Été* (1913); *Corona Benignitatis Anni Dei* (1915); *Trois Poèmes de Guerre* (1915). *Nouvelle Revue Française*.
2. *Paul Claudel.* Par Georges Duhamel. Paris: Mercure de France, 1913.

IT is a general rule among our French friends that an even more fervid adoration is lavished upon the unknown man of letters than upon the known. In France it is the laudable custom of the younger generation to wage merciless and incessant warfare upon its predecessor; and experience has established that the most potent weapon of assault is a secret literary cult. It affords at once a justification and a means of attack; it combines the advantages of a crusade and a conspiracy. Therefore, there are always good reasons, *a priori*, for heavily discounting the enthusiasm of such criticisms as have been M. Claudel's portion. His adherents are not merely estimating his positive worth, they are using him as a bludgeon to break the heads of their enemies. And the enemies reply in kind. Instead of merely insinuating a doubt whether M. Claudel is greater than Shakespeare, they deny him not only genius, but ordinary talent of a kind that is at all times common enough in France. In Paris unreadable plays are produced by the score, but they are all playable. M. Claudel's plays, say his adversaries, can be neither read nor played. 'Malheureux,' replies the crusader, 'celui que le premier choc n'effraiera point de cette terrible beauté et de cette formidable vérité.'

It is probable—once more to approach the question *a priori*—that M. Claudel will be rated neither so low nor so high when the fury of battle is calmed; but it is certain that the true judgment upon him does not lie in the mean between these extremes. No literary judgment is a mean; and that is why one mistrusts the action of the Academy, which, terrified at last by the clamour of

the crusaders, has delivered up to M. Claudel one of its average prizes and has endeavoured to strike an average of opinion for its justification: 'the poet is to be admired, but not to be imitated.' There have been so many French poets during the last quarter of a century who have been worthy to be admired but not to be imitated, that we are weary of them. A poet is worthy of both or neither.

At least it would appear that M. Claudel himself has spent long in playing 'the sedulous ape.' One of his seven plays is a translation of the 'Agamemnon'; and his vocabulary shows signs of royal borrowing from the Bible. Critics speak, also, of the influence of Shakespeare, but the evidences are visible only to the eye of naked intuition, unclothed and uncorrupted by a knowledge of Shakespeare. But, Shakespeare apart, *Æschylus* and the Bible are not the general food of modern French literature, which prefers its connexion with the Greek and Hebrew classics more delicately mediated; and Claudel's poetic language has, in comparison with the normal transparency of French style, an almost apocalyptic obscurity. Whether, therefore, he is the greatest of modern French poets or not, he is unquestionably in outward appearance the least French of them all. Not only is his language tumultuous and rhetorical, but his words leap from commonplace to recondite, while his lines are strangely shaped according to a plan which is by no means self-evident. The characters of his plays, moreover, do not speak; they chant; and not one only, like Cassandra, but all.

Yet, in spite of the initial strangeness, even upon those who approach Claudel's works in the order of their composition, the predominant effect is one of deliberate calculation. The lyrical frenzy with which the persons of his earlier dramas deliver themselves resolves into an argument built upon a firm structure of original thought. Even the impressive wealth of his imagery, the opulence of which has conciliated many hostile critics, is revealed as deliberate rather than spontaneous. His metaphors are links in a well-woven dialectic rather than the tumultuous visions of the seer. The novelty of his language is due rather to the logical precision with which he establishes the exact sense of his terms than to

an instinctive love of words in themselves arresting. In brief, Claudel's work is not merely philosophic poetry; it is essentially philosophy in poetry.

Perhaps the poet was conscious of his purpose from the first. Certainly, his evolution towards consciousness was rapid, for already the second version of his second drama, 'La Ville' (1897), has for its chief character a poet, Cœuvre, into whose mouth are put sibylline, yet definite statements concerning the nature of his art:

‘Dilatant ce vide que j'ai en moi, j'ouvre la bouche,
Et ayant aspiré l'air, dans ce legs de lui-même par lequel
l'homme à chaque instant expire l'image de sa mort,
Je restitue une parole intelligible.’

And in the same play, Besme, the arch-materialist, thus acknowledges the power of poetry: ‘Tu n'expliques rien, ô poète, mais toutes choses deviennent par toi explicables.’

Here Science is made to confess that the secret of knowledge rests not with her, but with Poetry. The poet alone knows; to him alone it is given to elicit the inward order of the universe. He absorbs and comprehends the world, and by the natural movement of his physical being utters the word. Therefore the poetic knowledge, which is the only true knowledge, is fundamentally creative. It is the vocal recognition of the goodness and inevitable perfection of the created world; it is the recreation of the ordered universe. So in the metaphysical argument of the 'Art Poétique' (1904), which is only formally distinct from the rest of his poetic works by a bold stroke of etymology, Claudel proclaims: ‘Nous ne naissions pas seuls. Naître, pour tout, c'est co-naître. Toute naissance est une connaissance.’ This is a striking statement of the converse of his earlier proposition. Since every being implies and necessitates every other, the creation of a new being is essentially the assertion of a yet more perfect unity; and man, to whom it is given not merely to be, but to express in intelligible words his sense of being, is born, or born anew, when he recognises the inseparable community between himself and the created world, and allows the sense of perfect oneness to penetrate his soul. Then, by uttering the word which is the natural efflux

of his living breath, he creates in comprehending and confers upon the universe of his knowledge full existence.

But it may be said that, although this is an original if mystical theory of poetic creation, it is itself independent of poetry, and affords no reason why Claudel's work should be outwardly different from another's. Nevertheless the influence of his philosophic convictions upon his poetry has been great. In the narrower sense, they have shaped his style and governed his use of language. He has been concerned above all to elucidate the unity, which according to his doctrine it is his function as poet to express. His method chiefly consists in the use of metaphor; he has sought out unseen relations with a persistence which has no parallel in modern poetry. The speech of many of his dramatic characters is hardly more than a deliberate succession of vivid images. In the profounder sense, his ideas were the means of swiftly leading him to the Catholic faith.

Claudel, who evidently passed through a brief period of hesitation—his first play, 'Tête d'Or' (1889), is in essence a glorification of the will to power—already in 'La Ville' displays himself securely possessed of the Christian verities. 'La Ville' is a metaphysical dialogue in which the champions of scientific materialism and profane love are finally overthrown by the poet-priest. The disputants declaim magnificently, as Cœuvre, the poet, finely flings down his challenge to Besme:

‘Je possède, dès que j'y entre
Ce jardin, Besme, plus que vous ne le possédez.’

A ring of youth may perhaps sound for some in this vindication of the poet's royalty. It is, in a sense, naïve and defiant as youth. But if these things are a mark of youth, then Claudel has never grown to manhood. He has become younger with advancing years. His naïveté and defiance have become more deliberate and more natural to him. The tangle of the universe has resolved itself into simplicity before his eyes, the mystery has opened to his key. What he said proudly as a youth is the inexpugnable certitude of the man. The living centre of his philosophy is his conviction that the function of man is poetic, both as the Greek world

understood poetry and as we understand it. Not only is poetry man's glorious heritage, but the poetic word contains the everlasting truth. More than this, the power to frame the word is a sure evidence of man's own immortality, for only the permanent can bear witness to the permanent, deep answering to deep. And in the first of the 'Cinq Grands Odes' (1900), wherein Claudel's art first manifests the full and beneficent expansion of maturity, he yet more clearly proclaims the power of poetry and the virtue by which it is shaped:

'Ainsi quand tu parles, ô poète, dans une énumération délectable

Proférant de chaque chose le nom,

Comme un père tu l'appelles mystérieusement dans son principe, et selon que jadis

Tu participas à sa création, tu coopères à son existence!'

Claudel's evolution has been strange, but strangely simple. By poetry alone, by the enforced meditation of an architectonic poet upon the nature of his own gift and art, he has ascended to the translucent heaven of simple devotion. Truly, as he himself says, worthily echoing Plato, there is no knowledge save of the already known; and, for all his skill in the subtleties of the schools, it must be that his is a naturally Christian soul. But development there has been, and that of a kind which distinguishes him with graphic definition from his many contemporaries who have of late years returned to the Catholic fold. With them it has been (in no derogatory sense) a reaction; with Claudel an action, an unfaltering progress upon a path of destiny that might have been read by one skilled in the stars of genius. They have abrogated something of their intellectual heritage; Claudel has forsaken nothing of his. They have buried their talent in the earth; he has multiplied his tenfold. He is a Catholic after the order of Pascal. 'Tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne m'avais déjà trouvé.'

Therefore his attainment of religious certainty has been a necessary condition of the full exercise of his powers, a means to freedom instead of a limitation. Not only has his thought been clarified from all vague hesitations, but his art, being so closely interwoven

with his thought, has been enriched by a splendid sureness of argument and technique. His religious conviction has been, as it were, a perpetual guarantee of the soundness of his aesthetic. It was well for Claudel that this harmony should have existed, for he has proved himself an innovator among the boldest; and, while his once courageous contemporaries have smoothed their metrical unfamiliarities down to the surface necessary for popularity, he has firmly gone forward upon his lonely path. At the present moment he alone is left of all the erstwhile votaries of *vers libre*, in honourable isolation. His poetry is the justification of his experiment; and there will be no one to contend with him for the distinction of having opened out a new horizon to French poetry. But it is doubtful whether any will follow him. What he has achieved is individual to him; and a new generation will hardly be able to use the form of the *vers Claudélien* without a measure of his intellectual richness.

Claudel most clearly declares his own metrical intention in certain words spoken by Cœuvre in 'La Ville.' They are of decisive importance to a technical understanding of his work :

' O mon fils ! lorsque j'étais un poète entre les hommes,
J'inventai ce vers qui n'avait ni rime ni mètre,
Et je le définissais dans le secret de mon cœur cette fonction
double et réciproque
Par laquelle l'homme absorbe la vie, et restitue, dans l'acte
suprême de l'expiration
Une parole intelligible.'

The broken line is thus to be considered as a means of recording a purely physical rhythm. Herein once more appears the direct reaction of Claudel's philosophy upon his art; as the poetic word is man's true function, so is its expression shaped by his natural movement. It is a spoken, not a written word; and the fact of its utterance is a witness of the unity of all things, equally with the relations established by the metaphors of which it is composed.

This very definite conception of poetical technique seems to have been evolved by Claudel early in his career, though not quite at the beginning. The lines

spoken by Cœuvre occur in the second version of 'La Ville'; they are absent from the first, while, together with their appearance, the majority of the more violent metrical eccentricities have been removed. The second version of this play may therefore be regarded as the turning-point of Claudel's technical progress. Thenceforward his advance towards ever greater metrical control has been steady. His mastery of rhythm is apparent not only in his verse, but, perhaps more remarkably, in his prose. It is the prose of a poet, as is all fine prose; it is always rich, but never exuberant; and yet, for all the sapience and sanity of its firm design, it rings in the memory with a wealth of unsuspected undertones. There are passages in the 'Art Poétique' and the 'Connaissance de l'Est,' which, read even a third and a fourth time, and worked over again in the recollection, have always a new and exacter beauty to reveal. Consider the subtle music of this sentence from the 'Art Poétique':

'Tournons donc comme la religieuse Chaldée nos yeux vers le ciel absolu où les astres en un inextricable chiffre ont dressé notre acte de naissance et tiennent greffe de nos pactes et de nos serments.'

Or for harmony of sound and sense together, this from the 'Connaissance de l'Est':

'Aux heures vulgaires nous nous servons des choses pour un usage, oubliant ceci de pur, qu'elles soient; mais quand, après un long travail, au travers des branches et des ronces, à midi, pénétrant historiquement au sein de la clairière, je pose ma main sur la croupe brûlante du lourd rocher, l'entrée d'Alexandre à Jérusalem est comparable à l'énormité de ma constatation.'

In the elaboration of French prose style to these perfections, it is true that Claudel has but continued the work of others. The progressive refinement of the musical theme from Chateaubriand to Maurice de Guérin, from de Guérin to Arthur Rimbaud, from Rimbaud to Claudel is without sensible deviation. Claudel's debt to Rimbaud is palpable and immense, but his superiority certain. Claudel can maintain his subtlety of rhythm for two hundred pages of dizzy metaphysical argument without monotony or euphuism. Nevertheless, and

happily, seeing that the English ear prefers a more ample composition in prose than the most elaborate French affords, Claudel has definitely chosen his own individual poetry for his instrument. He seems to have preferred a music still stronger winged than any he could compass in prose, while the conviction that the inner meaning of his art was to be sought in the ideally spoken word has prevented him from doing more than occasionally showing how exact is his mastery of the written period.

The drama which followed 'La Ville' is the original version of the play which, when produced in Paris three years ago under the title of 'L'Annonce faite à Marie,' was the means of making Claudel's name at least known to the wider public in France. 'La Jeune Fille Violaine' (1899), as it was originally called, is a naïve and touching story. From goodness of heart Violaine gives an innocent kiss to Pierre de Craon, who is miserable. They are seen by her wicked sister, Mara, who, desiring herself to marry Jacques Hury, Violaine's fiancé, tells him that Violaine has betrayed him. Violaine makes no defence, and abandons her adored lover to Mara, who drives her out of the house and blinds her with a handful of cinders. Living as a beggar in the forest, Violaine becomes acceptable to God and, having received the gift of miracles, heals Mara's little son who has been born blind. Mara, fearing that Jacques will turn from her to Violaine, kills her sister, who accepts her death with the resignation of simple faith.

The changes made in the second version of this play may serve as typical of Claudel's development as a dramatic artist. In 'L'Annonce faite à Marie' the religious element is yet more emphasised. A choir of angels magnifies the Virgin, while Violaine speaks with Mara in her forest cave. Pierre de Craon, the builder of cathedrals, becomes a far more important figure, expounding at length the noble philosophy of church architecture which had previously inspired Claudel to write a beautiful essay, 'Le Développement de l'Eglise.' The play itself is no longer called a play, but a Mystery; the time is no longer modern, but 'un Moyen Âge de convention, tel que les poètes du Moyen-Âge pouvaient se figurer l'antiquité.' Anne Vercors, Violaine's father,

makes his pilgrimage not to the United States, but to Jerusalem. The whole atmosphere is changed to that of mediæval Christianity. Furthermore the action is complicated and made more horrible by Pierre de Craon being represented as a leper from whom, by her chaste embrace, Violaine takes the disease. The most obvious effect of this radical change is a sensible lessening of dramatic probability; for, even though the play, and in particular the contagion, is largely symbolic, the realistic mind cannot avoid condemning Violaine for her criminal imprudence. Claudel cannot but have been aware of this; but no evidence of artistic intention can wholly restore our sympathy to Violaine. The inevitable conclusion is that Claudel has aimed at diminishing the possibility of his drama being acted; and in truth there is this justice in the orthodox criticism of his plays, that they do not lend themselves to representation in the modern theatre. His drama is lyrical in expression and philosophic in thought, and therefore is not drama, either by convention or etymology.

Since Claudel is a philosophic poet, the differentiation between the personages of his drama is more ideal than actual. Their language is always lyrical; and the quality of their lyricism is personal to Claudel. The intention of his dramatic method is—to compare the greater with the smaller thing—often reminiscent of *Æschylus*, but the intense dramatic focus of the Greek is wholly wanting to the French poet. Nevertheless the interesting clue afforded by the translation of the 'Agamemnon' could without much effort be traced in detail. In the astonishing range of his metaphor Claudel shows himself no unworthy disciple of the great Athenian, and even in particulars the influence is perceptible. In 'Tête d'Or' there is a princess, captive in her own palace and among her own people, who, like Cassandra, utters fateful and enigmatic words before the death of the king. Mara in 'L'Annonce' is not without a touch of the fierce blood of Clytemnestra in her veins, while both Lala in 'La Ville' and Lechy Elbernon, the strange adventuress who leads to ruin the two men in the most actual of the plays, 'L'Échange' (1894), might claim descent from either or both of the royal women of the 'Agamemnon.' In short, nearly all the women of Claudel's drama, save those in

whom the Christian virtues are exalted, may claim an *Æschylean* prototype. But a derivation from great drama is not enough to make a drama; and not even in the last and in many respects the most perfect of his plays, 'L'Ôtage' (1912), has Claudel achieved a complete fusion of his lyrical method and dramatic necessities.

His drama, in the last resort, depends wholly upon its poetry; but the poetry will bear the burden, for its quality is unquestionable. By a steady perfecting of his natural gift, and an ever closer adaptation of his practice to an æsthetic theory which has the transcendent merit of demanding the utmost effort alike in thought and language from the poet, he has reached a power denied to his contemporaries. He is secure in his position as the greatest living French poet. So it is that in his purely lyrical poetry one can most nearly approach to an intimate contact with his individuality. Here one is less distracted by a preconceived opinion of dramatic necessity. The majestic unfolding of his thought and vision is unretarded by a memory of time and place. Nor can it be reckoned an accident that most of the works of Claudel's maturity should have been cast into lyrical form. The 'Vers d'Exil' (1895), which are included in the last volume of the earlier dramas, by their use of familiar metrical schemes, lead by an easy progress to the larger rhythms which are the peculiar mark of the *vers Claudélien*. Had he been content to confine his expression within the strict limits of orthodox French versification, he would have been acclaimed a master long ago. The ten short poems of the 'Vers d'Exil' tremble with the austere vibration of contained passion. They are saturated with a sense of *desiderium* for eternal things:

'Réprenez le talent que vous m'avez donné.
Le banquier n'en veut point : ceci n'a cours ni change.
J'ai porté, j'ai montré partout ce siècle étrange.
Nul marchand ne l'honore et rien de lui est né.'

The loneliness of the human spirit is the undertone of all these poems. The bitter knowledge that the poet is set apart to work out his destiny alone is confessed with a courage of despair which is in itself almost serenity. There is no trace of hysteria nor of the braggadocio which has, for instance, endeared Henley's

defiance of eternity to the popular esteem. Claudel, even before his feet trod firmly in the paths of faith, knew that he was not 'the captain of his fate'; that there was a power within him which he could by no means escape.

'J'ai fui en vain; partout j'ai retrouvé la Loi.
Il faut céder enfin! ô porte, il faut admettre
L'hôte; cœur frémissant, il faut subir le maître,
Quelqu'un qui soit en moi plus moi-même que moi.'

Claudel is a Catholic poet; he himself would doubtless say that he was before all else a Catholic poet. Yet by reason of his passionate sincerity, his poetry can make a deeper appeal to those who do not share his certitude than that of many poets who profess no faith. Deep in the souls of men, whose souls have depths to be reached, there is identity. Thus the most personal confession of a great man is impersonal and universal. Claudel's lyrical poetry has this impersonal quality, which is achieved not by any vagueness or comfortable generality, but by the extreme exactness of his own self-definition. 'Il n'est science que du général,' says the 'Art Poétique,' 'il n'est création que du particulier.' Claudel has created himself and his poetry, according to this certain truth. Guided by it, he has been driven to abandon traditional forms of expression and to create for himself a means to the more complete delineation of his own soul.

In the 'Cinq Grands Odes' he had reached a sure mastery of his new method. The opening poem to the Muses is a great ode, indeed, in which he evokes the Nine, each by the virtue she bears to those who understand her gifts. A new richness has been added to the poet's understanding of his privilege; he knows himself highly associated with the eternal work of creation:

'Mais ton chant, ô Muse du poète,
Ce n'est point le bourdon de l'avette, la source qui jase,
l'oiseau de paradis dans les girofliers!
Mais comme le Dieu saint a inventé chaque chose, ta joie
est dans la possession de son nom,
Et comme Il a dit dans le silence "Qu'elle soit!", c'est ainsi
que, pleine d'amour, tu répètes, selon qu'il l'a appelée
Comme un petit enfant qui épelle, "Qu'elle est!"'

This is the rebirth of wonder in a world weary with much knowledge and a poetry enfeebled by words from which the immediate virtue has departed. The delight of recognition, the joy of the child in the revelation of existence, pours in such lines, like a life-giving stream, into the exhausted fields of modern French poetry.

But Claudel himself is not naïve or child-like. The deliberate particularity of his vision is the goal of a long process in which dialectic and intelligence have played their part. He has learned how to value his gift of sight and to perfect it to its purposes; and in the 'Cinq Grands Odes,' armed with the instruments he has himself fashioned, adding new and resonant strings to the feebler lyre which he received, he halts in mid-journey, —'nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita'—and turns to make an acceptable music to the Lord :

'Vous êtes ici avec moi, et je m'en vais faire à loisir pour vous seul un beau cantique, comme un pasteur sur le Carmel qui regarde un petit nuage.'

The five odes are one splendid *Magnificat*, full of poetry that is deliberately great. It would have rejoiced Matthew Arnold to discover in Claudel a French poet who could so surely use the grand style. In this book Claudel becomes wholly and definitely himself, having conquered his freedom, alike in his life and his art. Everywhere he moves securely, by reason of his faith in God, and in himself as the poet and servant of God. He moves securely, but he moves away from his familiar things. The past slips from him like a garment :

'Je me suis embarqué pour toujours! Je suis comme le vieux marin qui ne connaît plus la terre que par ses feux, les systèmes d'étoiles vertes ou rouges enseignés par la carte et le portulan.'

'Un moment sur le quai parmi les balles et les tonneaux, les papiers chez le consul, une poignée de main au stevedore;

'Et puis de nouveau l'amarre larguée, un coup de timbre aux machines, le break-water qu'on double, et sous mes pieds,

'De nouveau la dilatation de la houle!'

Henceforward Claudel is a man embarked upon a far journey; his remaining books, which all belong to the last few years, are likewise full of the calm acceptance

of separation. As he comes to acquiesce in his isolation, so does his confidence in the spiritual quality of his remoteness increase, and more and more deliberately does he employ the simplest language of common speech. His images become yet more exact and realistic, and his desire to eliminate from his poetry the last vestige of an inherited grandeur apparent. The spare outlines of this picture of departure are typical of the method which, though early implicit in his theories and never wholly absent from his practice, is the distinctive mark of his latest poetic period.

In the 'cantata,' 'Cette Heure qui est entre le Printemps et l'Été' (1913), three mystical maidens hold high converse together, by the banks of the Rhône. Laeta is 'a daughter of the Latin soil,' an embodiment of the sweetness of the pagan spirit; Fausta is a princess in exile, devoured by romantic and insatiable dreams; Beata has shed these transitory veils which conceal from her the knowledge of the divine. Laeta asks whether her bridegroom will love her for ever; Fausta whether the lover who has left her will return; Beata's lover is dead, and therefore hers for ever. 'Il fallait que celui que j'aime mourût, Afin que notre amour ne fût plus soumis à la mort.' Although there is no word spoken of the Christian faith, it is immanent in Beata's gentle acquiescence in separation and death. She alone, though all things are lost to her, has the security of riches. The poem trembles like the breathless stillness of the immortal hour wherein it is unfolded; it is beautiful as its title. The lofty and exact images, with which the chanted dialogue abounds, are not mere adornments to its structure, but an integral part of the edifice. One cannot mistake the intimate relation to Claudel's deepest thought of Laeta's invocation of the Rhône:

'Il faut bien des montagnes pour un seul Rhône.
Il n'y a qu'un seul Rhône et cent vierges pour lui dans les altitudes . . .
Cent montagnes et au milieu d'elles un seul Rhône.
Toutes les sources de bien loin entendent sa voix, comme les vaches qui de cime en cime répondent au corne du pasteur.
Tout confue vers lui.'

Two books of Claudel's poetry have appeared since the beginning of the war. The one, 'Corona Benigitatis Anni Dei' (1915), is a cycle of religious poetry; the other a slim volume containing three war poems. Although, when the poems which compose the larger book were written, Claudel can have had no premonition of the ordeal that was impending upon the world, they are complementary. In the religious poetry he has achieved the end of his evolution; he is not only certain, but he sees face to face. In so far as the progress of his belief was concerned, he could hardly hope to be more secure this side eternity. As with his faith, so with his art; the movement towards directness and simplicity of utterance could no further go. There are many poems in the 'Corona Benigitatis' which confound by their apparent *naïveté*; and they confound not merely because the poet, in his newness of heart, delights in the unhesitating statement of the most enigmatic doctrines of his Church, but because he can confront the mysteries of death so simply that they are not mysterious any more. He is so familiar with the other world that he is not awed by it; he can be whimsical with his destiny. His heaven is homely to him and his God a friend.

'Et puis il n'est homme si vulgaire qui ne Vous ait gardé quelque chose de nouveau,

Et qui n'ait fabriqué pour Vous, en dehors de ses heures du bureau,

Espérant que l'idée un jour Vous viendra de le lui demander,

Et que peut-être ça Vous plaira, quelque chose d'affreux et de compliqué,

Ou il a mis tout son cœur et qui ne sert à quoi que ce soit.

Ainsi ma petite fille, le jour de ma fête, qui s'avance avec embarras,

Et qui m'offre, le cœur gonflé d'orgueil et de timidité,

Un magnifique petit canard, œuvre de ses mains, pour y mettre des épingle, en laine rouge et en fil doré.'

Here is that 'bonhomie de Claudel' of which a recent French critic has spoken; but this super-simplicity is the crown of a long and arduous struggle. It is a new victory for French poetry; almost it awakens a new emotion, or its unfamiliarity may be so strangely sweet because the secret pulse of the religious emotion is so seldom

communicable to the profane. Claudel's triumph is that he can communicate this subtle tremor. He has cast away the obscurity which is the privilege of the adept, so that he almost persuades us that, if we should but open wide our physical eyes, from us too no secrets would be hid.

This surely is a mark of true poetry; and Claudel's 'Corona Benignitatis' is not the less true poetry because it is the pinnacle reached by a slow and deliberate ascent. He knows well what he is doing; he can look back upon the path by which he came, and calculate his position by the stars. He knows well how long and solitary has been the journey away from familiar things before he stood near to them again, as a man who circles a mountain to gain the peak whence he can look down upon the world. He knows exactly what emotions his words will awaken in those whom he was forced to leave.

'Adieu, amis! Nous arrivions de trop loin pour mériter votre croyance.

Seulement un peu d'amusement et d'effroi. Mais voici le pays jamais quitté qui est familier et rassurant.

Il faut garder notre connaissance pour nous, comprenant, comme une chose donnée, dont l'on a tout d'un coup jouissance,

L'inutilité de l'homme pour l'homme et le mort en celui qui se croit vivant.

Tu demeures avec nous, certaine connaissance, possession dévorante et inutile!

"*L'art, la science, la vie libre,*" . . . ô frères, qu'y a-t-il entre vous et nous?

Laissez-moi seulement m'en aller, que ne me laissiez-vous tranquille?

Nous ne reviendrons plus vers vous.

He is in his familiar and reassuring country; his voice, borne down the wind, awakens a little smile and a little terror in those who hear it; so precisely does Claudel know the essential quality of his poetry which makes one smile like a man to whom the terrors and certainties of his childhood have suddenly been made real again.

'Corona Benignitatis' is a statement of belief; the 'Trois Poèmes de Guerre' (1915) are a test of its efficacy.

In a moment the war has set, to all those who have sought a solution and a certitude in life, their old problems once again, with a sudden swiftness that will admit of no delay. Claudel alone among French poets was prepared. He does not cheat himself, nor turn his eyes away from the awful truth that war is a name for the untimely death of innumerable men. His war poems are acceptable, because they satisfy the demand which the modern mind instinctively makes upon the poet whose theme is war. His words must be profoundly resonant with the sense of mortality. An army is no longer a nation within a nation; it is the nation. A war is the murder of a nation's youth. The easy gallantry and joyful adventure of the old war-songs belong to an epoch of history which was closed by the Civil War in America; and, when Whitman and Lowell and Lincoln sounded their clarion call to the dead, they magnificently gave out the note for the grave and Dorian music of modern war. Claudel had these notes within his compass; and he too has sounded them nobly. He speaks fearlessly to the dead, knowing that only thus he can speak to the living. It is the blood of the innocent dead which will rise up against the people of Cain, who can never fill the silence in their hearts, left by the voice of those whom they have killed. Therefore the poet is confident in his cause, for his hope of victory is no other than his eternal hope. The fight will endure so long as Might remains in arms against the mightier, which is Justice. But of the ultimate issue there is in his heart no doubt. It is sure as the march of the seasons, for it is one with that progression:

‘ De nouveau après tant de sombres jours le soleil délicieux
 Brille dans le ciel bleu.
 L'hiver bientôt va finir, bientôt le printemps commence, et
 le matin
 S'avance dans sa robe de lin.
 Après le corbeau affreux et le siflement de la bise gemis-
 sante
 J'entends le merle qui chante !
 Sur le platane tout à l'heure j'ai vu sortir de son trou
 Un insecte lent et mou.
 Tout s'illumine, tout s'échauffe, tout s'ouvre, tout se dégage,
 Peu à peu croît et se propage

Une espèce de joie pure et simple, une espèce de sérénité,
La foi dans le futur été !
Ce souffle encore incertain dont je sens ma joue caressée,
C'est la France, je le sais !
Ah, qu'elle est douce, car c'est elle ! naïve mais péremptoire,
L'haleine de la Victoire !'

These opening lines of the elegy 'Aux Morts de la République' are a remarkable example of Claudel's poetical understanding. In the audacity of their movement, the delicate and inimitable acceleration which unites musical sense and spiritual faith into one triumphant certainty before the poet makes his unfaltering invocation to the dead, they mark the perfection of Claudel's peculiar gift.

Claudel is a great Catholic. His influence upon the religious ideal of an *élite* among the French youth has been already deep and may be incalculable. To some this will be a questionable title to their regard. But they cannot withhold it, if they reflect that he is a great Catholic because he is a great poet. He has held his craft so high that he has not been content by thought to become merely the master of poetical logic that he is. He has been impelled to justify his art to his own soul ; and the justification he has found is one that restores to his country the true conception of a poet's dignity, and poetry to its high and fitting seat, remote from the meanness of petty rivalries and the turmoil of the market-place.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY.

Art. 6.—THE NAVY AND ITS WORK IN THE WAR.

RECENT changes in the supreme command of the Navy, and more especially the transfer of Sir John Jellicoe to the office of First Sea Lord, make it opportune to review briefly the services which, under his control, the Navy has rendered to the country, the Empire and the Allies, in the present war. When the pebble fell into the water on Aug. 4, 1914, no man knew how far the ripples would travel. They touched many shores, and wherever they went British Sea Power went with them. If, indeed, we look at the face of the war, and examine the forces that are at work in the prosecution of it, we see the naval factor rising paramount above all others. Sea Power is the atmosphere in which the armies move. Many times in vital directions it has shaped the course of land strategy. Open transit at sea is at the very root of all that the Allies do. The want of such transit is at the root of many things the enemy cannot do. Some, indeed, of the elements which constitute naval power seem tending to assume new relative values. But, change as they may, the truth remains beyond question that the Navy counts as the first requisite for the maintenance of our security and the exercise of our power.

Yet, strange as it may seem, people at large are for the most part forgetful of the potent influence and preponderating importance of the services of the Fleet in the war, regarding it no more than they do the atmosphere they breathe. Newspapers tell the public very little about the Navy. It is, indeed, a silent service, emerging on rare occasions to fight a battle or engage in a 'scrap,' and then going into retirement again. People are distressed and anxious when a destroyer is lost, or when the enemy issues forth to make a sudden and evasive raid. The action of every submarine is to them an enigma and a portent. Apparent inaction troubles them, and they forget the enduring character and quality of the operation of naval force. If this is true of many Englishmen, can we wonder that neutral nations, and even our Allies, do not fully appreciate the achievements of the British and the Allied fleets?

If all the manhood of the nation were trained to arms,

we should perish if ever the command of the sea were to pass into the hands of a hostile Power. It was, therefore, a cause of deep thankfulness that at the outbreak of the greatest war that the world has ever seen, wherein our most vital interests are at stake and our resources are strained to the utmost, Great Britain stood in a position of unexampled naval superiority. Her people had, indeed, never lost their instinct for the things of the sea. There had been fluctuations and periods of decline, but the desire had been unquenchable and the purpose paramount to maintain our sea command ; and, thanks mainly to this and to the wise direction of a few of England's most far-seeing sons, when the hour sounded we were ready. The Fleet was incomparably more powerful than in any distant or recent period of our history. It was organised, distributed, administered and ready for the strategic needs of the time ; its officers and men had raised themselves and been trained to a pitch of professional efficiency which twenty years before had hardly been dreamed of. In every branch, in material and in personnel, the Navy has displayed elasticity of organisation, the power of expansion, and a remarkable genius for absorbing the elements of the mercantile marine and the fisheries into the service of the State.

The rise of the German Navy was a new influence which seemed to disturb the equilibrium of the world, and inevitably came to be regarded in many quarters as a challenge to our naval supremacy. The Germans did not at first admit the imputation. It will be remembered that on Feb. 14, 1908, the Emperor wrote a remarkable letter from Berlin to Lord Tweedmouth, then First Lord of the Admiralty, in which it was conjectured that his Majesty sought to influence the Navy Estimates of that year. 'It is absolutely *nonsensical* and *untrue*,' he said, 'that the German Navy Bill is to provide a navy meant as a "challenge to British naval supremacy"; the German Fleet is built *against* nobody at all.'* Prince Bülow, however, in the new edition of his 'Deutsche Politik,' asserts that by the building of the German Fleet British mastery of the sea was for the first time in many centuries seriously imperilled. He had misjudged the

* Letter printed in the 'Morning Post,' Oct. 30, 1914.

real situation. The German Army was ready for war, and the national finances may have been organised in view of hostilities, but the German Navy was in no position of advantage.

Mr Balfour, in a speech he delivered at the Guildhall on Nov. 9, 1916, attributed to the High Seas Fleet the intention, at the beginning of the war, of challenging us to a fleet engagement. There was no evidence of preparedness for such a conflict. For many months the German Fleet was, indeed, condemned to inaction in its ports. Its cruisers on foreign stations inflicted some loss on our commerce; but they were few in number, and were destroyed one by one. As to the liners, which were to be converted into auxiliary cruisers at sea, their performances were of no effect on the campaign. That gallant and chivalrous officer, Count von Spee, was given a squadron which, as he foresaw, must sooner or later be destroyed. If we had kept our ships together, he said in a letter dated Nov. 2, 1914, the Germans would have had the worst of it (so würden wir wohl den kürzeren gezogen haben).* It cannot be said that the German Fleet was well distributed for war. It was by one of those accidents of naval warfare upon which the German Admiralstab could not have counted, that the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau' escaped destruction in the Mediterranean, and secured safety in the Golden Horn. The German light cruisers were insufficient in number for the Fleet, and for the foreign stations and commerce destruction. The destroyers have played but a minor part in the war. The submarines which have become so serious a menace to our commerce had yet to be built.

The sea power which, in our hands, Prince Bülow thought was seriously imperilled, is entirely different in its nature from land power. Its business is to hold our world communications at sea, and to deny the like communications to the enemy. This has been achieved. The German High Seas Fleet, held fast at the Straits of Dover and the northern passage to the Ocean, cannot seriously influence the war outside the North Sea. In spite of

* 'Frankfurter Zeitung,' April 19, 1915.

occasional raids, it is true to say that we control the Dover Straits and the English Channel, the North Passage on either side of the Shetland Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca—in a word, all the great strategic gateways of the world; and we could organise the Falkland Isles as a base if we wished, or had need, in order to control enemy passage through the Straits of Magellan. It cannot be too fully recognised that the Grand Fleet, in its North Sea anchorages, governs the naval situation throughout the Globe. Incalculable are the advantages we thus enjoy. Not one of our Dominions or Colonies has been attacked or could have been attacked, while the enemy's foreign possessions have crumbled away.

The reticent strategy of the enemy in the North Sea is the signal note of the naval warfare. He has made no serious attempt to dispute our command of that sea. His sudden strokes in the bombardment of Scarborough and other places, his fugitive fight at the Dogger Bank, his selected hour in the Jutland Battle, which converted his action into a sally and a flight, and the action of his submarines, have left the strategic situation unchanged. Yet the truth is palpable that in the North Sea position lies the very heart of the naval struggle. The *animus pugnandi* has been lacking to destroy the Grand Fleet. The material means have not justified the enterprise. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz said to an interviewer that there would be folly in risking complete disaster, that the hope was to seize some advantage, such apparently as might result from a division of the British Fleet, whereby a part, and not the whole of it, might be engaged. Such was the genesis of the Jutland Battle.

Our command of the North Sea gives us, first, the immunity of the British Isles from attack. That a raid might be attempted for some local purpose is conceivable, but it is a conviction based upon both history and practical considerations that an invasion in force, with the object of subjugating the country, is impossible in the face of our undefeated Fleet. The transport of a great army, provided with all the heavy equipment and armament which a modern army requires, the necessary safety of its landing, the maintenance of

its communications and its supplies, together form an undertaking so grave and a risk so tremendous as to force the conclusion that no general staff will direct and no commander will undertake it. In these days of wireless telegraphy, of mines and submarines, of swift destroyers and heavily armed battle-cruisers travelling at very high speed, a situation has been created that would make infinitely more difficult that which has been found impossible during over 800 years of our island story.* We are free to contemplate the incalculable benefits which, in immunity from invasion, we derive from the possession of a paramount Navy—the continuance of our national life itself, the peace and security of home, and, in the domain specifically of the war, the means of maintaining our power of recuperation and of waging it with the naval and military forces, and the vast supplies and munitions which have their origin in this country or come to it from abroad. By naval means, in the guarding of insularity, we have been enabled, through nearly two and a half years of war, to develop our military strength to an unparalleled degree.

Next, as to the blockade of Germany. What is the nature of that operation in present conditions? Obviously we cannot do in this war what we did in the old wars. When Cornwallis blockaded Brest in 1803-5, his station was usually off the Black Rocks, with an inshore squadron at the entrance to the Goulet, which, in case of attack, could fall back on his stronger force. Nelson could employ a looser method at Toulon, his object being, as he said, to induce the French to come out. Sir John Jellicoe's system resembled Nelson's rather than Cornwallis's. He could not, if he would, have lain off the German ports. The destroyer, the submarine,

* The following authorities may be consulted on the question of invasion: Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P., 'Imperial Defence,' 1905 (a speech in the House of Commons, reprinted); Right Hon. H. H. Asquith, M.P., a speech in the House, August 1909; Hamley's 'Operations of War,' Pt vi, ed. 1907, by Lieut.-Gen. Sir L. E. Kiggell, then Assistant Director of Staff Duties at H.Q. (now Chief of the Army General Staff); J. R. Thrusfield, 'Nelson and other Naval Studies,' 1909, preface, and 'Naval Warfare,' 1913, ch. vi; Col. H. B. Hanna, 'Can Germany invade England?' 1912; Lieut.-Gen. A. von Janson, 'Der Ueberfall über See als Feldzugeinleitung,' 1909; Leyland, 'Invasion and Imperial Defence,' 'Nineteenth Century,' December 1907; and 'Naval Annual,' 1907, ch. xi.

and the submarine mine-layer made that impossible. The Admiral's post was in certain northern anchorages, whence he made periodical sweeps through the North Sea.

But, if the enemy is blockaded from a great distance, he thereby enjoys a measure of freedom of action in the North Sea ; and, in fact, he has issued forth to bombard places on our East Coast, and on occasions has cruised for some distance along the Danish coast, and even raided the Downs. Sorties of this kind, based on the analogy of fortresses beleaguered, have been a guiding feature of German strategy, as disclosed in the preamble of the Navy Law of 1898, under which an *Ausfallsflotte*, or sallying fleet, was to be created. It is the strategy of the weaker force ; and, though the principle of risk to the stronger fleet was proclaimed in the Navy Law of 1900, there was a recurrence to the earlier ideas when the risk proved of no avail to deter. We must observe that the freedom of movement which is left to the enemy in the North Sea gives him the opportunity of choosing his own moment for his operations, and his own conditions of light and atmosphere to suit his objects.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of military command, our control of the North Sea is firmer and more complete than our control of the sea has been in any previous war. De Grasse and Guichen in 1781, Nielly in 1794, Villaret-Joyeuse in 1795, Morard de Galle in 1796, Brueys in 1798, Bruix in 1799, Ganteaume and Linois in 1801, Missiessy and Villeneuve in 1805, and other Admirals, escaped from the French ports in the wars of those times. The German Fleet has very rarely come far out into the North Sea without being engaged, or having one or more of its ships attacked by our submarines. It has not diminished our command. Without fighting a decisive battle, we have enjoyed many of the fruits of one.

Fleet actions are, indeed, not of the essence of the Navy's work. This may seem to many people a strange thing to say. Have we not been told many a time that the business of the Fleet is to seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he is to be found ? But it must be realised that the Navy can fight only when the enemy is willing to risk engagement. It can seek out and destroy him only when he is found in a position in which he can be attacked. Its doctrine and its object have not

changed. In the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-'13, there was no fleet engagement at all; if we except doubtfully Byng's action off Minorca and Hawke's brilliant victory in Quiberon Bay, no really great encounters between equal forces of any special interest occurred after that date until Howe's battle with D'Estaing in 1778. In the War of the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1815, there were but eleven considerable naval actions; and Trafalgar was fought ten years before its close.

A controversy arose in the 'Times' in October out of this very question. Mr Churchill, lately First Lord of the Admiralty, had said in a public writing that 'without a battle we had all the most victorious of battles could give us.' He had ventured the opinion that 'no strategic cause' compelled us to quit our anchorage and fight off the Danish coast, and asked, 'What harm does it do to us if the German Fleet takes a promenade at sea?' Lord Sydenham thereupon held up to him the glorious examples of Drake, Hawke and Nelson, who had never asked such a question; and Admiral Sir Reginald Custance said such doctrines tended to breed leaders of the 'type of Howe and Hotham.' Admiral Sir N. Bowden-Smith pointed out, however, that the mine and submarine had rendered actions such as those of the three great old Admirals impossible, and expressed the hope that 'those commanding our Fleet would not be led to seek a battle off the enemy's coast, or that of a neutral, and thus be led into a trap.' It is probable that these and other flag-officers and writers all meant the same thing. No one would have our officers trained or inspired as Hothams—one would not lightly censure that great officer, Howe—but, as they certainly are trained and inspired, as Drakes, Hawkes and Nelsons. The only problem is as to what is possible in modern conditions; and the solution of it must be left to themselves. If Sir John Jellicoe had had the same certainty of destroying his enemy as Hawke had at Quiberon Bay, he would not have let the opportunity slip. The rocks that endangered Hawke were fixed and known; submarines and mines are neither. A mention of this controversy is not foreign to the purpose here. It would be an evil day for England and her Allies if popular clamour impelled our Admirals to any course that was rash or unwise.

We turn now to another aspect of the sea affair. The sea command we possess does not end with protection from invasion. It has its beginning there. It is not enough to keep the enemy out; our supplies must come in. Our dependence upon foreign sources for both raw materials and foodstuffs is known to everyone. The war has shown, too, the very great reliance the Allies must place on imported munitions of war of many kinds, coming mainly from the United States. It has shown not less the vital necessity of sustaining our exports, whereby the financial balance may be maintained. The Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War, which reported in 1905, stated that our stocks of raw material did not exceed six months' supply, except in the case of flax, jute, hides and leather. We imported 44·5 per cent. of our meat supply of every kind, 64·8 per cent. of our cheese, 53·1 per cent. of our butter, and 45 per cent. of our eggs. In 1904 we imported 27,720,000 quarters of wheat and flour. The war has enormously increased our imports. In the ten months of the year 1914, ending Oct. 31, we brought in, for home consumption and army requirements, grain and flour of all kinds to the value of 63,861,585*l.*; in the corresponding period of the year 1915, to the value of 91,915,426*l.*, and in that of 1916 to the value of 110,511,480*l.* Our total imports during eleven months of the year 1916 rose by 11·6 per cent. as compared with the corresponding period in 1915, and our exports by 33 per cent.

The Admiralty laid down, for the information of the Commissioners, two propositions which have been entirely justified by experience of the war. They said that command of the sea was essential for the successful attack and defence of commerce, and should therefore be the primary aim. We have made it our aim; and the enemy's floating commerce has been destroyed, while our own has been maintained. Further, 'the attack or defence of commerce is best effected by concentration of force'; and a 'dispersion of force for either of those objects is the strategy of the weak, and cannot materially influence the ultimate result of the war.' We have kept our main forces concentrated, basing every minor dispersion on a concentration of those forces, while the enemy, in

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the earlier stages of the war, dissipated his strength in endeavours which failed.

This subject divides itself into two branches, one relating to the operations of enemy cruisers, which is simple in character, and the other to the depredations of enemy submarines, which is more complex. The Royal Commission did not promise complete immunity to our merchantmen; nor did it foresee a wholesale sinking of them. The German raiding cruisers sank or captured some 56 British merchantmen. The 'Emden,' most successful of them, sank 17 vessels, representing a value of 2,211,000*l.*, besides three sent into port; the 'Karlsruhe' also sank 17 vessels, representing 1,662,000*l.* It was estimated that the property sunk by the German cruisers amounted to 7 per cent. of the total value of British shipping and their cargoes afloat. The campaign against commerce lost its intensity after the destruction of Count von Spee's squadron by Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee at the Falkland Isles, on Dec. 8, 1914. How the raiding cruisers were sunk or otherwise destroyed is on record. Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, devised the plan of a strategical web, in the weaving of which more than 70 cruisers, communicating by wireless telegraphy, as well as many armed merchantmen, were engaged. They searched the ocean and the archipelagos, working upon a plan somewhat analogous to the plan of a spider's web. By these means the enemy's cruisers were destroyed. The safety of our trade and supplies was assured; and, simultaneously, the enemy's trade was strangled, and the reduction of his colonies was begun. Equally important, the safe transit of troops from India and the Dominions was secured. This was a new triumph for Sea Power, working here, as in other things, for the maintenance of the conditions indispensable for our national existence.

On Nov. 15 last Mr Runciman stated that about 2,250,000 tons gross of British shipping had been destroyed. The Financial Secretary of the Admiralty estimated the loss to have been about 2½ per cent. of the whole merchant fleet. The values are not so easily ascertainable, but they have probably not exceeded the losses due to enemy frigates and other vessels in the war of the French Revolution and Empire, which Admiral Mahan states did not exceed 2½ per cent. of the commerce of the British

Empire. The Government war risks scheme began the war with 5 per cent. premium, but it was soon reduced to 3 per cent. and within two months to 1 per cent. It recently stood at a fraction over that figure. This is a measure of our immunity from serious danger.

The intervention of the submarine, and the part it has played in the attack upon commerce, and not only on commerce, but on liners like the 'Lusitania,' 'Falaba,' 'Persia' and 'Arabia,' to name no others, and upon fishing trawlers and other craft, is a new feature in warfare. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, some time before the war, expressed the view that the submarine would sound the knell of the battleship; but the enemy's submarines have been much more successful against vessels which are not ships of war. Neutral vessels, especially Norwegian, have fallen victims in large numbers; and there can be no question that the object is to reduce the volume of shipping available for the carrying trade of the Allies, either by actual destruction or by compelling neutrals to desist from engaging in their trade, and especially in the carrying trade of the United Kingdom. The submarine blockade of our coasts, which was proclaimed on Feb. 2, 1915, was intended to reduce our food supplies by sinking our own ships. It failed of its purpose from the beginning, and about the month of April in the same year abated, the Admiralty having adopted certain means, whereby a great many enemy submarines were destroyed. Our home waters, in effect, became 'unhealthy' for them; and the minority report of the Government Committee on Food Supplies stated, in October 1915, that the submarine menace was 'apparently well in hand.'

This optimistic opinion—like a good many others which from time to time have been vainly uttered—was premature. Another form of blockade has been attempted, that of striking at the oceanic and other branches of the carrying trade. Enemy boats of longer range and greater sea-keeping powers have been built; and about the middle of 1916 they began their depredations with this object in more distant waters, especially the Mediterranean. Efforts were made to root out the enemy's resources in the Mediterranean, where allied bases were established at Suda Bay in Crete,

Argostoli, Castellorizo and other places; and search parties were landed at Corfu, Zante, the Piræus, Phaleron, and on the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. The more powerful character and greater range and speed of the new enemy submarines, which have even crossed the Atlantic, point to the greater need of arming merchantmen, to the necessity of new measures of protection, and possibly to a recurrence to the old practice of convoy in threatened waters. The place of the submarine in naval warfare has not been made clear. It has modified strategic dispositions, and it may yet change the relative value of warship classes. Of its destructive power there can be no question.

Here it is important to observe that the great rise in the price of commodities does not imply any failure of the Navy, unless it be in some measure of ability as yet completely to suppress the attack of the submarine. The real causes of the enhancement of prices are mainly the absorption of mercantile shipping in the needs of the transport and other services of the allied countries, the shortage of labour at the docks for the handling of cargo, the employment of the fishery population in the mine-trawling and other work of the Navy, the withdrawal of men from agriculture and productive work for service in the Army, the insufficiency of neutral tonnage, and the restriction of exports to this country. Moreover, a large number of vessels was employed in the Gallipoli expedition and other operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and it seems certain that one of the objects of the enemy in his great thrust in the Balkans is to impose a still greater demand upon our mercantile marine in the work of transport in a sea in which his submarines may find their opportunities. These causes, combined with a considerable shrinkage of the volume of shipping due to submarine attack, account for the situation that has arisen.

The use of the submarine by the Germans has a direct relation to our blockade of the German coasts. Admiral Mahan, writing of the War of 1702-'14, said that

'the noiseless, steady, exhausting power with which Sea Power acts, cutting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes where it does

not appear itself, or appears only in the background, and striking open blows at rare intervals, though lost to most, is emphasised to the careful reader by the events of this war and of the half-century that followed.'

It is this pressure which we have sought to impose on the Central Powers by a blockade of ever-increasing stringency. How far we have succeeded cannot be stated definitely. The German declaration of Feb. 2, 1915, alleged that the 'war area' round our coasts was established in retaliation for our assumed illegal action. 'Since the shutting off of food supplies has come to a point when Germany no longer has sufficient food for her people, it has become necessary to bring England to terms by the exercise of force.' Yet, long after this date, the Imperial Chancellor and Herr von Batocki, Director of Food Supplies, declared that, notwithstanding much constriction, the nourishment of the German people was not endangered. Either the first statement was untrue, or there had been a gross miscalculation. Undoubtedly there is great scarcity in Germany, but the organising genius of the German people is directed to forestalling its consequences. The procedure in cutting off supplies from Germany is precisely analogous to the prevention of supplies reaching a besieged fortress. The rectitude of the procedure was set forth in the Reichstag, on March 4, 1892, by no less a person than General von Caprivi, then Imperial Chancellor, who said :

'The more a country depends on maritime commerce, the more necessary is it to cut all its communications in case of war at sea. Such a country might have need of this commerce for its food supplies and for the raw materials necessary for its industries. I am of opinion that to interrupt the enemy's navigation will remain an indispensable means of the struggle. He who makes war wishes to attain his ends; and, when he possesses the energy, he succeeds by employing every possible means, including, in war at sea, that of interrupting the communications of his enemy. No one can renounce this supreme weapon. It is, moreover, what is done in land warfare. If anyone during the Siege of Paris had sent a train of provisions towards the French Capital, that train would have been arrested. It is the same at sea.'*

* Speech quoted in 'L'Homme Enchaîné,' Feb. 27, 1915.

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From these remarks on our blockade of Germany we are brought to a consideration of the very serious and important question of certain limitations of naval power, which are visible in the present war. It is a self-evident proposition that ships of war cannot operate on land, except in so far as the range of their guns may enable them to attack places lying in the vicinity of the coast, or of the bank of some great river which naval vessels may be able to ascend. Therefore, unless naval forces can meet and engage the naval forces of the enemy, or can injure him by inflicting damage upon vulnerable and important places on his coast, they can act against him only by destroying his mercantile shipping, or driving it to port, and generally in the way of blockade. This has been the work of the Navy in the war. It seems certain that, in the conditions of modern states, it becomes more than ever difficult to exert that 'pressure on the vitals' of a nation to which Admiral Mahan has referred. Methods of food conservation, cold storage, the introduction of food substitutes through the use of natural products, such as nuts and nut-oil, and, in the domain of industry, of fibres and woods which it was not necessary to use in peace time, have strengthened resistance against the effects of blockade.

Increased means of inland communication have had a powerful influence in the same direction. If Germany had had no other means than the horse-waggons and river transport of former times for the collection and distribution of food, the war might conceivably have been over by this time. But the magnificent internal communications of the Central Powers enable them to draw supplies from the rich grain districts of Hungary and the countries bordering the Adriatic, and from Bulgaria, Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor. Vast supplies of corn and other produce were drawn from Rumania; and the rapid development of force to conquer that country, after she had joined the Allies, was sufficiently explained by the immense value of her resources in grain and oil. All these things add very greatly to the means of resisting the pressure of the naval blockade; and we know also that all our efforts have not prevented supplies from reaching Germany from and through Sweden and other neutrals.

Moreover, though naval action is limited by the enemy's coasts, the enemy enjoys the immense advantage of his central position which our Navy cannot touch, and of interior lines for the free movement of his troops. The German road to the East is made practically invulnerable by nature. The railway from Belgrade to Constantinople has better protection than almost any other similar route in the world. It adds immensely to the resources of the Central Powers. The Germans have also been able to utilise their forces in a way impossible to the Allies, by transporting them rapidly from front to front; and with these movements the Navy has not enabled us to interfere.

The power of the impending stroke, which belongs primarily to naval strategy, is now possessed in some degree by land forces. Armies may be immobilised, because we do not know where the enemy will make his stroke. An 'Army of Egypt' was announced as being organised; and the danger caused defensive preparations to be made and troops assembled in that country on a greater scale than was actually required by the military situation. Naval forces may themselves be augmented by means of internal communications, and German submarines have been sent in sections to be assembled at Trieste or Pola, and have also made their appearance in the Danube and the Black Sea.

The Germans have spoken a good deal during the war of 'Moltke' defeating 'Mahan'; and it was doubtless with such facts as are adduced above in his mind that Prof. Jäckh, a distinguished German Orientalist, declared his belief, in February 1916, that in the long run land power would show its superiority over sea power, 'whatever British and American theorists might say.' British policy ran generally counter to the construction of the Baghdad railway. Land communication through the heart of Europe into Asia was instinctively felt to be opposed to the interests of the great Sea Power. Doubtless the Anatolian railway was of enormous advantage to Turkey, but the control of the work carried onward to Baghdad, and intended to be carried down to the Persian Gulf, was obviously intimately bound up with our ability to carry help to India and the East. The enormous improvement of territorial communications—

railways, telegraphs, etc.—has undoubtedly done much to neutralise the superiority of Sea Power in some parts of the world.

It is gratifying to turn from the limitations of naval power indicated above, which cannot be questioned, to one of its greatest triumphs. History has no parallel for the gathering of our armies in this war, the despatching of them to many theatres of the hostilities, the constant supplying of them with guns, munitions and stores of every imaginable kind, the furnishing of our Allies with everything that their forces require—all this accomplished under the sure shield of naval protection. Not a soldier has gone afloat but a sailor has carried him on his back. We have gathered armies and supplies from every Dominion and Colony, and sent them to France, to Salonika, the Dardanelles, Egypt, Macedonia, India and Africa. Wherever the sea could carry troops or supplies, if they were required, they went. Because of the supremacy of our sea power, Archangel became filled with the ships of every friendly nation. Through Archangel have poured enormous supplies for the Russian armies; and the port, from being a sleepy harbour, became as busy a place as could be found anywhere on the continent of Europe, unless it were some port on the French coast of the Channel filled with the ceaseless *va et vient* of the great armies which have fought on the Yser and the Somme. Mr Balfour, in his speech on the Navy Estimates, March 7, 1916, indicated the magnitude of the work that had then been achieved.

'If you take the distance between Archangel in the north and Alexandria in the eastern base of the Mediterranean you will find that distance to be about 5000 miles; and those 5000 miles had in a large part to be guarded solely by the British fleets, and in another part had to be guarded by British fleets combined with those of our Allies, but in a manner which threw necessarily an immense strain upon the British Fleet. About 4,000,000 combatants have been transported under the guardianship of the British Fleet, 1,000,000 horses and other animals, 2,500,000 tons of stores, and, in addition, 22,000,000 gallons of oil for us and for our Allies. . . . This, in the presence, not of German cruisers, but of German submarines, threw an enormous task upon the British Navy which could

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hardly be foreseen, still less provided against, in the first days of the war. . . . If you had laid the matter before some professor of the theory of warfare or some student of military and naval history, I do not believe he would for a moment have admitted the possibility, in the face of the special difficulties with which we have to deal, of maintaining these enormous armies in Egypt, the Dardanelles, Salonika, to say nothing of Mesopotamia, or of the Colonial operations in East Africa or in the Cameroons—of carrying out such an operation as that without suffering immense losses, even if the operation could be carried out at all, in any circumstances, with the resources at the disposal even of the greatest Naval Power in the world.

Incalculable in their value have been the services thus rendered by the Navy to the country and the Allies. During the despatch of the original Expeditionary Force to France, cruisers, destroyers, naval aircraft and submarines were on the watch, and the patrol was maintained, day and night without relief, until the army had been effectively transported. The service has been continued ever since, and we can pay no higher tribute to the Navy than to say that not a single man has been lost owing to enemy attack during the whole of these operations, except in the case of one or two transports in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There would be no hyperbole in saying that without the command of the sea, exercised by the Allied Navies, and certainly in the fullest measure by the British Navy, embodying in itself and in its work the best elements of the mercantile marine and the fisheries, the task of the Allies would have been hopeless and the triumph of the enemy secure. Sea power has not only maintained our communications, but has also protected the rear and flank of the Western armies against all enemy operations. In the Baltic the Russian Fleet, as Admiral Kanin, who was then in command, stated, supported the Russian army, protected its flank from being enveloped and made impossible a German advance on Petrograd. In the same sea British submarines, with splendid daring, have operated to the restriction of German trade with Sweden, endangering important food and mineral supplies.

In the Mediterranean, sea power has played a predominant part. The two thousand miles of sea which

lie between the Pillars of Hercules and Port Said are a vital link in the strategic chain of the Empire. The fate of nations has often been decided in these waters. After the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau' had escaped into the Dardanelles, no enemy warship that navigated the surface dared to show itself in the Mediterranean. The French and Italian Fleets, in conjunction with our own, kept control during the Dardanelles operations; it may at least be asserted that, whatever may have been the genesis and the political or other objects of the expedition, the enterprise would have been impossible without the Navy, though unfortunately it exhibited an original want of understanding and co-operation between the naval and military authorities at home which exceeded in its mischievous effects anything of the kind in our history. The expedition of Saunders and Wolfe to Quebec in 1759 and of Jervis and Grey to the West Indies in 1793, showed how such expeditions may succeed; the relation into which Byng and Blakeney were brought in 1756 indicated the causes which lead to failure. In the case of the Dardanelles, the failure was not at the scene of action. Naval and military officers and seamen worked together on the spot with the utmost zeal and in full comradeship. Sir Ian Hamilton said the Navy was the sheet anchor on which the elaborate operations at Suvla Bay hung. 'One tiny flaw in the mutual trust and confidence animating the two services would have wrecked the whole enterprise.' Sir Charles Munro, after the evacuation, said it was a stroke of good fortune for the army to be associated with a service 'whose work remained throughout this anxious period beyond the power of criticism or censure.'

It was the good fortune of the British Navy in the Mediterranean to be associated in the closest co-operation with the gallant Navies of France and Italy. The Austro-Hungarian Navy has been condemned to inaction at Pola, though it is noteworthy that the Dalmatian fringe of islands presents immense advantages to the Austrian flotillas; and it is largely due to this situation that the Austrian hold on Cattaro is maintained. There have been a few enemy raids on the Italian coast, but the general situation has not thereby been affected. The enemy navy, notwithstanding its geographical

advantages, was unable to interfere with the delicate and difficult task of transporting the Italian army to Albania, or the withdrawal of the Serbian army from the coast, though attempts were made by cruisers, destroyers and aircraft. It was powerless also to check the advance of the Italians on the coast roads to Monfalcone.

Nor must we forget the influence of naval power in the reduction of the distant possessions of the enemy. It was by the service of the Allied Navy of Japan that Kiao-Chau was wrested from the Germans; and the Japanese took a part in the rounding-up of the enemy cruisers. All the German colonies have fallen to sea power. The Dominions have been with us from the beginning in this and other duties. The battle-cruiser 'New Zealand,' built for the Dominion, had already joined the British Fleet. The Commonwealth Government placed the Royal Australian Navy at the disposal of the Admiralty; and its cruisers were invaluable in sweeping the enemy commerce from the seas. It was the cruiser 'Sydney' that destroyed the 'Emden.' The battle-cruiser 'Australia' joined the Grand Fleet.

To conclude—many times has the Navy stood between the country and its would-be master. The 'island set in the silver sea' has always been in its care. It is fulfilling its historic functions once more. It is the safeguard against invasion, the protector of the food supplies and necessities of the country, the bond of the Empire, also the shaft to the military spearhead, the support of the Allies, and the guardian of all we have won in many hundreds of years. It has destroyed the enemy's floating commerce, ended his colonial empire, and forbidden him to make any stroke against the Allies by sea. Of some of the less-known elements in this great force, and of their work in our behalf, we hope to speak in a second article.

JOHN LEYLAND.

Art. 7.—DOMINION VIEWS ON IMPERIAL UNITY.

In view of the importance of ascertaining what is the state of opinion in the self-governing Dominions of the Empire on the question of Imperial Unity, an endeavour has been made to obtain contributions on the subject from distinguished and influential citizens of the Dominions themselves. It was suggested that these contributions should present, not so much the personal views of the writers, as their impressions of the trend of public opinion in the countries concerned. The following article comprises communications from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.
—(EDITOR.)

(1) AUSTRALIA.

A LEADING article in the Melbourne 'Age' for July 3, 1915, opens with these words: 'It requires very little prescience to foresee that the British Empire after the close of the great war will undergo great changes. It is given to few if any to foretell what these changes must be.' This attitude, on the part of an organ not usually troubled with doubts and uncertainty, fairly represents the condition of Australian opinion. Political thought, whether we look to Parliaments, the press, or the electorate, has not yet proceeded beyond a general recognition of the truth contained in the 'Age' article, and the assumption that in some mode or other the Dominions will be consulted in the arrangement of the terms of peace.

Contrast with this mental inertia the penetrating survey of the present constitutional position by Mr Hughes, on the eve of his return to Australia:

'The consequences of war to the Dominions,' he said, 'were not limited to the contributions of men to fight the battles of the Empire, nor to their maintenance, but extended in such a way as in effect to reduce the self-governing powers of the Dominions, merely giving effect to the war policy determined by those who controlled it. And the effect of doing those things that had to be done would not cease when the war ended, but would remain for many years—in this case at least for a generation—to modify profoundly, if not actually to determine, the policy of the Dominions. It would hardly be denied that, if Britain had a right to compel the Dominions to incur such a tremendous burden of debt as this

war would impose upon all of them, it had, for all practical purposes, the power to compel them to impose heavy taxation upon themselves; and, if one nation had a right to tax another, it was perfectly clear that the sovereignty or quasi-sovereignty of the latter disappeared. The causes of war were numerous; certainly no nation had ever been at a loss for a pretext for war when its interests demanded it. The circumstances of each nation determined its foreign policy; and it was well to realise that the domestic policy of every country was profoundly affected by its foreign policy. Treaties were among the most prolific causes of war; and, since Britain entered into these without consulting the Dominions, it followed that the Dominions, for causes that they might not approve, might be launched into war. This was incompatible with democratic government. Every one must accept the Prime Minister's statement that it must not continue. What form the change should take, he would not attempt to say now; but there must be a change, and it must be radical in its nature.' (The 'Times,' June 24, 1916.)

Nowhere has the Imperial problem been stated more clearly, and nowhere has the pressing need for a solution been expressed more emphatically.

In some respects, the position of the Australian colonies has been that of the United Kingdom intensified. The economic and political development of Great Britain rested upon the security of her insular position. Both the development and the security on which it rested helped to turn the minds of the people from any close and continuous attention to European politics. In Australia, more remote from the scene of *la haute politique*, more fully occupied with economic development and economic problems, the political interest of the people even more naturally turned inward; and the instinct of self-government was satisfied with the control of internal affairs.

The emergence of industrial politics did not radically alter this point of view; but the enjoyment and improvement of Australian social conditions was found to call for measures of a protective kind. New local activities appeared, such as the growth of an extensive shipping trade, and the necessity of establishing 'Australian conditions' in them. The doctrine of a 'White Australia' was formulated, partly as an economic, partly as a racial policy, and partly as a manifestation of democracy. All

must be excluded who could not be assimilated to our social conditions and our political life, or whose presence would threaten our economic standards. And this exclusion must apply in the case not merely of the settled parts but of the remotest parts of the Continent. No European Government, not even a British Government, could be trusted with guiding the development of any part of the Continent.

As soon as the establishment of federation called into existence a government released from the especial functions of 'colonial development,' the national interests as thus conceived began to receive more attention; and with the stimulus of events in the Far East it was realised that Australia had external relations of a vitally important kind, and a policy which might be challenged. In other words, the leaders of Australian democracy found that foreign policy was not the mere gold lace of court dress, but an essential phase of national existence. The result was the foundation of a system of defence on land and sea which, both in its political and its strategic character, has been built upon and to a great extent limited by these considerations. The Australian organisation and control of defence was a reminder to the Imperial Government and the people of Australia of distinct national interests forming part of the sphere of Australian government.

With this expansion of interests and policy, it is plain that the content rather than the meaning of self-government has undergone a great change since 1855. It has meant, throughout, the control of those matters of which the people were conscious as affecting intimately their interests and aspirations; and the circle of such matters has constantly tended to widen.

A commonwealth of five million people claiming the exclusive occupation of a Continent capable of supporting a population variously estimated at from 50 to 100 millions, establishing rigorous conditions of admission to the territory and setting up its own citizenship, determining its trade policy, enacting shipping laws, raising its own defence forces and sending its navy out on the high seas under its own flag; treated for most of the administrative relations of independent states (e.g. postal conventions) as a distinct unit—such conditions require

us to revise our constitutional formulas. The change has been conveniently described as a transition from the 'colonial' to the 'national' stage; it has been officially marked by the substitution of the term 'Dominion' for 'Colony'; and, in place of supremacy and dependence, we speak of co-operation and partnership.

Both the advantages and the disadvantages of the system have been for some time manifest. It has been admirably adapted to that sense of self-government which corresponds in the case of the community with the principle of liberty in the case of the individual; and, just because it has rested upon political understandings rather than legal rules, 'responsible government' has had a power of adaptation to new conditions. The unquestioning spirit in which the Dominions have taxed their resources in the present war has added to the material assistance a moral value which, in the eyes of many, does more than vindicate the informal and extra-legal character of Imperial relations, and establishes the wisdom of our political development. This was the most general response of the Australian Press when Mr Hughes, in one of his speeches in England demanding Imperial organisation, was understood to have associated himself with some scheme for 'organic union.' A typical and long-standing Australian view of tendencies is no doubt expressed in the conclusion of the 'Age' article ('many times insisted on in these columns') already referred to—'that the ultimate goal of Empire will be found not in any form of federation which, from its very clumsiness, would be quite unworkable, but in a family alliance of free and independent nations.' The only definite meaning to be assigned to such a conclusion would be the dissolution of the British Empire as a political unit. The writer quite certainly does not mean that; and the vagueness of any other meaning that could be assigned to it in no way detracts from its value as an expression of common opinion.

On the other hand, the system has been the negation of unity in policy and strategy. Australia, conscious of her own interests, has been aware of the possibility of their being overlooked amid European complications of which she was a little impatient, and fearful of their

sacrifice in favour of ends which she did not deem to be her immediate concern. Great Britain on her side found her anxieties increased by an Australian policy not restrained by responsibility, and by a disposition, in the absence of that responsibility, to treat, as if they were matters of domestic and constitutional concern, affairs which a sovereign government could only regard as involving foreign relations.

The war has revealed in a tragic way Australia's concern in European politics, and her liabilities as a member of the Empire. Not for many months did she realise that the case differed otherwise than in degree from the campaigns in which she had already sent her sons to take their place in the fighting line beside those of Great Britain; that she was engaged in a struggle wherein victory could be won only by sacrifices which had never entered into her imagination; and that every interest and every aspiration that belonged to her nationhood were at stake. Nothing in the history of Australia leads us to suppose that she can regard as outside self-government anything that she has found to affect her vital interests, or that she will continue, except of dire necessity, to accept a situation which commits her to the consequences of a policy in which her people have no share. If, as appears likely, one result of the war is the assumption by the people of the United Kingdom of a more real control over the foreign policy of the country, Australia will be the more conscious of her own exclusion.

The problem, so far as Australia is concerned, must be, how far she can realise this final attainment of self-government within the Empire. The impossibility of divided control, declared by Mr Asquith in 1911, is emphasised by every circumstance connected with the present war. Australia can hardly find her share in the control of foreign policy by an extension of the functions of her own Commonwealth Government without a definite breach in the unity of the Empire and the assumption of the status of an independent nation in alliance merely with Great Britain. Indeed, the functions of the Australian Government are already so far-reaching as to make a dangerous gulf between the power of a Dominion Government and the responsibility of the Imperial Government. Every sentiment and every

interest of Australia repel the notion of separation; with her vast undertakings she has a vital need for the support which membership of the Empire confers and which could not be guaranteed by any mere alliance.

In the matter of defence, defects appear in the system, whether it be regarded from the standpoint of strategy or of polities. In form, the cooperation of Australia in war, its manner and extent, depend upon the free will of her Government when the occasion for action arises. In the early stages of the war, pride in the good services rendered by the Australian navy, in the first instance to our own coasts and shipping and then to the whole Empire through the destruction of the 'Emden,' and the success with which a large force was raised and transported to Europe, disposed even doubters to applaud our policy, and strengthened the feeling of confidence and satisfaction with the system which had produced it. But as the months passed, and the news received no longer encouraged the hope of an early termination of the war in our favour, people began to realise that, where all was at stake, every resource must be available; that every part of the Empire was called on for its own preservation to do no less than its utmost. It was apparent that every Dominion was endangered, if its resources did not enter into the scheme of imperial defence as fully as did those of the United Kingdom; and impatience was manifested when, in the urgency of the demand for munitions, the possibilities of supply from Australia appeared to be ignored.

Every scheme of strategy must be partial and hypothetical which cannot take account and dispose of the resources of the Dominions on a comprehensive plan. Australian democracy, even more than English, is willing to make large sacrifices of efficiency for the sake of its conceptions of self-government, personal liberty and justice. Its own institutions bear many marks of the small attention which the administrative side of public affairs has received in comparison with the representative and political. But here there is more involved than administrative co-ordination. Membership of the Empire involves unlimited liability to share in the common defence. Ultimately, defence, like every other matter of government, becomes a matter of political responsibility.

Yet the matters for which, in the actual conduct of the present war, the people of Australia can justly hold the Commonwealth Government responsible, cover a very small part of the actual employment of Australia's forces. The Dardanelles expedition, to mention only one episode of the war, can hardly fail to bring home to Australians, perhaps more directly and vividly even than the war itself, that there are matters of responsibility which concern them very closely, but for which the existing constitution offers them no satisfaction.

There was doubtless wisdom in the counsel of those who, like the late Lord Salisbury, warned us against attempts to force a decision before a decision was ready; and the appeal for delay may have been appropriate to the political conditions of 1902.* But between 1902 and the present—between August 1914 and the present—there is a great gulf fixed. We have been carried too far in one leap for the necessary adjustments within the Empire to wait on the 'slow process of evolution' or other unconscious methods of adaptation. The danger that Lord Salisbury saw is still with us—the risk of discord in political institutions and the facts with which they have to deal. But to-day it lies in the fact that the actual relations have outrun their political expression. Some definite constructive policy will be demanded to bring the government of the Empire into harmony with the realities of the new situation.

The main objects to be attained in the re-settlement of Imperial relations are the efficient organisation and co-ordination of the resources of the Empire for common defence, the correlation of foreign policy and military strength, and a common responsibility for policy in foreign affairs. So far as the problems are administrative merely, the realisation of earlier schemes for a permanent secretariat, an intelligence department, expert commissions for collecting information, subsidiary conferences to deal with special subjects, and an Imperial general staff, might go some way to the solution of many of them. So far as the questions are matters of government and policy, the Imperial Conference and the

* The reference is to the speech of May 7, 1902.

Committee of Imperial Defence have been to some extent rival claimants for the position of an Imperial council of advice. Either of them might be used for this purpose, if the Dominions made the office of High Commissioner more definitely an office of political functions, as Australia appears likely to make it. At present the High Commissioner is (to borrow an analogy from the international field) a consular rather than a diplomatic agent. But schemes of this kind stop at consultative and advisory functions. The Conference is rather a council of diplomats, representing distinct Governments, than an organ of government. It is without power of binding determination; its essential principle is that of independent action by the several Governments; its responsibility is the responsibility of each Government to its own constituency. Its importance, therefore, is practically limited to those comparatively minor matters in which independent decision and action are possible. If it extended to matters of the first importance, it would proclaim that the Empire had already become a mere alliance.

Australia at any rate has not far to travel for illustration of the futility of attempting the work of government through conferences of independent Governments. Her own history from 1863 to the establishment of the Commonwealth was one of the failure of conferences to deal effectively with any subject, a history which did perhaps more than anything else to educate politicians as to the need for closer union.* Nor is the younger generation in Australia without a reminder of the same weakness in the arrangements of Conferences of Premiers at the present day.

The Committee of Imperial Defence differs from the Conference in more ways than one, but principally in that its advisory relation to the British Government emphasises the concentration of power in the Government of the United Kingdom. It has more than once been affirmed that the existence and functions of the Committee in no way impair the sole responsibility of

* For an account of the Intercolonial Conference, see the 'Quarterly Review,' No. 380 (Oct. 1899); Quick & Garran's 'Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth,' p. 103, *seq.*; Moore's 'Commonwealth of Australia,' 1st ed., p. 33, *seq.*

the British Cabinet to the House of Commons for Imperial policy. The Committee might have proved a useful organ for consultation and advice in an intermediate stage of development, while action and responsibility still remained in the British Government; but the war has in fact swept us beyond this stage. The problem is now one of securing unity in action and responsibility to, and therefore of, all.

In any scheme of union the first question must be whether the central power is to be based upon, and exercise authority over, the several constituent Governments merely, or is to be a Government of and over the people as its own citizens; in other words, whether the union is to be of the 'confederate' or of the 'federal' type. The common allegiance to the Crown, the notion of British citizenship (albeit rather hazy), and the formal supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, point to Federalism. But the history of our actual relations would point rather to a union of Governments. When Australian thought begins to move towards the solution of the Imperial problem, it is hardly doubtful that its first inclination will be in this direction.

It is a conceivable development of the Imperial Conference that it should acquire power to make determinations binding upon the several constituent Governments, and thus become the organ of a 'Britannic Confederation.' With a somewhat enlarged membership, it might serve as a permanent council for foreign affairs, defence, and the relations of the several parts of the Empire *inter se*, a council the concurrence of which should be necessary to all the more important acts of Government under these several heads. The Ministers in charge of the departments directly concerned might be appointed by the Crown on its nomination, and might be immediately responsible to it. It could be practically in continuous session, and it might have the active assistance, both for information and deliberation, of the permanent heads of the departments. Such a body might serve more than one modern purpose. It would bring together the representatives of the several parts of the Empire. But it would also bring together departments of Government, and it would associate with them the council or committee system which many of our reformers have

desired, in no department so much as foreign affairs. Sufficiently small to be a real deliberative council, it might be sufficiently large to be able to make use of committees of its own members. It might be a valuable means of educating the public mind, for it might meet in open session whenever the nature of the business permitted it.

Selection of members by the several Governments would go some way towards ensuring a choice of fit persons, for probably each Government would have some care at any rate not to appear at too great a disadvantage in council with others. A system which definitely links the 'State' Governments, as such, with the 'Imperial' or 'Confederate' Government has, too, an advantage which some federal systems have not secured. The peculiar conditions of the British Empire make it inevitable that some things—such as taxation—which in a homogeneous community would be the subject of uniform action by a common authority, should be the subject of special arrangements to suit local conditions. The war, just in proportion as it has demonstrated the interdependence of all our social and economic relations, has increased the difficulties of a separation of powers, which would leave each Government completely equipped for the fulfilment of its own functions without recourse to the other. No scheme of union can, therefore, afford to disregard conditions which are favourable to co-operation among the several Governments.

The disadvantages and weaknesses of the confederate system are too notorious and too well proven in history to need restatement. It does indeed avoid the requirement of unanimity which marks the conference of independent States. But its decisions in matters beyond those which can be carried out by the acts of its own Ministers (e.g. the making of a treaty) rise no higher than an agreement of the Governments, and have as little security for their execution. The possibility of miscarriage is brought to a certainty when it is realised that many of these decisions, and, in particular, decisions in finance, could, according to the traditions of all popular Governments, only be carried into effect by legislative act, and would therefore require the concurrence of numerous and variously constituted chambers in the component States.

It is hardly to be expected that, in the first instance, a convention will be assembled to frame a scheme of government. What is more likely is that the statesmen of the Empire will find themselves confronted in conference with a number of definite problems. Australian opinion as yet appears to be more concerned with future trade relations than with political construction, but with those relations as bearing immediately on foreign policy and defence. These problems will be sufficiently serious and practical to compel a more candid facing of the facts than we are perhaps accustomed to in our Imperial relations. The occasion will find men in the mood for seriousness and candour; and many comfortable words which have passed current as political wisdom will be found to have been no more than substitutes for taking thought. It may well become clear that nothing but a large measure will be a safe measure; that nothing short of a federal union will meet the case.

As the primary concerns of any scheme of Imperial union are defence and foreign politics, the structural part of any constitution must be dominated by government and administration—executive functions. The legislative function will no doubt be essential, but its place will be auxiliary. The case is very different from that of a constitution with plenary powers, where the business of Government consists mainly in preparing legislation and administering laws. It would not be wise, therefore, to follow existing models of parliamentary government too closely. It would appear essential that the federal nature of the union should express itself in the organisation and working of the executive. It may well be that this result could best be attained through the constitution of a Council or Senate upon the lines and with the functions already described as representing a possible development of the Imperial Conference. Such a body would be at once an executive council and a part of the legislature, though it would be very much more than a 'second chamber.' It would fulfil functions similar to those which appear to have been designed for the Senate in the United States, the plan of which was influenced by the 'Governor's Council,' at once executive and legislative, of the colonial period.

In such conditions the Ministers would be subjected to continuous criticism and responsibility. There would be an elective assembly, but its meetings need neither be frequent nor long. It might perhaps be desirable that, when the full Parliament was called, the Senators and elected representatives should sit as a single chamber. This would prevent conflicts and possible deadlock, and would bring Ministers into immediate touch with, and responsibility (though not exclusive responsibility) to, the elected members.

In working out the details of constitutional reconstruction, difficulties will be encountered at every step, any one of which will be insuperable unless there is a conviction that it must be overcome. To some of us, British statesmen of the reflective type appear rather to exaggerate the difficulties of federation, with its necessary division of authority, in relation to the responsibilities of an Empire. The present war, while (as already pointed out) it may in some respects justify the opinion of those who deprecate any constitutional separation of powers as artificial and therefore dangerous, does from another point of view disclose the perils of a system which leaves the primary functions of government—security from external attack—undistinguished from a multitude of miscellaneous matters, most of them closer to the daily life and experience of the people. Of the two lessons the second seems likely to have the greater effect on public opinion. In the United Kingdom, the stability of constitutional arrangements has no doubt suffered by all that has happened since 1909. But out of much that is evil this good at any rate may come—that the resistance to adaptation will be diminished.

Federalism is the expression of a reasoned conviction of political necessity rather than the spontaneous outcome of sentiment. Without joining with those who see in the Dominions all the qualities of statesmanship that they find lacking in the United Kingdom, it may be said that the statesmen of the Dominion will bring to conference two valuable qualifications for the task of political reconstruction—experience, and a courage which will help to reduce difficulties to their due proportion. We need not fear that any will refuse to admit now what two years ago many would have failed to

recognise—that there is an Imperial problem to be solved. The next step must be the conviction of leaders as to the general nature of the means of solution. There will remain the task and the responsibility of forming a public opinion sufficiently strong to carry an effective measure. Any measure which is not really effective will only produce those 'feelings of discontent, feelings of difficulty,' which Lord Salisbury feared, and may well bring about results very different from any we desire.

(2) NEW ZEALAND.

WHEN one is asked what New Zealand thinks ought to be done in the matter of remodelling the Constitution of the Empire after the war, so as to give the Dominions a greater voice in the settlement of Imperial affairs, it is not very easy to answer the question. The politicians, irrespective of party, have been curiously chary of discussing in Parliament the wide Imperial issues which sooner or later every part of the Empire will have to face.

In these circumstances the writer, in his endeavour to discover what is the trend of New Zealand feeling regarding the future Government of the Empire, has taken the opportunity of conferring not only with political leaders on both sides of the House, but with others who are not in politics, whose opinions, representing some of the more solid elements of thought in the country, are at least of equal value. These include Judges of the Supreme Court and eminent members of the Bar, University professors, and a number of leading business men and farmers who have taken the trouble in their leisure hours to study Imperial questions, and to think seriously about the future of the Empire.

In the first place it may be said that one finds an emphatic and unanimous opinion that 'things can never be the same after the war as they were before,' and that there is not only an ardent desire for closer unity, but a firm conviction that the war will in some way knit the British Empire more closely together. When, however, one comes to practical suggestions for bringing about closer union by means of an alteration in the constitutional machinery, marked differences of opinion are

met with. Those who wish for some organic change urge that, since the Oversea Dominions are necessarily involved in any war in which England may engage, they ought to have direct influence on the foreign policy of the Empire. The present system of cooperation is regarded as crude, anomalous, and illogical; and, although it may have stood the strain of the present crisis, doubts are expressed as to whether it will be sufficient for the needs of the future. Nearly all students of Imperial questions, however much they may differ on other points, agree that the great Dominion of Canada is the *crux* of the situation; and they speculate as to what is likely to be the position when its population exceeds that of the mother-country, as it may easily do within the lifetime of some of those just entering on the world's stage. A consideration which weighs very heavily on the minds of the most patriotic New Zealanders is the huge burden of military and naval defence which rests on the mother-country, and the want of any equitable and systematic arrangement to ensure the Dominions taking a fair share of the load.

But, when one comes to concrete proposals for removing the alleged anomalies and defects in the present system, even those who say there must be a change are very chary of committing themselves to details. Take, for instance, the suggestion that an Imperial Parliament, in which every part of the Empire is represented, shall be set up to deal with Foreign Policy, Defence, and other questions affecting the whole Empire, leaving the British Parliament, the Irish Parliament (if and when it comes into being), and the Dominion Parliaments to deal with their own local affairs. Very few New Zealanders who have given serious thought to the subject would agree to surrender to a central governing body any portion of the autonomy and liberties they at present enjoy, in consideration of a more or less nominal representation on that body. Such an Assembly, be it Parliament or Council, if its control of Imperial affairs is to be effective, must be invested with powers of compulsion. It must be in a position to make levies on the constituent States if the cost of defence is to be made a joint charge, shared in proportion to population or on any other basis that may be decided upon. Presumably also, in time of war,

it will make levies of men and prescribe the proportion to be furnished by each State instead of trusting to the free and spontaneous operation of national patriotism, which has not failed the Empire in the present emergency. In these and other respects it is feared that the ' silken ties of kinship ' may be replaced by fetters which will gall, and in the end prove less potent as a means of keeping the Empire together.

As to the contention that the Dominions under the present system have no voice in deciding the issues of peace and war, it is asked whether this is strictly correct? Is it conceivable that any British Cabinet, in shaping its foreign policy in future, would take any step which might possibly lead to war, without pausing to consider seriously whether the cause was such as to command, not only the support, but the enthusiastic approval of the Dominions? In effect, would not the indirect influence exercised by the Dominions under the present system be almost, if not quite, as great as the influence which they would be able to exert directly in an Imperial Parliament in which they were represented?

Because the cry of 'no taxation without representation' was raised at the time of the American Revolution, it is sometimes assumed that representation will always be regarded as ample excuse and solatium for taxation and other forms of compulsion which a Federation Parliament exercises over its component States. New Zealand was strongly wooed by Australian statesmen to enter the Commonwealth on its foundation; and, when she declined, the way was left open for her subsequent entry, should she so desire. The New Zealand people, as a whole, had no hesitation in deciding that these islands would do better to preserve their independence and work out their own national destiny; and there is not an Australian statesman who visits these shores who does not now admit that, whether it was instinct or considered judgment which guided New Zealand on that occasion, the decision was perfectly sound and wise.

One of the ablest of the Commissioners appointed by the New Zealand Government to consider the question of Federation with Australia was Sir John Hall, at one time Prime Minister of the Colony; and a sentence in his report has passed into a proverb. Alluding to the

distance in miles between New Zealand and Australia, he said there were twelve hundred reasons why New Zealand should not link her political fortunes with those of the commonwealth. There are many who now hold that there are twelve thousand reasons why New Zealand should not enter into a Federation of the Empire which would lead to our being taxed from London, to say nothing of the possibility of our sons being called up compulsorily to take the field in response to the ukase of the same remote authority.

On the basis of population, New Zealand, in an Imperial Parliament of three hundred members, would be entitled to five representatives. Apart from the difficulty of finding five New Zealanders who could afford to go home for the purpose, and in whom at the same time a democracy which looks rather askance at men with independent means would have complete confidence, there is a practical certainty that those elected would in a very short time become affected by their new environment, and lose touch with those they were supposed to represent. An ordinary parliamentary representative may soon get out of sympathy with his constituency, unless he visits it frequently and talks to those who can inform him as to the local currents of the fluctuating thing called public opinion. It is a matter of common observation that High Commissioners, with unequalled opportunities for keeping themselves informed of what is going on in the Dominion they represent, find it impossible to follow a public opinion influenced by considerations unknown to the bulk of those with whom a Dominion representative in London is more immediately in contact. A case in point was the suggestion that 'Australasian public opinion' would never tolerate the withdrawal from Gallipoli, whereas in both Australia and New Zealand public opinion was unanimous that the question of withdrawal must be determined by military considerations alone, without regard to the feelings of people in the Oversea Dominions or anywhere else.

Among the jurists and serious students of constitutional history with whom the writer has discussed these questions, there is a practical consensus of opinion that any proposal to substitute a written constitution for that which is at present unwritten should not be

adopted with a light heart. The difficulties and dangers of any proposal under which an instrument, at present elastic, flexible, and capable of being so shaped as to meet fresh difficulties and requirements as they occur, is to be suddenly converted into a legal document to be rigidly interpreted and extremely difficult of modification, are cogently set forth by Prof. Dicey in the latest edition of his work on the British Constitution. Those difficulties and dangers have practical exemplification in the case of the United States; and the troubles which have beset the infant Commonwealth of Australia as the result of its written constitution form an even more striking object-lesson so far as New Zealand is concerned, because it is closer at hand. Moreover, it has been very well pointed out by Mr H. J. Randall in a review of Prof. Dicey's work ('Law Quarterly Review,' July, 1915) that

'the loosening of the legal bonds that bind the Dominions to the mother-country has proceeded concurrently with the strengthening of the political and sentimental ties. In the middle of the 19th century Parliament not only claimed to, but did actually, legislate for the Dominions in a way that would never be seriously contemplated at present; but, as the exercise of the legal powers has gradually faded into obscurity, what may be called the contractual and consensual cooperation—colonial conferences, consultation on matters of policy, participation in Imperial Defence, and the like—has grown apace.'

Among the more thoughtful students of Imperial questions in this Dominion there is a well-defined dread lest, in adopting some form of federation, with a central Parliament exercising forms of compulsion on the hitherto free States of the Empire, we may be setting back the clock, and exposing the British Empire afresh to dangers from which it happily has been freed. Those who hold this view regard with misgiving any attempt to substitute some rigid material form of union for the spiritual ties of kinship which have hitherto held the Empire together.

While holding that the Constitution of the Empire requires no such revolutionary amendment as the creation of a central Parliament with coercive powers, they are able to point to the fact that the present system has stood

the test of the greatest strain to which it could conceivably be subjected in the shape of war. On July 31, 1914, four days before the British Government had made up its mind to declare war against Germany, the Prime Minister of New Zealand telegraphed offering an expeditionary force. The later declaration of the Government—'Although New Zealand is but a small country, all we are and all we have is at the Empire's call'—was no figure of speech, but a literal expression of the spirit of the people. Fifty thousand of her sons are under arms; and reinforcements at the rate of 10 per cent. of the main body are being sent forward every month. In case the resources of voluntaryism should be exhausted—of which there is no sign at present—a Military Service Act has been placed on the Statute Book empowering the Government to call up by ballot the number required to make up the reinforcement drafts. The little island of Niue, the tiniest dependency of New Zealand, showed the same valiant and unhesitating spirit of loyalty and patriotism. Thus ran the letter from its Chief:

'To King George V, all those in authority and the brave men who fight. I am the island of Niue, a small child that stands up to help the kingdom of George V. There are two portions we are offering—(1) money; (2) men.'

This little coral atoll (formerly known as Savage Island) only thirty-six square miles in area, and with a population of four thousand men, women and children, sent 164*l.* to the Empire Defence Fund and furnished two hundred young men for active service. The spirit shown by New Zealand and its 'small child' is the spirit manifested by every self-governing Dominion and by every Crown Colony and Dependency throughout the Empire. What more, it is asked, could have been accomplished under the most perfect and logical form of federation?

Those who are opposed to any drastic change in the Constitution of the Empire agree, however, that there are many ways in which the Empire may be drawn more closely together without vitally altering its fundamental structure. The process of evolution, by which it has been built up in the past, will no doubt continue at an accelerated rate in the future. A very important step in

advance was taken when the British Government invited the Dominions to send representatives to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and still more when the Prime Minister of Australia was invited to join in the deliberations of the British Cabinet, having previously availed himself of a similar invitation from the Canadian Cabinet on his journey through the Great Dominion. The Imperial Conferences held in the past have proved of decided value, and it might be possible to hold them more frequently—say every two years. The advantage of these being attended by the Prime Minister is that he knows what he is able to accomplish by means of his majority in the local Parliament, and is in a position to give undertakings which lift the Conference far above the level of 'a glorified debating society.' During his visit to London the Prime Minister of each Dominion might also attend the meetings of the Committee of Defence, and, on occasions when matters of moment were to be discussed, he might be invited to take part in a sitting of the British Cabinet. In alternate years, i.e. when the Imperial Conference is not sitting, the Minister of Defence might visit England, and in like fashion be admitted to the inner Councils of the Empire. In that way His Majesty's Ministers overseas would be made to feel themselves more truly Ministers of a great Empire. Every Dominions Minister who visits England will admit that he has gained by his contact with British statesmen, and that his mental horizon has been enlarged by the information he has acquired. Would it not be possible for members of the British Government occasionally to visit the outer marches of the Empire? The interchange of visits of members of Parliament promoted by the Empire Parliamentary Association is all to the good, and might be further extended.

The question of the future trade relations of the Empire is too large to be entered upon in this article, but it may be stated, without hesitation, that New Zealand, which for years has had a preferential tariff in favour of the mother-country, and whose Parliament last year gave power to the Government to impose a surtax of fifty per cent. (of course after the war) upon goods coming from countries which are at present our alien enemies, will gladly welcome any plan for bringing

about closer commercial relations with the mother-country and other parts of the Empire. She will enthusiastically support proposals calculated to prevent Germany from again enriching herself at our expense, and perhaps thereby financing some future war of aggression. Judging by our experience in the past, however, something more than tariffs will be required to make our position secure. Evidence given before the Dominions Royal Commission showed that New Zealand's preferential tariff in favour of British goods was to a large extent nullified by the fact that British shipowners, to stave off German shipping competition, carried German goods from Hamburg to New Zealand at a much lower rate than that charged on British goods shipped from British ports. Probably as much could be done to conserve the Empire trade by making full use of our shipping supremacy as could be effected by means of tariffs.

There are other ways in which the Empire may be drawn together without an entire change of its organic constitution. The ideal to be aimed at was clearly seen by Prof. Seeley nearly forty years ago. 'If,' he said, 'the colonies are not, in the old phrase, possessions of England, then they must be a part of England, and we must adopt this view in earnest.' A New Zealander or an Australian in England is still treated in some respects as if he were a foreigner—for example, in being compelled to pay English income tax, not only on his English income, which would be perfectly just and fair, but on his New Zealand or Australian income as well, notwithstanding that he pays tax on the latter to the Dominion Government. It is only right to add that an Englishman who takes up his residence in the Dominions is, so far as income tax is concerned, treated in the same hostile and inequitable fashion. These are sources of irritation which should be removed by a reciprocal arrangement between the mother-country and the Dominions. New Zealand, it may be added, has already made overtures with that object in view. The Finance Act (1916) provides that, in any case in which excess profits are chargeable with excess profits duty, both in New Zealand and Great Britain, the Minister of Finance may arrange with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the duty shall be collected in one country only—the one which levies the

heavier tax—and the proceeds shall be apportioned between the two Governments as agreed.

It may doubtless be taken for granted that after the war greater facilities will be given to lads in the Dominions to enter the Army and Navy, and that the system of interchange of officers will be further extended. But there are other directions in which partitions which at present divide might with advantage be removed. Immediately after the South African War the present writer, in a letter to 'The Times,' urged that, the colonists having shown that they were prepared to fight for the Empire, every opportunity should be given to them to work for it. He suggested that colonial candidates should be given equal facilities with the residents of the British Isles to enter the English and Indian Civil Service and especially the Department ruled by the Colonial Office. This, it was pointed out, could be done by holding the examinations at the chief colonial centres at the same time as they are held in the United Kingdom, the papers of the colonial candidates being sent to the examiners and judged with the rest entirely on their merits. At present, a young New Zealander who wishes to enter the Imperial Service must go to England for his examination; and few parents can afford this expense, especially with the possibility of failure to be considered.

The system of Rhodes scholarships has placed the benefits of a liberal education at Oxford within the reach of many colonial youths of promise. Trinity College, Cambridge, some time ago, generously gave a scholarship to be awarded by the Governing Body of Canterbury College (University of New Zealand); and this has made a desirable link between the old university and the new. Christ's College Grammar School, Christchurch, New Zealand, which has founded itself on traditions of the English public schools, is the pioneer of another form of educational interchange which bears the promise of much good, if funds could be found for its extension. An arrangement has been come to with the Head Masters of Clifton and Rugby for the interchange of masters. A Clifton master took one of the houses at Christ's College; and a Christ's College master, born and educated in New Zealand, had the great privilege of serving for a couple of years or so as a master at Rugby. The benefits of

such an arrangement extend far beyond what might appear on the surface. The advantage to the New Zealand master and the New Zealand school is apparent. But the master who has returned to Clifton will be far better qualified than before to talk to the boys there on Imperial duties and responsibilities. Some of them may intend to try their fortunes overseas; if so, the master will not only be able to give them practical advice from first-hand information, but, by means of the personal friendships he has formed in New Zealand, to assist them in obtaining a footing in the new land.

It is hardly necessary to emphasise the value of cheaper cable communication as a means of linking up the component parts of the Empire. The present writer, in giving evidence before the Dominions Royal Commission, especially urged the importance of cheaper week-end messages for social purposes. English parents who send their sons to the Dominions would lose to a large extent the sense of being cut off from them which they feel at present, if for, say, half a crown, or even five shillings, they could occasionally receive a brief telegram telling of their welfare. The Dominions Commission, in an interim report, laid great stress on the importance of cheaper cabling and expressed the opinion that 'the feeling of devotion to the Empire and of loyalty to the mother-country will be strengthened in proportion as increased facilities are offered for keeping in close personal touch with friends and relatives overseas.' Some concessions have been made, but we are far from Sir Henniker Heaton's ideal of a penny a word.

Such suggestions, slight as they may appear, regarding the more or less mechanical, or at least material, means of unifying the Empire, may have their use in the evolutionary process which in time may give us an Empire more theoretically complete and logical in its constitution than it is at present. But, apart from the ties of a common literature, the common liberties, and common traditions, which have bound us together in the past, our union has been firmly cemented by the blood-brotherhood of the Great War.

(3) SOUTH AFRICA.

AT a Congress of the Nationalist Party held at Worcester in the Cape Province in September 1916 the following resolution was unanimously passed :

' This Congress, having heard of the movement in the United Kingdom and its Colonies in favour of the reconstruction of the British Empire, declares itself as strongly as possible against such reconstruction which may have the effect of any reduction of existing rights of Colonial self-government or any interference with the immediate power or rule of the people of the Union or our Government over matters of moment to the country.'

Mr Fremantle, who moved the resolution, remarked that, if a Federal Council or Parliament were established for the whole Empire, he foresaw both civil war in South Africa and war between the British Empire and South Africa. The sooner the British public and the public in the other self-governing Dominions realise what is implied by such a resolution, passed by such a body, the better for all concerned.

The Nationalist Party in the Union polled some 80,000 votes at the last general election. They at present occupy 28 seats out of 120 in the House of Assembly. They received these votes and achieved this measure of success, because, negatively, they carefully and consistently avoided any condemnation of the rebellion of 1914, and because, positively, they preached in season and out of season a doctrine diametrically opposed to that of General Botha—namely, that the South African is under no obligation whatsoever, political or moral, to fight for the British Commonwealth, and that no indissoluble identity of interest exists between the Union and the rest of the Commonwealth. This attitude has not been modified with the progress of the war. If anything, it has hardened. Were a general election to take place to-morrow, the Nationalist poll would probably be increased. Electioneering experts, not confined to the Nationalists, even go so far as to predict that in the next Parliament the Nationalists will have a larger number of representatives than any other single party. That view probably gives insufficient weight to the

effect of a decisive victory for the Allies upon a considerable number who have temporarily registered on the Nationalist roll, not a few in order to find a plausible excuse for not sending their sons to the front. Nevertheless there is every probability that the party which passed the above-quoted resolution, in direct conflict with Australians like Mr Hughes and Mr Fisher, Canadians like Mr Borden and Sir Clifford Sifton, and New Zealanders like Mr Massey, would come back to a new House of Assembly with members approximately equal to the Ministerialists or the Unionists. Such a position must be kept steadily in view if British public opinion is not to be misled regarding what may reasonably be expected from Union representatives at the Imperial Conference which, it is to be hoped, will be summoned to discuss Imperial problems after the war.

But before dealing more fully with this point let me cite a few expressions of opinion by way of illustrating National sentiment. Just before the close of the last session of the Union Parliament, the Rev. Mr Vorster, a prominent Nationalist, took exception to a measure providing for a time limit to claims against rebels, on the odd ground that rebels themselves had lost property and had no means of redress. He went on to say :

'The iron has gone deep into the soul of the majority of the Dutch people in this country, and they feel it most keenly, but it seems to me that it is almost impossible for the British section of this country to place themselves in the position of these people. If you want to drive the iron deeper into the soul of the people, it may be to the advantage of our party, because the more you do it, the more will our cause be forwarded. . . . Things change quickly here, and the day may come when the English section may be in this position, and claims may be put forward by them for leniency. Let our English friends understand that this is a question between the Dutch-speaking people of this country.'

'Several voices: No, no.'

'The Rev. Mr Vorster: Oh, yes, most decidedly; because, if it had not been for the efforts of General Botha and his followers of the Dutch people to suppress this insurrection, I believe it would not have been done.'

'An Hon. Member: Do you blame them for being loyal?
(Hear, hear.)'

'The Rev. Mr Vorster: I do not blame them for being loyal. I do not praise them for having done it; I am stating the fact. If it had not been for the efforts of the Government to suppress this rebellion, it would not have been suppressed. It might have been a success.'

In other words, in Mr Vorster's opinion it was only the misfortune of General Botha's unaccountable partiality for the Empire which assured the failure of the rebellion; and he warns the Unionists (that is, in effect, the South Africans of British descent) not to count on always having such a Prime Minister when Britain is in trouble. This does not indicate much appreciation of obligation or identity of interest.

About the same time another Nationalist member, Mr E. W. Fichardt, in criticising the vote on military account 'objected to South Africa helping the Empire with millions of money, and also the lives of men'; while a fellow-Nationalist (Mr de Waal) declared that 'South Africa would not derive any benefit from all the money it was now spending.' These utterances are thoroughly typical of Nationalist sentiment as voiced in Parliament. Outside Parliament the most powerful mouthpiece and guide of Nationalist opinion is 'De Burger,' a Cape Town newspaper established about a year ago and edited by a Dutch ex-clergyman of great ability, the Rev. Dr Malan. On the eve of the arrival of Mr Hughes, the Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, in Cape Town, 'De Burger' came out with a leading article entitled 'Where is Imperialism leading us?' South Africans were exhorted to note what comes of assuming that the Botha-Smuts view of the inevitability of participation in the wars of the Empire was the 'only possible and correct one.' The consequences of such an assumption were thus described.

'In spite of their freedom the Colonials are really a shuttlecock in the hands of European politicians and nominally in those of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet. It is obvious that this situation will become increasingly intolerable as the Colonies become stronger and more independent. In the determination of England's foreign policy, in questions of peace and war, they have nothing to say. And yet they must pay the piper. As long as their

convictions and their hearts are in England's war, this situation will still be tolerable; but, if the reverse is the case, the Imperial bond will be a painful pinching chain. From this difficulty in which the Botha-Smuts interpretation plunges the Empire, there appears to be only one way out. The self-governing colonies must obtain a fellowship in determining the issues of peace and war in the general foreign policy of England. If they are to be jointly responsible for the result, then they must also share in the power to decide. But it is obvious that if this principle is once acknowledged, the matter cannot remain there. Partnership means the undertaking of equal obligations of all portions of the Empire. For example, contributions in men and money in case of war, and generally the entire military arrangements of the self-governing Colonies, must be regulated not by the Colonies themselves, but by the Empire.'

'De Burger' thus assumes that the 'optional neutrality' which General Botha long before the war denounced as an 'absurdity' exists as an alternative which any Dominion may choose. In this way all idea of obligation drops out of sight. The way of wisdom is not to ask for a share in the control of foreign policy, in order to avoid entanglements in disputes in which you have no voice, but simply to decline to have anything to do with the Empire's quarrels. The utterances of the Nationalist leader have been in a similar vein. Speaking at Pretoria, on the day Mr Hughes landed at Capetown, General Hertzog sneeringly observed that

'the object of the visit was probably to bring them more true Imperialism; and they must see to it that General Botha did not go back to an Imperial Conference with cut-and-dried proposals and bring back to South Africa a scheme upon which this country had nothing to say.'

In a speech at Zoutpan in the Free State last September, General Hertzog enlarged on this subject in the course of a bitter attack upon his former political chief. 'It was not the interest of South Africa but that of the British Empire which the Government kept its eye on. They were nothing more than agents of the British.' Consequently they had to

'bear the troubles of the Empire. The sons of South Africa had to go everywhere to fight for the Empire—wherever the

Empire made war and made debts for these wars. The day would dawn in South Africa when the English-speaking people no less than the Nationalists would oppose that view.'

I could quote scores of similar utterances.

It is easy enough to demonstrate the illogicality of this attitude. General Hertzog will neither advocate secession nor accept the consequences of continued inclusion in the British Commonwealth. But to convict 80,000 voters of illogicality is not to change their political temper. So long as that temper remains what it is, how could a Commonwealth Executive and a Commonwealth Parliament expect to raise loans on such a security? And if a shadow of doubt existed in so vital a matter, how could they ensure the provision of the armies and navies, without which no control of foreign policy would be possible?

That this practical difficulty is acutely felt by South African statesmen and politicians who are anxious to do all they can to strengthen the solidarity of the Empire, is evident as well from their silences as from their utterances. It is a remarkable fact that not a single leader of the Unionist party has broken silence on the specific demands made by the statesmen of the other Dominions, or on such proposals to meet these demands as Mr Lionel Curtis has embodied in his well-known work. This silence is probably due mainly to a desire to avoid embarrassing General Botha; but it is none the less significant. The Prime Minister himself has hitherto refused to be drawn; while those of his colleagues who have referred to the subject have been careful to commit themselves to nothing. Speaking at Ermelo in the Transvaal on Oct. 21, Mr Burton, Minister of Finance and Railways, reminded his audience that, when the question of an Imperial Parliament came up at the Imperial Conference on the initiative of New Zealand, General Botha's attitude led to the matter being dropped. 'Nothing,' he added, 'had happened since to alter General Botha's views.' On the other hand, Mr Burton himself went on to point out that

'it was misleading to say that the object of the promoters of an Imperial Parliament was to drag South Africa into England's wars. Even in the present war they had not been compelled to take part; but, when England was at war, South

Africa could not be neutral. In the present war it was recognised that it was a question of life and death not only for Great Britain but for South Africa. It was a question of liberty, a question of life and death for South Africa as well as for the rest of the Empire.'

Though all this is true, not all of it would be admitted by the Nationalists. Moreover, it does not touch the real point; for, if the Union is inevitably at war when England is at war, then, so long as the decision of peace or war rests with England absolutely, South Africa might conceivably find herself at war against her will. Mr Malan, the Minister of Education, in a speech at Malmesbury in the Cape Province on Sept. 6 also referred to the question of Imperial Federation. He contended

'that there was danger for a small minority in a Federal Parliament, as it might lose part of its independence. A solution, however, was possible. Each Dominion could retain its own Parliament with a Central Parliament to decide questions of peace and war. This question was not an immediate practical question. Moreover, it was undesirable to worry about such questions now when nobody was thinking normally.'

But perhaps the most striking illustration of the practical difficulties which confront the South African statesman is the note of perplexity in the speeches of Mr Merriman, who has been a tower of strength to the Government and the Imperial cause in all that concerns the war. In addressing his constituents at Stellenbosch on Sept. 22 he remarked that:

'clever people were going about telling them what they ought to do when the war is finished. All he could say was that they were going to have a very troublesome time. There were gigantic questions to be settled. We may have to make an arrangement in the British Commonwealth, so that we may keep up some common link amongst us, and that is a most difficult thing to do. I see General Hertzog has been trying his hand at it. He wants to shatter it all to pieces. I do not think that would do. We in South Africa would be a very funny little nation with no fleet and nothing to prevent the Japanese marching to Delagoa Bay. These questions are most important, and people should consider them before they indulge in loose talk. We are a dependent nation, and we

must never forget that. These little bull-frogs who are trying to blow themselves up to look like oxen must never forget what they are.'

A week later, at Somerset Strand, Mr Merriman referred to the same topic :

'We in South Africa,' he declared, 'had the privilege of being a nation set up by Great Britain, not in order to increase her Dominions, but so that we might grow to be a sister or daughter nation, be independent and manage our own affairs ; and when the time came these new nations were free to choose whether they should part or keep together. We would have to make the decision very soon, and we should have to devise some method by which, while maintaining our own independence and retaining the gift we had of managing our own affairs, we would at the same time keep our connexion with some body which was powerful enough to defend us and to see that we were not snapped up by any Power which came along looking for a rich country. When the war was over we would have to face our future relations with Great Britain. That was one of the things which affected their future more than anything else in the whole world.'

We may be quite sure that had the 'little bull-frogs' not had something between 80,000 and 100,000 voters at their back, the most experienced Parliamentarian and the most brilliant orator in South Africa would have had something more explicit to say of a constructive character.

In short, all South Africans outside the Nationalists are agreed that self-interest and obligation alike bind the Union to the Empire ; but they are also conscious that Nationalist antagonism is a formidable fact which must be taken into account in any scheme of closer union likely to prove a practical success. Such a scheme, for instance, as Mr Curtis has elaborated in his 'Problem of the Commonwealth' is logically unassailable. If the Dominions are to share in the control of the foreign policy of the Commonwealth, in the sense in which that control is now exercised by the British Cabinet and the British House of Commons, there is no way in which this participation can be secured except by the establishment of a Parliament with power to determine what each of the Dominions—the Dominion of the United

Kingdom included—shall contribute to the support of the Commonwealth armies and navies ; and, in the last resort, to distrain upon any defaulting Dominion. But absolute certainty in the working of such a mechanism is essential ; and an indispensable requisite of certainty is the existence of a virtual unanimity in all the self-governing communities regarding the indissoluble identity of interests in all conceivable circumstances between the Commonwealth and the constituent Dominions.

The facts and opinions I have set out above show that, whatever may be the case in the other self-governing Dominions, no such unanimity exists in South Africa. Yet it is dangerous to 'leave well alone' in the Herzogian sense. Unless something can be done to get rid of a disability which vexes statesmen who, like Sir Robert Borden, desire to give loyalty its due, the failure will certainly be turned to account by the lukewarm or the disaffected in South Africa for their own purposes. Is there any need—the question thus suggests itself—to tie us fast between the horns of a constitutional dilemma, a dilemma which seems to leave no alternative between keeping the Dominions in a nervous fright about being dragged willy-nilly into a war, and setting up a new machinery which, as things are at present, at all events in South Africa, might generate friction and so tend to frustrate the very purpose of its builders? Grant that only such a scheme as that of Mr Curtis can secure to the Dominions a control of foreign policy in the sense in which the control is now exercised by the British Cabinet and the British House of Commons, there may be other ways in which the views of the Dominions may be so voiced as to influence this control, and at the same time to promote a temper which will ultimately ensure perfect concert. Such a temper once ensured, the Curtisian Commonwealth in all its rounded symmetry would follow in the fulness of time.

Four years ago it was suggested in the columns of 'The Cape Times' that, if in each Dominion Cabinet the Minister of Defence were also made a Minister of External Affairs, and possibly of Commerce, he might well be deputed to visit London once a year, in order to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and to discuss in Cabinet with the British Ministry any

topic, including, of course, foreign policy, of interest or importance to the Dominions. He would then be able to present to the Dominion Ministry, and—to the extent to which the *arcana imperii* are discussed in the House of Commons—to the Dominion Parliament, the full case for cooperation in any particular matter, with a knowledge and authority which are now practically impossible. The result, one might reasonably hope, would be to foster a disposition to concerted action, based on the confidence that the Dominion Parliaments were as much 'in the know' on foreign politics as the House of Commons. Given that disposition, the various Parliaments would be less likely to boggle at contributions to Commonwealth Defence, which might be proportioned in accordance with some more popular standard than a taxable capacity estimated by a Board of Assessors, let them be never so expert, such as Mr Curtis proposes. The most easily understood standard of all, under existing conditions, must be associated directly with the protection afforded by the Navy, and also with the desirability of developing trade-interdependence within the Empire. This result might be achieved by combining the late John Hofmeyr's proposal for a uniform all-round Commonwealth super-Customs tax with a uniform all-round levy, in the nature of an insurance premium, calculated at so much per cent. either on the freight tonnage which enters and leaves the ports of each of the five nations, or on the value of the goods carried, or on both. The proceeds from both sources would be pooled for the purposes of Commonwealth defence, the cost of local defence, of course, being in each case deducted. I see no reason why proposals such as these should not meet with acceptance by an Imperial Convention. Certainly their introduction and adoption in the Union Parliament would be much easier, and attended with far less risk of subsequent friction, than a more ambitious scheme, however logical in its conception and outlines and just in its consequences such a scheme might be.

Art. 8.—GERMAN WAR LITERATURE ON THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

1. *The Pangerman Plan unmasked.* By André Cherdame. Murray, 1916.
2. *Der Kampf um deutsche Kulturarbeit im nahen Orient* (*The struggle for German culture and its work in the Near East*). By Dr F. Mohr. Berlin, 1915.
3. *Eine Aegyptische Expedition als Kampfmittel gegen England* (*An Egyptian expedition as a weapon against England*). By Prof. Gustav Roloff. Giessen, 1915.
4. *Die Ziele unsere Weltpolitik* (*The aims of our world-policy*). By Prof. Alfred Hettner. Berlin, 1915.
5. *Deutschland und der Osten* (*Germany and the East*). By Prof. Haller. Tübingen, 1915.
6. *Der Vierbund und das neue europäisch-orientalische Weltbild* (*The Quadruple Alliance and the world-significance of the new connexion between Europe and the East*). By Dr Freiherr v. Mackay. Stuttgart, 1916.
7. *Der Kampf um Arabien zwischen der Türkei und England* (*The struggle over Arabia between Turkey and England*). By Franz Stuhlmann. Hamburg, 1916.
8. *Central Europe* (*Mitteleuropa*). By Friedrich Naumann. With an introduction by Prof. Ashley. King and Son, 1916.

And other works, by Véla, Erich Meyer, von Staden, Trampe, Hennig, Oncken, Rifat, Grobba, etc.

AT this moment it is of the highest importance, not only for Great Britain but also for her Allies, to grasp the true inwardness of the efforts made by Germany to obtain control of the Balkan States and the road to Constantinople. Peace made now, on the basis of the *status quo*, would leave Germany, with Austria as subservient ally, in complete possession of these regions. The 'Drang nach Osten' would have triumphed. What does this mean, for us and for Germany?

Now, there are two main trends of thought running through German war literature dealing with the Near East. The first is occupied with the subject of a European agglomerate stretching from the Baltic and the North Sea to Constantinople, and thence dominating Asia to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. This

plan first found definite expression in the writings of Friedrich List. The second dwells on the use of this agglomerate as a wedge to split the British Empire.

'The first and foremost direction for the blow to be struck by the new Quadruple Alliance is known and has been much discussed. Its point is defined in the phrase: "Ostend-Bagdad!" It is directed against Britain's supremacy of the seas and the chain of naval stations connecting the North Sea with India. It counters the London blue-water school with the principle: Waves are broken by the land' (Mackay, *op. cit.*).

'Our principal war aim is to secure Germany's future; and that end can only be attained by a certain solution of the Oriental problem. When speaking on the Kaiser's birthday in 1913, the German Ambassador von Wangenheim said: "He who lays a finger on Anatolia touches the vital interests of the German people." . . . What is the Oriental question? At one time it meant the relations of the Christian peoples to Turkey; at another the supremacy of the Black Sea, or the Dardanelles question. At one time or other it has turned on Armenia, Syria, or Persia, but since the Congress of Berlin the far-reaching nature of the question has gradually become apparent. To-day it may be expressed in the formula: Is there to be a great Mohammedan Power or not? If not, then who shall be the heir of Islam?' (Mohr, *op. cit.*).

The Germans are not blind to the fact that an alternative to the Teutonic would be a Slavonic wedge. Indeed, the present war is declared to be Germany's most favourable opportunity for cutting off Russia from the Balkans, above all from Constantinople, for ever. It is more than probable that the desire to settle this conflict between the aspirations of the two countries was one of the motives which induced the Berlin Government to precipitate war in 1914. The Pan-German party hopes to attain two principal ends by establishing German domination from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean. Firstly, Russia would be switched off (to employ the German idiom 'ausgeschaltet') from South-eastern Europe and Western Asia. Secondly, a huge land-wedge would be formed with its edge on Britain's neck, i.e. Egypt and the Suez Canal. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Kaiser is credited with having become a convert to this conception and with having worked towards realising it.

'Many years ago Kaiser Wilhelm II, as a far-seeing politician, recognised Turkey's importance to Germany. During his visit to Constantinople and Damascus, the Kaiser openly declared himself to be the friend of the Moslem world and was unreserved in giving tokens of his friendship. At that time the foundation stone was laid for the subsequent *entente* and final alliance between Germany and Turkey. But that the imperial friendship-programme included greater than mere economic aims, has been amply proved by later developments. The motive which inspired the friendship with Turkey was identical with that which inspired the acquisition of Heligoland. What we had to expect from England had been foreseen; and measures were taken not only to secure ourselves, but also to create bases for future action in case of war. In the Orient our plan was to create a base from which England's position in Egypt could be shattered.*

'The visit of our Kaiser in 1889—by the influence of his personality on the Sultan and by the deep impression which the visit of the Emperor to the Khalif made on the Moslem world—transformed Germany into a factor which the Turks took most seriously into their subsequent calculations, and immediately created commercial relations for Germany. In 1889 our trade with Turkey was worth 850,000*l.*; by 1912 it had risen to 8,620,000*l.*'†

Prof. Roloff discusses the problem of an expedition against Egypt as a weapon against England. He considers that the greatest triumph which Germany could hope for would be the expulsion of the British from Egypt. After losing the vast sums of money invested in the Nile country and abandoning control of the waterway to India and Eastern Asia, England would lack both the means and the inclination for another war. Roloff hopes now that land communications exist from Germany to Egypt, that the next expedition will be a joint one, consisting of Turkish and German troops, and believes that it will be an easy matter to supply them with every kind of provisions and munitions as well as the necessary reinforcements. He says:

'Even if the British escape catastrophe in Egypt, their occupation of that country will bring them little profit and

* Véla: 'Die Zukunft der Türkei im Bündnis mit Deutschland (Turkey's Future in Alliance with Germany).' Leipzig, 1915.

† Professor Düring in 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte,' Sept. 1915.

less peace of mind if Turkey emerges from this war strong and rejuvenated. In that case England would always have to reckon with a possible Mussulman attack on the Suez Canal and be compelled to detach a large portion of her forces to defend it, i.e. weaken herself in Europe' (*op. cit.*).

The consensus of opinion expressed by German writers is the hope that Turkey will come entirely under German influence. Reorganised by Germany, the Turkish Empire would become so powerful that Britain's position in Egypt would, in the very nature of things, become untenable. From this point of view German proposals in regard to Turkey's future have a special interest.

'The present war must decide whether Turkey is to be split up or preserve her integrity. For many years past Germany has pursued the policy of the "open door" in that country. We have sought no territorial acquisitions, but only a field for economic and cultural work. We wish, therefore, to protect Turkey from being divided up by other Powers, to strengthen her as far as possible, so that she will be in a position, allied with us and Austria-Hungary, to defend her independence. During the war, Turkey, in unison with the Central Empires, has defined her aims in regard to Egypt. It must become an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. If we are victorious, we shall protect Persia from the fate reserved for her by Russia and England. As regards all these countries, a policy of conquest is a thing of the past, and the "open door" the watchword of the future. . . .

'The first, most important, but, thank heaven! the easiest condition to fulfil, is that of a permanent friendship with Austria-Hungary. We can only develop our Oriental plans hand-in-hand with the neighbouring Empire. The second condition is the entrance into the alliance of the Balkan States lying between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, viz.: Serbia and Bulgaria and, if possible, Rumania too. The third condition is friendship with Turkey herself, for we wish to follow no plans of conquest in that country, but only to work together on common friendly tasks. We can only pursue such aims as have Turkey's full consent. Territorial aggrandisement is out of the question. It is questionable whether it will be possible to establish large settlements of German peasants. Without doubt Germany will be interested most of all in commercial undertakings, developing the means of communication and systems of irrigation, together with educative work in political, military and cultural matters. . . .

'Such a policy will give us a strong ally, whose strength will grow from year to year; an ally who will be of greater value to us than any coloured African troops could ever be. At the same time it opens the way to Egypt and Persia, and through the Persian Gulf—where England's supremacy must be broken—to the Indian Ocean and the lands around it. It will enable us to force our way between the Russian Empire on the one hand and England's supremacy on the other, and obtain equal rights in the development of Western Asia. Thereby we shall come in contact with two especially sensitive spots in England's world domination, where we can apply the leverage of threats to compel that Power to show us more consideration in other places where our interests may be endangered' (*Hettner, op. cit.*).

'When Turkey stands secure against all projects for her conquest, and, with the help of Austria and Germany, has been politically and economically reorganised; and when, with the inclusion of some other Balkan States, a huge economic domain has been consolidated, stretching from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Nile, then Germany will, in many respects, be independent of the articles which hitherto have been imported from America and Australia. We shall acquire new markets in Mesopotamia and Syria for our manufactures, while large numbers of educated Germans, who have difficulty in finding employment in the Fatherland, can be made use of there' (*Roloff, op. cit.*).

'Turkey can be assured of Germany's help in furthering the former's economic progress with all the means in her power; for Germany would merely be working in her own interest. An ideal opportunity is offered to German exporters to extend their connexions and to conquer entirely a field where to-day strong German sympathies prevail. In order to attain this tempting goal, it is not only necessary for the German export world to be as careful as possible in choosing its representatives for Turkish emporiums and in taking the peculiarities of the Turkish market into consideration, but our exporters must also see to it that a good German Press is created in Turkey.'

'After a victorious war and an honourable peace we must above all things be absolutely German. We must be true to ourselves by emphasising and cultivating everything German. In all undertakings engineered by German diplomacy and financed with German money the official language must be German. Hence, French, which has been the official language on Turkish railways, must disappear. There must be a German school near every large railway station; and in

these schools both the German and the Turkish languages must be employed in giving instruction; any other language will be merely taught. Only specially selected and well-educated teachers should be sent to Turkey. Above all, German medical men must be introduced into Turkey's railway system. They are the best medium for spreading German influence and for awakening esteem and affection for Germany.*

'On broad lines it is now quite clear what form the future Turkish Empire will assume. From Tripolis across to Persia and on to the ridges of the Caucasus, German energy—without injury to the sovereignty of the Osmanic State—will co-operate in Turkey's renaissance and the development of her treasures. But our enemies, together with their money, languages and schools, will disappear from the territories which they hoped to divide among themselves.' †

German writers advance the opinion that Constantinople could only attain her true position in the world under German guidance. The British would reduce that ancient seat of culture to a Gibraltar; Russia would merely establish a barricade there. But, if it falls under Teutonic domination, the city will fulfil its historic mission as the 'Gate of the East.'

'When England—the European outsider who lags far behind Germany in national power, individual talent and political strength—loses India, then her world-power will be broken. The ancient high-road of the world is the one which leads from Europe to India—the road used by Alexander—the highway which leads from the Danube *via* Constantinople to the valley of the Euphrates, and by Northern Persia, Herat and Kabul to the Ganges. Every yard of the Bagdad railway which is laid brings the owner of the railway nearer to India. What Alexander performed and Napoleon undoubtedly planned, can be achieved by a third treading in their footsteps. England views the Bagdad railway as a very real and threatening danger to herself—and rightly so. She can never undo or annul its effects.'

* Prof. Düring in 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte,' Sept. 1915. Plans are being pushed forward for a 'Haus der Freundschaft' (House of Friendship) to be built in Constantinople. It is to be a University, a museum, a club, a library, etc., consecrated to Turco-German culture—in other words, a centre for German propaganda. Designs for the building have appeared in a German magazine.

† Dr K. von Winterstetten: 'Die Lage der Berlin—Bagdad-Politik,' in 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte,' Sept. 1915.

'The die is now being cast to decide the fate of the metropolis on the Golden Horn; to settle whether the city shall rise again to its former splendour or sink into insignificance. If Constantinople fell to Russia's share, it would never become a central emporium on the world-way from Antwerp to Basra, but be transformed into a barricade (*Sperrtor*) for all commerce on this line. From the very nature of things, Russia would be compelled to annihilate in the shortest possible time this dangerous competitor to its own routes, Odessa—Trebizond—Bagdad, and Moscow—Tiflis—Teheran. For England too, whose communications to the Orient take other routes, it would be (in the technique of the science of communications) an off-the-line point. A Byzance in Russian or British hands would become a Sebastopol or Gibraltar—a military dépôt—but for commerce a dead, yes, intentionally strangled city.

Such a development, however, would be in opposition to the iron laws of history as revealed in the life of the modern world. The destiny of time—which determines according to the inward capacities and needs of the nations, which weaves "der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid"—has decided that Prussia-Germany should at last claim and maintain her position in the arena of world-politics, because she represents a more highly developed form of State organism than the world has hitherto evolved. The spirit of history has determined too, that in the cultural war let loose by enemies filled with fear and hate for our State system, the Central Empires' towering superiority in cultural greatness shall beat back and vanquish the barbarous methods of our antagonists.

'Logically the same laws will determine that the parts of South-Eastern Europe, Eurasia and Western Asia, where in prehistoric times Indo-Germanic tribes made their settlements, and which in historic times became an incomparable garden of culture for the Hellenes, Romans, Byzantines and Arabians, shall be rescued from falling into the dark night of Muscovite rule and English exploitation. These lands must become a link, firmly welded, in the community of European peoples.*'

'Field-Marshal von Mackensen is paving the way indicated by Prince Eugene of Savoy; and the young German Empire has undertaken the task which the Holy Roman Empire left as an unsolved heritage to the German nation. Turkey seems so near to us; and the German nation is sacrificing blood and

* Trampe: 'Der Kampf um die Dardanellen' (The Fight for the Dardanelles). Stuttgart, 1916.

treasure for the sake of regulating conditions in the Balkans. The most striking and at the same time the most pleasing symptom, however, is that there are no protests at the turn events have taken. The conviction seems to have penetrated through the whole nation that it must be so—that we are not out for an adventure, but merely obeying an inward necessity, when we make the cause of Turkey and Bulgaria our own. In reality we are only obeying a compelling geographical command.

‘Germany needs, like every other land which desires to live in freedom and independence, access to the sea. She had that in the north so long as Germany and Britain were at peace, but lost it when the latter became her enemy, and placed a huge padlock on the door of the German house by blockading the North Sea. Hence, unless we wish to die a death of economic suffocation, nothing remains but to force our way through in the opposite direction—a route already indicated by the course of our greatest natural thoroughfare, the Danube.’

‘The road is free! On Oct. 26, 1915, when a Bulgarian patrol entered the camp of the Austro-German army at Kladowa, East and West joined hands. The time has passed when each tried to subjugate the other in a sanguinary life-and-death struggle. Each will retain its own peculiar characteristics, recognising and aiding each other. Great tasks, extraordinary in their limitless prospects, await us there’ (Haller, *op. cit.*).

It would be invidious to deny the possibility of developing the means of communication between the North Sea and the Black Sea. Charlemagne had the intention to build a canal joining the Main (which flows into the Rhine) and the Danube. The Main-Danube canal was completed in 1840, under Ludwig I of Bavaria, but, like many other such waterways, it fell almost into disuse with the development of railways. Furthermore, it is frozen over for weeks, or even months, every year. The war seems to have brought home to the Germans the possibilities of this connexion; and during the past year there has been considerable agitation in favour of enlarging the existing canal to enable ships of 600 to 800 tons burden to pass through. Engineers have already drawn up plans which have been accepted by the ‘Bavarian Canals Society’ (President, King Ludwig III). The canal leaves the Main at Bamberg, passes through

Erlangen and Nuremberg, and joins the Danube at Ratisbon. It is proposed to avoid certain obstacles by correcting the present course, so that the new ship-canal would be connected with the Danube at Kelheim. The Germans hope by this means not only to facilitate their trade with the Balkans, but also to open up new areas of supply. This, it is believed, would be an effective weapon in case the North Sea were again blockaded. Such a development would of course deprive Austria-Hungary of many geographical advantages, besides increasing Germany's political influence in the south-eastern European States. It would no doubt promote one of the fundamental ideas of Naumann's 'Central Europe,' a book which has been received with mixed feelings in the Dual Monarchy.*

Signs are not wanting to show that there are still Germans who remain unconverted to *Weltpolitik*. Prof. Hettner refers to the antagonists to a German colonial policy in these terms :

'It is all the more astonishing that, now as we are approaching victory, there are patriotic men raising a warning voice against the acquisition of new colonies, even advising the surrender of our old colonies and the renunciation of our maritime policy, or at least that this should only occupy a subordinate position. Without further ado it may be admitted that the first care of a nation must be its own immediate territory, before it can venture to satisfy the desire for luxuries. Those advisers would be right, if our world activities were merely the luxury English critics have dubbed them. But they are no longer luxuries, they have become an absolute vital necessity. We can no longer cover the home demand for food from home sources; without an outlet for our energies, without importing food and raw materials, without a market for the products of our industries, without opportunities for realising our goods and investing our capital in the outside world, we cannot exist. . . .

'The possession of colonies and, in fact, every kind of political activity in foreign lands assumes the possibility of the means of communication with them remaining open, not only in peace but also in war. Such a cutting-off from our colonies, as well as from all other domains where we have been engaged in economic, political and cultural work, as we

* Dr Naumann has recently been lecturing on this subject in Bulgaria.

are suffering from in this war, can only have a disastrous result. We can only be and remain a world-nation when we have free communication at all times with every part of the globe. World-economics, world-culture and world-politics must be based on a secure system of world-communication.

'Even of late years it has seemed as if our Oriental policy was by no means firmly established. Thus, in 1913, the author of "*Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg*" (German World-policy without War) advocated the renunciation of our Oriental plans in favour of expansion in Central Africa. But it is to be hoped that the present war and the alliance with Turkey will give our Eastern aims a firm and permanent position in our foreign policy. So long as the Orient was only accessible through the Mediterranean it was outside our consideration. But its special importance now lies in the fact that here we have found a door leading to the outside world, a continental route which is not dominated by England's naval supremacy, and which in case of war cannot be closed by England. It is true that it leads through foreign territories, and therein lies the difficulty.

'Our naval development must proceed together with our work in the Orient because our colonial possessions are all overseas; instead of giving them up we must increase them. The indispensable preliminary condition for our world-work is that the seas are free, i.e. delivered from British domination. It is true that up till now this freedom has been non-existent, but still we have had fruitful fields of work beyond the seas. We were merely walking blindfold along the edge of a precipice. The long period of peace with England had caused us to overlook the danger which lay in England's naval supremacy. Indeed, we were hardly conscious of it, although many of us have viewed the future with anxiety, since the relations between the two countries became less friendly. But I do not believe that anyone had ever imagined the catastrophe which has now befallen our shipping, our overseas trade, and our colonies, and that therewith England would ignore the principles of international law and wage war, not only against the German Empire, but against the private property of German subjects. England's supremacy on the sea must be broken. Now that our *Weltpolitik* has brought us into armed conflict with England, we must endeavour, in spite of Britain's power, to gain that which will be conducive to our welfare; and that is not a limitation to West Africa, but a sphere of interest or an empire which stretches across Africa from one ocean to the other. We will win our place in the sun, and to this end

destroy England's world domination, and keep Russia within her proper limits. Nor will we renounce the Pacific either to American or Japanese dominion. Until we have broken England's power we cannot be a great and free nation' (Hettner, *op. cit.*).

The entire September number, 1915, of the 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte' was devoted to the Eastern question. In an article already cited, entitled 'Deutschland und die Türkei,' Prof. Düring writes:

'I spent fourteen years in the Orient just in the period when German interests and influence began to increase there. My great love for the country and its people has always led me to wish and hope that Turkey would rise to the rank of a first-class power with Germany's help. For, in common with many thoughtful Turks, we have long since recognised that such a development would be impossible with Russian, French or British aid. In fact none of these Powers ever intended or desired the hope to be realised, but on the other hand thwarted its realisation by every means in its control.'

And Prof. Roloff follows up the idea.

'Turkey has become a kind of "life insurance" for Germany against the English danger. For, in case Britain eventually attacked Germany, the reply would be an attack through Turkey against Egypt. A beginning has also been made in the tremendous task of awakening new life in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, the once fruitful Mesopotamia. For many years past a British company has been engaged on this gigantic problem. They have endeavoured, by reconstructing the decayed irrigation canals, building new dams, and extending the irrigation system, to revive in this dead land the same or even greater fertility than it enjoyed thousands of years ago. Now we may safely assume that German engineers will complete the work of transforming and opening up these enormous territories.

'Another task to which the Turks must devote themselves is the development of their sea power. Germany too must acquire a naval station on Turkish soil. France and Britain have consistently opposed both these aims with all the powers at their command. Yet it will be necessary to force them through, in order to break down Anglo-French supremacy in the Mediterranean' (Roloff, *op. cit.*).

'It is imperative that in the present war we should dispel from the British mind the belief that any injury whatever

can be inflicted upon us by a blockade. Our alliance with Austria-Hungary and the re-birth of the Turkish Empire are the foundations upon which the plan can be realised. In these three Empires there is everything to hand which we require. England herself has indicated the way to our goal by the wrath with which she has pursued us since the commencement of the Bagdad railway. That was the first attempt to undermine Britain's supremacy of the seas by boldly evading it with a land route. Of what use would Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal be to England, if our land-ways to Persia and India are secure beyond the range of the biggest naval guns? The time must come when the British will be met by land cannon wherever they may try to land. The logical and crushing reply to a British blockade is a stupendous Continental System which will finally drive John Bull from one ocean to the other like a Flying Dutchman.*

The past, present and future of Mesopotamia and the Arabian peninsula are dealt with in great detail by several writers, all of whom write under the assumption that Germany is sure of a victory in the war which will enable her to direct the destiny of the territories in question. It must be admitted that in the meantime nothing has transpired that is calculated to destroy these hopes, while the capture of Bucharest on Dec. 6 will doubtless have strengthened them. If any deduction is possible from Germany's huge effort to crush Rumania, it is that Germany attaches the greatest importance to the removal of a menace to the Berlin—Constantinople line.

Herr Hans Rohde gives a clear account in his 'Germany in the Near East'† of the existing and projected railway between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf. The following particulars have been taken from this source. The section Haidar-Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Konia (466 miles) belongs to the Anatolian Railway, and is built for a speed limit of 21 miles in the hour. The remainder of the line is known as the Bagdad Railway, on which the speed limit is 46 miles

* Wilhelm Weiler: 'Der Krieg gegen England' (The War against England), in 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte' for Sept. 1915.

† 'Deutschland in Vorderasien,' von Hans Rohde. Mittler & Son: Berlin, 1916.

in the hour, its length being 1,188 miles. Either during or after the war the first section (i.e. as far as Konia) is to be relaid, so as to make the speed limit of 46 miles uniform throughout. After Konia there is a gradient which climbs to the highest point on the whole length of the line, at Ulukischla, 4,800 feet above sea level; thence the line descends *via* Karapunar and Dorak to the Cilician plain, with a gradient of 1 in 40. This Taurus section offers the greatest engineering difficulties in the entire length of the Bagdad Railway. Although it is only 62 miles long, no fewer than fifty tunnels have had to be excavated, some of them 2000 yards in length. There is a gap of 21 miles between Karapunar and Dorak, which the German author expected would be completed in 1916. On Dec. 1, 1914, a tunnel 1850 yards in length was completed near Karapunar; and the completion of one farther south, over 5000 yards in length, was announced in November last. According to the same author there are three sections not completed, but the work in the first two is being pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to establish the line of communication to the Egyptian frontier. They are: Karapuna—Dorak, 21 miles; Mamure—Radschu, 62 miles; Ras el Ain—Samarra, 415 miles.*

The Bagdad Railway consists of a single track; construction is proceeding simultaneously at both ends of each gap; and the entire railway should be completed in 1917, when (we are told, and can well believe)

'it will produce economic, political, and cultural results the extent of which cannot now be imagined. In a very short time direct communication by rail will be established between Constantinople and Bagdad; while during the next generation towns and villages will spring up along the line, and along the lesser railways which will be built to complete the network. These will provide for the agricultural and industrial development of that ancient seat of culture to the mutual profit of Turkey and Germany.'

'The sword had to decide the fate of Near Asia, and a decision has fallen, unless unforeseen events intervene. Germany will not be limited to the sphere of influence

* In the accompanying map, the railway is given as finished eastward as far as Nisibin. In default of more authoritative knowledge, the discrepancy can only be noted, not explained.—(EDITOR.)

formerly allotted to her, but in future she will devote her energies to Armenia, Syria, and Mesopotamia in the interests of German capitalists and merchants. In this manner the way will be kept open which the war indicated and which, together with our Allies, we have fought for and won—the way that leads from Berlin *via* Vienna—Sofia—Constantinople—Baghdad, to the Persian Gulf, and has become the vital nerve in our economic life and our policy' (Rohde, *op. cit.*).

In another passage the same author gives a hint of Germany's commercial plans in the Arabian Peninsula.

'Baghdad (he says) is the most important Turkish town in Asia. It is the trade emporium between India, Persia, the Levant and Europe. After the completion of the railway, Germany's most important commercial routes will meet there, by junction with the "Hamburg Amerika-Linie," which runs to Basra and Baghdad; and with the "Deutsche Levante-Linie," which runs to Alexandretta, and thence by rail to Aleppo, Mosul, and Baghdad.'

Herr Rohde quotes a great many statistics to show how German trade to that part of the world has increased. A few of them will suffice to illustrate the point. The 'Deutsche Levante-Linie' was founded in 1890. When war broke out, the Company possessed nearly sixty steamers. The banking concern 'Deutsche Palästina-und-Orient-Gesellschaft' established itself at Jerusalem in 1899, and since that year it has opened branches in many other towns. The turnover in 1890 was 1,500,000*l.*; in 1900 5,500,000*l.*, and by 1911 it had risen to 134,150,000*l.* In the same period the share capital increased from 22,000*l.* to 1,000,000*l.* Rohde remarks:

'German banks in the Orient discount the accounts of German firms, paying 60 to 80 per cent. for them. They also call the attention of native buyers to German firms and obtain agents to represent the latter. In this way, the Deutsche Palästina-Bank was instrumental in driving English petroleum motors from the market in favour of the German article. German export trade to Turkey has increased tenfold since 1887, and after the reconstruction of Turco-German economic relations it will develop in an undreamt-of manner.'

In return for the manifold material advantages which Germany has obviously obtained from Turkey, she did

not make many apparent sacrifices for the cultural good of her present ally. Before the war there were about 1000 foreign schools in the whole of the Turkish Empire, attended by 90,000 pupils. The following table shows the number of schools supported by various Christian nationalities :

France	530	schools, with about	54,000	pupils.
America ...	273	"	18,000	"
England ...	126	"	10,000	"
Italy	67	"	5,000	"
Germany ..	23	"	3,000	"

Recently the Turkish Minister of the Interior informed a party of German journalists that his Government intended to introduce German experts after the war into all the administrative branches, in the hope that they would exercise an educative influence on the native officials. In commenting on this project, a German writer * claims that, after a few decades of intensive culture, Turkey will be able to supply the deficit in German requirements as regards grains, fruit, cotton, wool, petroleum, fat, etc.

'But,' he adds, 'this will only be possible, if German officials and German capital are given complete freedom of action, and all foreign undertakings—above all, English and French projects—are excluded. Hand in hand with this demand must go the work of developing the means of communication, colonisation plans, and the securing of the power of the State by a proper organisation of the administrative and military establishments.'

It is fitting to conclude this article with some extracts from a recent pamphlet by Prof. Jäckh, because he is an old apostle of the Berlin—Bagdad idea. He says :

'Heligoland and Bagdad, although they are so far apart, are united by a deep inner meaning. They are the two boundary pillars which German development needed and erected, and they are intended to support the mighty arch—Central Europe. What caused the decay of the Turkish provinces in Asia? The discovery of the sea-way to India. But the

* 'Mesopotamien, das Land der Zukunft' (Mesopotamia, the Land of the Future), by an anonymous writer. Berlin, 1916.

opening of the land-way from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf will restore them to still greater prosperity.*

Prof. Jäckh points out that three world-historic wills meet in conflict in this part of the world, namely, the Russian, the English, and the German. These three forces made the present war inevitable. Further, when Turkey has been reorganised, it will be the arm with which to knock at the door of Egypt, but then the arm will not be that of the 'Sick Man of Europe.' According to this writer, there is only one Power capable of reorganising the Osmanic Empire, that is, Germany; and his justification runs thus:

'Germany is the microcosm of Central Europe, by the very nature and history of her own particularism; she faced, and has solved within her own frontiers, the same problems which the macrocosm of Central Europe calls upon Germany to solve to-day. Germany is an Empire of "allied Governments and free cities." From without, this always appeared a source of German weakness; and so it was, as long as the single organs had not grown together to the unity of an organism.

'The organic principle, the principle of evolution, of uniformity and variety, by the strength of which the macrocosm lives and, *vice versa*, by which the single organ among the many arrives at perfection—this is the innermost thought and kernel of German mysticism; the unity of the individual and the absolute, the balance of the particular and the general, according to Leibnitz. Unity in variety and variety in unity, that is to say—harmony! And this is the ideal, the eternal theme of German thought, German life and German art, and we may add too, of German policy in and for Central Europe.'

THOMAS F. A. SMITH.

* Jäckh: 'Das grössere Mitteleuropa' (Greater Central Europe). Weimar, 1916.

Art. 9.—OUR NATIONAL DEBT.

1. *How to pay for the War.* Essays edited by Mr Sidney Webb for the Fabian Society. Allen & Unwin, 1916.

THE imminence of another War Loan once more concentrates attention on the growth and magnitude of our National Debt. To speak of the Debt as gigantic is like emphasising the fact that grass is green. Superlatives in relation to national finance have long since become so familiar by repetition that we seem to want a new vocabulary of astonishment. It is an interesting, though unprofitable, speculation to enquire if in the year 2017 this debt will be looked back upon as a comparatively small matter, just as we look back upon the debt of 1817 as a comparatively small matter. 'If the most enlightened man had been told in 1792 that in 1815 the interest on eight hundred million pounds would be duly paid to the day at the Bank, he would have been as hard of belief as if he had been told that the Government would be in possession of the lamp of Aladdin or the purse of Fortunatus.' This characteristic passage occurs in Macaulay's account of the origin and growth of the National Debt. How much harder of belief would 'the most enlightened man' have been, if he had been told that in 1917 the interest on three thousand million pounds would be 'duly paid to the day at the Bank'! The amount of our aggregate liabilities on March 31 next is expected to be 3,755,000,000*l.**; and, although probably nearly a thousand millions thereof represent money lent to our Dominions and Allies, the whole sum has nevertheless to be treated as a liability, and interest upon it, whether for a longer or shorter term, will have to be paid. Presumably the borrowers of the thousand millions aforesaid will pay interest for it at stated times, so what

* Mr McKenna's estimate was 3,440,000,000*l.*, but since then there has been an increase of more than 300,000,000*l.* in the expenditure over the estimates. Nearly half of this is represented by floating debt, consisting of bills issued at a discount, and not carrying interest, but it is continually falling due, and must, in the course of a year at the outside, be paid off or renewed. As the former alternative is impossible, the only question is as to the method of continuing the liability, whether by new Treasury bills or by the issue of a long-dated loan.

this country will actually have to find will be the interest on a net debt of 2,955,000,000*l.* On March 31, 1914, the National liabilities amounted to 707,654,000*l.* During 1914-15 a sum of 458,000,000*l.* was added; and during 1915-16 a sum of 1,031,637,000*l.* (after allowing for the effect of conversion). Thus, on March 31, 1916, there was already a total of 2,197,500,000*l.*; and the estimated addition for the current year, together with unforeseen expenditure, will bring up the figure on March 31, 1917, to 3,755,064,000*l.* gross, without reckoning the Japanese loan. What is pertinent to Macaulay's remark is, that taxes have already been imposed which, if their present yield can be maintained, virtually ensure the certainty that the interest will be paid.

Such an enormous growth in so short a time dwarfs all previous records. Even in the long conflict with France, first with the Revolutionary Government and then with that of Napoleon, extending, with a brief interval, over a period of twenty-three years, the addition made to the Debt was not much more than a fourth of that for which the present war is so far accountable; and no one can say how much smaller that fraction may be made by new borrowings. There are possibilities—indeed, probabilities—lying behind the qualifying words 'so far' which forbid us to suppose that the net debt of 2,955,000,000*l.* can be regarded as the limit. War has always been the prolific mother of expenditure and the origin, at all events in modern history, of public debt. During the last two centuries, in particular, its insatiable maw has periodically consumed our substance and loaded us with liabilities. The War of the Spanish Succession added nearly 38,000,000*l.* to the Funded Debt, the Seven Years' War added 64,000,000*l.*, the American War of Independence over 121,000,000*l.*, the Great War (it must surrender 'that distinctive title now) close upon 604,000,000*l.*, the Crimean War 34,000,000*l.*, and the South African War 160,000,000*l.* Yet the total of all of these is almost trivial in comparison with the addition for which the war of to-day is already responsible.

During the prosperous intervals of peace there have been occasional reductions on a slow and relatively nibbling scale, but, before time enough has elapsed to bring about any appreciable diminution of the amount

annually set apart for the service of the debt, the costly tide of conflict has flowed again and has quickly engulfed our pitiful economies. It took forty years of peace to pay off 75,000,000*l.* of the 600,000,000*l.* added during the war of a hundred years ago; the 34,000,000*l.* added in the Crimean War were not wiped out in less than twelve years of peace; and the additions caused by the South African War had been but slightly diminished, when the present colossal struggle was forced upon us. It seems to be the fate of humanity to experience these set-backs. The labours of Sisyphus were not more futile than have been the peace-time efforts to lessen our National Debt.

The fact nevertheless remains that, in nearly every instance, the economic waste and financial loss caused by our great wars have been followed by a steady industrial recovery, an increase of national wealth, and an improvement in the standard of personal welfare. And in no equitable review of history can we escape from the conclusion that in not a few cases these conflicts have proved to be, in the larger patriotic sense, a wise and prudent investment. This was especially so with the struggle that put an end to the ambitious dreams of Napoleon, in spite of the ruinous rates at which money had to be raised for carrying it on; and the cost of crushing Prussian militarism and safeguarding the liberties of the smaller European States may equally be looked upon as an insurance, albeit at an appallingly high premium, against the destruction of those ideals of civilisation and progress that Britons hold dear. This view of war expenditure is forcibly put by the late Mr McCulloch, the eminent economist, in the following passage:

'The integrity and increase of our Dominions, the protection of our rights and liberties, and our triumphs by sea and land, are the real equivalents for the public debt, and of all the blood and treasure we have spent in warlike enterprise; and they are quite as ample and conduce as much to our prosperity as a nation as if they had been realised in an increase of wealth and population. No sacrifices can be too great that are required to preserve national security and independence, and a loan expended on armies and fleets employed for such a purpose is quite as well and profitably employed as if it had been laid out on agriculture or in promoting manufactures or trade.'

David Hume's narrow and unimaginative theory of National Debt has never found acceptance in this country when it became a question of resisting the ambitious policy of European rivals. One can picture the sort of reception that would now be given to any economist who ventured to adopt Hume's unpatriotic sentiment: 'Better for us to have been conquered by Prussia or Austria than to be saddled with the interest of 140,000,000*l.*' Most of us think, on the other hand, that it would be infinitely better to saddle Britain with a debt which would take a century to repay, than that she should be condemned for all time to be the vassal of Prussia.

It is well to know clearly what we mean by National Debt. Formerly the term was generally employed to describe funded debt only, though the irredeemable part of it could not be strictly called debt at all, the obligation of the State being limited to payment of the interest in perpetuity. Unfunded debt was scarcely thought of in connexion with National Debt, because it was a more or less temporary arrangement, and only on rare occasions attained proportions which gave it exceptional importance. In 1816 the unfunded debt amounted to 50,000,000*l.* out of 846,000,000*l.*; in 1869 to 9,000,000*l.* out of 749,000,000*l.*; and in 1885 to 14,000,000*l.* out of 654,000,000*l.* To-day unfunded debt is a vastly more formidable item, notwithstanding the certainty that a large proportion of it will have to be converted by means of a loan into a long-term or 'semi-permanent,'* instead of a short-term liability, and will thus become merged in the so-called Funded Debt. It consists mainly of Treasury Bills, Exchequer Bonds redeemable in three and five years, two-year War Expenditure Certificates, and miscellaneous liabilities, including loans by foreign countries and War Savings Certificates. It is difficult to get from available data an accurate estimate of the national indebtedness at any specified time, since the dates which apply to some of the figures do not apply to the others, and changes, especially in the floating debt, are continually going on. Roughly, however, after

* This is a City coinage of which the most that can be said is that it 'means well.'

allowing for conversions, etc., the following may be taken to be approximately the position at the beginning of last December:

	£
Total funded debt	318,460,000
Capital value of terminable annuities	26,159,000
3½% War Loan	62,774,000
4½% "	899,997,000
American Loans	160,000,000
Treasury Bills	1,148,000,000
Exchequer Bonds	460,000,000
War Expenditure Certificates	28,953,000
War Savings Certificates	38,987,000
Japanese Loan	10,000,000
Miscellaneous liabilities	10,000,000
	<hr/>
	£3,163,280,000

The longer a war lasts, the more stringent become the terms upon which money can be obtained for financing it. Either the rate of interest goes up, or the issue-price goes down. There is little to commend, and much to condemn, in the issue of loans at a discount ; it is satisfactory, therefore, that only one of the loans raised in connexion with the present war has been issued below par. This was the first, nominally for 350,000,000l.,* and it was offered at 95 per cent., the rate of interest being 3½ per cent., so that during its currency it yields very nearly 4 per cent., and the holder also makes a profit of 5 per cent. on the redemption. To put it in another way, the Government has to pay interest on 17,500,000l. more than it has received, independently of any deduction for the expenses of flotation. In the second loan the sounder plan was adopted of increasing the rate of interest to 4½ per cent. and issuing at par. The loan to which the country is now looking forward, will no doubt also be issued at par, but the rate of interest is expected to be either 5 per cent. or 4½ per cent. free of income tax, rates which have already been exceeded by the much-criticised issue of 6 per cent. Exchequer Bonds. To the total must be added the new borrowings between Dec. 2 and March 31, which, with expenditure greatly exceeding

* Much of this has been converted into 4½ per cent. Loan.

the estimated 5,000,000*l.* a day, will probably bring the amount up to 3,755,000,000*l.* Of the 3,163,280,000*l.* (the total reached in the foregoing table), 1,800,000,000*l.* are short-dated securities, including an actual floating debt of 1,148,000,000*l.* in Treasury Bills.

Remembering the desperate devices resorted to for financing the war with France, it is consolatory to note that the later additions to our National Debt represent cash actually received. To issue loans at a discount means that the country is committed to payment of interest for a number of years on capital of which a portion is non-existent. 'In consequence of the prevalence of the practice,' says McCulloch in his 'Dictionary of Commerce,' 'the principal of the debt now existing (1835) amounts to nearly two-fifths more than the sum actually advanced.' The pernicious plan of undertaking liability for a greater nominal debt than the amount lent to the State was not adopted on a large scale before 1780, but it made such rapid headway that in the following year the excess of capital liability amounted to 75 per cent. of the loans raised—the State issuing stock to the amount of 18,000,000*l.* at 3 per cent. and 3,000,000*l.* at 4 per cent., or 21,000,000*l.* in all, in return for 12,000,000*l.* in cash. That is to say, for every 100*l.* paid, the investor got 150*l.* of stock at 3 per cent. and 25*l.* of stock at 4 per cent. From 1793 to 1797, the amount of capital funded was over 67,000,000*l.* against an actual sum received of 44,000,000*l.*; and during the whole war, debt to the amount of 275,000,000*l.* was created in excess of the amount received, the average issue being 169*l.* of debt for 100*l.* subscribed.

Pitt has been blamed for the policy of offering for subscription loans of the low denomination of 3 per cent., but, as Lord Rosebery has pointed out, 'he had no choice.' Loans offered at 4 per cent., and even at 5 per cent., met with very little support from the financial houses and groups who provided most of the money for the war. It was capital increment and not yield that they were after. The gravamen of the case against Pitt is: (a) that he was obliged to borrow on terms which did not provide for repayment and which virtually made the enormous National Debt a perpetual encumbrance; and (b) that a large proportion of this permanent debt was

never represented by money in the coffers of the State. The longer the war lasted, the smaller was the chance of abandoning this prodigal finance. During the nine years of war that followed Pitt's death such fantastic tricks were played with the national finances as might have made the high heavens of orthodox finance weep. It was not only that loans continued to be raised at a heavy discount; bonuses and lotteries were regular devices for enticing money into the Treasury. The State was in the position of a desperate spendthrift, who could only keep going by borrowing at unconscionable rates. The bill-brokers and stock-dealers of Change Alley were the principal agents for providing the money; and, unless they could get nominal stock for double the amount of their subscription, they buttoned up their pockets and put on what Sheridan calls a 'damn'd disinheriting countenance.'

All the debt that is being contracted to carry on the present war is debt in the strictest meaning of the term; that is to say, the principal has to be repaid. We are borrowing for definite periods, not contracting to pay interest for an indefinite period. Whatever posterity, a couple of hundred years hence, may have to provide in the way of taxation, at all events it will not be saddled with the costs of the present war. The first War Loan is redeemable in from eleven to fourteen years from the date of issue; the second is redeemable at the latest in 1945, and there is an option by which the Government may redeem it in 1925.

Irredeemability in a loan can only be justified when the purpose to which it is applied confers a perpetual benefit in the form of earned revenue. Some of the productive debt of municipalities comes into this category, also the debentures of railway and other companies. So, in one sense, does a war fought to preserve a nation's independence, although that motive does not justify us in passing on the burden indefinitely to unborn generations. The interminable annuity is no longer to be thought of as the machinery of a War Loan. It is juster by far, both to ourselves and to posterity, to create debt which is debt and has to be paid off at some fixed date, whether near or distant. Only in the event of the method failing should we be warranted in departing

from so sound a principle. What really matters is not the duration of the loan, but its terminability.

Lord Rosebery's pessimistic prediction that 'after the war all the belligerents will be in a state of economic exhaustion, disastrous both to the State and the individual,' reminds us that every serious accumulation of war debt in the past has been looked upon as the certain presage of national ruin. In the first edition of 'The Wealth of Nations,' published in 1776, Adam Smith remarked that the progress of the enormous debt oppressed, and in the long run would probably ruin, all the great countries of Europe. But at that time the English National Debt was only about 130,000,000*l.*; and the cost of the great war with France was yet to come, as well as the indebtedness consequent upon it. Adam Smith was, of course, judging by the national wealth and capacity of the time, and he no more foresaw their expansion than he foresaw the possibility of a National Debt of over 3,000,000,000*l.* His view was the common one. Notwithstanding the quick recoveries of prosperity and the profitable developments of trade which followed the restoration of peace and falsified the gloomy prognostications of the economic Cassandras, it was always prophesied that every new growth of debt would be the last straw of Britain's endurance. The country was warned again and again that it was on the road to national ruin. But the expected does not always happen; and the *dies iræ*, as if to mock the soothsayers, was always coming but never came. The prophets of evil were as far out in their reckoning as those Solomon Eagles who from time to time have foretold the end of the world on a specified date, and have found everything going on as usual not only on the appointed day but on every day after.

That there were temporary set-backs after exhausting wars was but natural; the outstanding fact about them is that they *were* temporary. After comparatively brief periods of hesitation and uncertainty, the spirit of Progress again spread her wings for flight. Population increased, trade multiplied, cities grew, fortunes were accumulated, the land was more largely cultivated, the marts became too small for the requirements of improving business, the harbours were overcrowded with

shipping. The heralds of disaster were put to confusion by a prosperity that knocked their glum forebodings into the proverbial cocked-hat. After the Great War—to take only one illustration—the people found it no more difficult to pay the interest on 800,000,000*l.* of debt than their ancestors found it to pay on 80,000,000*l.*; and this was because they were so much better off. It is not the amount of the burden that is the real test of a nation's capacity, but the proportion which it bears to the country's gross income. That is why the situation, so far as Great Britain is concerned, may, after the war, turn out to be more cheering than Lord Rosebery anticipates. The following table provides food for reassuring reflections :

	After the Napoleonic Wars, 1815-1816.	After the Crimean War, 1859-1860.	In 1914.	In 1917.
Population . . .	20,000,000 £	29,000,000 £	47,000,000 £	48,000,000 £
National Income . . .	300,000,000	700,000,000	2,400,000,000	2,600,000,000*
Taxation . . .	62,000,000	66,000,000	164,000,000	500,000,000
Excess of Income over Taxation } . . .	238,000,000	634,000,000	2,236,000,000	2,100,000,000

Our foreign trade before the war showed an equally instructive contrast; the imports for 1914 were 697,430,000*l.* against 26,700,000*l.* for 1815, and the exports were 525,720,000*l.* against 47,880,000*l.* Taxation has more than doubled since the present war began; but, even if the National Income had remained stationary, there would still have been an excess over taxation of 1,900,000,000*l.* A National Debt of 3,755,000,000*l.* is more than four times as large as the debt of a hundred years ago, but our annual income is nearly nine times as large; and, whereas the proportion of income to gross debt was about 35 to 100 in 1816, it is now nearly 70 to 100.

Perhaps, however, the estimate of income for the current year, the increase in which is largely due to the activity of war industries, is too abnormal to be fairly taken as a basis. Moreover, income must be measured

* Sir George Paish's estimate is 3,000,000,000*l.*, but it is safer to take the smaller figure.

in its relation to the cost of living ; and, as 1*l.* to-day will buy no more than 14*s.* did before the war, the figure of 2,800,000,000*l.* has to be qualified by its reduced purchasing power. It is safer, therefore, to take as a guide the pre-war income of 2,400,000,000*l.* Even this is nearly 90 per cent. of the estimated total net debt at the end of 1916-1917. Too sure an edifice must not be built even on these figures ; they are suggestive rather than conclusive ; but at any rate they show that we are better able to deal with the debt thus far contracted than our ancestors were to deal with theirs at the close of the long campaigns in Western Europe. There are two qualifying—perhaps one ought to say moderating—factors. One is that the duration of, and the ultimate expenditure involved in, the war are uncertain ; the other is that the national income after the war may, and probably will, experience a temporary shrinkage.

Taxation, however, must be a constant factor, for the debt charge, in any circumstances, will have to be met. This debt charge, including a provision of 1 per cent. for amortisation, already amounts to 145,000,000*l.* a year (excluding the short-term debt)—a very serious jump from the 24,500,000*l.* in the past normal times of peace. If to this amount be added the ordinary pre-war expenditure, and the 20,000,000*l.* that will be required for pensions, a total of 338,000,000*l.** has to be found yearly, for a good many years to come. The present revenue is at the rate of something over 502,000,000*l.*, of which over 100,000,000*l.* will be on account of excess profits tax imposed only for the period of the war. After the war, therefore, the revenue on the basis of the present taxation (except as regards excess profits) will, it is estimated, be about 400,000,000*l.*, which shows a surplus of some 62,000,000*l.* over the anticipated expenditure,—a surplus with a wide margin for any such contingency as a shrinking tax-yield.

A great deal depends upon the time which it will take to restore national prosperity and to develop the trade expansion that, sooner or later, has hitherto followed in the wake of our big wars. Will it follow in

* This does not include any provision for a larger expenditure upon armament, upon increased cost of education, or upon financial assistance in trade competition, all of which will probably have to be incurred.

the wake of this one? There is no inflexible economic law that makes such a prospect absolutely sure. The only thing certain is that Germany, directly peace is declared, will employ every resource, strain every nerve, and organise in every department, to compass a great trade victory in foreign markets, and that such a victory would not only prevent any substantial recovery here, but would make our own estate even worse than it is at present. In former times we have not had this fierce and unscrupulous rivalry to fight against. The world has been our oyster, and we have opened it without much opposition. Those easy-going conquests are at an end. Foreign trade in the future will have to be fought for; and, if we are to win, we must be at least as thorough and persistent as our rivals, whether enemy or neutral.

A moment's reflection will show that the National Debt, though primarily a financial question, is largely mixed up with economic questions. How to provide its interest, how and when to pay it off, involve the consideration of a number of economic theories, not by any means in agreement. As the doctors who rush in to prescribe in a case of illness are often at loggerheads with regard to the treatment, so the economic advisers of the Government are far from being unanimous in the remedies they propose. We shall certainly want all the wisdom and experience we can command. Ideas will never be more welcome. The country is no longer content to be governed with shibboleths, or to drift to disaster in the rotten hulk of obsolete political creeds. It is perfectly true, as Mr Sidney Webb says, that 'when the war is concluded our financial difficulties will in a sense begin,' for what with the huge debt-service, the payment of pensions, and the ever-increasing cost of armament so that we may be prepared for the always possible calamity of another war, normal expenditure is bound to remain at a very high level and may even become greater.

The Socialists have a majestic way of dealing with the problem. In a series of able essays edited by Mr Sidney Webb under the title 'How to pay for the War' (published by the Fabian Research Department), the line

is boldly taken that 'the only effective way of meeting the new burdens, is not by increasing imposts, but by making the nation as a whole more productive.' (The proposed capital tax referred to later, although it is not an impost in the above sense, gives to this somewhat dogmatic assertion a comical air of inconsistency.) The writers are against all 'fancy' taxes, not only because they would be more trouble than they are worth to collect, but also and chiefly because they would be but a drop in the ocean. They are equally against a Customs tariff, 'with its drawbacks of raising prices to the consumers, putting an unnecessary toll of profit into the pockets of some capitalist employers to the detriment of others, and diminishing trade all round,' because the amount of revenue such a tariff would raise is so disproportionate to the need. 'The only real way to pay for the war is to replace, by new construction, the material wealth that has been destroyed.' If instead of saying 'the only real way,' Mr Webb had been content to say 'one of the real ways,' he would have gained more adherents without weakening his own case. And his case is a pretty big one. It comprises five highly controversial schemes of great magnitude, namely: (1) the development of the Post Office as a source of profit; (2) the State purchase of the Railways and Canals, thereby facilitating and cheapening transport; (3) the nationalisation of the Coal Supply; (4) State Life Insurance; and (5) 'a revolution' in the Income Tax—a revolution remarkable for a new system of graduation, by which the net income of a man with 30,000*l.* a year, taxed at 5*s.* in the pound, would actually be more than the net income of a man with 100,000*l.* a year taxed at 16*s.* in the pound.

In principle, the proposal that the Railways and Canals should be acquired by the State has gained a good deal of support as a result of the smooth and successful working of the Government control of the railways since the beginning of the war. We need not stop to argue that cheap transport is one of the essentials of increased production, or that cheap transport is more likely to be obtained by a centralised system of working than by an agglomeration of competing companies with all the waste inseparable from divided control. But, if nothing more than the lowering of transport rates were aimed

at, some less drastic operation than the purchase of the railways might serve the purpose. A board of managers, in which the Government had, as now, the controlling voice, could surely devise an arrangement which should be just to the public without being unjust to the shareholders.

In the work edited by Mr Webb, a much larger object is foreshadowed. The suggestion is that the Government should buy out the holders of railway stocks at their Stock Exchange valuations on some future undivulged date, instead of on the terms of purchase provided for in the Act of 1844, paying in Government bonds bearing interest at such a rate as would make them saleable at par. The writer reckons that, after paying interest on the bonds, there would be an annual surplus which, if used as a sinking fund, would, by the end of the century, be sufficient to extinguish 2,500,000,000*l.* of the National Debt. If this means anything, it means that by the year 2000 the railway bonds could all be paid off, the interest upon them saved to the State, and 1,500,000,000*l.* of other debt extinguished. It is an attractive picture, but, long before A.D. 2000, aviation may be the universal method of locomotion, and railways be as obsolete as stage coaches. Such a measure would at the outset add nearly 1000 millions to our national liabilities; and, although this—supposing existing conditions to last—would be a productive and profit-making debt, the disastrous experience of the municipal tramways ought to make the State cautious of embarking upon a huge transport enterprise whose future no living man can determine. If one could be certain that the railways are going to remain for the next century or so the chief means of inland transport, it would be possible to agree heartily with the Fabian writer's claim that production would be stimulated and cheapened by their unification under the State, and that in addition to a direct advantage in the greater prosperity of trade, there would be the later advantage of accumulated profits available for the reduction of the Debt. But we cannot be certain of anything of the kind.

The same principle of Stock Exchange values is recommended for the purchase of the Coal Mines, and this significant commentary is made: 'To buy out on

the basis of Stock Exchange values all private interests in coal from the royalty owner and colliery proprietor down to the little retailer and hawker, would cost no more, as a capital sum, than the consumers now pay for a single year's supply of coal.' If this estimate can be substantiated, the financial character of the proposal becomes irresistible in its simplicity. Coal, being an indispensable factor in industrial production as well as for domestic use, is one of those commodities that ought to be produced, regulated, distributed and priced by an independent authority and in the interests of the State as a whole.*

Into both these great questions of Government ownership there enter economic problems which are outside their financial scope, such as that of the enormous addition which such changes would make to the number of State employees, and the danger—real or imaginary—that their combined influence and electoral strength would be an undesirably powerful lever in political matters affecting their own interests. 'Collective bargaining,' it is urged, might, if it were used on such a colossal scale, assume dimensions inimical to the welfare of the State. There is at least a chance that political parties might not be unwilling to bid for so formidable a support by concessions not altogether in the interest of the taxpayer. This is a hypothetical objection, and perhaps the best answer to it is that the railways belong to the State, either wholly or in part, in almost every important country except the United Kingdom and the United States, and that there has been no serious resulting clash of interests between Labour on the one hand and the State on the other.

It is difficult to summarise in terms of money the results anticipated from these proposed changes. In the case of the nationalisation of Life Insurance, for instance, the proposals are too complicated for even a *précis* here. What, it is said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would gain would be the gradual absorption by the ever-growing Insurance Fund of more and more of the Great War Loan, the whole unredeemed portion

* Since this paper was written, the Government has decided to take over the control of the coal mines for the duration of the war.

of which would probably within the next few decades be completely immobilised in the hands of the State Insurance Department. The coal profit is estimated at not less than 7,000,000*l.* a year, the railway surplus at 2,000,000*l.*, and the increased Post Office profit at 6,000,000*l.* It is, however, from the Income Tax 'revolution' that the greatest haul is expected; chiefly by the operation of a Special War Levy of 10 per cent. on all private property over 100*l.*, 1 per cent. being payable each year for ten years. This, and a poll tax of 10*s.* per head for persons who do not possess property worth 100*l.*, are estimated to produce 100,000,000*l.* a year, or 1,000,000,000*l.* in ten years.

This proposal, taken in conjunction with the new income-tax graduation scheme, under which incomes of over 100,000*l.* a year would be taxed at the rate of 16*s.* in the pound, is Mr Sidney Webb's chief contrivance for avoiding fresh imposts. In order that enemy goods may come in free and that the consumer may have to pay no more for them, capital and incomes are to be 'sweated' to an extent which threatens to be ruinous to enterprise and production. The merciful consideration shown to property-owners in the tithe-by-instalments plan deserves their humble gratitude. 'We won't kill you outright, we'll bleed you to death,' is the compassionate cry of the financial 'revolutionaries.' Worse still is the lot of the man or the firm with a substantial income, for the Socialist proposal is to raise the tax from 5*s.* to 10*s.* and to impose a super-tax on top of that. If a manufacturing firm making a divisible profit of 100,000*l.* a year in peace time is to be compelled to surrender 80 per cent. of it to the State, then we may as well say good-bye to all enterprise on the large scale. Even in the case of a private individual with an income of 100,000*l.*, to levy a tax of 16*s.* in the pound would be more befitting the audacity of Captain Macheath than the sober sense of the Legislature. Believing, as we do, in the principle of graduation and super-tax, we hardly need say that their application must be reasonable. There is nothing reasonable in appropriating four-fifths of even a rich man's income and taking 10 per cent. of his capital as well.

A still more extraordinary proposal with regard to capital, said to have originated in 'responsible quarters,'

was recently printed in the City Article of the 'Times.' What it amounts to, in brief, is the raising for war purposes of a large sum of money, in lieu of another loan, by means of a tax of 6 per cent. on capital, payable in monthly instalments of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. It is assumed that the capital of the country available for taxation is 24,000,000,000*l.*, which at 6 per cent. would produce 1,440,000,000*l.* But what is the nature of this estimated capital? At the outside only 15,000,000,000*l.* consist of investments in land, houses, factories, commerce, railways, municipal undertakings, limited companies, and the other more or less material assets usually classed as capital wealth. The other 9,000,000,000*l.* consist of the supposed capitalised value of income earned by intellectual or physical work. The doctor's fees, the barrister's earnings, the author's net receipts, the actor's salary, and the working-man's wages, all come within the category of the annual product of brains or labour; and, in that economic sense, brains and labour are forms of wealth. But they are not forms of wealth that are either constant or permanent as material assets are. No one can pretend to believe that a man's intellect or his skill as a craftsman is worth twenty years' purchase, since all earning capacity is liable to be determined by loss of health or by death.

A proposal to tax capital must either exclude the capitalised value of earned income and thus provoke the reasonable protests of those whose capital is invested, or it must include such value capitalised on a basis which may be entirely at variance not only with actualities but also with actuarial probabilities. A doctor, after years of study and patient drudgery, may have built up a practice of 600*l.* a year, on which he has already to pay a not inconsiderable income-tax. If he is to be taxed 6 per cent. on this income capitalised at twenty years' value, he will have to pay, in addition to existing taxes, 720*l.* on his so-called capital, or 120*l.* more than his average yearly earnings. Still more unfair would be the exaction of 6 per cent., or 180*l.*, on the twenty years' capitalised value of the wages of a working-man earning 3*l.* a week. The proposal, in short, so far as it applies to capital based on earned incomes, is fantastic and absurd. Nor would its incidence be any more just to

the owners of real estate. A 6 per cent. tax on the capital value of land and buildings could, in the majority of cases, only be paid by selling part of the property to raise the funds.

All kinds of businesses, too, whether private or joint-stock, would be seriously hit by such a tax. To many of them it would mean ruin. The smaller their real capital, the more severe would be the consequences. Take the example of a small tradesman making a net profit of 200*l.* a year. This, capitalised at twenty years' purchase, would be 4000*l.* (6 per cent. on which would be 240*l.*), whereas three years' purchase would be the utmost his business would command in the market. To find 240*l.* in twelve months would be almost impossible in nine such cases out of ten; and, even if it were possible, it would eventually spell bankruptcy. Nor would the great joint-stock companies be able to undergo the strain without grave detriment to their business prosperity. The capital invested in the railways of the United Kingdom—to take only one group—may be put roughly at 1,000,000,000*l.*; and the tax they would be called upon to pay under this scheme would be 60,000,000*l.* To find even a quarter of this huge sum within twelve months would handicap their development for years to come. Banks, industrial companies, and shipping companies would all be crippled in greater or less degree. It is hardly too much to say that such a tax as that proposed would paralyse the industry of the country, and utterly destroy many of the springs from which its wealth is obtained. If ever there was an illustration of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs, we have it here.

None of the authorities responsible for the various schemes, methods, proposals, or whatever they may be called, seem to have given much weight to the potentialities of Science in modifying the conditions of the future. Their general note is one of despondency. The only gleams of light they can see in an otherwise impenetrable gloom are the torches they themselves have lit. No allowance whatever is made for scientific development and the expansion of trade it foreshadows. Yet we are living in an age teeming with new inventions. Airships and aeroplanes, submersible ships, wireless telegraphy, and motor-traction, have all been made

practically useful within a couple of decades. Progress, instead of being behind us, is in front of us. 'The truth is,' as the 'Daily Telegraph' has wisely remarked, 'that by the time this war ends we shall be confronted by a new world, one of almost infinite possibilities.' In such conditions it will be only by the most inconceivable submission to supine influences that we can help being carried forward by a movement in which Science, as the handmaid of Trade, will speed on winged feet to achievements paling all the records of the past. While anything like optimism is to be guarded against, except as an incentive to resolute organised effort, even more is pessimism to be held at bay. This great overhanging fabric of debt will not crush us if we go forward with the unhasting, unresting steps of confidence and hope. Tariff Reform, unification of the Railway System, utilisation of the Canals, State ownership of Collieries, improved Postal administration, and a fair scheme of Income-tax reform may all be needed, in a greater or less degree, to enable us to overcome the dragons in the path ; but the greatest force at our service is the realisation of this new after-the-war world of 'infinite possibilities.'

H. J. JENNINGS.

Art. 10.—THE STATE AND AGRICULTURE.

AT the beginning of the present war few of those who were compelled to be onlookers had any conception of its probable duration. Rapid military victory was at first expected. When this hope was seen to be vain, it was succeeded by the confident belief that economic and financial pressure must bring the war to a favourable end within a measurable period. It was conceded, with a certain grudging and rather scornful admiration, that the German Empire had revealed a wonderful degree of military preparation; but it was not till much later that it was generally realised that the defensive measure of providing for economic self-preservation had been equally carefully thought out. The rapid rise of food-prices in Germany, and the introduction of tickets for bread and other commodities, were hailed as signs of approaching surrender to the inevitable. This phase of public opinion was followed by another brief period of reaction, during which the same grudging admiration was extended to the German power of organisation in economic and industrial matters. Then came rumours and authoritative evidences of mistakes which had been made, and of popular discontent leading to spasmodic outbursts of rioting. These facts rekindled hope and led us to believe that we were succeeding economically, and that in this respect German discipline and skill was after all not sufficient to meet us.

Meanwhile we had slowly adopted, in the military sphere, the doctrine '*fas est et ab hoste doceri.*' But the lesson of economic organisation and discipline has been a far harder one; the necessities of the case do not provide so urgent a stimulus to overcome our great weight of inertia. The steady and insidious rise in prices at home and the skilfully concealed shortage of certain necessary commodities have been glossed over by pointing to the far worse state of things in Germany, and speaking soothingly of the inevitable discomforts of war-time. When the submarine menace first became sufficiently serious to drive home the lesson of our dependence on foreign foodstuffs, it was dealt with by the naval authorities and the alarm subsided. The fictitious

prosperity created by separation allowances and munition works has helped enormously to avoid serious agitation.

Nevertheless our habitual neglect of these problems is now forcing them on our attention with almost as much urgency as the deficiency of munitions formerly presented. The question is whether we are going to take a long-sighted view of the matter and allow or urge the Government to organise the food-supply for the whole nation, or whether we are to continue the present method of dealing in a half-hearted way with special details and certain commodities. Certain persons, few in number and generally disregarded, have been urging since the outbreak of war that the whole matter of production, distribution, and conservation of food supplies should be regarded as an organic whole and treated thoroughly; not only that, but that it should be recognised as intimately bound up with the questions of man-power and national service. We have had, instead, scattered committees from time to time when indignation and apprehension increased to an alarming point; and, like many other Government committees, these seem to have been chiefly considered as a convenient method of shelving the problem. The most striking instance of this was the appointment of three Departmental Committees on food production, which faded away without any practical effects whatever, and a subsequent Committee on food prices, which seems most unlikely to come into touch with realities at all. Meanwhile, in centres where munition wages, separation allowances, and war bonuses have been less plentiful than increases in the cost of living, as for instance in Dublin, hundreds of people are being reduced below the primary poverty line; and throughout the kingdom discontent and indignation are growing to a point which, if not dangerous now, may very likely become so. At the same time a very large number of people, with a certain knowledge which would be helpful in dealing with problems of this kind, and with strong but perhaps vague aspirations to national service, are unemployed; and the experts themselves continue to cry in the wilderness, write letters to the papers, pass resolutions, or find occupation in work for which they have less aptitude and training.

If it is distasteful to us to learn from our enemies, even in time of urgency, we can at least take a lesson or two from our Allies. The semi-official 'Journal d'Agriculture Pratique' for Nov. 2, 1916, contains a report addressed by the Minister of Agriculture to the President of the French Republic, which outlines, within the compass of two thousand words, a complete and far-reaching policy for dealing with the provision of modern agricultural machinery to replace the scarcity of labour and stimulate production, both now and in the period of reconstruction. Let me quote a passage which speaks for itself :

'The State and some large associations have put themselves at the head of the movement [for popularising agricultural machinery], the State to provide education and subsidies, the Societies to construct and popularise the best models and those most suited to our country and to the methods of our agriculturists. The appearance on the scene of mechanical cultivation (motoculture) has been a revelation to them ; and at the present time we are witnessing, in a large number of departments, a regular onslaught designed to put us in possession of the most perfect types of machinery.

'Syndicates [i.e. cooperative associations] for mechanical cultivation, whose number is constantly increasing, are being organised everywhere to take advantage of the concessions offered by the State, and to make experiments under the eyes of the rural population which may convert them to the new idea. Everyone is beginning to understand that the revolution in the methods of cultivation must be carried out in accordance with principles which are known and applied in the industry, and that it must have the benefit of all the knowledge which manufacturers and agriculturists have gleaned from fifty years of scientific discoveries. From one end of the country to another it is now recognised that what was yesterday only an advance in civilisation will be to-morrow—after the war—an imperious necessity, the only means of replacing the heroes who are gone and of bringing our agricultural production to the highest possible efficiency.'

M. Meline goes on to outline what has been done already. The Government has organised shows and competitions for machinery, and has urged the syndicates, the communes, and the departments to join in the movement, backing up its persuasion with the offer of liberal

subsidies, up to half the value of the implements acquired. The Automobile Club and other large bodies, and also the railway companies, have joined in the work. Two hundred tractors have been obtained; and a number of wounded and unfit men and 'reformed characters' have been trained in a very short time to handle this type of machinery. But the programme for the future is far more ambitious. The Report estimates that immediately after the war 2000 tractors, 110,000 ploughs, 50,000 harrows, 22,000 drills, 15,000 reapers, and a corresponding number of other implements, will be required for use in the invaded districts alone. 'In order to make certain of this formidable equipment,' says M. Meline, 'it is imperative not to wait for the end of hostilities.' The steps recommended are first to come to an understanding with the makers in France as to the quantities they can supply, and then to enter into contracts with foreign manufacturers for the balance. The raw materials required by the French manufacturers must be obtained for them as soon as possible. Ways and means must be scientifically studied, a scheme mapped out, and individual competition adjusted. The manufacturers must be instructed to prepare the type of machines suitable to the country and above all to small holdings. Furthermore, financial steps must be taken to help societies of small farmers to acquire the machinery; and the present system of technical education must be made universal and democratic.

A short *decret* follows, appointing a commission to carry out the whole scheme. The commission consists of thirty-one persons, all well-known in France either as agriculturists, economists, or manufacturers of machines; and by this time it is no doubt at work. The contrast is striking between this attitude and the policy—or rather, no-policy—hitherto adopted in the United Kingdom. Although we have thousands of able-bodied men still available, and are still to a great extent carrying on a more or less normal life and enjoying an open-sea trade, we appear unable to provide our agriculturists either with labour or the machinery to replace that labour, which they must have if they are to produce food. It is almost impossible at the present time for the farmers to obtain delivery of machines or to get adequate

labour; even when machines can be supplied by manufacturers, they are almost certain to be indefinitely held up in transit. The excuse put forward is always the same—the necessities of war. Manufacturers are under Government control, and must give precedence to munitions; men are needed urgently for the war; tonnage must be employed for wheat or transport, railways for carrying troops and munitions. All this is very plausible, and has the advantage that it almost applies the stigma of lack of patriotism to any one who questions it. But how comes it that these excuses do not seem to apply to France, where every possible man is mobilised and every available resource requisitioned to deal with actual invasion, and where a large part of the most effective manufacturing centres have been for two years in enemy hands?

Before attempting an answer to this somewhat embarrassing question it will be well to take a little more evidence, which can be found in another number (Nov. 16, 1916) of the *Journal* already quoted. Here we have two more circulars from the Minister of Agriculture, each addressed to the Presidents of various Farmers' Societies, cooperative and other. The shorter of these deals with a problem which is on the same level as that of the provision of agricultural machinery, namely, the supply of fertilisers. Here there is no question of financial assistance on the part of the State, but simply of taking business-like steps to ensure the proper delivery of supplies. It is pointed out that the facilities of railway transport are being taken over, in an ever-increasing degree, by the War Office, with consequent delay to other materials. The Department of Agriculture, however, realises that it is absolutely necessary that farmers should be able to obtain their fertilisers in due season. No difficulty has been found in convincing the War Office of the reasonableness of this view; and accordingly an agreement has been reached between the two Departments to the following effect:

'The War Office, in consultation with this Department, has decided to organise on a business-like basis the carriage of all fertilisers necessary to farmers; in order to ensure the success of the plan, the complete schedule of deliveries must be submitted to it by the 15th of December at the latest.'

'It has accordingly requested all the leading dealers in fertilisers to provide it with full information as to the size and destination of the deliveries they expect to make; you will understand from this how desirable it is for farmers to give their orders as quickly as possible to their usual dealers, in order that the latter may be able to include these orders in their schedule of deliveries.'

The Minister goes on to say that after the date mentioned no special facilities can be given, and that consignments not included in the schedule will be treated as ordinary goods, subject to indefinite delay. Further, he recommends the grouping of orders in bulk and the avoidance of giving orders to centres unnecessarily distant. Two further paragraphs merit translation :

'With a view to the grouping of orders, farmers' societies (Associations Agricoles) would be doing useful service, as I have already frequently advised them, by combining the orders of all their members. In order to simplify the delivery, consignments will be sent in bulk to a given point, from which deliveries will be made to the final destinations within a small radius.

'I have requested the dealers in fertilisers to let me know before the 20th of November, with regard to all classes of manures, the quantities which will be available. In this way I hope to be able to give, to those societies which do not know to whom to apply, the name of dealers who have stocks in hand.'

Here is surely another example of a comprehensive and business-like method of applying the machinery of Government to the urgent necessities of the case, from which we might well learn something.

A third and longer circular is addressed to a more limited class—namely, the Presidents of the Agricultural Credit Societies. It begins by pointing out that these institutions were never more needed than at present, but that unfortunately many of them have become more or less inactive owing to the absence of their members; and it gives instructions as to the means by which the wives of these members can be brought into touch with the Societies and benefited by them. It then proceeds to explain the law passed in October, dealing with the recultivation of farms which have been abandoned during

the war, and showing the part which has to be played by the Credit Societies in connexion with the administration of this law. The law in question provides that the local authorities—including local associations of farmers which have been created by the Government in every district where existing 'Syndicats Agricoles' did not render it unnecessary—should examine all the cases of farms which have fallen out of cultivation and decide which of these are most suitable for recultivation. The owners are then to be called upon to undertake this work; and, in the case of their failing to do so without good reason, or the far more likely case of their being unable, the authorities are to take the matter in hand themselves. The actual decision is made by the mayor and two councillors; and the land is then handed over to the local agricultural committee, which is either an existing cooperative association or a newly created body consisting of prominent farmers and landowners of the neighbourhood.

The authority thus constituted has the advantage of first-class agricultural advice, the power to hire or even commandeer machines, horses, and so forth, from neighbouring farmers who are not using them, the right to appeal to the military authorities in all questions regarding labour-power, and the privilege of borrowing capital from State sources through the existing Agricultural Credit Societies. The details of the methods by which the Societies will carry out these loans are clearly set forth in the circular.

These three examples of what is being done in France, covering as they do the whole field of the capital, labour, and raw materials necessary to production, will suffice to show that a comprehensive agricultural policy is quite possible even in a country which is fighting for its existence and is partly occupied by enemy forces. It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary to argue that it is desirable, as well as possible, but the results, which speak for themselves, may be briefly outlined. From France, alone almost among the countries of Europe, we have heard nothing of the outcry against economic conditions and the increased cost of living. The Paris restaurants have put up their prices very little. An observer, lately returned from a journey of enquiry through the zones

not touched by the war, reports that he was able to live in complete comfort at country hotels for less than ten shillings a day—little, if at all, in excess of the rates which prevailed in time of peace. Every officer interested in such matters has testified to the fact that practically every acre of farm land is fully cultivated up to the edge of the firing line, although there are no young or able-bodied men to be seen on the farms. France has no fears for her future harvest; she can look forward to supporting herself without excessive hardship even if the submarine menace were to increase a hundredfold. Yet she has sent away every possible man either into the army or the munition works, and is neglecting nothing of military advantage.

Not far behind France in these respects comes Italy. The official bulletin of the Department of Agriculture ('Bollettino del Ministero di Agricoltura') contains a series of regulations and decrees of much the same character, adapted to the peculiar and perhaps slightly less pressing needs of that country. Immediately after her intervention in hostilities, a decree was issued providing powers by which the local authorities could transfer labour and machinery from one district to another and one farm to another, according to the needs of the moment, either by amicable agreement, or if necessary by compulsion. Subsequent numbers have contained more detailed instructions as to the necessity of abstaining from the use of certain foods in feeding live-stock and of substituting others, together with advice as to the most convenient way in which this could be done. These instructions, prohibitions, and advice are faithfully reproduced in the many agricultural papers, most of which are published by cooperative associations.

The problems of Germany have been somewhat different, and it may be said that we have been by turns unduly pessimistic and unduly optimistic as to the moral to be drawn from the measures taken by our enemies to deal with the economic situation. It is probable that we can do little by direct imitation of Germany, but we can at least realise the thoroughness with which their policy of dealing with both production and distribution of food has been carried out. With this policy we

propose to deal in another article. At present we need only say that Germany is in a harder position than her opponents, and that more discipline and self-sacrifice are required in that country; but there is no reason to believe that starvation is at hand. It certainly would have been an accomplished fact with us if, with our present policy, we had to change places with Germany. It may be argued that we have *not* to change places; that, if we had, we should devise a policy to meet the situation; and that, since at present we have no urgent stimulus to deal with these matters, we do well to concentrate entirely on the more purely military aspects of the situation. If the growing and now very serious discontent of the working classes, the partial failure of the American wheat crop, and the renewed outbreak of submarine warfare, are not a sufficient answer to this argument, surely we may admit that it is ignominious to confess ourselves inferior in all-round organisation to practically every European country. An American who had recently occasion to travel overland from the Hague to Constantinople writes of his wonder and admiration at the continuous cultivation which he saw in Germany, Austria and Serbia. Not till he reached Turkey was an untilled country revealed. Is it not humiliating to feel that a neutral must travel across Europe to Turkey to find a state of things which, had he gone westward, would at once have become obvious to him in England?

It is not my purpose, however, to press this point, which is in the main admitted. It is more desirable to consider what practical steps can be taken. As a beginning, let us see whether there is any one thing which all the countries we have spoken of hold in common, but which is neglected in the United Kingdom. Students of agricultural organisation will unhesitatingly answer this question in the affirmative; there is undoubtedly one vital principle underlying the success of many European countries. It is fairly self-evident to those who study the subject, but it seems to elude the casual observer and to be almost abhorrent to the authorities. It is the principle of self-help supplemented by State assistance—the encouragement of local organisation, locally controlled and assisted, but neither hampered nor spoon-fed by the central authority. After many

misdirected efforts, this policy has been worked out in Germany, in France, and in Denmark. It has never been arrived at in Great Britain, but, by a strange irony, its philosophy has found its first and most authoritative concrete expression in the Report of the Irish Recess Committee, expressing the ideas which Sir Horace Plunkett, who really understands this policy, has devoted a lifetime to bring into effect.

This fact in itself would be a sound academic reason for dealing at length with the present economic position of Ireland as the most vital part of any scheme for national organisation. There are also valid practical arguments in favour of the same course. It is only twelve years since the British Government succeeded in separating the land question from the Home Rule agitation in Ireland by carrying out one of the biggest measures of land reform known to history. During those years more than 75 per cent. of the small farmers of Ireland have become freehold owners of their land by the assistance of State loans, bonuses, and administrative machinery. Those who have relied upon Arthur Young's celebrated maxim, that 'the magic of property turns sand into gold,' are entitled to expect that, as a result of this reform, Ireland would now be providing large food supplies for the United Kingdom in its time of need. As a matter of fact barely 15 per cent. of the available land of the country is now under tillage; and the slight increases which were obtained last year under pressure of war conditions have given place to a reaction during 1916 which leaves the situation not appreciably better than it was before the war. Yet the resources of Ireland have not been largely mobilised for any other form of war service.

Whatever may be the views of the new Government with regard to conscription in Ireland, we must recognise, without expressing any political views whatever, that the existing population is unlikely, unless some startling change takes place, to contribute any greatly increased number of effectives to the Allied armies. Yet, if Ireland is to continue to be considered as an integral part of the United Kingdom—as all but the most extreme Nationalists recognise it must be—it

will be to everybody's advantage that it should make some definite contribution to the support of that Kingdom in the present crisis. In saying this we put no case either for or against Home Rule; the argument holds alike for Nationalist and Unionist, Englishman and Irishman.

We have, then, a country which is overwhelmingly agricultural, which has to contribute to a certain cause, which has a large number of able-bodied men still available and likely to remain so, and which has already benefited by most favourable legislation designed to increase its productivity. The obvious moral is surely that these circumstances should be taken advantage of by making Ireland so effective agriculturally that she will lead the way towards minimising the dependence of the United Kingdom on imported food-stuffs.

For this purpose the machinery is all at hand. We have seen that the success of foreign countries in this direction is conditioned by the adoption of a policy of local voluntary and semi-official organisation, helped and directed by a central authority. The essential elements in such a policy are a system of small holdings, a network of cooperative societies and farmers' associations, a decentralised administration of agricultural authority, and an expert and sympathetic central Board. In England some at least of these elements are as yet undeveloped; the large English tenant-farmer does not lend himself by circumstance or temperament to rapid organisation. But in Ireland we have a nation of small holders with a natural tendency to association, a thousand Cooperative Societies with the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society to advise and supervise them, and the Irish Agricultural Wholesale Society to do their collective trade. We have a Government Department with a democratic Board, and under it County Committees of Agriculture. If this existing machinery were working as it works in France or Germany, Ireland herself would be so prosperous that discontents would largely vanish, her man-power would be so well employed that the natural anger of England against her special privileges would disappear, and she would lead the way towards a far greater measure of economic independence for the whole Kingdom. The facts are far otherwise; a country which should be

exporting food-stuffs is in such a position that no single district is even self-supporting in spite of the machinery we have described.

It is impossible not to feel that, if this state of things were fully realised, the present contemptuous indifference or annoyance with which things Irish are usually regarded would give place to a whole-hearted demand for concentration upon economic reform. Such a demand would perhaps be Utopian if no machinery were in existence; as it is, all that is required is not even legislation, but a change in the spirit and method of administration. Those who did the great work of land reform in Ireland, and then sat back to watch 'the magic of property' at work, forgot one lesson, which has been learned in every country where similar reforms have been carried out. It is not sufficient, if sand is to be turned into gold, that men should be given the sand—Arthur Young uttered only a half-truth here—they must also be taught the science of the alchemist. To this teaching there are two parts, a technical and a business part respectively. In Ireland Sir Horace Plunkett realised this before the reforms were accomplished; and he realised also, what has been found true in practice in every country, that these two sides were the proper functions of two bodies—a State Department and a voluntary organisation. In two great campaigns he established these two bodies, and they and their offspring are still there; but the harmony is destroyed, and with it the best hopes of a permanently successful policy.

There is no need here to go into the reasons for this misfortune, no need even to try to apportion the blame. It is quite sufficient to draw attention to the facts. Here are two great bodies, each spending public moneys—one to a large, the other to a small extent—for the furtherance of the same general purpose, and each part of a definite machine. They are thoroughly out of sympathy with one another; and the Government which provides the funds refuses to intervene even in these times of urgency. Yet, so long as the lack of sympathy continues, each body is deprived of the greater part of its effectiveness.

We have shown clearly how in France and Germany

the State Departments of Agriculture carry out their work through local cooperative bodies. It was the existence of 17,000 or more of these bodies which enabled Germany to organise supply and distribution for 70,000,000 people, not to speak of collecting millions of marks for war loans. In Ireland the instructive circulars and advice of the Agricultural Department go for nothing, because they proceed from a central body in Dublin, and farming is a local matter. The same instructions coming to 100,000 farmers through 1000 Cooperative Societies would have a very different effect. The science of production and the business of marketing are inseparably bound up in agriculture; in Ireland they are treated separately.

Let us take one or two examples. The Department recommends increased wheat-growing; the farmer who takes the advice, if he is lucky enough to get the labour to harvest his crop, finds it practically impossible to dispose of it. In many places the nearest mill is forty miles away. Here is obviously a case for cooperative mills, which the I.A.O.S. could organise. Yet no attempt has been made to combine the two pieces of propaganda. Even more striking is the condition of the dairying industry. There are 350 cooperative creameries in Ireland, and yet the average production per cow is almost 200 gallons a year below that which obtains in Denmark, and there is scarcely any winter dairying at all. In Denmark every creamery has its cow-testing association—a very ordinary piece of common-sense—while in Ireland there are not half-a-dozen successful associations of this kind. Again, science is divorced from business; the Department is responsible for cow-testing associations, the I.A.O.S. (and some butter merchants) for creameries.

In Denmark the whole policy of the Government is devoted to ensuring that the output of butter shall be uniform in quantity and quality throughout the country and throughout the year. Nothing of the kind is to be found in Ireland. The loss in this direction alone runs into seven figures a year. In questions of capital, fertilisers, feeding stuffs, machinery, and so forth, the same futile wastage is going on, which is so intelligently averted in France. There are Agricultural Credit

Societies all over Ireland, organised by the I.A.O.S. There might be many more of them, and they have admittedly tremendous potentialities for good. Instead of sending friendly and helpful circulars to them and putting capital at their disposal, the Department has taken this opportunity to withdraw all the capital which it had originally lent them. Moreover, before the war, after hampering them in many ways, the State body held an enquiry into them, kept them *sub judice* for two years, condemned them as in the main unsatisfactory, and proposed to set up a rival system of its own. From that time to this, nothing has been done; and naturally the Societies are suffering from lack of confidence and stagnation. Meanwhile the Post Office Savings Banks and the Deposit accounts of the Irish Joint Stock Banks show accumulations of 80,000,000*l.* A large percentage of this money comes directly or indirectly from agriculture two per cent. of it reinvested in the same field would revolutionise Ireland. Instead, it goes—one must suppose—into Consols, which the banks solemnly and mournfully depreciate on their books year by year.

Seeds of first-class purity and germinating power are hardly more plentiful in Ireland than they were ten years ago; fertilisers and machinery have to be bought in the face of every obstacle both of price and transit. Neither manufacturers, merchants, ship-owners nor railway companies seem to have been brought to believe that the needs of agriculture during the war are urgent. Nor is this surprising, considering the attitude of the authorities. To take one from many instances, the height of absurdity was surely reached when the Government, after giving permission with great reluctance for the export to Copenhagen of the raw materials for milk-cans, which were urgently required and could not be manufactured in the British Isles, afterwards refused for months to allow the finished article to enter the port of Dublin on the return journey.

Officials will no doubt say that all that has been written in this article is forcing an open door—that instructions are issued on all the points in question, and that everything possible is being done. No doubt the archives of Government departments contain many schemes fully as

well-intentioned as those which we have quoted from other countries, but there is something radically wrong in the spirit and method by which they are carried out. In spite of all comfortable utterances, there is no good in disguising the fact that the situation is bad and is growing worse, and that in Ireland a great opportunity is being thrown away. Bitterness is growing between town and country, and between people and Government. Stocks are being depleted, crops are failing, land is going out of cultivation. Man-power remains, in an idleness which, according to immemorial precedent, must lead to trouble. And this trouble will not end with the end of the war. To meet the conditions, we must face the hard facts of the steady rise in cost of living, which we have attempted to minimise; we must abandon the *laissez faire* attitude which we find so comforting. Both production and distribution have to be dealt with simultaneously; it is plain that they go together, and it would not be hard to follow out the same lines of argument with regard to distribution and show that somewhat similar remedies can be applied.

It is not sought, however, to prove that in Cooperation alone lies all the remedy for our troubles. We urge simply a definite policy of organisation for the problem as a whole and the nation as a whole, and we claim that in Ireland at present lies the greatest opportunity and the greatest wastage. Let the Food Controller be assisted by a council of two or three really representative and experienced Irishmen who can formulate a policy which will bring together the work of the Department and the I.A.O.S. Let them control the railways* and the shipping of the country in the interests of agriculture, as they are controlled in England in the interests of the military authorities. Furthermore, let them get into touch with manufacturers of machinery, seed and manure merchants, and similar agencies, as is done in France, and bring the information so gained to the knowledge of the Cooperative Societies. Let them have power to stabilise the supplies of labour, and to dispose of capital which will make that labour effective. Finally,

* Since this article was in type, the Government has taken over the control of the Irish railways.

let them be authorised to exert compulsion upon farmers, if there are any such, who contumaciously refuse to make the best use of their land ; but, on the other hand, let them see to it that those farmers who do make the best of it are guaranteed the rewards which they have a right to expect.

These things, if done in the wrong spirit, may lead to an odious and ineffective dictatorship ; if done in the spirit which M. Meline has shown in France, they will have results of incalculable benefit, first for Ireland, and secondly in an equal degree for the whole kingdom. They will at the same time increase her resources and lessen her perils. The amount of money required would be a drop in the ocean compared to our present expenditure ; and not only would the investment bear direct interest at a high rate, but by this means alone can the Government recover the interest due to it on the legislation of the past. The Irish farmer will not put obstacles in the way. He has been much abused, and for many of his actions and attitudes he has no doubt deserved the abuse ; but insufficient attention has been paid to the previous conditions which have led to his lack of responsiveness ; he has shown many times that, if the conditions were improved, he is well enough fitted to give a fine response. In intelligence and adaptability he is superior to the small farmer in many countries ; perhaps it is his intelligence which makes it so hard to get him to respond to the wrong kind of treatment. At least the chance is here now ; and, if it is not taken, no amount of vague optimism will remedy the difficulties either of the political or the economic situation after the war.

LIONEL SMITH-GORDON.

Art. 11.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL MOTOR.

THE influence of the war upon the development of the agricultural motor has been somewhat complex, inasmuch as its effects have in a sense been beneficial, and in another sense detrimental. Without fully endorsing the general opinion that farmers are extremely conservative, it is at least safe to contend that as a class they are not much inclined to indulge in expensive experiments of a speculative character. They are more impressed by the actual experiences of other farmers of their acquaintance than by the theoretical advantages of any new invention, even if these advantages are demonstrated in a practical manner. They are, moreover, inclined to be very critical, and perhaps to lay undue stress upon the comparatively weak points of some fresh idea, and not enough upon the compensating advantages.

It would be futile to deny that, in his endeavours to convince the farmer, the motor engineer has in past years not been able to put forward a very strong case. The application of motor power to agriculture has proved extremely difficult. The conditions under which a farm tractor has to work are incomparably more severe than those which accompany the use of an ordinary motor-car, or even of a heavy commercial vehicle. While a tractor is ploughing or doing other heavy work upon the land, it is obliged to develop its full power for long consecutive periods, whereas the engine of a motor-car is only extended to the full occasionally, and there are long intervals during which its work is comparatively light. Another essential difference between the two classes of machine is to be found in the fact that the farm motor has to develop its power at very low speed. A large amount of work can be got out of a light machine, provided the speed at which it operates is high enough ; but, when the speed is low, very substantial construction becomes necessary, since the stresses experienced by the parts which transmit the power are in inverse proportion to the rate of motion. It follows that parts constructed for use in motor vehicles, and quite strong enough for their work, are not necessarily adequate when embodied

in an agricultural tractor. Unfortunately, many designers have been slow to recognise this primary fact, and numerous failures have resulted from the neglect of it. Attempts have been made to employ ordinary motor-cars, only slightly modified, for the haulage of farm implements upon the land ; and the consequences have been disastrous to the prestige of motor transport in this application. In other instances, lack of success has been traceable to a want of appreciation of the fact that a farm motor is handled, as a rule, by men of no great engineering knowledge or mechanical aptitude. Not infrequently, it suffers from neglect, not only in respect of proper repair and maintenance, but even as regards the ordinary precaution of cleaning and lubricating the moving parts.

The conditions under which farming is carried on in Great Britain differ widely from those prevalent, for example, in the greater part of the United States or in the West of Canada. There, the problem is generally to cultivate enormous areas of open lands ; and it is often deemed sufficient to plough to a depth which, in the opinion of the British farmer, would amount merely to a scratching of the soil. Where land is cheap and limitless in extent, there is not the same need to study the art of obtaining the maximum production from a given acreage. Where the country is open and merely undulating, with a soil homogeneous over large areas, it is possible to employ a comparatively cumbrous engine which would be almost, if not quite, useless in confined fields often involving heavy gradients and frequent changes in the consistency and nature of the soil. For these reasons, the British farmer has quite rightly refused to consider the whole-hearted adoption of agricultural motors built primarily to work under American or Colonial conditions. His attitude in this matter has been rendered all the firmer by the fact that, even in districts where all the circumstances favour the big farm tractor, expensive failures have been extremely numerous.

In Great Britain, the manufacture of agricultural motors has not been carried on upon a large scale. The demand has been small and uncertain, and very difficult to nurse into a healthy development. The more substantial engineering firms have in general preferred to

expand along lines of less resistance, and in some cases, after tentative experiments, have come to the conclusion that the farm motor is a dangerous affair which, in the interests of shareholders, had better be left alone. Meanwhile, pioneers have laboured under many disadvantages, the principal of which has been the lack of funds to support them through an unexpectedly prolonged period of experiment and qualified success. At the time of the outbreak of war, the British industry had not attained considerable proportions, but there had been developed, year by year, machines which had become thoroughly practical and well suited in principle to the average British farmer's requirements. The quality of the workmanship and material put into them was not always above reproach. The supply could only improve materially if the demand were correspondingly enlarged; and this seemed likely to happen only very gradually, because, as already indicated, the supply did not represent anything approaching the farmer's ideal. Meanwhile, labour and horses remained available in adequate quantities and at reasonable prices.

The Royal Agricultural Society of England had apparently approached the subject with some reluctance. The only set of competitive trials that had been organised and carried through by that body had produced very little valuable information, and had suffered from a number of restrictive regulations, which had prevented the entries from being representative. In these trials, steam tractors weighing about five tons had shown up much better than the lighter motor tractors using petrol or paraffin. Apparent results had been too much dependent upon fuel costs, which, though important, are not really the main consideration. Such difficulties as those connected with bringing up supplies of water and fuel to steam tractors at work upon the land had not been taken into account. Undoubtedly, the steam tractor is a very valuable implement for direct ploughing under some conditions, but it is certain that sooner or later the internal combustion engine will predominate.

In France, more energy had been shown in the matter of organising trials and demonstrations; and some valuable statistics had been collected. The real test of an agricultural motor is not the intrinsic beauty of the furrow

turned by it, but the yield of the land which it has cultivated. Nothing really conclusive is likely to follow from trials, unless these are taken in hand by centres of agricultural research. At such centres, samples of various types of farm motors ought to be collected, and each type employed for the whole of the cultivating processes required on certain stretches of land, which should be as nearly as possible identical in position and composition. The crops ultimately obtained from these stretches should be carefully measured and analysed, and compared with those yielded by similar stretches cultivated entirely by means of horse-drawn implements. In any one centre such trials would serve to establish with fair accuracy the relative advantages of motor and horse-drawn implements on land of the same quality. If contemporary tests of a similar nature were also made at other centres, the aggregate result would be the collection of data of the highest possible value. The cost of the whole of this procedure would amount only to a few thousand pounds; and the results, in their possible influence upon the problem of bringing more land under the plough and encouraging intensive culture, would almost certainly be of inestimable value. In certain instances, the makers of agricultural motors have set seriously to work to enlarge their experience by cultivating farms of their own with power-driven machinery, and keeping exact accounts over a period of years. This plan should, in any given case, lead to the rapid improvement of the type of motor manufactured. It does not, however, provide results available as a basis for comparison of the various types upon the market.

Wherever agricultural motor trials are held, one hears many and diverse opinions expressed as to the effects of the machines upon the land. It is quite conceivable that one motor may turn very clean, straight furrows, while another may do what appears to be slip-shod work, and yet that the second may produce a better yield than the first. Such a result might be influenced, for example, by the difference of pressure upon the ground of the driving wheels of the two machines. Then again, some machines run with both driving wheels upon the unploughed land; in others, the wheel supporting the bulk of the weight runs in the

furrow. Assuming that compression of the soil is in any case detrimental, it still remains an open question whether it is worse to compress the surface before turning it, or to compress the bottom of the furrow, afterwards turning the unpacked land on to the top of what quite conceivably might tend to form a sort of subterranean watercourse. The French have developed a number of motor implements, which aim at the abandonment of ploughing proper in favour of cultivation by a large number of rotary digging implements, which break up the soil into fairly uniform and small pieces. From the mechanical standpoint, this scheme has the disadvantage of introducing comparatively delicate cutting implements, which must certainly be more liable to fracture than the ordinary plough, if stones or heavy roots are encountered. On the other hand, it has the great advantage of making the implements themselves do their share in the propulsion of the machine, which they drive forward while kicking up the earth backward. They thus solve the troublesome problem of securing adequate adhesion on greasy and hilly land, and this without introducing weight so considerable as to make serious packing of the soil inevitable.

The pioneer work of the French has, in fact, been of very wide scope. In addition to these motor cultivators, our Allies have developed independent motor tractors and also self-contained motor ploughs, in some cases having the cutting implements so arranged that the machine itself does not have to turn on the headland after completing each furrow. Another method tried with some success in France is to employ a tractor, with a wire rope gear connecting it to the plough or other implement. The tractor itself runs forward light until the whole of the wire rope is unwound. It is then anchored by means of some sort of sprag, and the wire rope is wound in by the power of the tractor's engine, dragging the plough forward with it. In a small field, a complete set of furrows can be turned in one reach. In larger areas, the operation of unwinding and drawing in the wire rope may have to be repeated several times in turning a single set of furrows. The basic idea is that power and weight, which would not be adequate to propel the tractor and draw the plough simultaneously,

may be quite sufficient to perform these two operations consecutively. The conditions would have to be very adverse to make it impossible for the tractor when running without load to secure sufficient adhesion ; and the method thus helps to solve this difficult problem.

The main development in Germany prior to the war was in the direction of substantial self-contained ploughs. Some of these were of admirable design and thoroughly well built, but the general tendency was to attempt too much, which led to undue complication, and to the necessity of employing skilled mechanics in place of ordinary ploughmen.

In Great Britain, a few attempts had been made, more or less on the lines of the French cultivating method referred to above. They have not, however, been sufficiently successful to lead to anything permanent. Steady development has gone on in the direction of producing moderately light tractors for direct haulage of ploughs or other implements ; and simultaneously there has been developed an essentially British type of machine which may be described as a two-furrow plough with a motor in place of a team of horses. The implement is balanced about a single pair of driving wheels, one of which runs in the furrow, and is adjustable so that the implement can cut a furrow to any desired depth and yet remain upon an even keel. These little ploughs are very handy for work in small fields and in orchards and hop gardens. They are easy to manoeuvre, and can be turned upon an exceptionally short headland. They possess natural limitations, inasmuch as, aiming at lightness so as not to compress the soil unduly, their engine-power does not suffice to work a full-sized threshing machine. In this, and also in respect of adaptability to the haulage of produce on the road, they are inferior to the independent tractor. On hilly and greasy land, they are, however, often able to operate under conditions which would make the wheels of a tractor skid and render the ploughing combination temporarily useless. This fact was well demonstrated during trials held late in 1915 by the Highland Agricultural Society, when a little self-contained plough of 10 h.p. worked well on freshly manured land involving heavy gradients, whereas in the same field comparatively heavy and

powerful tractors were unable to make any headway at all.

Other attempts to secure adhesion without undue weight are based upon the employment of endless chain-tracks in place of driving wheels. This is what is sometimes known as the 'Caterpillar' method of propulsion. Where conditions are fairly favourable, it is probable that the chain-track method will prove less popular than the more normal type of machine, as certain complications follow inevitably upon its introduction. On the other hand, the 'Caterpillar' type can travel absolutely anywhere, and can haul a substantial load over the greasiest and roughest country. It is this method which is employed in the now notorious 'Tanks.'

Manufacturers of the straightforward types of agricultural tractor will, of course, point out that, to secure adhesion under adverse conditions, spikes or stakes are provided which can be attached to the driving wheels at short notice. In some instances, fittings of this kind have been devised which are no doubt fairly, if not entirely, effective. Nothing of the sort can, however, quite overcome the tendency towards skidding upon grease or upon freshly manured surfaces, which often serve to clog the stakes or spikes, so that in a few moments they become inoperative. Consequently, many farmers still regard the agricultural tractor as a dry-weather machine. However, even if we admit this to be a more or less permanent limitation, it is not nearly so serious as may appear at first sight. The superior speed and power of a tractor allow the farmer to choose his time for performing various operations. In fact, one of the principal arguments for mechanical haulage upon the land is that the various jobs can be done with great rapidity when weather conditions are just right, and the yield of the land is thereby improved. This is one of the main advantages of mechanical haulage upon the land; and another allied to it is the capacity for cultivating to a greater depth than is often possible by means of horses.

Reverting to the provisions made for securing adhesion on soft ground, it is evident that spikes, stakes, or other devices likely to be effective for such a purpose would be pretty certain to damage the surface of comparatively

hard roads, and at the same time to cause injury to the tractor wheels while the machine is travelling over macadam or setts. Such fittings are of course illegal upon the public roads of this country; and it is therefore important that they should be so designed as to allow for their being removed or put into place at very short notice. It is a serious matter if, after completing the work in one small field, two or three hours have to be wasted before the tractor can cover a few hundred yards of public road with a view to entering another field. Some manufacturers have watched this point carefully; others appear to have ignored it entirely.

Agricultural tractors of the independent type ought of course to be useful not only upon the land, but also for the haulage of produce and supplies between the farm and the market or railway station. In general, they are not, however, so well suited to this class of duty as is a tractor designed primarily for road work. The efforts, quite rightly made, to keep down weight so as to avoid packing the soil often lead to the fitting of wheels which are too light to stand the vibration inseparable from road work. Moreover, springs are, in some examples, absent altogether, and in others more or less inefficient. As a result, the mechanism is subjected to severe vibration when rough and hard roads are being traversed. An agricultural tractor ought to be, so far as possible, suitable to be handled by a man with little or no mechanical knowledge or ability. It is doubtful, however, whether it is possible to design one which, while due regard is paid to the conditions of field work, will not be exposed to the risk of injury when driven at high speed upon hard roads.

As regards future development in the use of farm tractors in Great Britain, it is beyond question that the movement will increase materially even if dependence is placed solely on individual enterprise. There are, however, two ways by which it could be substantially assisted. One of these is by the more whole-hearted adoption of the cooperative principle. British farmers have been slow to accept this principle; and the best progress has been made among the small holders in Ireland. The methods adopted with the assistance of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society are perfectly

sound. A Cooperative Society grows naturally from small beginnings, and depends for its financial success on the fact that modern methods are comparatively speaking economical. Thus, an implement owned by a Cooperative Society can be hired out to members at a rate which shows a good profit to the Society, and an appreciable saving to the members as against the cost of working with more primitive appliances. The funds of the Society thus accumulate, until it is in a position to purchase even the most expensive implements, including agricultural tractors and motor ploughs.

A second means of accelerating progress has already been briefly indicated. It consists in making arrangements for the conduct of comprehensive and conclusive experimental work at our scientific agricultural centres. This is a matter directly for the Board of Agriculture, and indirectly for the consideration of the Departments upon which that Board depends for the necessary pecuniary assistance. The Board is no doubt fully alive to the importance of popularising motor power upon farms. The Departmental Committee appointed in 1915 to consider the question of home production of food recommended that special consideration and assistance should be given to the manufacturers of agricultural motors. Moreover, at the instigation of the Board, numerous small trials were held in various parts of the country. These were of undoubtedly assistance in enabling farmers to form an opinion as to whether some of the machines that are now being imported are reasonably suited to their requirements. In the Oversea Dominions and Colonies there are enormous potential markets; but at the present moment, pending the appearance of some more complete programme for safeguarding the future of British industry, it is impossible to say how far our manufacturers can assume that they would be justified in producing on such a scale as to cater effectively for these markets as well as for our comparatively small, but rapidly increasing, home demand.

HORACE WYATT.

Art. 12.—AIRCRAFT POLITICS IN WAR TIME.

1. *First and Final Reports of the Committee on the Administration and Command of the Royal Flying Corps, etc.* Wyman, 1916.
2. *Aircraft in Warfare.* By F. W. Lanchester. Constable, 1916.
3. *Aircraft in War and Peace.* By W. A. Robson. Macmillan, 1916.

THE plain man is as much inclined to think aircraft politics beneath his notice as he is to consider aircraft technics above his head. He wants plenty of good aircraft and is willing to pay for it; he is reluctant to study the new-fangled troubles with which the fulfilment of this very simple desire seems to be beset. He probably recollects vaguely that his good friend Lord Derby looked in upon the arena, asked advice from Harrods' Stores,* left and was silent; that Lord Montagu also looked in and left, but was not so silent; that Lord Northcliffe offered so much advice that he thought himself obliged to disclaim the ambition of becoming 'First Lord of the Air.' If the plain man was little moved by these doings, he was still less impressed by the arrows of Mr Billing and the slings of Mr Joynson Hicks. It was only persons in that very narrow coterie which calls itself, and is, the 'aeronautical world,' who noted that these two gentlemen had the approval of Mr C. G. Grey, editor of 'The Aeroplane,' a Trade journal; and it is generally known that, outside of the Services, which have no politics, there is no aeronautical world but the 'Trade'—i.e. those who profit by the sale of aircraft and aircraft sundries or are engaged in their production or design.

About July 1916 Mr Billing and a few others were busy whistling for a wind; it was difficult to know with what exact object, but they got a hearing by timing the waves of their tumult to the various Zeppelin raids. In this way we come to the charges of using 'murderous' aeroplanes. It appears that, some time before the war,

* The Burbidge Enquiry Commission, appointed by Lord Derby in April 1916, which reported subsequently to the Air Board when under Lord Curzon.

a newspaper writer* had charged the military authorities with using aeroplanes † so ill adapted to their work that an order to use them was tantamount to murder ; and Mr Joynson Hicks had followed up this article with a letter on the same day in the same paper.

Mr Billing seems to have dug this out and, without quoting its origin but with all the appearance of circumstantial knowledge, reiterated the charges in the House. Certain newspapers picked him out for special reporting ; the tail wagged the dog ; and the Government appointed a Judicial Committee, which was to examine the statements previously made. The Naval Air Service declined to be enquired into ; and the Military Air Service was seen to be going through an investigation which followed none of the accepted canons of evidence and listened to hearsay with astonishing patience.‡

What was revealed to the Committee ? It transpired that Mr Billing had no evidence, but he avoided discomfiture before the public, if not before the House, in part by reason of the abridged reporting of the proceedings, and in part by his own astute suggestion that his function was not to give proofs or to substantiate charges, but to show the Committee where they might enquire if they wished to establish his accusations. The first report of the Committee of Enquiry, dealing with the charges made by Mr Billing, was dated Aug. 3, 1916.§ Certain results were at once apparent. A politician, very young and not very accurate, is snuffed out. A member of the Upper House withdraws his charges. Another politician can give no proofs, because, he says, they are so confidential that he cannot even produce them in confidence to Mr Justice Bailhache ; he disowns having had any intention of doing more than using the Air Service as a means of political attack, and

* Mr C. G. Grey in the 'Daily Express.'

† The machines known as BE and FE.

‡ Lord Curzon remarked : 'I was astonished and even scandalized at the manner in which gossip, rumour, invention, and charges—very often wholly unsupported by evidence—were brought before that Committee' (Hansard, Aug. 1, 1916). Some of the statements made in the press will appear later as footnotes.

§ The final Report, dealing with the other charges against the R.F.C., at home and abroad, has appeared since this article was written, but does not necessitate any alteration in its general conclusions.

concludes, after being cross-examined, by wishing that instead of playing at politics he had kept to playing at marbles! Yet another politician finds that what was apparently an 'air muddle' three weeks before has become much better the week after, though palpably there has been no possibility in that time for any change in orders or in material, and there has, in fact, been no change in men. From the inception of the enquiry to November 1916, some four or five months, all has gone well—if we are to judge from the press reports—with the Royal Flying Corps,* and no doubt its services have continued satisfactory.

Two questions at once occur. Why was the original attack on the R.F.C. made? And why was there this sudden change from attack to appreciation? Taking the second query first, we see at once that the conditions of scribbling and speech-making had been entirely altered by the very existence of the Committee of Inquiry. Instead of being able to make any assertions they pleased before a somewhat uninformed House or a credulous public, politicians and pressmen now became liable to be asked for proofs by a Committee which, whatever its technical shortcomings (and its ignorance of aeronautics was commented on), was at least capable of distinguishing between proof and statement. In other words, it was a Judicial Committee; and, as such, it declared the charges to have failed.

The agitation purported to be in the interests of the flyers, of the army, of the better protection of the country, against the supineness of the administration of the R.F.C., against the failure to order good aeroplanes, and to order even those that were ordered in sufficient quantities. The whole tone of the campaign had, shortly after the existence of the Committee, become more temperate and more guarded, and indeed it soon died down altogether. Be it observed, however, that it does not seem to have been part of the Committee's function to reveal why, in fact, there had been an aeronautical agitation at all.

* Nov. 1916. Just now the Royal Naval Air Service is coming in for a share of blame, mostly in the 'Times,' for which there may be other reasons; we must also remember that the R.N.A.S. was not under enquiry and therefore remained a free field for unsupported charges.

Quite apart from the strange and gloomy joy we take in England in depreciating our efforts in the matter of invention and the organisation of industry and technical progress generally, it is of course possible, nay probable, that the R.F.C. was not perfect in machines or men or officers, or in the supreme command. The officers, that is the pilots, were certainly no worse than the enemy flyers; the men, i.e. the mechanics, were too rapidly recruited, perhaps, to have been thoroughly selected on the basis of skill, but they were and are good; and, considering that they numbered as many thousands as there were hundreds in the total aeronautical industry before the war, it would be preposterous to expect to find them super-mechanics. What imperfections resided here were evidently no just cause for the attacks on the R.F.C.

Two elements of the supreme command may, for present purposes, be considered to have been under attack—the part which controls *personnel*, and that which controls *materiel*. The former is said, on the one hand, to have ordered pilots to take unwarrantable risks—a charge expressed by describing the flyers as ‘Fokker-fodder’; * and on the other to have failed to order pilots to take action in bombing-raids on places like Essen, or to send pilots out quickly enough or in sufficient numbers against Zeppelins at home or abroad. The element of the supreme command which deals with *materiel* did not, it is said, order good aeroplanes, when they existed, but sacrificed country, reputation and the lives of subordinate officers to bolstering-up the officially designed aeroplanes by issuing bad designs for reproduction to the makers of automobiles, gas-engines, furniture, musical instruments, reapers and binders, steam engines, cycles and motor-cycles, coachbuilders, and pump makers, throughout the country, as well as to some of the aeroplane makers themselves. If we leave out what may be called the ‘ignoble’ and ridiculous charges of having deliberately prevented our airmen from getting the best aeroplanes, or intentionally preferred a bad engine, or maliciously tried to stop every aeroplane of better design than the official one, or of stifling the industry, etc., we find very little left, and we certainly do not find the true and

* The description was used in the House and in the daily press.

primary cause of the air agitation. Again we are led to ask what was the cause of it?

The machines selected were good; they were indeed the best for the work at the time; and the engines were not only the best but the only good engines available in quantity.* The R.F.C. mechanics do not seem to be in question. The pilots had grumbled; and we should be the last to blame men who have shown such courage, skill and devotion, if they occasionally complained. Such utterances are frankly human. In the trenches it is the enemy's mortars, hand-grenades, and methods which seem to the infantryman to be formidable. In the air it is the enemy's aircraft about which the flyer writes home; to which he ascribes the most astonishing qualities of speed, climb, accuracy and mobility, while his own appear of little account.† Each side feels the pointed end of the enemy's spear and only the blunt end of his own. We fail to find in this the cause of the air agitation. We must look deeper.

It must not be supposed that the pilots had any serious cause of complaint.‡ It is to be doubted, judging by the speeches of Lord Hugh Cecil (himself a pilot and associated at the Front with numberless pilots), whether any pilot has done more than quote his newspaper and his local gossip. It has been suggested that the officer-pilot declined, when invited by the Committee, to come forward and prove that his machines were dangerous, in fear lest a vindictive Staff, thus impugned, should break his career by way of punishment. This suggestion ignores the secrecy provided by the Committee and the actual status of the major part of the officers at home and abroad. It is a minor matter, but it is a fact that the career of the majority of these men is not the army; they are in every kind of civil occupation; they

* The Judicial Committee (Report, par. 59) speaks of 'the invaluable service to the Army . . . which would have been impossible without this combination [viz. officially designed aeroplanes and officially designed engines] for, at any rate, many critical months.'

† The much-vaunted Fokker, when captured and carefully tested for speed and climbing power by our men, was found to be in every respect inferior to our machines of the same category, and moreover to be thoroughly unstable. It appears that there was no time, since the Fokker was introduced, or before, when we did not have a superior machine.

‡ This is confirmed by the Committee's Report.'

are only, even in the case of Regulars, engaged to the Flying Corps for the short period of four years, much of which has in many cases elapsed. These, forsooth, are the men who, full of courage before the enemy, are supposed to be unwilling to come forward to save their own and their friends' lives by authenticating without possibility of detection the letters they are stated to have given to Mr Billing and other persons. They have written letters, of course; they have retailed the anecdotes, the gossip, the grumbles of the camp; and naturally they object to having their private chat turned into serious charges against their superiors.

They are not likely to have concealed the obvious fact that the enemy's defensive light aeroplanes were swifter than our heavy types, just as the enemy's heavy types have been, and always will be, slower than our single-seater fighters and defensive light machines. It is the business of the heavy types to go over the enemy often at low level (since they must be below the clouds) to effect their purpose of bomb-dropping, reconnaissance, photography, artillery direction, etc.; and no one who understands that the light single-seaters are purposely kept light to be able to outmanœuvre and impede the doings of the heavy types and the multi-seaters, can fail to see that, in an encounter of one to one, the light type, whether it be a Fokker or one of ours, can regard the heavy type as 'fodder'—its natural prey. However, the press reports that the Fokkers were preying on our machines and were faster than our machines did not draw attention to the fact that the aeroplanes attacked were the two-seater or heavy type.* The newspaper leaders did not know enough about it to enquire, and so these reports lent themselves usefully, in the view of an uninstructed audience, to the cause of the grumblers, a cause which we will now consider.

It has been unfortunate for those entitled to complain, that, though they have a good cause, they have, through force of circumstance, had to accept as spokesmen persons

* They entirely failed to mention that our fast single-seaters were doing the same to the German's heavy types; the daily press actually stated that a Fokker brought bombs to our coast! This was of course impossible.

on whom they could not confer moderation of speech, or justice of outlook, or correct technical knowledge. These persons with a genuine trouble are, both in their own view and in fact, the British aeronautical world, the little world of producers, designers, makers, financiers of aircraft construction and aircraft sundries; in other words, 'the Trade,' plus a few enthusiasts. It is significant that those members of the Trade who gave evidence before the Committee had no complaint to make against the R.F.C. or the Government designers. They could not endorse the politicians' peculiar methods.

The aeroplane makers have, however, a cause of complaint which is unquestionably important. They have suffered hardship; many have suffered ruin; they risk at the present moment serious loss, if not extinction after the war in certain eventualities. Their past history * is that they have been suppliers of a commodity for which there is but a single purchaser—the State, which has purchased from them by open competition; and if, under peace conditions, any one failed to get the order for which he sought, in order to keep his factory from coming to a standstill, he had every prospect of being a broken man—his foremen scattered, his workmen distributed over the country, his works disorganised, and his good-will unsaleable. All this is unconnected with the charges against the R.F.C. which the Committee was instructed to examine.

We need scarcely enlarge here upon the impossibility of keeping together the elements of a factory whose output is interrupted indefinitely with a gambling chance of revival 'on next year's estimates.' Year after year the aircraft trade was faced with this nightmare, merely because of the abnormal conditions of this particular industry, which has the misfortune, on the one hand, to be novel and in a state of rapid evolution, and, on the other, to have a considerable number of votaries, while the purchaser is a unique entity, with a mania for lump-sum contracts on a competitive basis.

* We must distinguish between the constructors introduced to aircraft work by fat orders since the war, and those belonging to the 'accredited aeroplane industry' who did the painful pioneer work in pre-war days. The difference between their points of view is dealt with later.

We have before us the anomalous case of individuals whose success and continuance is vital to the safety of the State, and yet whose existence is liable to be threatened by what is the normal act of State purchase—an invitation to tender, an order to him who offers the lowest price, and nothing for the others. 'Nothing for the others'—mark these words. In the circumstances they mean ruin. The dread of this precarious position is the original cause of the air agitation. It has long been simmering; it has revealed its presence in peace days in the House and in the Press; it is the cry of those who are conscious of initiative and inventiveness, and of devotion to a cause which they know to be good, but who are wriggling under the heel of a system of purchase which is truly intolerable in the circumstances.

The war only altered matters for the moment. The coming of peace may mean ruin to one-fourth of the aircraft industry, unless other countries can be induced to order from England. What hope could any one have of altering so rooted an institution as the Contracts Branch of the Army or Navy? None. A flank attack had to be tried, the frontal one was too difficult; and, incidental to the flank attack, the chief blame that can justly be attached to the air agitators is that their cry has been voiced in a manner which showed little consideration for the genuinely good technical workers in Government employ, whether naval or military, men who are unable to answer, and themselves have nothing to do with the competitive tendering. These people are the designers of the Government aeroplanes. They had to be howled down, because their machine designs were the basis of the competitive system of purchase.*

We must bear in mind that the aeroplane industry had, and has, the excuse of critical pressure. The wretch

* Mr. C. G. Grey in 'The Aeroplane': 'the permanent incubus of the Trade' (18. 11. 14); 'a self-advertising ring out for its own ends, a drag on progress' (17. 2. 15); 'self-seeking civilian officials' (3. 2. 15); '... obviously hostile to the manufacturers' (6. 1. 15); 'temporary gentlemen,' 'landscum,' 'stay-at-homes' (21. 7. 16); 'the leakage of the motor trade' (11. 8. 15); 'logrollers' (10. 2. 15); 'hands-in-pocket workmen' (2. 12. 14). These people 'succeeded only too well in squeezing out promising firms . . . and in holding back the development of others' (5. 8. 14); ' . . . might have had thousands of machines but for the mistaken policy of trusting the R.A.F.' (10. 2. 15).

cannot trouble to be mellifluous when he responds to an extra turn of the thumbscrew. The Trade has had the greatest difficulty in making itself heard. During what was a veritable struggle for existence, it has been impossible to disguise the fact that its interests were not altogether identical with the interests of the taxpayer and the public. Whatever it said for itself, by way of urging the development of air work, has always been liable to be discounted. Our machinery for the protection of the taxpayer is very elaborate; but it is assumed that trade interests are fully able to look after themselves, though it is very questionable whether they are so in an embryonic industry. At any rate, 'looking after themselves' is precisely what the Trade spokesmen have been striving to do; and, in order to get a hearing, a confusion has been elaborately created between the two interests, those of the 'Trade' and those of the nation, those of the manufacturers and those of the Services.

It has become a definite object, in order to stop competitive tendering, to show that those designs of aeroplanes which are not proprietary to the trade firms, viz. the Government designs, are bad.* It is they alone that were treated as murderous;† it is also they and they alone that are put up to public tender. It is the drawings of these aeroplanes which, on being issued to the constructors, were found to be astonishingly full of errors, if we are to believe all we hear. These are the aeroplane and aero-engine designs which it is desired to show are as bad for the public safety as they are for the prospects of the aeronautical firms. This phase of the campaign is not entirely calculated to edify the righteous. No

* An Admiralty experimental design is derided as 'hilariously funny, obviously futile' (C. G. Grey, 25. 8. 15). War Department designs: 'got no further than preliminary designs in two years' (21. 7. 15); 'any rule-of-thumb draughtsman could have produced machines of identical aerodynamic design which would . . . cost just half as much in time and money to build. . . .'; 'bad drawings, impossible designs, absurd specifications, and general lack of practical knowledge' (13. 10. 15).

† A design produced by the 'Admiralty's tame designers' is 'obviously preordained to slay its pilot' (25. 8. 15). Designs produced by the War Department, 'the fatal FE2'—'they [the R.A.F.] buried the Royal Aero Club inquiry' (which exonerated the design) (18. 11. 14); 'neither the design, workmanship, nor material of the R.A.F. are to be trusted' (1. 7. 14). 'I can find half a dozen witnesses to show that FE2 was unfit to fly. . . .' (5. 8. 14).

pains have been spared to enlist some share of the sympathy which is poured without stint upon those who fly for our sake,* as well as to make capital out of the timidity awakened by the Zeppelin raids.

These are the elements of the agitation to be observed, and they indicate its cause. What, then, is the precise difference that the suppression of the Government designer, whether at the Admiralty, at the Royal Aircraft Factory, or in the Aeronautical Inspection Department, would make? His disappearance or the elimination of any markedly successful design from these centres would make a very great difference indeed. When the war is over, that which occurred in *ante-bellum* days will recur; a manful struggle will be made by the aeroplane industry to find some other customers for their wares, and so relieve the periodical tension arising from the fact that there was but one purchaser. With infinite difficulty it was possible in the past to get slender orders from Russia, from Rumania, from Spain, and even from France; and there were hopes of orders from the Argentine, Mexico, U.S.A., Japan, etc. But these little orders were all for proprietary designs, since one of the conditions on which Government designs are issued (and must obviously be issued) is that they shall not be conveyed or sold or made for foreign Powers. Now the widespread scattering of the official designs among British makers was having, it was urged before the Committee, the effect of killing the private designer† and therefore all the *post-bellum* prospects of the private trader.

The accusation of deliberately intending to kill the private designer, as launched before the Committee against the Government, was unfortunate. The lack of

* 'The Report [of the Royal Aero Club] throws all the blame on the pilot, conscious that the victim of official science cannot reply' (8. 7. 14). The designers of Government machines 'have always placed the opinion of pseudo-scientists before the experience of practical men; the graves of R.F.C. officers and men are monuments to the grim fact' (16. 12. 14). 'Most of the designs turned out by these people [the Government's civilian designers and alleged experts] have killed more pilots than the products of any other designers' (15. 12. 15).

† Mr C. G. Grey: 'It is entirely the fault of the R.A.F. that we have practically no British engine' (5. 8. 14); 'a certain clique . . . set out deliberately to exalt themselves at the expense of the Trade, the obvious idea being that if the Trade could be pushed out of the way the whole supply would be drawn from a huge Government Dockyard' (17. 2. 14).

any conceivable motive for such intention is sufficient to show the absurdity of the charge; but the fact that it was openly launched shows the trend of thought in 'the aeronautical world.' The difficulty felt was that, so long as the State designs are good, and while the State continues to bear the expense of designing and experimenting, the private manufacturer has so little chance of being recouped for the great expense of making his own designs and experiments that he is tempted to abandon the effort. These conditions actually existed; and so the charge of killing the private designer was not entirely unfounded. The innocence of intention in the Government designer's mind was hardly likely to reconcile the sufferer to his fate, or induce him to spare the designer.

If the prospects of future trade abroad are bound up with the extinction of the so-called 'murderous' official design, so also is it desired to destroy the good repute of the official designer in order to get relief from a new anxiety which has arisen in an unexpected direction. The war has introduced into the aeroplane industry a considerable new group of industrials, who had nothing whatever to do with aircraft before the war, and who are entirely distinct from the 'accredited aeroplane trade.' It is more than likely that the Committee did not grasp the force of this distinction. This new group manufactures at once, without experiment, without risk, and with State help in their capital expenditure, successful and satisfactory aeroplanes to the official designs and working drawings.

After the war the new group can remain in the industry to cut prices, and to help to ruin the 'accredited aeroplane trade,' only so long as the official designer provides them with a complete set of instructions and working drawings which they can follow. If you can discredit the official designer's product,* if you can pretend that he is a mere copyist, if you can persuade the R.F.C. pilot that to mount one of his machines is fatal, if

* 'We could produce them [more fighting aeroplanes] if it were not for the . . . officials who have their own axes to grind. . . .' 'The civilian aircraft departments have done more than anything to delay the supply of aircraft to both services' (28. 7. 15) 'ever since the war began' (11. 8. 15).

you can make it clear that notoriety and appreciation will be given in the public prints only to pilots using a proprietary aeroplane, if, in short, you can produce a general feeling against the official design,* you may be able to extinguish at one blow the official designer and the whole of the new 'spurious' aeroplane traders and builders, and induce them to return to their old business of making motor cars, gas engines, harvesters, pianos, and the like. The war has brought these firms in, and their presence has tended to defer to an indefinitely remote future the prospects of peaceful aeronautical manufacture with even legitimate profits for the accredited aeroplane trade.

The business of discrediting the official design and vituperating the official designers has been the unremitting occupation of certain writers, not exclusively in the Trade papers, for many years. They were wrong not to adopt the cleaner course of putting the situation frankly before the public. We are a business community, and none in the world can appreciate better (a) the deplorable effect of complete interruption of orders upon a manufacturing organisation; (b) the inevitableness of such interruption in the aeroplane trade when ordering is conducted on the standard methods; (c) the danger of extinguishing the makers of a vital war munition by adhering to a financial procedure which in itself is a mere precaution for economy; (d) the result of enormously enhancing prices if one adopts a procedure which causes the makers' livelihood to be precarious to the verge of ruin; (e) the anomalous effect upon a trade of having but a single purchaser during its development period; (f) the effect of sudden alterations in the quality, kind, shape, substance, etc., of the product asked for; (g) the effect, in deflecting capital from an industry, of any prospect of State competition.

The British business man is perfectly capable of understanding all this, and, indeed, he early obtained a ministerial promise that there should be no State competition. It appears that this promise was kept, and the

* 'In every case [of official design] a sample [aeroplane] was made and tried at Farnborough by some pilot who was afraid of losing his job if he said the machine was no good or dangerous' (8. 9. 15).

output from the Government yard of either aeroplanes or engines has been infinitesimal; * only those things appear to have been made there which were unobtainable elsewhere, or were experiments, or were needed by the Trade itself.† Nevertheless the attacks went on undiminished, for were there not all the other dangers and difficulties enumerated above? Was it not, in fact, imperative to alter the direction of the Government's designers' efforts, and, if possible, to smother them with routine and repair work ‡?

As regards Zeppelin raids, the resemblance between the aeroplane trade agitations in France and England, the continued touchiness of the industry, the stimulus which these have secured in both countries from each raid, have been pointed out elsewhere. It is only lately that such raids have ceased in England to be the signal for fresh declamations against the types of aeroplanes in use in this service—an astonishing silence, considering that out of a batch of ten Zeppelin visitors only one or two have on any occasion suffered the penalty. The explanation is that out of all our aeroplane types, only those have been successful against Zeppelins which have been designed by the Government designers. § Attempts have been made to suggest that better aeroplanes should be supplied in mercy to the gallant pilots, but this proved a weak ground for attack on the designer. The pilots preferred these machines for the work. The

* See the Air Board's note on the report of the Burbidge Committee. Lord Curzon said: 'The Aircraft Factory can hardly be described as having been a manufacturing concern at all,' in correcting a 'misstatement on the part of the Committee' (Hansard, 1025, vol. 22, no. 61).

† 'I do not know how our airmen would have performed the wonderful feats they have at the Front unless there had been a supply, well filled and constantly replenished, of all the oddments required in the construction of aeroplanes which you cannot get from the Trade, and which at the beginning of the war were not to be got anywhere except at the Royal Aircraft Factory' (Lord Curzon).

‡ 'Aeroplanes which had undergone serious injury should be sent to the R.A.F., assuming that Department to be carrying out its proper duties, reconstruction,' etc. ('The Aeroplane,' 5. 1. 16).

§ A seaplane of proprietary design manned by our sailor airmen finished off one of these Zeppelins; but this does not alter the general argument. The Report of the Committee says (par. 62): 'It is a striking commentary on this evidence [that against official designers] that all the three airships brought down in flames . . . were brought down by pilots flying BE2C machines fitted with R.A.F. engines.'

names of the flyers we know from the honours which have been awarded and so richly merited—Brandon, Robinson, Sowery, Tempest. The type of aeroplane used has now been disclosed, but the subsidiary devices and methods applied are of course a secret.

Let us now briefly consider the question of manufacturing in war time. To borrow a phrase from 'Aircraft in Warfare' (p. 169), the whole organisation of modern manufacture depends on continuity of work. That continuity depends on a flow of orders given months in advance of their expected fulfilment; indeed they must be given some months before the time when they are even expected to be started on. And it has been stated that that flow has faltered from time to time during the war. This would appear to be in a measure true both from the alterations of types and the interruptions of orders. What the manufacturer wants above all is 'repeat' orders; and, of all possible orders, he would naturally prefer a repeat order for his own proprietary aeroplane at his own time and date. This is just what he has but seldom got. Let us suppose—and it is fair, because the supposition represents what occurs—that he has based his price upon the expectation that, if he is reasonable, the financial authorities will incline to repeat his orders. Then he will expect, with all appearance of good reason, that the merits of standardisation in use will secure for him from the technical authorities the repetition of orders which he desires. He lays down a special tool equipment and thereafter finds himself defrauded of that which alone would recoup him for his outlay on standardised tools and gigs and stocks of material, if any advance seriously changes the type of aeroplane or engine.

Progress in design and in methods of aerial war has been death to standardisation, and a sorrow to those who sought in repetitive manufacture rapid production with reasonable profit. The pace of progress in design has been forced, partly by the designers of private aeroplanes themselves, partly by the Government designer, partly by the discovery of new essential features by the practice of the Expeditionary Force, partly by the scientific discoveries of the Advisory Committee on

Aeronautics, of the National Physical Laboratory, and also let us not forget of certain Cambridge and other University men such as Busk, Lucas, Taylor, Hopkinson, etc., and men like Lanchester, Bairstow, and Lord Rayleigh, who have made special researches. Changes in the enemy's methods have also had their effect upon ours, and upon our requirements in material.

These alterations are not liked. It is an ill-disguised fact that rapid progress and consequently change have been anathema to the 'Trade' journal. Individually or collectively, sometimes by special articles devoted to belittling either the individual or the institution in question, Mr C. G. Grey and his friends in the daily press have expressed their trade feeling.* The workers† are 'pseudo-scientists,' 'professors,' etc., 'experts' (in inverted commas and with an inverted meaning). The reason is not far to seek; every alteration is a cause of incredible inconvenience, a restriction of turnover, a call on the personal attention of the management, an upset of factory routine, which when reiterated becomes well-nigh intolerable. It may be wrong to blame the designer or the deviser of the new notion; he ought, perhaps, to be thanked and praised; but it is both very human and very comforting to anathematise him, though a just apportionment of the blame would leave it on those who decided upon an undeveloped type at too early a stage.

The general consequence of this progress has been that, at any given time, it is perhaps not the particular manufacturer most in need of an order to keep his wheels turning who has ready the new type design for which the new demand exists. He has a design coming on towards its critical time of test and approval, but, if he is not exactly ready, he must either be idle—which is out of the question in war—or manufacture to the hated Government design, or even to some rival's design if the official design is not the latest and best.

* 'The best brains have not been consulted at all' (28. 7. 1815), C. G. Grey. 'The R.A.F. and Nat. Physical Laboratory . . . the official mutual admiration society' (28. 7. 15); 'be-lettered scientists and the leakage of the motor trade' (11. 8. 15). Cf. note * on p. 210 above.

† The civilian officials engaged on design; Lord Rayleigh's Advisory Committee, the Admiralty and War Department designs; the Nat. Phys. Laboratory.

There are, of course, many other causes which lead to interruption of flow in aircraft manufacturing. Weather may delay the test of the intended type; experimental difficulties may arise at the last moment; raw material for some detail may be lacking. Any of a hundred things incidental to war, conditions of labour, etc., may occur, and have occurred, to interfere with the essential continuity of manufacture. And so it happens that, even in war, when orders flow like water, the aircraft builders are full of sorrows and worries in the present and of pre-sentiments and anxieties for the future. From this there results the touchiness which is largely the cause of the outcries and demands of which we have lately heard so much. And it is the same touchiness which has over-accentuated our claim to air-supremacy, with a view to future business abroad, a claim followed the next moment by violent reactions of gloom, when the desire to deliver an attack rises uppermost. Once we have ensured to the Aircraft Industry an equitable and reasonable livelihood, once we have developed an instructed public opinion independent of the trade, capable of judging kindly and fairly of trade interests, we shall have given the child a soothing draught; it will forget its teething troubles and growing pains, and will develop more rapidly into a finer and healthier being than if it be perpetually subjected to nervous crises.

One parting word must be added, because its iteration is apparently essential to producing the necessary impression on the British mind. We must determine *now* to have twice as many aircraft of all sorts as any possible enemy. With twice as many aircraft we shall not have air-supremacy, but we shall be four times as strong; and, with four times the strength, we may be reasonably sure of blinding the enemy and of not being blinded ourselves at all by land or water. The demand for technical superiority has been highly pressed. We have, generally speaking, had this all along, but we have *not* established our quantity demand. Let it be two aircrafts to one, declared or not, but effectively secured from the earliest possible moment.

Art. 18.—THE RECENT POLITICAL CRISIS.

THE extent to which the present war has deflected party government from its normal course cannot be measured accurately at the present time. We may, however, note four periods. In the first (the critical fortnight which ended on Aug. 4, 1914) the Prime Minister received formal assurances from the Opposition leaders that they would support him if the Liberal Cabinet decided on war. In the second (August 1914 to May 1915) the Unionist Party made good this undertaking, not merely by their public utterances and action, but also by placing their services at the disposal of the Government for administrative purposes. They did not ask, nor were they invited, to accept the responsibility of office. With the third period (May 1915 to December 1916) came the Coalition, hurriedly called into existence in order to prop up the crumbling fabric of its predecessor. In this Ministry Unionists took their full share of place and power. The fourth period, upon which we have just entered, began with the formation of a Cabinet under a Liberal Prime Minister, in which various new elements were introduced, while the old party distinctions were to a large extent obliterated. The new order is hailed by its friends as a National Government; and the prayer of the whole country is that it may realise the hopes which it has inspired.

The Liberal-Radical Administration, which was in power throughout the first and second periods of the war, came into existence in the winter of 1905-6. The skill of Mr Asquith in the management of Parliament and in the arts of party government, and the condition of his opponents, who during the whole of this period showed themselves lacking in ideas, policy, cohesion and leadership, were two of the main causes which contributed to so long a tenure of office. But, without the salt of some active principle, even a Government so well led and so feebly opposed must have been liable to decay. The preservative element was provided by the courage, energy and imagination of Mr Lloyd George—a man, at that period, more hated by the opposite party and less trusted by his own than any politician of modern times.

The Coalition held office during the third period. It

was no very startling innovation upon its predecessor either in spirit or methods, but only in composition. A number of Unionists, who already for ten months had been sharing the burden of administration without official responsibility, were in May 1915 taken into full partnership. There was a very slight infusion of Labour; but the Irish Nationalists held aloof. Up to this time there had been no parliamentary opposition; now, however, there began to be a certain amount of irregular criticism, which tended to increase in volume, without, however, combining for common action. The real opposition—His Majesty's Official Opposition—seemed to have been transferred from an attenuated House of Commons to an overgrown Cabinet. At first sight this arrangement might appear to promise the advantage of secrecy; but, if this hope was ever seriously entertained, it was disappointed by the enterprise of the press and the incontinence of Ministers.* The majority in the Cabinet was willing to endure the reproach of dilatoriness sooner than take any decision without the fullest deliberation. On the other hand, the Cabinet Opposition, of which the leader appeared to be Mr Lloyd George, maintained that there are occasions when it is necessary either to hurry or to be too late—as in the case of a forest fire, a wash-out in a cañon, or a European war.

When the Coalition fell in December 1916, the Liberal Leaders withdrew in a body, with their whole apparatus of Whips, funds and organisation. Their attitude appears to be one of dudgeon, tempered by a 'benevolent neutrality'; while that of the Irish Nationalists may perhaps be described as a 'vigilant neutrality.' The National Government is an odd and unprecedented mixture. Assuredly there is plenty of leaven in the loaf—the Prime Minister himself, Lord Milner, Sir Edward Carson, and some dozen gentlemen whose qualifications are not party services, but work done and reputations made outside politics. Labour also is more adequately represented than it has ever been hitherto

* The classic instance occurred during the autumn of 1915, when some Minister opposed to 'Compulsion' and anxious to defeat it supplied a newspaper with what purported to be an account of a Cabinet discussion on this subject, the aim of this breach of confidence being to prejudice and intimidate ministerial deliberations by fomenting an agitation out of doors.

in any British Ministry; possibly it might with advantage have been given an even larger share. The Liberal contingent, with the single exception of the Premier, consists of persons who previously have held only junior offices or none at all. The stable or conventional element—an ingredient as necessary in making a Government as dough in baking bread—is provided by official Unionism. Mr Bonar Law has successfully avoided emulation of Mr Lloyd George's originality of choice. Indeed the Vatican itself could hardly have excluded Modernism with more scrupulous zeal than the Unionist board of selection appears to have shunned the taint of new ideas. If there be anything nowadays which corresponds to the 'Young England' party of the 'forties or to the 'Tory democracy' of the 'eighties, it has not found a place in the National Government.

National unity has been maintained ever since the outbreak of war, but not always at the same level. In some important respects it has changed its character. It has been tempered by knowledge and adversity, and, like good metal, it is a finer thing at the end of the process than it was at the beginning.

In July 1914 the United Kingdom was more bitterly divided than it had ever been during the lifetime of any man or woman then alive. The German Government reckoned upon this, and we can hardly blame their miscalculation. They observed correctly, but, as foreigners are very apt to do, they drew the wrong inference. War put an end at once to internal dissension. There was agreement, all but universal, as to the justice and necessity of British intervention. It is true that the nation did not realise until much later what sacrifices and changes would be required in order to carry out so tremendous an undertaking. It was not occupied at first in considering the means to the end so much as the end itself, and the monstrous nature of the evil with which it found itself confronted. Opinion throughout the United Kingdom and the British Empire was not less unanimous for going to war than it was up to the very last in praying for peace. Never in history did any people take up arms with greater reluctance, nor with a firmer conviction that duty left no other course open to them. A

challenge seemed to have been thrown down to freedom, justice and civilisation. It was accepted without hesitation, with perfect confidence in the final result, but with feelings of the deepest horror. We read of acclamations and rejoicings in Germany; there were none in England, Scotland or Ireland, or in any part of the British dominions.

All the facts which were known at the time supported the national resolve, while others which occurred or came to light later only served to confirm it. The manner in which war was forced upon Serbia, and afterwards upon Belgium; the brutalities of the successful invaders; the frank disclosure by official Germany of its aims of conquest and annexation, of its hatred, hitherto dissembled and disavowed, against ourselves, and of its determination to bring about our destruction—all these seemed to prove conclusively the truth of the popular idea that the Spirit of Evil had broken loose, choosing its own time, armed to the teeth, and with all its preparations perfected for a sudden and overwhelming onset. Moreover, the aggressor announced frankly that 'Might was Right,' and made it evident that he was determined to put his foot once and for all upon the liberties of Europe. This is a simple and true statement of the issues as they appeared to our people at the beginning; and after nearly two years and a half of war nothing has happened in any way to change our beliefs.

In July 1914 Germany had many friends in this country, whose patriotism is as unimpeachable as their judgment was at fault. They had endeavoured—with considerable success so far as our own nation was concerned—to promote amicable feelings between the two countries. Such people were now no less determined upon war than those who for years past had been engaged in proclaiming to deaf ears their distrust of German policy. Indeed the friends of Germany were perhaps more strongly moved by indignation than any other section of British opinion. The consciousness of betrayal sharpened their anger. Germany had suddenly destroyed their beautiful vision. They had come to believe that law, justice and arbitration were the accepted means of settling differences between great civilised Powers; but here was one of them—whose claims to

be in the forefront of civilisation they had warmly championed—now asserting bluntly that 'Might was Right.' It seemed as if the world on a sudden had plunged back into the abyss; and they saw that the only hope of realising any part of their ideal of universal peace lay in the overthrow of the powers of evil which had vowed its destruction.

One thing which made for unity at the beginning was the fact that there was no War Party. So long as the issue remained in doubt, no one uttered a provocative phrase, no one clamoured for war. There were few who did not pray earnestly that Sir Edward Grey's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement might succeed. This crisis was unlike every other in our modern history; there were no cheering mobs, no ringing of joybells when war was declared. The 'triumphing' of a War Party has been one of the commonest causes of national disunion, by setting up a reaction and calling a Peace Party into existence. The country was spared this evil in August 1914. Whatever criticisms in other regards may be urged against Viscount Grey's conduct of affairs, he deserves the highest credit for having contributed, probably more than any man, to this result.

The state of mind in which war surprised us contained possibilities of danger. We are as warmly attached to our country and as susceptible to noble impulses as any nation, but we suffered under one signal disadvantage; we were unprepared for war, quite as much in our mental attitude as in our material provisions. During three generations or more, public opinion had been gradually taught to regard a death-struggle between ourselves and any of the great military nations as unthinkable. The doctrines of Cobden and his Manchester School, in so far as they applied to the relations of capital and labour, had long ago fallen into discredit. In recent times they had also been challenged in regard to fiscal matters. But they still maintained their hold upon the popular imagination in the sphere of foreign policy. We were still assured that the less we let our thoughts dwell upon the prospect of war the less likely was that evil to occur. Consequently, when war came, the nation, which had been taught to banish the idea of

such a catastrophe from its mind, was obliged to go through a long and painful struggle before it succeeded in uprooting its disbelief, adjusting its vision, and realising the full import of the event.

With France and Germany it was very different. In neither country was public opinion taken by surprise. In the one case national sentiment was supreme and independent; in the other it was receptive and wholly obedient to an autocracy; in both unity was secure. But our own education did not begin until war was declared; and in such circumstances it is hard to arrive at unity without leadership of a very superior order. The natural leaders were the Government, for they knew more of the facts than the nation did, and they knew them earlier. Their example would be watched and followed, their decisions would be accepted, their spirit would be reflected in the public mood. They would set the tone, whether it were patience or effort, fatalism or self-reliance, swift resolution or cautious delay.

During the second period events followed one another in a swift and bewildering succession. The armies of the Kaiser won great battles during the autumn of 1914, but they failed to win the war in a single campaign—which was the great objective at which German policy had confidently aimed. By Christmas they were firmly held by the French and British; they were foiled in their thrust at Warsaw; while their Austrian allies were disheartened by a succession of crushing disasters. It was clear that the original German war plan had miscarried, but it was too readily assumed that the supposed rigidity of the Teutonic mind would fail in all attempts to make another. This absurd fallacy was responsible for extravagant hopes and grievous miscalculations.

Lord Kitchener predicted a long war; but in political circles only a very few people appeared to believe in his prophecy. Still fewer acted as men would who realised what a long-drawn struggle must inevitably entail in sacrifice of life and treasure, theories and habits. The only hope of a short war lay in preparing for a long one. There was but one way in which the nation could be organised so that recruiting should not interfere with the output of munitions, and that the minimum of injury

should be inflicted upon those staple wealth-providing industries of the country which formed the basis of our financial strength. That one way was rejected, by some from timidity, by others with contempt, as too utopian for consideration.

When the leaders are unable or unwilling to see, the people may be forgiven for coming to wrong conclusions. At Christmas 1914 the general belief was that peace would be signed within a year from the outbreak of hostilities. What sense, therefore, could there be in looking two years or even twelve months ahead, in training vast armies, in accumulating gigantic stores of material, in pinching and paring and putting everybody to inconvenience, in endangering the popularity of politicians and disturbing the fabric of the party system? How angry the people would be, and what fools the great men would look, if the war ended in six months' time and they were left with two years' supplies in hand or on order!

The anger of the people would have been less fierce against extravagance than it was against default. Ministers would not have looked greater fools if the war had ended suddenly, leaving them with a burden of unsaleable provisions and embarrassing contracts, than they did when it continued and found them short both of material and men. Various explanations have been put forward in their behalf; as, for instance, that manufacturers failed to keep their contracts. But this is not a valid excuse, for British contractors were bound to get into difficulties if they lacked the support of national organisation. Men who were essential to the installation of new plant and to the production of munitions were swept by thousands into the ranks of the New Army under the unregulated pressure of the voluntary system. The War Office would not give them up, because it was short of recruits, while the factories and workshops were starved owing to the want of artificers.

In these as in other matters the Government showed a want both of foresight and resolution. Throughout this second period it continued to act as if the war could not last another six months, as if it must certainly be over before this or that proposed reform could possibly

yield results. Ministers appeared to credit the news which they permitted to appear in the newspapers. They bowed down in superstitious reverence before the censorship, accepting its optimistic confections as if they were oracles, forgetful apparently of the fact that the censorship was their own creation, and that the distinguishing characteristic of a censor's office can never be a true sense of proportion.

It is one of the first duties of a War Government to use its imagination, to think ahead and then state clearly what is needed in order to secure victory. The nation was ready to grant everything that was asked. It expected orders, and was prepared to obey them. But, during this crucial period of preparation, the Government seemed to be in a state of bewilderment, like a crew without a captain. It appeared lacking in energy and resolute purpose. It issued appeals but no orders, even with regard to military service; it gave no guidance, far less instructions, for the husbanding of national resources and the increase of food supplies. It misunderstood the temper of the nation and appeared more apprehensive of public disapprobation than of the enemy. The minds of Ministers, and of their satellites in Parliament and the Press, were distracted from the main problem of how to win the war, by their concern about a political situation, the danger of which was mainly imaginary, and, where not imaginary, was the direct product of their own hesitations.

The spring campaign of 1915 opened hopefully for the Allies; but before long the prospect was overclouded. The shortage of artillery ammunition became apparent, and led to considerable recrimination. Early in May the Russians, who had hitherto been progressing favourably in Galicia, were heavily defeated, and their great retreat began. A few days later the Liberal Government came to an end; and the Coalition was formed under the same Prime Minister.

During the preceding four months the temper of certain sections of the nation had been changing, by no means for the better. The real opposition was neither vocal nor organised. Indeed it was less an active opposition than an inert obstacle to unity. It consisted of those who are accustomed to look at every event solely

from the standpoint of their own immediate material interests, to whom 'brass,' whether in the form of profits or of wages, is the one solid fact in life, and who meet every crisis with the same question—Where do I come in? Such persons were in a small minority; but they were by no means negligible. Their mutual jealousies and suspicions, and their more or less passive resistance to the prevailing sentiment of union, produced the same results as grit in the bearings of a machine.

We may believe that by far the greater part of these acted as they did, and failed to act as they should have acted, for the simple reason that they had not yet realised what the war meant. The first glow of excitement had died away. The appeal which might have awakened their slumbering patriotism was not made. They were encouraged in selfish indifference by official news which, in recording events, paid too little heed to truthful perspective. Moreover, the most impassioned eloquence and the most candid record of occurrences would have failed to rouse this section thoroughly, unless they had been accompanied by some clear demonstration on the part of Government that it knew what was needed in order to win the war and was determined to do it. Not merely command but action was required; yet, up to the date of its reconstruction and for long afterwards, the Cabinet failed to accept this obvious necessity. It declined to govern.

In the early stages of the war, perception and therefore unity were undoubtedly more complete in France and Germany than among ourselves. Both countries appeared to understand at once that this struggle was not one where armies alone went to war, while the greater part of the citizens were concerned merely with paying taxes. In this case whole nations went to war; national organisation was pitted against national organisation. To delay organising, to clutch at compromise, or to imagine that half-measures would suffice, was to court defeat. Realising these things, the peoples of France and Germany made easy the task of government. There was no holding back, no opposition; friction and confusion were reduced to a minimum. Down to Christmas 1914 we were inclined to say much the same of ourselves. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that we might

very speedily have become what we aspired to be, had our aspirations been taken at their flood-tide by those in authority. But this particular tide was missed, and several others besides, with the result that national unity fell insensibly into a decline.

The original German war-plan had miscarried, but Germany was not thereby reduced either to despair or impotence. On the contrary, during the winter of 1914-1915, while we were indulging ourselves in comfortable illusions, the Imperial General Staff at Berlin occupied itself in thinking out and preparing a new offensive. In May 1915 it proceeded to put its plan into execution with great energy and determination. The startling success of this effort obscured the unalterable consequences of the previous failure from the greater part of the world, possibly even from the Germans themselves. The Russians were driven out of Poland; Greece was kept out of the war, and Bulgaria was brought in; Serbia was crushed, and communications with Turkey established.

Our disillusionment as to the duration of the war began with the battle of the Dunajec (May 1915), and by the beginning of harvest-time it was complete. The truth of Lord Kitchener's prediction was established. And yet the winter of 1915-1916 passed away, and the summer of 1916 was at hand, before the action of Government even began to keep pace with the needs of the situation. By May 1916 a year had elapsed since the Coalition Government was formed. It was clear by this time that our enemy had been a great deal more successful in repairing the consequences of his early failures at the battles of the Marne and Ypres than we and our allies had been in profiting by it. We might feel a legitimate pride in the achievements of our Fleet, in the annihilation of German overseas trade, and in the defeat of the first and second submarine campaigns against Allied and Neutral shipping. Every German possession outside Europe, except a portion of a single colony, had been taken from her. The Russians had won brilliant victories in the Caucasus. But against these successes we had to set the French losses at Verdun and a series of British disasters on an ascending scale—at Antwerp, at Gallipoli,

and in Mesopotamia. Nor was it possible in any one of these three instances to lay the blame upon ill luck. The only point in dispute was whether bad judgment in their conception or bad management in the carrying of them out had more to do with the lamentable result.

During the first twelve months of Coalition Government the spirit of union, which shone so steadily at the beginning, was blown to and fro, so that at times its flame seemed to be in danger of extinction. That the Cabinet and the Prime Minister desired union and sought to preserve it cannot be doubted. But the way to union, like the way to happiness, is not a direct pursuit; seeking you do not find, and fearing to lose you do not keep. Compromises, soft words, formulas which draw the teeth of disagreement, eirenicons which compose for the moment the anger of opponents without satisfying the needs of policy, do not lead to the desired result but away from it. The tremulous cohesion of a vacillating Ministry is not the same thing as national unity.

The spectacle presented by the politicians and their adherents in the Press, more especially during the autumn of 1915 and the early spring of 1916, was not such as to give confidence to the nation. Their wrangles and intrigues, their hesitation to act, even when thousands of lives were hanging in the balance, lest as a result the Cabinet might break up, produced the impression that here was a body of men who could not see the wood for the trees, who could not rid their minds of the minor tactics of politics and fix them firmly on the grand strategy of war. The nation had already realised, though the Government apparently had not, that the strength of the enemy lay in a system of great thoroughness, and that he could only be beaten by another system of even greater thoroughness. It became impatient to see some signs of a beginning. It saw none in the political sphere, but only disorder, which seemed to increase rather than diminish as time went on. A thorough system cannot be called out of chaos by the most adroit appeasement of personal differences among Ministers or by the most impressive rhetoric, but only by action and the exercise of authority. As the Government shrank from giving orders, people, with good reason, came to suspect that they were not being

governed; and thereupon, realising that a policy was the prime essential, they began themselves to seek for it, and for more than a year engaged in arguing one with another as to what should be done.

The Coalition was originally composed of two political parties which distrusted one another; and this fact made for delay and hesitation. But, beyond this, the war created a new division, which cut clean across both these parties and caused a second cleavage without welding the first. Two spirits were in conflict and struggled for mastery. One of these was obsessed by the belief that ultimate victory was inevitable, and that serene endurance was the greatest of public virtues. The other was dominated by the contrary conviction, that victory was not inevitable, that defeat was not impossible, and that the only hope of winning an honourable and lasting peace lay in prompt decisions, stupendous sacrifices, and unparalleled efforts. Men of this spirit cried, 'Awake, arise! put forth your whole strength or the war will be lost.' But the others replied, 'Keep calm and everything will come right. Changes which are excellent in theory and might possibly be useful in practice ought not to be entertained if they are likely to arouse opposition in any quarter. The parliamentary and political situation at home is as important as the military situation abroad. The national interest will be best served in the long run by preventing disagreement and by following the line of least resistance.' In its anxiety not to overstep the limits of a prudent responsibility, in its desire to avoid controversy and to wait for a clear mandate from public opinion, the party of serene endurance, which kept the upper hand until May 1916, invited and incurred a more dangerous dissension.

Those who championed this opinion assumed the fair-sounding title of 'optimists,' plumed themselves upon the imperturbable calmness of their confidence, and condemned in advance every fresh proposal for increasing the national effort. They consistently underrated the courage and resources of the enemy, and occupied themselves overmuch in recital of his misdeeds, and with visions and forecasts of an impending retribution. Every warning and every appeal—whether as regards shortage of munitions, need of men, lack of organisation, or bad

husbandry of the estate—were denounced in turn by the 'optimists' as symptoms of hysteria, cowardice, or intrigue. But in every instance they were proved wrong by events. They uttered soothing prophecies as to the course of the war, and gloomy warnings of the riots, revolution and wreckage which would occur if the nation were required to make a supreme effort. But none of their predictions of either sort ever came true.

The latter half of April 1916 was an eventful fortnight. A rebellion broke out in Ireland, attended with great loss of life and destruction of property in Dublin. Lowestoft was bombarded by the German Battle Cruiser Squadron; the East Coast was twice raided by Zeppelins; our positions in France were attacked with fury and not altogether without success. After a siege of five months Kut fell, and close on 10,000 British troops were forced to surrender. In addition there was a Cabinet crisis of exceptional severity.

It was clear by this time to every one except the Government and a few fanatics that, whatever might be the demerits of 'Conscription,' it was a method which could not be applied by halves. Parliament met in secret session; and this meeting was followed by the usual official proposals for a compromise which, however, the House of Commons peremptorily refused to entertain. In the first week of May a new Military Service Bill was brought in, extending the principles of compulsion to married men. Upon the introduction of this measure the Government immediately gained strength. Its action was taken as proof that the party of unresting effort had at last got the upper hand in the Cabinet, and that the spirit of serene endurance would no longer be able to trammel action. The nation was aware that the War Office and the Military Commands in France had been reorganised; and, although it knew nothing of the details, it was prepared to place absolute confidence in Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig. There was a general belief that henceforth the soldiers would be better supported than in the past, that they would be less subjected to political interference, and that these conditions would make for success. There was also a feeling that the Government had at last learned two lessons of the highest importance—the first, that action

and not deliberation is the main thing that matters in war; the second, that the nation was prepared to make any sacrifices which might be deemed necessary to secure victory.

For the next six months—that is, until the end of October 1916—the Cabinet did not meet with much serious opposition, when once it had weathered the gale of the abortive Irish negotiations. The Government (it was asserted) was the only possible Government; it had undergone a change of heart and purpose; and it was the duty of every man to support it. The Prime Minister was held in personal regard even by those who had criticised his former course of action most adversely. By temperament he was obviously ill suited to the particular emergency; but in intellect he was superior to most of his contemporaries. It was assumed that he must have learned from experience and adversity. Moreover, he was a loyal colleague, who always manfully shouldered his own mistakes and, upon occasions, those of other people. He shunned tawdry self-advertisement, and, although he had been blamed for not putting down his foot upon the intrigues of his personal adherents in the Cabinet, no one had ever charged him with practising the same arts. He had borne with dignity and steadfastness the heaviest load of public care and private sorrow. For these reasons his own position and that of the Government over which he presided were to all appearance stronger in the early autumn of 1916 than at any time since the first battle of Ypres. In the last week of October the Coalition seemed indissoluble; nevertheless in the first week of December it was dissolved.

We should look in vain for a full explanation of this catastrophe in the military events which occurred between the introduction of the Compulsion Bill and the fall of Bucarest. These events were of a chequered character. During May 1916 there was no sign of a clearing sky. The Austrians launched a great offensive and the Italians were driven back with heavy losses of men and guns. At Verdun the Germans put forth redoubled efforts, which met with a considerable measure of success. On the last day of the month a naval action was fought off Jutland which was announced in London on the Friday as if it had been a defeat, and on the Sunday was claimed as

a victory. But the North Sea battle was the turning point, and, until well on in the autumn, the fortune of war was wholly with the Allies. The Allied offensive was fairly well timed. The Russians led off in the first week of June, the Italians in the last, while the Franco-British efforts began on July 1. All were successful. The lines of the Central Powers groaned and gave way, east, west and south, although they were nowhere actually pierced or broken. The German assault upon Verdun was abandoned, just when it seemed on the point of succeeding. A Turkish attack upon Egypt failed. A force from Salonica recovered Monastir. Moreover, at the end of August, Rumania entered the war, and at first won striking successes. This seemed at least some set-off against the failure of our diplomacy in Greece. On the other hand, the new submarine campaign began to inflict losses which were seriously felt and gave cause for anxiety; and early in November the position of Rumania, enveloped north and south by the Germans and their allies, was becoming critical.

Such an alternation of success and failure will not account for the fall of a Government which had gone through heavier trials. Although the most recent of the events just narrated had not a little to do with the dissolution of the Cabinet, the main cause was internal rather than external. The supposed change of heart and purpose was to a large extent illusory; not owing to insincerity on the part of Ministers, but from the inability of a number of very able deliberators to convert themselves into men of action.

While the 'combined offensive' continued in full swing, people occupied their minds mainly with the achievements of the different armies, and the voice of political criticism was hushed. But so soon as military operations began to slacken with the approach of winter, public attention in every Allied country turned with startling suddenness and vehemence to appraise their various governments, and to consider which statesmen were worthy of confidence and which deserved release. As regards the past, had everything been done that was possible to secure an early victory? As regards the present, were affairs upon a satisfactory footing? As

regards the future, were preparations for the next campaign being pushed forward with the utmost vigour and promptitude, and with a true appreciation of the value of time? Above all, were the civil authorities moved by the right spirit, or was action still paralysed by deliberation, and effort hampered by serene endurance? In none of the Allied countries was there a more drastic revaluation of political assets than in our own.

The contumacy of Greece contained possibilities of serious danger. The perilous situation of Rumania was not merely a military disaster, but a wound to the national honour. The ravages of submarine piracy during August, September and October gave food for grave reflection. Our pride was offended by two German destroyer raids in the Channel; nor was our irritation allayed by the character of the Admiralty counterclaim. All these matters came under consideration; but public attention tended to fix itself less upon the mistakes and omissions of the past than upon preparations for the future, and the spirit in which these were being carried out.

Various matters pressed urgently for settlement and decision. The success of next year's campaign depended, among other things, upon man-power. How were the additional recruits to be obtained? The Navy and the Army were competing against one another for aircraft, and the Air Board appeared unable to compose their differences. Some form of Admiralty reorganisation had been freely talked of and seemed somewhat overdue. The arming of merchantmen against submarine attack, and the building of new vessels to make good recent losses, were matters which demanded immediate attention. Increase of the home production of food had been earnestly recommended by a government committee so long ago as Midsummer, 1915, but its report had apparently been pigeon-holed and forgotten. If rising prices drew attention to this glaring neglect, they also pointed to the need for immediate steps to regulate existing supplies and for the prevention of waste. But beyond expending a vast deal of money, paste, printer's ink, paper (which was at famine prices) and labour (which was growing every day more scarce) upon plastering the country with extravagant advertisements which

advocated thrift, no steps were taken to enforce economy upon the nation. The question of pensions was in a most unsatisfactory position ; and, in the absence of a clearly defined policy, discontent was rife. It had long been recognised that an overgrown Cabinet of twenty-three was an ineffective instrument for waging war ; but the War Council, which had now been in existence for a year, had not provided the remedy which was so much needed.

Weeks went by without any appearance of a solution of these problems. A ' food dictator ' was promised, but he was never appointed. Public opinion developed very rapidly from acute dissatisfaction with the methods of government to a state of mind which approached desperation, when day after day politicians and pressmen of all parties kept repeating that no other Government was possible. This was the situation of affairs in the last days of November 1916.

The leadership of the British Government was marred not so much by a bad tradition as by an unsuitable one. There are two ways of overcoming difficulties—the offensive and the defensive. A Minister may wait for troubles to arise and deal with them when they occur ; or he may go out to meet them and prevent them from ever gathering to a head. Under the working of our party system in peace time, statesmen have been used for so long to pursue the former method that it has come to be accepted as the right one for every emergency. But in a state of war it was clearly the wrong way ; and this fact had at last been fully realised by the nation. The plan of waiting for public opinion to give a lead to Government had produced not only delays but disasters.

The expert is often the last person to perceive that some new discovery or mode has put his special expertise in limbo. Statesmen, who had reached the highest places and had there maintained themselves by their proficiency in a certain method, were not likely to realise its unsuitability for a novel situation so early as other people. The country suspected what was wrong much sooner than the Cabinet did, and arrived at certainty while Ministers were still puzzled to explain to themselves the reasons for their unpopularity and non-success.

Things had been worse during the first year of Coalition Government, but even now—in the autumn of 1916—the United Kingdom did not present such a pattern of unity as could have been desired. There was considerable opposition, no little holding back, and great confusion. There was friction between different industries, and even between Government Departments. There were quarrels between capital and labour, employers and employed. Agitators and 'profiteers' vied with one another as to who should work most mischief. There were strikes, malingering, hoarding of stocks, threats to stop vital supplies and services, waste, extravagance, oppression, breaches of agreement, defiance of the law. Rebellion was smouldering in Ireland. The mass of the people regarded these occurrences, so far as it was allowed to hear of them, with a mixture of vexation, disgust and horror. In no part of the community did they excite greater anger and impatience than among the working class, whose sacrifices for the prosecution of the war, if fairly measured, were as great as those offered by any other section—in some respects, indeed, much greater.

The policy of waiting for the tide and missing it when it came had been pursued with pathetic constancy. The Government was taunted with opportunism; but the true charge was that it missed its greatest opportunities, that it hesitated and delayed and so let them slip by unobserved, one after another. As a result, those sections which had never been more than lukewarm about the war were filled with discouragement; while those which, unconsciously or in the secrecy of their hearts, had been opposed to it, began to trim, to plead for free discussion, and for the production of terms of peace which they fondly imagined might combine 'the crushing of Prussian militarism' with proposals acceptable to a victorious Germany. Finally, those sections which from the beginning had been against the war became vocal, ranged the country with great activity, and spread their doctrines without let or hindrance from platforms and in the correspondence columns of newspapers which continued, though not always very convincingly, to protest their lack of sympathy with the propaganda. This party, which stood for surrender and

the acceptance of German domination, professed to be gaining adherents every day. We could well believe it, for nothing makes so strongly for peace as a Government which does not understand how to wage war.

The will of the people was to end the war by winning it; and the Government had a free hand within the terms of this simple commission. The people did not ask to be consulted about methods; it was far too much concerned about the final result. It was filled, not with approbation, but with anger, when it saw the Government waiting anxiously for mandates, and watching timidly the ebb and surge of newspaper agitations before it could make up its mind how to act with regard to this and that—with regard to recruiting, prevention of waste, regulation of industry, development of internal food supplies, restriction of imports, winding-up of enemy firms, enforcement of the blockade. According to the popular view it would have been wiser had the Navy been allowed to blockade Germany before the Germans were in a position to begin blockading us. By delaying to act until popular pressure became irresistible the most favourable opportunities had often been missed, in other cases as in this.

A member of the Cabinet admitted in a moment of candour that its motto had been 'too late'; and what the Government has itself acknowledged there can be no treason in deplored. The vast cost of being too late—the cost in life, suffering, treasure and prestige, in prolongation of the war, and even in security—had become so obvious that the nation refused to listen any longer to the official apologist when he explained that all the delays were inspired by the highest wisdom, and that under no other leadership could we have preserved our national unity. The wisdom of the serpent, however, was less in evidence than the sinuosities of its course.

The nation was in a mood of intense seriousness, willing to obey authority and to listen to reason, even when, as in the case of the Trades Unions, reason was opposed to some of its most cherished traditions. On no single occasion did Ministers ever demand a sacrifice or issue a firm order without finding themselves stronger as the result. They acted in this way too seldom. They were praised by their own press for the skill, patience

and good temper with which they slowly circumvented obstacles, out-maneuvred opposition in the Cabinet and the House of Commons, devised formulas which violated no man's prejudices, skilfully provoked timely outbursts of popular impatience, and in the end overcame their immediate difficulties with the aid of external pressure. But 'in the end' was often 'too late.' And what is more, many of these difficulties would never have arisen if the Government had made up its mind and taken a bold line in the first instance, instead of waiting for public opinion to crystallise and insist. Throughout the whole of 1915 and 1916 these evils continued in a more or less acute form, hindering by so much the realisation of complete national unity. The nation during this period was like an engine registered at a hundred horse-power, which is handled so unskilfully that it generates no more than half the force of which it is capable. And in order to bring the war to a victorious conclusion it was necessary in some way or other to make it yield even more than its nominal capacity.

The people as a whole had gradually become aware that something was wrong; but, although the popular power is a tremendous force, it is limited by its nature. The people cannot perform executive functions, cannot issue definite orders, cannot govern. It is not clothed with personal authority. When its instincts are vigilant, as in this case, it can judge whether things are going well or ill; but, although it can diagnose, it cannot prescribe. Moreover, at this juncture—the gravity of which it fully realised—it was more restrained than usual in declaring its mind; and, out of patriotism, it subjected itself to a rigorous control. Its silent disapprobation was either misunderstood by the Government, or held to be of less importance than the noisy clamour of an inconsiderable minority.

In ordinary times there is no influence which Governments are more anxious to conciliate or readier to respect than the will of the people; for Ministers live in dread of elections, fearing the victory of their opponents. But in our recent situation elections did not count, for the reason that there was no organised opposition through which popular feeling could express itself. The Government regarded itself as 'indispensable,' proclaimed a

general election to be 'unthinkable,' and changed the constitution in order that it might remain irremovable. And yet the Government fell, and it fell for the simple reason that the people did not trust it.

The Coalition disappeared on Tuesday, Dec. 5, only a few hours before Bucarest surrendered to an Austro-German army. The King immediately sent for Mr Bonar Law, who, on the following day, intimated his inability to form an Administration. Thereupon Mr Lloyd George was invited to undertake this task; and by Thursday evening it seemed likely that, having secured the assistance of the Unionist and Labour parties, he would succeed. On Monday, Dec. 11, the composition of the new Government was announced in the morning papers; and two days later it was made clear at a meeting of the Liberal parliamentary party that for the present, at any rate, Mr Lloyd George's Administration would not be challenged either in the country or the House of Commons, but on the contrary would be given a fair trial.

For a year at least many of the most eminent members of the late Administration and their admirers had made no secret of their belief that the country would be shocked and depressed, that the enemy would rejoice, and that the confidence of our Allies, of friendly Neutrals and of financial interests throughout the world, would be shaken to their foundations if the Coalition fell. The country, far from being shocked and depressed, was manifestly relieved and elated. The comments of the enemy press seemed to indicate anger rather than jubilation. Our Allies, while expressing respect for the outgoing Cabinet and gratitude for its great services, accepted the change with satisfaction as evidence of our determination to wage war with greater energy than before. Among friendly Neutrals there were no signs of condemnation, but rather a disposition to wonder why we had not made the change long ago. Still, up to the last moment, the conviction seemed to linger in official Liberal circles that the resignation of Mr Asquith and his chief adherents would cause despondency in the City and a panic on all the Allied and friendly Bourses. There was no despondency and no panic. The 'Funds' rose somewhat on the news.

There remains the further question why the Coalition collapsed. It has been freely alleged that this occurrence was due to two causes—press criticism and intrigues. In Mr Asquith's speech at the Reform Club, he attributed his fall to 'a well organised and carefully engineered conspiracy'; but, as he went on to say that he did not believe it to have been 'countenanced in any quarter of the Liberal Party,' it would appear that he exonerated Mr Lloyd George. Nothing has emerged to point to the guilt of his Unionist colleagues, or of the Irish or Labour parties. Who, then, were the organisers, engineers and conspirators?

It is a well-known fact that, when a man is overwrought, he is apt to entertain the most groundless suspicions of his fellow-creatures. This, in fact, is one of the commonest symptoms of hallucination, a condition to which nations and parties are no less liable than individuals. Moreover, the terms 'intrigue' and 'conspiracy' are far too commonly bandied about by politicians for any one to take them very seriously. It is, of course, obvious that there were a very large number of people, including Mr Lloyd George, who did not agree with the view that the fall of Mr Asquith's Government would be a national misfortune. Many of these, believing that it was managing the war badly, were anxious to turn it out. It is tolerably certain that, at the end of November, the greater part of the country held those views; and it is not unlikely that a majority in both Houses of Parliament was of the same mind. But action which proceeds from such opinions, whether erroneous or not, does not necessarily fall into the category of intrigue and conspiracy.

The historian will probably attach much less importance to the efforts of newspapers in bringing about the fall of the Coalition than the newspapers themselves are inclined to claim, or to attribute to one another. We are apt to forget that, in 1906, the greater part of the press—greater in influence as well as circulation—supported the Unionist party, which, nevertheless, was beaten as none has ever been within recent memory. On the present occasion we saw the same phenomenon. The greater part of the press assured us that there was no alternative to the Coalition, and yet the Coalition not

only fell but was promptly replaced. The power of journalism is very great for certain purposes; but it can do little or nothing to change Governments unless it has public opinion behind it. Moreover, it 'makes,' much less than it is 'made by,' public opinion.

A comparatively small part of the press had criticised and at times attacked the Liberal and Coalition Governments ever since April 1915. They made but little way until, towards the end of November, their animadversions found a resonant echo in the leading Liberal journals. If, therefore, journalism is to have the credit or discredit of Mr Asquith's resignation, we must not award the whole praise or blame to the 'Northcliffe Press' or the 'Morning Post,' but allow an important share to the warnings of the 'Westminster Gazette,' the vigorous admonitions of the 'Daily Chronicle' and the 'Manchester Guardian,' and the loud lamentations of the 'Nation.'

In short, if we desire to form a true judgment of the reasons which led to the fall of the Coalition, we must set aside those hasty and fanciful theories of press campaigns and personal intrigues. Rightly or wrongly, the great mass of the people had come to the conclusion that the Government, by its delays and compromises, was in a fair way to lose the war. The newspapers merely echoed what was already in men's minds. The intriguers, if they existed, were not principals but only instruments. The same popular instinct, which, in autocratic Prussia, had insisted a few months earlier upon displacing Falkenhayn and putting Hindenburg at the head of affairs, now, in democratic England, insisted upon displacing Mr Asquith and Viscount Grey and making Mr Lloyd George Prime Minister.

The party of unresting effort has won. It has had a free hand and a fair start. There is a 'daemonic element' in Downing Street. What it will make of things remains to be seen. It succeeds to an inheritance which is admittedly in a state of great confusion and considerable embarrassment; but, under able management, there should be a large balance of assets over liabilities.

In Mr Asquith's first speech in the House of Commons after the change of government he seemed to look forward hopefully to the reinstatement of the party system

after the war. It is interesting to speculate upon the future; but it is hard to believe that, when peace is signed, the two historical party organisations will take down their shutters, polish up their brass plates, and issue their customary trade circulars announcing a resumption of business on the old lines and under the familiar trade names. For there will be a war after the war—a war of no brief duration—a war not so much against foreign nations as against the defects which recent events have disclosed in our own methods of government, trade, and social organisation.

It is certainly probable, that, during this period of reconstruction, some sort of party system will revive, and that there will be two clearly marked political divisions. But it is more likely that these will be the same two which have lately been struggling for mastery with regard to the conduct of the war, than that we shall return to the Unionists and Liberals of pre-war days. There will be the party of unresting effort—the people who want to get things done, and to improve the national and imperial organisation beyond any standard which has hitherto been dreamt of. Probably at first this party will have public opinion behind it. But there will also be a Liberal-Conservative residuum—sceptical, patient, skilled in all the exhaustive devices of democratic statecraft, master of one great party organisation, and possibly of both, vigilant in taking advantage of every blunder which enthusiasm may make, and in turning every current of discontent in its own favour. The party which is prepared to wait-and-see may not be in good odour when peace is declared; but it may nevertheless succeed in returning to power long before we have set our house in order.

The political event which occurred a few weeks ago was something more than the fall of a Government. It was, in fact, the collapse of a school of thought, whose most renowned teachers were, on the practical side, Richard Cobden, and, on the theoretic, John Stuart Mill. Their system had gradually permeated both political parties to a greater or less degree. It had had its ups and downs since 1850 or thereabouts, but until lately had generally been regarded as a solvent and prosperous concern. As in the case of other great bankruptcies, however,

disturbing rumours had been current for some years before the crash actually came. The war shook the whole fabric to its foundations, and on Dec. 6, 1916, it filed its petition and admitted failure. The causes of the disaster make the same tale to which the ears of the Official Receiver are so well accustomed. The debtor had not taken account of new developments, had not been able to foresee the course of trade, and had refused to listen to those who did. He would not prepare against bad times, and, when the bad times came, he was so much wedded to the old routine that he could not change his methods—by which means alone he could have hoped to weather the storm. The fall of the Coalition was not the bankruptcy of a statesman, or of a government, or of a party, but that of a gigantic system of make-believe which, although it excelled in theory and argument, had long ceased to observe the facts of national life.

The evolution of the modern state has produced such an elaborate organism that it is no longer safe (if it ever was so) to leave each section free to seek its own interests in its own way. The worst of our social evils are due to individualism run riot, and many of the defects of our political structure are due to the same cause. 'The various tribes of Britons,' wrote Gibbon of our rude ancestors who fled or fell before the Roman legions, 'possessed valour without conduct, and the love of freedom without the spirit of union. They took up arms with a savage fierceness; they laid them down, or turned them against each other, with wild inconstancy; and, while they fought singly, they were successively subdued.' In early days the sea, in later times sea-power, were relied on as barriers, behind which the spirit of disunion might with impunity be permitted to rage at will. But, if the present war has taught us anything, it is that no barriers, natural or artificial, can protect a nation which is not welded into union.

Events which have happened recently in Ireland, in South Wales, and on the Clyde—to mention only the most notorious—have shown us that, even at the crisis of our fate, we were not able altogether to overcome our ancient weakness. For this we may blame our geographical situation, our history, our policy deliberately pursued over a long period of years, and our Government,

which, when war came, failed to rise to the height of its opportunity. It is impossible as yet to apportion the responsibility fairly among these various factors. But, if we endeavour to judge the problem without prejudice, we shall be forced to admit that we should have waged war with much greater energy and success had we been more firmly united as a nation and as an empire. And further, if we are capable of learning wisdom from adversity, we must understand that after the war national existence will depend on national unity.

It would be folly to imagine that even in the most perfect unity there will be no differences of opinion upon policy and administration, no vigorous antagonisms of persons and principles, no divergences of interest between classes, and no political parties—for this would mean stagnation, and stagnation is not unity. It is possible, however, to conceive a State in which public opinion will pass prompt and final judgment upon all proposals, according as they seem to promote or endanger the well-being and security of the nation. This is the standard now; why should it ever change?

Art. 14.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

THE persistently bad weather of the past three months has caused an unavoidable slackening in the Allied offensive on the Somme. A period of heavy rain and south-westerly gales, interspersed with occasional fair intervals of brief duration, set in on Oct. 2, and continued well into November. The atmospheric conditions, by interfering with aerial observation, prevented the effective cooperation of artillery in the attack; and the chalky soil of Picardy, under the action of incessant wet, was soon reduced to a state which precluded the employment of large bodies of troops in the attack, and made it difficult for heavy guns to change position. The continuity which had previously characterised the operations was, in consequence, interrupted; and the attacks which were carried out from time to time, as occasion offered, were, for the most part, restricted to such limited objectives as could be attained and made good by comparatively small forces.

The comparative inactivity imposed by the weather was the more unfortunate because, at the beginning of October, there was every prospect of more brilliant successes being in store for the Allied armies than any which had been achieved during the earlier stages of the offensive. The new British troops had become hardened and experienced, and were elated by the unbroken series of successes which had definitely established their supremacy over the enemy both on land and in the air. They were in the confident mood which, by triumphing over obstacles, commands the favours of Fortune, and carries armies to victory. The Germans, on the other hand, were, for the most part, suffering the depression which is induced by a long succession of reverses, accompanied by heavy losses, and varied by no substantial success which might have served to cheer their flagging spirits. Moreover, the formidable system of fortifications which had been evolved by German ingenuity, and perfected by nearly two years of unremitting labour, had collapsed before the onset of the Allied armies, who now had before them only hastily prepared entrenchments, providing inadequate cover during bombardment, and comparatively poor facilities for resisting attack. The

enemy was without reserves, every division which could be borrowed from other parts of the front in France having been thrown into the fighting on the Somme—sometimes twice, or even three times—and practically destroyed as an effective force. In fact, the crisis of the prolonged conflict seemed to have been reached when the weather joined forces with the Germans, and, by checking the Allies' progress just when a vigorous advance was most essential, saved them from defeat.

The capture of Eaucourt l'Abbaye on Oct. 1, and of Le Sars on Oct. 7, opened up the line of attack on the 'hammer-headed spur,' which, springing from the main ridge between Flers and Martinpuich, and sweeping round to the east of Eaucourt l'Abbaye at a distance of 1500 yards, broadens out into the form which suggested its name, filling the greater part of the space between Thilloy and Le Sars, and overlooking those villages at a distance of half a mile. The western end, marked by a tumulus known as the Butte de Warlencourt, was occupied early in November, but the eastern extremity is still in the enemy's hands. A second dominating spur, which stretches from Morval in the direction of Thilloy, and commands the German positions in the region of Le Transloy, was also the objective of minor operations, in conjunction with the French, throughout October. By the middle of November the greater part had been captured, and the Allied trenches had been pushed down the eastern slope within 1200 yards of Le Transloy; while, further south, the French had taken the twin villages of Sainly and Saillisel, and occupied the western margin of the Bois St Pierre de Vaast. During the same period, the capture of a series of entrenchments between Le Sars and Thiepval enabled the British to establish their front on a line two miles north of Courcelette, astride a third great spur which extends from the vicinity of the Stuff Redoubt to the region between Pys and Miraumont.

The operations outlined above gave our troops possession of a considerable part of the northern slopes of the watershed between the Ancre and the Somme, and of the three important spurs commanding the line of villages, from Grandcourt and Miraumont, on the west, to Le Transloy, on the east, which the enemy has fortified

as pivots of his system of defence in the lower country beyond. The western extremity of the ridge beyond the Schwaben Redoubt, and a formidable maze of fortifications on the slope which falls steeply to the Ancre, including the strongly defended village of St Pierre Divion, were still in the enemy's possession; and these, together with the heights above Beaucourt and Beaumont Hamel on the opposite side of the river, had to be taken in order to complete the conquests of the preceding four months by securing possession of the gorge through which the upper waters of the Ancre issue into the Somme valley. The German positions in this locality both commanded the British entrenchments to the south-west, and the line of advance from Thiepval and Courcelette towards Grandcourt and Miraumont.

The improvement in the weather, which took place on Nov. 9, after a final burst of storm and rain, offered an opportunity which Sir Douglas Haig was not slow to seize. Before dawn on Nov. 13, under cover of a thick mist, an attack was delivered on a front of about 8000 yards astride the Ancre, extending from the neighbourhood of the Staff Redoubt, on the right, to a point midway between Beaumont Hamel and Serre, on the left. The enemy's positions were thus simultaneously assailed in front from the south-west, and in flank from the south-east. The attack was preceded by a brief bombardment. The Germans appear to have been completely taken by surprise, for the attack, in its earlier stages, was not strongly opposed. St Pierre Divion was taken early in the day, and before evening Beaumont Hamel had fallen. On Nov. 14 Beaucourt was captured, while, south of the Ancre, the front was advanced to the outskirts of Grandcourt. On Nov. 18 the weather broke again, and the operations had to be suspended.

The loss of these positions, together with nearly 7000 prisoners, was a severe blow to the Germans, who had, apparently, persuaded themselves that the Allied offensive had come to an end. The defences are said to have been even more formidable than those of Thiepval; and the success of the operation is evidence of the excellence of the Staff arrangements, and of the intelligence and resolution with which they were carried out. The dense

mist, which favoured surprise, made it difficult to maintain order and cohesion in the attack; and the precision with which the objectives were reached testifies to the discipline of the troops, and to the courage and resource of their leaders. To quote the official report, 'The troops employed have shown conspicuous skill, dash, and fortitude; and our success was not won without a hard struggle, as the enemy resisted strongly, and the condition of the ground greatly increased the difficulty of the attack.'

On the front south of the Somme, the French, during October and November, carried out a series of operations which had the result of bringing up the reentrant in their line between Chaulnes and Berny. On Oct. 10 they captured the hamlet of Bovent, 1200 yards north of Ablaincourt, the western outskirts of the latter, and the greater part of Chaulnes Wood. Four days later they advanced their line eastward from Bovent, taking the hamlet of Genermont, within half a mile of Fresnes; and, by a separate attack, captured the first-line trench east of Belloy on a front of 2000 yards. Finally, on Nov. 7, they completed the occupation of Ablaincourt, and gained possession of Pressoir, which lies 600 yards to the south-west, on the road to Chaulnes. The toll of unwounded prisoners taken in these operations amounted to nearly 4000.

But the most notable event on the French front was the brilliant offensive conducted at Verdun between Oct. 24 and Nov. 4, and continued on Dec. 15, by which our Allies recovered the Damloup Battery, Forts Vaux and Douaumont, the Thiaumont Redoubt, and the Haudromont quarries. The enemy were completely taken unawares, having, apparently, persuaded themselves that the French had exhausted all their energies on the Somme. The recapture, on Dec. 15 and 16, of the Bezonvaux and Hardaumont redoubts, the village of Bezonvaux, the Chambrettes Farm, and the villages of Louvemont and Vacherauville, together with the intervening position of the Côte du Poivre, restored the French practically to the positions occupied on Feb. 24, the third day of the great German offensive. The number of prisoners taken in this series of operations exceeded 14,000. The enemy's chagrin may be judged

from the attempts of the German press to make light of the loss of Fort Douaumont, which had been officially described in February as 'the corner pillar of the fortress of Verdun.' Its evacuation was asserted to have been purely voluntary, and to have had no effect on the situation on the Verdun front.

True to their traditions, the Germans have not been remiss in counter-attacking, though, as might be expected from the exhausting struggle they have had to sustain, their efforts have never attained the magnitude or the vigour of the great counter-strokes of July and August, when they still had fresh reserves. Their attempts, for the most part, have been barren, though positions have changed hands on several occasions; as, for instance, at Eaucourt l'Abbaye and the Regina Trench (Oct. 1), St Pierre de Vaast Wood (Oct. 13), the Butte de Warlencourt (Nov. 5), and on other occasions when success was only momentary. The most formidable counter-offensives on the Somme front were, perhaps, those at La Maisonette (Oct. 30), where the Germans still retain the farm buildings and a length of trench on the north; and on the front Ablaincourt-Chaulnes (Nov. 15), where, employing three divisions, they carried the eastern portion of Pressoir, from which they were ejected on the following day, after an obstinate fight.

Since the capture of the German positions on the Ancre, the weather conditions have restricted offensive operations to the trench warfare which characterises periods of enforced inaction. The task of harassing the enemy has been pursued with restless energy, by means of frequent raids and intermittent bombardments. On the Somme front our artillery has been noticeably active, with the object of frustrating the enemy's attempts to elaborate new lines of defence, and of denying him the respite needed to recover from the nervous strain of the summer and autumn months.

Before proceeding to consider the progress of the campaign in Rumania, which has been the centre of military interest during the past three months, it will be convenient briefly to notice the operations on the other fronts, which were probably designed mainly with the view of relieving the pressure on the Rumanians. The

Italian offensive on the Isonzo, which had been suspended about the middle of August, after the capture of Gorizia and the heights which command it on the south, was resumed with great dash and brilliancy on Oct. 10. The Italians first directed their attention to the heights south of Gorizia, adjoining the railway to Trieste, and to the plateau of the Carso, further south. In the course of three days' fighting they broke through the Austrian front between Sober and Vertoiba, three miles south-east of Gorizia. On the Carso they carried a succession of positions on the high ground east of the line San Grado—Nova Vas, advancing their front from one to three miles, and taking 7000 prisoners. After an interval they returned to the attack on Nov. 1, extending the front of operations so as to embrace the lower heights of the Rosenthal, east of Gorizia. The first day of the attack saw them masters of the trenches on the eastern slopes of Tivoli and San Marco, which overlook Gorizia from a distance of 3000 yards; and, in the region of Sober, they established themselves on the ridge dividing the upper waters of the Vipacco from the Vertobica, which joins the former river near San Grado. The fighting on the Carso, which continued till Nov. 4, resulted in a further advance, and the capture of a line of commanding heights on either side of the road which connects Gorizia with Trieste. Nearly 9000 prisoners were taken, bringing the total captures since Oct. 10 to 16,000. The new front was held against a succession of counter-attacks, supported by a powerful artillery, until, about Nov. 10, torrential rains put an end to the operations.

The course of events on the Macedonian front, which, since April, have been allowed to pass unnoticed, as having little relevancy to the operations in the main theatres of war, have lately sprung into prominence. The Allied force under the command of General Sarrail now comprises, in addition to a considerable number of French and British troops, the reorganised Serbian army, and Russian and Italian contingents. It has undertaken offensive operations with the view of relieving the pressure on Rumania; and the danger which threatened it through the thinly-veiled hostility of the ruling power in Greece has become plain to the least observant. In

order to pick up the threads it is necessary to take a backward glance as far as the spring of last year.

In April Field-Marshal von Mackensen assumed the command of the enemy's forces in the Balkans, and immediately began to make arrangements for taking the offensive. During May a considerable Bulgarian force assembled on the frontiers of Eastern Macedonia. A division, advancing from Xanthi, secured the passages of the river Mesta, on the road to Kavalla. Another division, moving down the Struma, took possession of the forts Rupel, Dragotin, and Nea Petra, which were surrendered by the Greek garrisons, apparently without protest, if not by pre-arrangement. German troops had previously occupied positions in Greek territory, near the Vardar.

In July General Sarrail began counter-preparations for taking the offensive in the direction of Monastir. The British force, under General Milne, which had been holding the lower Struma, was charged with the defence of the front from the mouth of the Struma to the Vardar; the remaining forces being drawn towards the left wing, between the Vardar and Lake Presba. The enemy, however, intervened by seizing the initiative. On Aug. 17 German troops occupied Florina, having driven out a weak Serbian detachment; while the Bulgarians took possession of Kavalla, where a Greek army corps surrendered, and of the heights on the left bank of the Struma. The intention, apparently, was to upset the arrangement for the Allied offensive, and to distract attention from the concentration of Mackensen's force, which was being effected on the Dobrudja frontier; for the operations ceased at the end of August.

By the middle of September General Sarrail, having regrouped his forces, began the movement on Monastir. The French captured Florina on Sept. 18; and the Serbians, after defeating the enemy on the frontier ridge of Kajmakchalan, advanced on Oct. 5 to the bend of the Cerna, 15 miles south-east of Monastir. General Milne, meanwhile, had occupied the Struma after some fighting, and established a bridge-head on the left bank, thus holding the enemy in check on that flank.

Six weeks of heavy fighting ensued, the Serbians carrying successive positions on the heights in the bend

of the Cerna with the aid of an outflanking movement east of the river, while the French advanced from the south, and sent a column round Lake Presba on the west to threaten the enemy's right flank. An Italian force, moving from the Adriatic coast, was reported, on Oct. 20, to have arrived at Leskovec; and its mounted troops came into touch with the French cavalry a few days later, but it does not appear to have reached the scene of action. On the enemy's side German regiments were brought from the Russian front, and further reinforcements were sent, but they arrived too late to save Monastir, which fell on Nov. 19. These forces, however, enabled the enemy to prevent the Allies from gaining possession of the heights which enclose the town on the north. The tactical position cannot, therefore, be considered satisfactory.

Nor can the general situation be contemplated without uneasiness. The position of the Allied Army in Macedonia, never promising from the military point of view, has become dangerous. It is unnecessary to do more than recall the gradual disclosure of King Constantine's hostility as the enemy advanced in Rumania. There can be little doubt that he entertained the design of falling on the Allied force in rear, in conjunction with a frontal attack to be delivered by the Germans and their allies so soon as troops could be freed from Rumania. The diplomatic parleying by which he sought to gain time gave place to a treacherous and cowardly attack on the Allied detachments which landed at the Piræus on Dec. 1, which demanded prompt retribution. This murderous outrage was followed by the reinstatement, as Chief of the General Staff, of the pro-German General Dousmanis, who had been removed from that appointment at the instance of the Allied Powers. It was also made the subject of a general order conveying the King's congratulations to the troops for having saved the country from its enemies by their 'loyal devotion to duty, self-sacrifice, and courage.' Although the state of feeling thus manifested demanded the utmost promptitude in taking effective measures to secure the rear and communications of the Allied Army in any circumstances that might arise, a month was allowed to pass before the presentation of the Note embodying the Allies'

demands. The lapse of time, and the merely negative power of the blockade, instead of promoting saner counsels, have confirmed and aggravated the hostility of the Greeks, who doubtless regard the delay as proof of irresolution and weakness. Moreover, the terms of the Note provide ample opportunities for temporising, in order to gain time for the development of the new German move in Macedonia, which, judging from their increasing truculence, the Greek government anticipate in the near future.

The operations on the Russian front need little notice. Intermittent fighting, sometimes of great severity, has taken place on the Kovel—Vladimir Volynsky front, and south of Brody, each side taking the offensive from time to time, but without affecting the general situation. There have also been local outbursts of activity at various localities so far north as Riga, in which only small forces took part. The purpose of these operations was doubtless to prevent, or to screen, the withdrawal of troops to Rumania. The conflict in Volhynia seems to have terminated about the end of October, in mutual exhaustion consequent on the despatch of reinforcements, which made their appearance during the fighting in Wallachia. Even more desperate was the struggle in the region between Brzezany and Halicz, which lasted almost without cessation from early in September till the middle of November, the Russians endeavouring to gain the line of the Dniester. At the outset our Allies drove the enemy across the Gnila Lipa; but the latter, having been strongly reinforced, took the offensive, and, in a series of fierce battles, forced the Russians to withdraw to the heights east of the Narajovka, a left-bank tributary of the Gnila Lipa, where they have since maintained their positions.

It will be recollected that, in the early days of October, the Rumanians, after their defeats in the region of Petroseni and at Hermannstadt, had fallen back to positions in front of the Vulkan Pass, and about Caneni, five miles south of the frontier at the Rother Turm; while, further east, they were retiring before superior forces in the Schassburg region. In the latter quarter

Falkenhayn's left wing, under General von Morgen, pursued vigorously, handling the Rumanian rearguards somewhat roughly in the mountainous forest country, and occupied Brasso and Szekely Udvarhely on Oct. 8. The Rumanians fell back to the northern exits of the passes, where they repulsed all attacks until, on Oct. 13, their left flank was pushed back through the Törzburg to a position a few miles north of Dragoslavele.

Meanwhile the enemy, as had been expected, were directing reinforcements to the Moldavian front, in the hope of breaking through to the Czernowitz-Buzau railway, which served as the lateral communication in rear of the Russian and Rumanian armies. Here, also, the Rumanian Northern Army withdrew to the passes, where it was heavily attacked between Oct. 14 and 20. The enemy—chiefly Austrian troops—under General von Arz, carried the Gyimes Pass, and made some progress in the Trotus valley; but they were held back in the Uzul, Slanic, and Oitoz valleys, by which they attempted to turn the Rumanian positions in the Trotus. During the same period they attacked the junction of the Allied armies near Dorna Watra with large forces, but were driven back after severe fighting. In spite of the snow, which set in about this time, the wooded Carpathians, between the Rumanian frontier and the Jablonitza Pass, have been the scene of fierce local struggles for heights throughout the past three months, without, however, making any material change in the situation outlined in October.

Before returning to the main operations on the Wallachian front it will be convenient to pay a brief visit to the Dobrudja, where, at the beginning of October, the Allied force was attacking Mackensen's position a few miles south of the Constanza railway. In conjunction with this attack, a Rumanian detachment crossed the Danube between Rustchuk and Tutrakan on Oct. 1, and seized a line of villages, with the object, apparently, of establishing a bridge-head from which Mackensen, if driven southwards, might be attacked in rear. According to Sofia, the force, which consisted of fifteen battalions without artillery, was attacked by columns from Rustchuk and Tutrakan, and destroyed, the bridge having been demolished by Austrian monitors.

Bucarest described the move as a demonstration, on completion of which the troops withdrew across the river; and later statements from Berlin and Sofia admit that part of the force made good its retreat by a bridge. The main battle ended inconclusively; but, after an interval in which he was reinforced, Mackensen took the offensive on Oct. 19, defeated the Allies, and advanced to the line Harsova—Devenderi, where he appears to have detached part of his force to form the nucleus of the Danube Army, under General von Kosch, which appeared later in Wallachia. On Nov. 5 the Allies again advanced under General Sakharoff, who had assumed the command, but were brought to a standstill before a strong position a few miles north of the railway, where we shall leave them for the present.

The loss of the Törzburg obliged the Rumanian Second Army to fall back in the entire group of passes south and south-east of Brasso, in order to restore the continuity of its front. On the whole, the change of position was advantageous; for, by holding the defiles south of the passes, the Rumanians compelled the enemy to fight under conditions unfavourable for the development of superior strength, especially in guns, for the transport of supplies, and for the rapid enforcement of the fighting line. Such a situation favours bold offensive action by falling on the heads of the attacking columns before they can deploy, and throwing them back in confusion. By these tactics the Germans were kept at bay for nearly two months in the Brasso group of passes, being unable to dislodge our Allies from positions about Dragoslavele and Liresci in the Törzburg, and Sinaia in the Prédeal, while their progress on the Bratocea, Buzau, and less important routes was even more restricted.

The right wing of the First Army maintained itself at Caneni against gradually increasing numbers till the end of October, when it fell back fighting to Calimanesti, where it kept von Delmensingen at bay till the position was turned by the advance of von Kühne's army from the Jiu valley. In the latter region the Germans carried the Vulcan Pass on Oct. 24, and after some vicissitudes, involving the destruction of an entire division, defeated the Rumanians at Tîrgu Jiului on Nov. 18, and occupied Craiova three days later. The Rumanian left wing,

which held the Iron Gates till the last moment, appears to have made good its retreat, with the loss of its rear-guards, to the line of the Aluta, where the First Army formed up on Nov. 25, between Calimanesti and Slatina. This position was untenable from the first. Delmensingen was attacking the right flank about Calimanesti and Curtea dei Arges, while Kühne, who was advancing eastwards from the Jiu, sent his cavalry forward across the Aluta below Slatina. Mackensen, moreover, who assumed the chief command, had crossed the Danube on the previous day at Islaz and Simnitz, with Kosch's Army of the Danube, which moved on Alexandria. The Rumanians fell back to the Arges. On Nov. 29 they lost Pitesti and Campolung on the right, while, on the left, Comana fell to Kosch. The situation was clearly desperate; but they fought stubbornly on the Arges, in the hope that Russian reinforcements would come in time to save Bucarest. Meanwhile, Russian forces having arrived in Moldavia, an advance was begun, on Nov. 28, on the entire front between the Jablonitz and Buzau passes; while Sakharoff attacked in the Dobrudja, but made little impression on the enemy's position. These operations had no obvious effect on the situation in Wallachia; but it is possible that German reinforcements, which speedily appeared on the Moldavian front, had been diverted from the Brasso region, where it would have been so clearly to the advantage of the enemy to break through at this stage, in order to separate the armies in Wallachia from those in Moldavia, that it is reasonable to credit them with that design.

On Dec. 2 Russian troops began to arrive in the region south of Bucarest, but their numbers were insufficient to gain more than a momentary success against Kosch. On the following day the Rumanians retreated from the Arges; and on Dec. 6 the enemy occupied Bucarest, whence the Government had moved to Jassy, and Ploesti, the centre of the oil-fields. The retreat seems to have been effected in good order, for, on Dec. 9, the Rumanians were able to turn on their pursuers and throw them back across the Cricovul. This bold action was doubtless taken to gain time for the withdrawal of the wings; for the right wing, which held the passes, was entangled in the mountains, where,

according to Berlin, large numbers were captured ; while the left wing, which was still south of the Jablonitza, had to march a greater distance than the centre, in a district ill provided with roads. On Dec. 14 the enemy occupied Buzau ; and Sakharoff began to fall back in the Dobrudja, conforming to the movement of the main armies, which by that date had been strongly reinforced by Russian troops.

For a week after the occupation of Buzau the enemy's advance slackened, Mackensen being engaged in re-organising his forces and bringing up supplies, while awaiting the arrival of the heavy artillery, which had fallen behind. The Rumanian First and Second Armies appear to have withdrawn to reorganise, for the Russians occupied positions extending from the Danube near Viziru to the neighbourhood of the Vrancea Mountains, where they joined the Rumanian Northern Army, which prolonged the right as far as the Oitzo valley, inclusive. The region north of the Oitzo was occupied by Russian troops. On Dec. 22 the attack developed on the entire front from the Danube to the Oitzo, Falkenhayn advancing in strength against the positions in front of Rimnik, where the main road and the railway enabled him to bring up a powerful force of artillery, and to keep it liberally supplied with ammunition. After five days' gallant resistance our Allies had to abandon their ruined trenches, and fall back north of Rimnik. Kosch's Army of the Danube, less formidably equipped, made little progress ; and all the positions on the Allies' right wing were maintained, except in the Oitzo and Casin valleys, where the Rumanians lost some heights. On Dec. 31, Sakharoff had evacuated the Dobrudja, except the Matchin bridge-head, opposite Braila ; and the main front ran a few miles north of the line Viziru—Rimnik to the Vrancea Mountains, whence it followed approximately the northern trend of the frontier.

It is possible to trace roughly, in the light of the official reports, the deployment of the German armies subsequent to the battle of Tîrgu Jiului, and their advance through Wallachia to the line of the Sereth. After Kühne's advanced troops had seized Craiova, his entire army-corps turned to the left, so as to form line facing east between that place and Tîrgu Jiului, and

advanced to the Aluta. On its right General von Schmettau's cavalry corps rode forward to seize the crossings of the Lower Aluta, and, having defeated the Rumanian cavalry, gained contact with Kosch on the Vedeia. Between the Aluta and the Arges, Delmensingen came into line on Kühne's left; but, as the chief resistance was encountered on the left wing, the right wing (Kosch) and right centre (Öttinger's and Knobelsdorff's divisions of Kühne's corps) made more rapid progress, causing the advance to assume an oblique direction, the front stretching from south-east to north-west. Needless to say, this result was not altogether accidental, the stubborn resistance of the Rumanian northern wing being necessary to cover the retreat of the southern wing, which was in some danger of being cut off from Moldavia, and of being thrown back on the Danube above Braila. Incidentally, the obliquity of the German advance had the effect of facilitating outflanking movements on the south, an example of which occurred south of Tergovistea on Dec. 3, when part of the Rumanian First Army, falling back before Delmensingen, found its retreat intercepted by Knobelsdorff.

As the advance proceeded, the Rumanian Second Army had to relinquish the Brasso group of passes, enabling Morgen to come up on Delmensingen's left, where he acted as the pivot of a great wheeling movement by which Mackensen formed his forces on the front Braila—Vrancea Mountains, in the following order from right to left: Kosch—Schmettau—Kühne—Delmensingen—Morgen. On Morgen's left General von Gerok's Austro-German army (of the Archduke Joseph's army group) prolonged the line to the region of the Trotus valley, completing the great battle-front on which, as we go to press, one can discern the opening phase of a general engagement which marks the crisis of the war in Rumania.

Whatever may be the issue of the campaign, it can hardly fail to be favourable to the enemy. The ill fortune or mismanagement which has marred every project of the Allies in the Balkans has dogged their footsteps in Rumania. Four months ago it seemed, and the Allied War Council doubtless expected, that the intervention of Rumania would alter the course of the war by laying Austria-Hungary—the weak spot in the

Germanic organism—open to invasion. The situation, however, was reciprocal, for the Allied flank was also in the air, and the advantage would rest with the side which should apply the altered conditions to the best use. Hindenburg declared that he would roll up the Allied armies from the south, much as the Allies proposed to treat the enemy. So far the Allies have failed; and Hindenburg, though he has not succeeded, has at least averted the danger which threatened Hungary.

The causes of this untoward development are easily recognised. They may be epitomised as miscalculation of the enemy's capabilities, and the pursuit of large projects with insufficient means. The Allies appear to have reckoned too confidently on the enemy's exhaustion, and on the efficacy of pressure applied in other quarters, where no vital point was threatened, to prevent the concentration of hostile troops in Transylvania, where the enemy had most reason to fear the consequences of defeat, and would, therefore, risk lesser evils to avert it. The Germans, on the other hand, adopted the sound policy of mustering all the forces they could collect, and even persuaded the Bulgarians to risk the temporary loss of Monastir, in consideration of the possible acquisition of the Dobrudja. The hostile forces engaged are stated to have amounted to twenty-nine divisions, comprising some 630,000 men at war strength.*

The situation demanded, in the first place, such a vigorous offensive from the Carpathians, in cooperation with the Rumanian advance, as would oblige the enemy to disperse his forces, instead of striking heavy blows at chosen points with locally superior numbers; and, in the second place, the effective guarding of the Dobrudja, where the initial reverses had much to do with the Allies' misfortunes on the main front by causing them to divert troops therefrom. So soon as the mistakes were perceived, the Russians made great efforts to retrieve them. Reinforcements were hurried to every important point on the Russian front, and preparations were made for despatching large forces, which began to appear in

* An official statement published at Paris on Dec. 15 gave the composition of the forces as 12 German, 11 Austrian, 4 Bulgarian, and 2 Turkish divisions.

Moldavia and Eastern Wallachia about the end of November. But the enemy, having a far superior railway system, was able to pour in reinforcements more rapidly than the Russians, and to keep his troops better supplied with munitions. The loss of the Constanza railway, by closing the Odessa line of supply, threw an additional strain on the congested railways behind the Russian front, and further delayed the transport of munitions and supplies.

It needs no assurance from eyewitnesses to prove that the Rumanians fought gallantly and well. It is especially significant that they resisted to the last the desperate attacks on the Brasso and Rother Turm lines of advance, where the enemy might have been deemed most likely to succeed, on account of the facilities provided by the continuous lines of railway for the transport of the heavy war material to which the Germans largely owed their superiority. The ultimate failure of the defence on the Vulkan line, where, in respect of communications, our Ally had the advantage, corroborates the conclusion, obvious enough on other grounds, that forces were wanting to meet the enemy's onslaught. Not only were the Rumanians too weak numerically for the defence of their extensive frontier, but they were far inferior to the Germans in artillery, aircraft, and munitions of every kind.

After the capture of the mountain defiles had enabled the enemy to deploy, the Rumanians were at a still greater disadvantage; for, on account of the great extent of the front in relation to the strength of the armies, there was ample room for manœuvre, in which the German commanders and troops excelled through the experience gained in the Russian and Serbian campaigns; while the Rumanians had enjoyed no facilities for practice in the handling of large forces other than those provided under the limited and artificial conditions of peace training. Hence it happened that our Allies were repeatedly manœuvred out of positions which, with more war experience, they might conceivably have held more tenaciously. It is, probably, for the same reason that the counter-manœuvres against the enemy's flank or rear, which they attempted at various stages of the retreat, met with poor success, and were sometimes

turned to their disadvantage by their more practised adversaries.

It would be premature to discuss the probable results of the campaign, seeing that the issue is not yet in sight. We may, however, conjecture how the Germans regard the situation, and what they aim at. The Russians have been driven back from Rimnik Sarat; and the enveloping movement which the Archduke Joseph is attempting on the Moldavian front, with the design of reaching the railway to Czernowitz, on which our Allies depend for their supplies, has made some progress in the Oitoz and Casin passes. It may be supposed that the Russians have not yet fully developed their strength; and, moreover, the main armies have benefited by the evacuation of the Dobrudja, which has freed Sakharoff's army for more effective cooperation with them. Hindenburg has still far to go before realising his professed project of rolling up the Russian armies, and laying Bessarabia open from the south; and he would, perhaps, be well satisfied to gain possession of Galatz, which, with the Dobrudja in the hands of the Bulgarians, would provide a firm resting-place for the flank of the Austro-German armies. Hungary would be safer from invasion than heretofore, and the road to the east would be secured.

With the prospect of thus assuring her position in the east, and with her front in the west still unbroken, Germany thought it expedient to lose no time in suggesting a Peace Conference. East and west, the aims of her military policy have been practically accomplished. In the east she dominates the Balkans, and holds the road to Constantinople. She has pushed Russia back from the Prussian frontier, and occupied most of the territories which she aims at forming into German colonies or buffer-states, with the object of weakening the strategical situation of Russia, and lessening her population. In the west, she controls the mines and factories of northern France and Belgium, together with Antwerp, one of the most formidable naval bases in the world, and has gained a strategical position which would completely dominate France at the outset of a future war. But Germany knows well that, if the war were fought out to a decisive end, these acquisitions would be

wrested from her one by one, and that, in the process, what remains of her military strength would be destroyed. The time has come to choose which course she will pursue—west, or east; whether she will aim at expansion oversea, where the British Navy bars the way, or overland, where the way lies through friendly territory. There can be no doubt which of these alternatives more nearly touches the neutral Powers—especially America—whose good offices she has succeeded in enlisting in support of her astute proposal for a conference, at which she doubtless hopes to secure, by adroit manipulation of the occupied territories, what is essential for the realisation of one or other of her aims.

The one thing that seems certain at the moment is that Germany wants peace. The conquest of Rumania, so far as it has been achieved, has not given the economic relief which the German people had been led to expect; for the Rumanians destroyed the stocks of grain with a thoroughness which may be gauged by the irritation displayed in the German press. The shortage of men may be judged from the efforts which the Germans are making to expand and supplement their resources by the impressment of prisoners of war and Belgian slaves, the general levy of the population, and the endeavour to enlist a Polish army. It would be rash to conclude from such indications that Germany is on the verge of collapse, for it is not her way to await the compulsion of necessity. We must credit her with the resolve to make a determined effort to regain a temporary superiority in men, artillery, and aircraft; and, the peace lure having failed, we must expect her to make a desperate bid for victory, to gain which she will stick at nothing that may promise to give her the advantage.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 15.—GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES, AND PEACE.

1. *The Issue.* By J. W. Headlam. Constable, 1916.
2. *Imperial Germany.* By Prince von Bülow. New edition, with Preface by J. W. Headlam. Cassell, 1916.
3. *The Road toward Peace.* By Charles W. Eliot. Houghton Mifflin, 1915.
4. *The American Crisis and the War.* By W. M. Fullerton. Constable, 1916.
5. *Articles by 'Cosmos' in New York Times, Nov.-Dec. 1916.*

And other works and papers.

ON several occasions during the last two years German statesmen have spoken, primarily to their own people but also to the world, on the possibility of peace. Their remarks, as was only natural, were studiously vague, but they were accompanied by indications, sufficiently clear, that the peace contemplated was one which would leave Germany in possession of most of the advantages she had gained. They attracted no great amount of attention here, being regarded as kites sent up to show which way the wind was blowing, or as intended to appease a war-weary people and to placate the neutrals. Many other forecasts of the probable or desirable conditions of peace have also been published by persons and groups of more or less authority in Germany and elsewhere, especially within the last twelve months. Meanwhile it was supposed that, across the Atlantic, the bulk of the American people was either indifferent or favourable to the cause of the Allies. The action, or the inaction, of the President was thought to indicate a policy of 'peace at any price'; and the result of the Presidential election was regarded as proving that the one thing the American people desired was to be 'kept out of the war.' Consequently, no active intervention was feared—least of all, an intervention which, whether so intended or not, would assist our opponents. Nevertheless, it must have been evident to any student of American politics and American newspapers, during the last three or four months, that an active pacifist sentiment was growing up in the States. New motives became apparent; fresh forces were seen at work; a change of feeling in certain

quarters towards the Allies, a veering of opinion as to the probable issue of the war, made themselves felt. It seems worth while, in the first place, to collect and compare the most noteworthy of the peace-programmes referred to, in order to see if they throw any light on the conditions likely to be proposed by Germany and her allies; and, secondly, to examine the condition of American feeling and the changes that have taken place in it, in order to form some idea of the forces and motives which have resulted in the Presidential Note. The events of the last six weeks we must assume to be fresh in our readers' minds.

In the attempt to ascertain German aspirations and intentions, we may leave on one side the *ante-bellum* schemes and forecasts of such bodies as the Pan-German League. By this time they may be supposed to be fairly well known in this country, and to some sections of American society. With regard to the plans of the League in Central and South-Eastern Europe, Herr Naumann's 'Mitteleuropa,' and M. Chéradame's recently translated work, are well calculated to enlighten public opinion; and further information will be found in another article in the present number of this Review. It is well to keep these projects in mind, for they not only indicate the intentions of influential Germans before the war, but they also show how large a step the German armies have already made towards the realisation of Pan-German ambitions, and how fatal to the security of Europe and the world would be a peace which left Germany in a position to realise them fully. But, for our present purpose, we shall do well to confine ourselves to the views of more or less authoritative persons or bodies, published since the war began. A very useful introduction to this subject is to be found in Mr J. W. Headlam's admirable little book.

We can take no higher authority than the German Chancellor himself. On no less than six occasions Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has spoken publicly about the possibility of peace. So far back as May 1915, shortly after the entrance of Italy into the war, he declared that Germany must endure till she had 'gained and created every possible real guarantee and security, so that none of our enemies, neither alone nor united,

will again venture on a trial of strength with us.' The language is vague, but its purport cannot be mistaken. An increase of strength which would enable Germany to defy a united Europe can only be obtained by large additions to the German Empire. Three months later, the Chancellor, rendered more confident by the conquest of Russian Poland and the failure of the Anglo-French offensive, was a little clearer. In August 1915 he said :

'This gigantic war will not restore the old situation. A new must arise. If Europe is to arrive at peace, it can only be through the strong and inviolable position of Germany. . . . The English Balance of Power must disappear.'

No more equilibrium! The peace is to be a German peace. It is the dream of Charles V, of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, in a new form.

The Chancellor's next utterance is specially remarkable. In December 1915 he complained that the Allies would not accept the verdict of the war and offer to treat with Germany. Herr Scheidemann, leader of the 'tame' Socialists, remarking that in such a war neither party was likely to be beaten to its knees, concluded that it was for the victors to offer terms. Such terms, he added, should not include annexations; 'we are opposed to all who would convert this war into one of conquest.' The Chancellor indignantly retorted that Germany could not offer terms; that was the function of the defeated. So long as the enemy continued to be 'entangled in guilt and ignorance, any offer of peace on our side would be folly, which would only prolong the war.' As to guarantees for the future he refused to be precise, but his words were ominous :

'I cannot say what guarantees the Imperial Government will require, e.g. in the Belgian question—what foundation of power it will consider necessary for these guarantees. . . . But neither in the East nor in the West must our enemies of to-day dispose of gates through which they can fall upon us. . . . It is known that France gave her loans to Russia on the express condition that Russia should build her Polish fortresses and railways against us; and it is just as well known that England and France looked on Belgium as a starting-point for an attack upon us. Against that we must protect ourselves.'

The opportuneness (as the Chancellor alleges) of the moment now chosen for the offer to treat consists in its coincidence with striking military successes; and these are emphasised to enhance the generosity of the proposal. That a beaten Power should sue for peace is natural, but that a victorious Empire should offer to treat in the very moment of its triumph is, to say the least, unusual; indeed, we are unable to recall any other example of such magnanimity. Has the Chancellor come round to Herr Scheidemann's opinion, or has he recognised at least the impossibility of ultimate victory if the war goes on?

But to return. In April last the Chancellor went a step further, and stated clearly that Poland and Belgium are to be brought under the control, commercial, military and political, of Germany; but he still avoided the use of the hateful word 'annexation.' He even, on this occasion, repudiated the idea. 'Who can seriously believe (he said) that it is lust for an extension of our frontiers that inspires our storming columns before Verdun? . . . It is not for a piece of foreign territory that Germany's sons are dying.' But other utterances gave the lie to these words, which can only be regarded as a momentary weakness. On June 18 of last year, referring again to terms of peace, he declared that they must be settled on the basis of the war-map. In other words, what Germany had she intended to keep—or as much of it as she could. Finally, on Sept. 29, he referred to his speech of the previous April as proving his desire for peace. 'From the first day the war meant for us nothing but the defence of our right to life, freedom and development.' Perhaps; but the sting is in the last word. His previous speeches show that German 'development' involves considerable sacrifices on the part of her neighbours. Comparing these various utterances, stretching over a period of nearly twenty months, we remark, on the whole, a striking consistency in their expression. The recent Note may be regarded as a discreet summary of the Chancellor's speeches, only drawing the veil over certain dangerous places where he had, doubtless in obedience to the demands of his more fiery followers, occasionally lifted it.

But these utterances do not stand alone. Much may

also be gathered from the second and revised edition of Prince von Bülow's work 'Imperial Germany.' The Prince, as Mr Headlam points out, is one of the most important men in Germany. 'He is both a past and—may we not add?—a possible future Chancellor.' He is, from temperament and experience, a highly-skilled diplomatist; and no one is more likely to represent the German Empire in a Congress of the Powers summoned to draw up the terms of peace. He therefore speaks as a man of authority and with the sense of responsibility which his high position requires. What then does Herr von Bülow regard as the legitimate claims of Germany?

Let us begin with England. We remember what he said, in the earlier edition of his book, about the necessity for a strong German fleet, and the policy, followed during his tenure of office, of cajoling England until that fleet had attained dimensions sufficient to render a more outspoken attitude possible. Now he maintains that

'after a war waged by the German people . . . against half the world, we have the right and also the duty to require, not only our own security and independence at sea, but above all a real guarantee for the freedom of the seas, for the further completion of our economic and political tasks in the world.'

Mr Headlam is right in pointing out that, considering the unusual defensibility of the present German coast, this demand can only mean the extension of German control over other parts of the shore of the North Sea. The 'freedom of the seas' doubtless means, as usual, the inviolability of private property at sea. The only other 'real guarantee' that England could give would be a limitation of her fleet and a formal recognition of German naval superiority. Next as to France :

'Perhaps the French people will, in the course of time, adapt themselves to the decisions of the Peace of Frankfort, when they see that they are unalterable, especially and if we succeed in confirming our strategic position as against France, which has hitherto been an unfavourable one.'

In other words, France is not only to give up all hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, but is also to submit to a rectification of the strategic frontier. At all events, France is to be placed, from the military point of view, at the

mercy of Germany. Russia is to be dealt with in a similar way.

'We have now (says von Bülow) the right and the duty to demand a real guarantee that East Prussia . . . shall not again be exposed to barbarous devastation. . . . We require in the East a greatly increased and strengthened security, which in the nature of things can only consist in a correction of our unfavourable eastern frontier, a correction which will protect us from future invasions.'

Here again we are left to surmise what, precisely, the territorial cessions are to be; but they are evidently large. Besides the security of the eastern frontier, Prince von Bülow has in view the weakening of Russia by loss of population—an end which, he hints, may perhaps be attained by the cession of the Ukraine. This, presumably, is to be Austria-Hungary's share of the spoil.

With regard to Italy, the Prince is silent. He has his peculiar connexions with Italy, and probably nourishes the hope of winning her back into the fold. Nor does he deal, except cursorily, with the Near East or the 'Mittel-europa' question. This is dangerous ground; and he knows well enough that Austrians and Prussians do not always see eye to eye when the Balkan States are concerned. Moreover, he is a practical politician; he cultivates *Realpolitik*, and is no dreamer of dreams. Security is his one ostensible aim; but it is clear from what has been said that security is but another word for conquest.

Other persons in Germany are less reserved. A joint meeting of the Conservative and Free Conservative parties, in December 1915, passed a resolution demanding, 'as the aim of peace, a Germany strengthened in its whole position, and enlarged beyond its present borders by retaining the greatest amount of those territories which are now occupied.' Herr Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberals, wrote in July 1915 that no peace was possible 'which does not bring us the frontiers in which we may find security against future wars.' The central committee of the party gave its approval to this language. The Progressives resolved in December 1915, that the conditions of peace must offer 'a permanent increase of power, of wealth, and, so far as its

security requires, of territory.' The Centre Party, adopting words used by the King of Bavaria, resolved, in October 1915, that the losses of the country 'call for a strengthened protection of our land in East and West, which will take from our enemies the desire to fall upon us again, and permanently secure the industrial provision for our growing population.' It is clear that German parties, excepting the Socialists, are at one in demanding large annexations as the reward of victory.

Mr Headlam, from whose book these quotations are taken, also prints two manifestoes, the one a petition presented to the Chancellor in May 1915 by six great Economic Associations,* the other signed by a large number of 'leaders of German thought' in June 1915 and published at Berne in the following August. These documents show a marvellous agreement.

' For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken France both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose we must radically improve our whole western front from Belfort to the coast. Part of the northern French coast on the Channel we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England, and to secure better access to the ocean. . . . On Belgium we must keep firm hold. . . . Economically, Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us. . . . Russia is so rich in territory that she will be able to pay an indemnity in kind by giving lands—but lands without landlords. . . . We shall assure ourselves of the Persian Gulf against the pretensions of Russia and Great Britain.'

Thus the 'leaders of thought.' And let no one suppose that, because many of them are professors, their ravings are of no account. We in England are apt to laugh at professors; in Germany they are a force to be reckoned with. The economists and industrials are not a whit behind. They too demand the incorporation of Belgium and the adjacent districts of France—Calais and Boulogne, Verdun and Belfort—with the Baltic Provinces and a large part, at least, of Russian Poland. And the reasons? They are military and economic. France and Russia are to be dismembered, Belgium and

* Summarised also in the 'Times' of Aug. 14, 1915.

Poland annexed, that German pockets may be filled, and German safety, i.e. domination, assured. As for the justification, it is simply, We want these things ; we can take them ; *ergo*, we shall take them. No highwayman ever set forth his doctrines more clearly, or put them into practice with a more engaging frankness.

But, it may be said, these claims were made a year and a half ago. Things have altered since then. No sane German would now expect to sweep the board so clean. True ; but it is of the highest importance for those who are to negotiate with Germany, to know with what sort of people they have to deal, and to be made aware of the use to which the Germans would have put their victory if they had won. Quite recently, some of them have lowered their demand, but others remain impudent, and talk as if complete victory were still in their power. Let us see, then, if any light is thrown on the chances of peace by the various schemes which have recently been proposed.

On June 17 last the Council of the German Navy League, the largest and most influential association in Germany, unanimously adopted a secret memorandum,* which was published just before Christmas in the 'Kreuzzeitung,' the chief organ of the military party. It deals ostensibly with naval aims only, but does not neglect military and other considerations. Dealing first with the Flemish coast :

'Here (it says) lies the key to Germany's future, for nothing but a Belgium under Germany's political and military influence could provide the possibility of effectively threatening the British Island Empire, by enabling our fleet to create for England that risk which was to be the final purpose of its construction. . . . The military position of Belgium, outflanking France, will be of inestimable value to us. . . . A return to the former political situation of Belgium would be equivalent to a defeat in this grievous struggle.'

The memorandum applauds the Chancellor's rejection (in December 1915) of conditions which would restore the *status quo ante*, and ends thus : 'After what has happened, the Navy League considers that it is impossible

* Large extracts are given in the 'Times' of Jan. 1, 1917.

to arrive at any other agreement with Great Britain than one which consists in fear of our strength.'

Of a very similar colour are the views of the 'Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung,' a paper which circulates largely in the most important manufacturing district of Germany, and is said to represent the opinion of the industrial magnates. It laid down, on Oct. 27, what it calls the 'five principles of German peace.'

'First, our enemy is in the West. . . . Ninety per cent. of Germans burn with the feeling that we must reckon once for all with England and France. Secondly, terms of peace will be decided by the military situation on the day when peace is declared. Thirdly, our enemy must be either annihilated or conciliated, and . . . a policy of conciliation in the West is impossible. . . . We have to fight our way through to the ocean, and whatever stands in our way must be destroyed. Fourthly, we maintain the old Balkan principle, "the conqueror keeps what he has." . . . There is nothing more to be said about Belgium. We need an opening to the Channel, and we must have Antwerp. He who wants Belgium may come and take it from us. Fifthly, we must strengthen the German Empire; and that means strengthening the Empire's central Power, which means Prussia.'

The Westphalian organ could hardly have blown a louder blast had it sounded in the hopeful days of August 1915. The Chancellor's Note of Dec. 12 has set a different tone. Two days before it actually appeared, but doubtless with full knowledge of its imminence, Count Karloyi's paper, the 'Magyarorszag,' declared that all Hungarian parties were agreed that peace was possible only if the Central Powers resigned all claims to territorial aggrandisement. The organ of the Hungarian Opposition went on to sketch the terms which it believed would be acceptable to both sides. Omitting minor details, we may summarise them as follows: (1) the restoration of Belgium and Northern France, the neutrality of the former being guaranteed; (2) Poland (i.e. Russian Poland) to be created an independent state, Russia receiving Bukowina as compensation; (3) Italy to receive the Trentino, but not Trieste; (4) Serbia to be restored (with an outlet to the Adriatic), Montenegro to be restored (without Mount Lovcen), Rumania to get back her territory, Macedonia to be divided between

Serbia and Bulgaria ; (5) Germany to recover her colonies, and to obtain a coaling station in the Mediterranean ; (6) the Bagdad Railway and its branches to be internationalised ; (7) limitation of naval armaments to existing strength ; (8) no economic unions or *blocs* ; (9) no war indemnities. The difference between this scheme and the uncompromising demands of the German Navy League and the Westphalian magnates is remarkable.

Want of space compels us to pass over numerous other schemes which have been put forward—some extremely grasping, others comparatively moderate. If we endeavour to summarise these very diverse anticipations, and to deduce from them any single or harmonious whole, we shall essay a very difficult, if not impossible task. All of them, however, excepting perhaps those of the Socialists, agree that the peace must leave Germany with a vast increase of security and power—an increase which, if it falls short of what the Pan-German school demands, would make the attainment of their aims merely a question of time. Since Dec. 12 a change has been noticeable. Most of the schemes recently suggested have been more moderate, but even the most moderate leave much to be desired, and contain inadmissible demands.

It is difficult to resist the conviction, confirmed by a comparison of the Chancellor's latest words with those used by him a year ago, that the rulers of those Powers, perceiving the retention of all their conquests to be no longer possible, have made up their minds to sacrifice some in order to retain the rest. A continuance of the war, with its accompanying economic pressure, *might* result in losing all. We are hardly in a position to say positively that it *would* do so ; still less can our enemies be expected to accept this view. The game is not yet lost—far from it ; they have still more than one card to play. Peace based on existing conditions would, of course, suit them best ; but peace, as yet, is not essential. If they can hold out till the autumn, when the Wallachian harvest would come in, they might be able to tide over another winter. Short of immediate peace, a conference is the next best thing—a conference which might bring out divergences of aim among the Allied Powers, or at all events proposals of compromise

which might be unsatisfactory to one or other of them, and thus tend to break up the Alliance. European Coalitions have rarely, if ever, lasted out long wars. It is notorious that the Germans have repeatedly striven for a separate peace. So far they have failed; but a premature conference on the conditions of a general pacification might enable them to succeed. And once the Pact of London is broken, it would be all up with the hopes of a durable peace. It is in this connexion that the intervention of the United States becomes a matter of vital import.

We have no right to criticise, and we have no inclination to blame, President Wilson's conduct of the foreign relations of his country since the outbreak of war. We may regret, in the interest of America as well as of the world, that he did not raise his voice against the invasion of Belgium or against other crimes, and that until quite recently—the Note about the Belgian deportations is a new departure—he confined his protests to cases in which the lives of American citizens were destroyed or their interests assailed. But that is no concern of ours; it is for the people of the United States to judge; and a majority of Dr Wilson's fellow-citizens has recently approved his conduct by returning him to power. But his Peace Note is in a different category. He has now seen fit to intervene in *our* quarrel; his action involves the welfare of this country; and we have therefore the right, as it is certainly our interest, to enquire into the origin and causes of this step, and to consider its probable aims and effects.

To begin with, what can we ascertain as to the probable origin of the Note? We have all of us heard a good deal about the German propaganda in the United States. We know that German agents have been actively engaged, since the beginning of the war, in disseminating Teutonic views as to its origin and conduct; and we have reason to believe that they have won a considerable measure of success. But it is not generally known that the peace campaign, which has recently emerged into full light, began more than two years ago. From the first, the effort to stop the war has been skilfully connected and confused with the movement in favour of

measures to ensure permanent peace. This confusion is plainly perceptible in the President's Note.

The 'peace' movement, properly so called, is to be carefully distinguished from the 'stop-the-war' movement; but, as in the case of the Union of Democratic Control, the No-Conscription Fellowship, and similar associations in this country, the supporters of the one are frequently, though by no means always, supporters of the other. The 'peace' movement has for many years past been strong in the United States. It has led to Hague Conferences, Arbitration Treaties, a permanent Court at the Hague, and other devices; and it has brought about a considerable advance in public opinion. It has found supporters everywhere, but probably nowhere so many as in the United States. Its latest outcome in that country is the 'League to enforce Peace.' This association was founded in Philadelphia on June 17, 1915, and held its first Annual Meeting in Washington in May 1916, when over 2000 delegates were present. It aims at the prevention of war. Its principles are that a league of nations should be formed, binding the signatories to submit all justiciable questions to a judicial tribunal, and other questions to a council of conciliation; the Powers agreeing to use their economic and military forces against any one of their number going to war with another signatory without first carrying out the aforesaid pledge. Ex-President Taft is Chairman of the American Branch; Mr Lowell, President of Harvard, is head of its executive; it includes many prominent American names, and it has received the public blessing of Dr Wilson and Mr Elihu Root, of Lord Bryce and Viscount Grey. This is the body which Mr Jacob Schiff attempted to capture last November for the purpose of putting a stop to the present war. But, before we relate what happened on that occasion, we must go back to a date earlier by some two years.

In November 1914 Mr Schiff, who is head of the great banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., and is said to be the wealthiest Jew in America, began a correspondence with Dr Eliot, ex-president of Harvard, on the subject of peace. Now, Dr Eliot is one of the first men in the United States, universally respected for his moral character and his intellectual gifts. He is a warm

supporter of the Allied cause, and has repeatedly condemned, by speech and writing, the aims and the methods of Germany. He is a lover of peace, and in his book 'The Road toward Peace,' and elsewhere, he has indicated what he regards as the best methods of maintaining it. But he has not joined the Peace League described above, believing rather in a formal alliance to be eventually made between the United States and the Western Powers for the maintenance of a world-peace. Mr Schiff is closely associated with the Speyers and other great financial houses. One of his partners is Mr Paul Warburg, a member of the 'Federal Reserve Board,' which holds in the States a position somewhat analogous to that of the Bank of England in this country. Mr Schiff was largely instrumental in founding the 'American Neutral Conference Committee,' the vagueness of whose title leaves open many possible activities, and he is a member of the 'League to enforce Peace.'

When Mr Schiff approached Dr Eliot with a view to enlisting his support, the battle of the Marne and the first battle of Ypres had been fought; and it had become evident that the original plan of campaign had failed. A long struggle was in prospect. Mr Schiff wrote on Nov. 25, 1914, to Dr Eliot, saying that the first thing to be done was 'to bring forth a healthy opinion here' (i.e. in America), and that, if men like Dr Eliot adopted the same line, 'American opinion could before long be made to express itself emphatically and insistently in favour of an early peace.' A long correspondence followed, but Mr Schiff failed to persuade Dr Eliot, who firmly declined to follow his lead, and replied that he desired 'to see this war fought out until Germany is persuaded that she cannot dominate Europe.'

Mr Schiff still urged that, 'either through the force of public opinion or otherwise,' the war should be brought to a speedy end; but his efforts were vain, so far as Dr Eliot was concerned. It is not, however, to be supposed that they were therefore relaxed elsewhere. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence that a peace propaganda was being actively pushed. Nevertheless, since official Germany had not yet expressed a desire for peace, the movement was carried on apparently on the general lines of the Peace League. Now, as Dr Eliot

says, the Americans 'are an idealistic people'—a fact which we are too apt to neglect. They are often regarded by foreigners as a hard-headed, hard-fisted, materialistic race; and in normal times this side of their character is perhaps most visible. But the other side is always there, and in times of stress, such as the Civil War and the Cuban business, it comes to the front. It may be, and often is, vague and ill-informed; it can be played upon and utilised by persons having very different ends in view; but it is vigorous and has to be reckoned with by any one who would understand and deal successfully with the United States.

One of their most strongly-held ideals is that of a world-peace; and it was to this sentiment, among others, that the late Prof. Münsterberg, of Harvard, one of the ablest and most active of German propagandists in America, appealed in a long article published in several American papers on July 30, 1916.* This article was headed 'Germany, England, and the United States, to be future allies.' Nothing else, the writer held, would secure the peace of the world. He went on to refer, as a certainty, to the peace negotiations which were to begin in the autumn, and to lay down the terms which Germany would be willing to accept. 'Not a square foot of conquered territory in France or Belgium' would be demanded; Kiaochau and German S. W. Africa would be given up; and, as 'a small territorial substitute,' Germany would be content with Courland, and 'perhaps other colonies from France, Belgium and Portugal.' Germany would even be ready to cede part of Lorraine in exchange for 'a good part of Morocco.' The whole scheme is well worth notice, but we have no space for further details, beyond observing that the Berlin—Bagdad Railway is to remain in German control, and that 'the sea is to be free.' Peace being made on these terms, the alliance proposed will become possible; and President Wilson is the man to bring it about. 'No greater rôle could come to a man to-day than that of being the mediator between the enemies in Europe; no fitter mind for this rôle than that of the President.'

All this is not to be dismissed as the mere rhetorical

* For an analysis of this article see the 'Morning Post,' Sept. 9, 1916.

fantasy of a German professor. Dr Münsterberg was in direct touch with the German Chancellor, as was proved by the disclosure of a letter intercepted by the British authorities, and published in the 'New York Times' on Oct. 10. In this letter, dated May 12, 1916, Prof. Münsterberg assured the Chancellor that, once the President 'works himself into the idea of being the arbitrator of the world, he will be so inspired by the joy of playing a historic part that he will give himself up to it with his whole soul.'

'I have (he continued) the impression that Wilson's desire to play the part of mediator was at first over-estimated in German official circles here. . . . As, however, in the last fortnight, as a result of Mexico, Ireland, and the submarine settlement, the pacifists everywhere have come forward more strongly, and even threatened the formation of a third party round Bryan, Ford and McClellan, Wilson is certainly for the moment more favourably disposed toward the preservation of peace, and from this position he can be more easily pushed into the pose of mediator. . . . For all these reasons I hold it now to be my chief task here to encourage the pacifist sentiment now abroad.'

Prof. Münsterberg may be presumed to have obtained his information as to the imminence of peace negotiations from the high official to whom this illuminating letter was addressed; and the article quoted above is, perhaps, the first overt move in the campaign based upon this knowledge. Other people, however, were aware of what was in the wind. Towards the end of August, there appeared in the 'Semaine Littéraire,' of Geneva, an article headed 'Le Complot pacifiste,' the author of which was described as a political personage occupying an important position 'in a great neutral country.' The writer describes the network of German influences spread over both belligerent and neutral countries, the object of which is to obtain a compromise that will leave Germany in a position to renew its efforts for dominion at some later date and in more favourable circumstances. He attributes the 'rising wave of pro-German sentiment' to the occult action of cosmopolitan finance. This, he says, is synonymous with Jewish finance, and Jewish finance means the German Jew.

Religion and Socialism are being used. The Roman Catholics in the United States are working with the financiers.

'Well-informed people (he asserts) know that a *mise-en-scène* is being prepared by President Wilson, the Pope, and the Emperor. As soon as the ground seems sufficiently well prepared, either the Pope or the President will take the initiative and offer his mediation. The one will immediately be supported by the other; and the Emperor will reply to the offer made him that he accepts the intervention without condition. This will be easy, for all the conditions to be demanded of the Allies will have been settled beforehand by Germany and the mediators. All the forces of the neutral countries will then be brought into play, and to these will be added the different pacifist organisations of a moral, a religious, or a socialist nature.'

The whole of this forecast has not yet, at the time of writing, been fulfilled, but much of it has already come true. It is rumoured that the German terms have been confidentially communicated to Dr Wilson; and Count Andrassy has given the rumour the weight of his authority. According to the organ of the U.D.C., the American Neutral Conference Committee sent, on August 30, a deputation to the President, urging him to 'cooperate in a conference of neutral nations which shall offer joint mediation to the belligerents by proposals calculated to form the basis of a permanent peace.' The President received the deputation, and expressed his sympathy with their objects. The Committee also issued a private circular, in which they asked, 'Has not the time come when it is the privilege and the duty of the United States to mediate?'

Shortly afterwards certain leading American newspapers began to publish articles in favour of peace. On Sept. 9 the 'New Republic,' a remarkably well-written weekly, published a vigorous article, declaring that the objects of the war required definition; that a decision must be reached before Christmas; and that neutral opinion might help. If the war were ended before winter, the peace of the world might be secured for ever. It appealed to the President to aid in this good work.

The appeal to Dr Wilson was probably not made in

ignorance of the President's views. It has been stated that the editor, Mr Lippmann, is intimate at the White House, and had no little to do with the subsequent Note. Other influences were also at work. At the annual meeting of the U.D.C. in October last, it was reported by the secretary, Mr E. D. Morel, that, through the efforts of Mr Norman Angell, the U.D.C. had won the support of Dr Wilson.* This well-known pacifist claims also to have drafted portions of the speech—probably that delivered at Omaha on Oct. 5—in which the President first expressed the desire (afterwards put forward in the December Note) to know the objects of the war. 'The war (he said) has obscure European objects which have never been disclosed. Europe must understand that, before we exert the force of this nation, we want to know what we are exerting it for.' And he went on to warn his hearers that the United States could no longer remain as heretofore, 'confined and provincial. She belongs to the world.'

It may be guessed that Mr Lloyd George had these intrigues and the probability of American intervention in mind when he allowed himself to be interviewed (Sept. 28) by an American correspondent, and declared that, for this country, it must be 'a fight to a finish.' The interview was applauded by most American papers as countering the pro-German peace campaign; and the Peace League at once issued a statement, saying that 'it has not sought, and does not seek, to end the present war. . . . It has no objects but those set forth in its four proposals [see p. 274]; and these proposals are quite in harmony with the policy of strict neutrality laid down by Mr Wilson.' The U.D.C., on the contrary, passed (on Oct. 10) a resolution, strongly disapproving of Mr Lloyd George, which they sent to the American Ambassador in London. As Mr Hirst's paper, 'Common Sense,' said on Dec. 9, 'But for Mr Lloyd George and his friends, we might have had an armistice this Christmas and an honourable peace on a firm basis before the end of the

* A letter from Mr Bertrand Russell, one of the leaders of the U.D.C., to Dr Wilson, was published in the 'New York Times' and other American papers on Dec. 23, imploring him to intervene, and assuring him that the bulk of public opinion in this country was eager for peace, and that the papers opposing it were in the control of the Government.

winter.' Does this remark throw any light on the recent change of Government? At the same time Germany took care to let fall hints, through the pen of Dr Dernburg, that the alternative of peace would be a renewal of ruthlessness in a form more violent than before; and Mr Swope, editor of the New York 'World,' who had just returned from Germany, carrying these forebodings with him, gave vent to his anxiety lest such a development might involve the United States.

Meanwhile the Presidential election had come and gone; and Dr. Wilson was firmly seated in the saddle. The plot thickened. On Nov. 20 'Cosmos' began to publish his articles in favour of peace—of which more presently—in the 'New York Times'; and next day that paper, hitherto one of the best friends of the Allies, published a leader strongly supporting its correspondent's contention, on the ground that the war was really over. Germany was beaten, and she knew it! Why go on fighting?

The redoubtable Mr Schiff evidently thought the time opportune for making a great stroke. On Nov. 24, at a conference of leaders of the Peace League, he urged the League, in spite of its statement of Oct. 1 (see above), to support immediate intervention. Mr James M. Beck, the eminent defender of the Allied cause, had recently declared that peace now would be 'premature.' This view Mr Schiff dismissed as 'unwise.' 'We would not only be doing our duty (he said), but would gain the friendship of all nations, by moving now for peace.' The condition of things that would supervene upon a war carried on *à outrance* would be such as to render the efforts of the Peace League for permanent peace of no avail, if they only began after the war. Therefore it was to their interest to press for peace at once. Mr Schiff's proposal does not seem to have met with the approval of the League; and a week later he practically withdrew it, explaining that what he suggested was not immediate peace, but only a discussion of its conditions. That is, indeed, all that Germany proposes.

At the same time, however, Mr. Schiff was forming in New York a branch of the American Neutral Conference Committee, to which we have already referred. The general object of this Committee, in its own words,

is 'to support our Government in any effort it may make toward a just and lasting peace'; and its 'specific' object is 'to urge our Government to call or cooperate in a conference of neutral nations which shall offer joint mediation to the belligerents by proposals calculated to form the basis of a permanent peace.' It was with the same object that Congress, before its recent prorogation, added to its Appropriation Bill a vote empowering the President to take steps to summon such a conference, and devoting a sum of money to this purpose. The 'New Republic' aided the movement by an editorial article (Nov. 25) which, in several respects, foreshadowed the coming Note.

'Rumours (it said) that President Wilson intends shortly to take some positive action in favour of peace are rife, and, what is more, they are intrinsically probable. . . . Public opinion throughout the civilised world, both in neutral and belligerent nations, needs above all to know the precise nature of the political objects for which each of the belligerents will continue to fight. . . . We have not as yet been sucked into the war, but our Government has been in ugly controversies with both the Allies and the Central Powers. . . . As long as the war lasts, they are simply insoluble. . . . The American Government will either have to abandon any idea of protecting its citizens, or it will have to make its means of protection more effective. . . . But if we may well be forced to fight, and if by fighting we contribute to the success of one of the two groups of belligerents, we have every reason to enquire what the actual results of the success accomplished by our aid are likely to be. . . . Some positive action by President Wilson in favour of peace is consequently called for by the plain and pressing necessities of American national policy.'

'A conference, by defining the terms on which the belligerents would make peace, would furnish our Government with the means of deciding in what way and to what extent its participation in the war could be used to promote, not the national interests of the belligerents, but the common interest in a more secure national order. The "New Republic" is unable to understand how else this knowledge could be obtained.'

The whole argument rests on the assertion that the objects of the war are unknown to the Government of

the United States, and that the President cannot decide on his future course of action until the Governments concerned give him the requisite information. This pretence of ignorance had some excuse in the Note; in the 'New Republic' it is mere affectation—or worse.

A very similar line is taken in the series of articles, sixteen in number, contributed by 'Cosmos' to the 'New York Times' between Nov. 20 and Dec. 18 last. The author is editorially described as 'a distinguished publicist,' and is pretty clearly an American citizen. The first article is headed 'All want peace; why not have it now?' and the opening sentence runs thus: 'The time has come to consider whether the war may not shortly be ended by international agreement in which the United States shall participate.' The subsequent argument might be regarded as put out of court by the statement, at the outset, that 'the question as to what Power is chiefly responsible for the war has become one of merely historical interest'; but, since these articles have evidently attracted considerable attention in the States, it is worth while briefly to examine their contents.

'Cosmos' thinks it clear that Germany and her allies cannot win, and equally clear that the Entente cannot do so except at a cost so heavy that 'victory may be only less disastrous than defeat.' In these conditions he believes that both sides are ready to have conditions of peace pressed on them. Comparing the words of Mr Asquith and Lord Grey with those of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, he finds a practical identity of view, except perhaps on the question of the freedom of the seas. But in this comparison we find a confusion, which we have noticed elsewhere, between the conditions which are to end this war, and the subsequent measures which may ensure a durable peace. The German Chancellor, in the words quoted by 'Cosmos,' refers to the latter question; Mr Asquith and Lord Grey were speaking of the former. This mistake vitiates the whole argument. 'Cosmos,' however, seems to think that a conference summoned to end the war can quite easily decide also on measures which will prevent its recurrence. The President seems to think so too. It is a futile idea, already repudiated by the Chancellor himself.

The writer then proceeds to discuss conditions of

peace. His views are interesting as showing what conditions would appear satisfactory to a prominent American authority. He advocates the 'freedom of the seas'—a principle always dear to the heart of Americans—an autonomous Poland, balanced by an autonomous Ireland, the restitution of conquered territories, and the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine. Russia is to have control of the Straits; the Balkan peoples are to be organised 'on the basis of nationality under an international guarantee'; and a barrier is to be erected 'against the possible extension of German *Machtpolitik* to Asia Minor and its adjoining lands.' It all sounds delightfully simple and easy. Such is the author's optimism that he thinks the Central Powers would be willing to let the Poles and the Yugoslavs settle their own fate by plebiscite. Finally, as to the overthrow of German militarism, he devotes a whole article to showing that this is 'a state of mind' which the Germans must cure for themselves, and that an attempt to destroy it from outside would indefinitely prolong the war. He challenges Mr Asquith's declaration on the subject, being apparently ignorant that the speaker had subsequently explained, quite clearly, that he referred, not to the domestic arrangements of Germany, but to her military domination of Europe.

The remaining articles deal chiefly with arbitration, Hague Conferences, and similar topics, which have nothing whatever to do with the ending of the war. What he says about them is praiseworthy but irrelevant. The confusion already noted is maintained throughout. We have devoted some space to these articles, not because they contribute much of importance to the solution of the grave problems which we have in hand, but because they are typical of certain phases of American thought and feeling. We may regret that utterances to which such prominence has been given should display superficiality of judgment, a shallow and ill-informed optimism, and a strange neglect or misapprehension of the real issues at stake; but it is our business to note the prevalence of this state of mind, and not to minimise its importance for ourselves.

We may hope that the foregoing pages will have thrown some light on the peace campaign in the United

States. But it would be a great mistake not to recognise that such success as it has secured would have been impossible but for other conditions and causes, quite independent of Germany, which of themselves would have sufficed to raise in the States a strong desire for intervention in order to end the war. To these other causes we now turn.

To the widespread pacifism of the United States we have already referred. It forms a fertile ground in which other plants may take root. One of these plants is the dislike of this country, which, always latent in a large part of the population, has been fostered by certain events during the war. While it is doubtless true that the great majority of native-born Americans are more or less strongly in favour of the Allies, principally on account of the wrongs of Belgium, the ubiquity and the force of this sentiment may easily be, and have been, exaggerated. It is strong in the East, especially in New England, but in other parts of that vast country it is largely mixed with indifference or even with hostility. Quite apart from the 'hyphenated,' whether German or Irish, the people of the older stock are by no means always with us. The old leaven of the Revolutionary war still works, kept alive by school-books, and by the occasional rubs of later days. Where the feeling for the Entente is strongest, it is often due to the ancient friendship and admiration for France, rather than to any liking for England, Russia, or even Italy. As for the mass of immigrants from less civilised lands, they are either indifferent or cancel one another. In short, as the N.Y. 'Tribune,' in one of its friendly warnings, pointed out to us, the United States, taken as a whole, are a foreign country; and to call their attitude during the war 'disappointing' is absurd.

To this must be added the ignorance about foreign affairs which prevails, naturally enough, in the Central and Western States, and crops up, sometimes unexpectedly, even elsewhere. The people of the West and Middle West are a long way from Europe; we are apt to forget that New York is further from San Francisco than it is from Falmouth. A democracy is generally ignorant of foreign countries; a democracy so separate and isolated as the American is especially likely to be

wrapt up in its own concerns. Many Americans must have inwardly rejoiced when they were told by their President that 'with the causes and objects of this great war we are not concerned,' or when 'Cosmos' said that 'the question of responsibility was merely one of historical interest.' Such a view saves much intellectual effort, which it is always pleasant to avoid.

When to this we add the extremely active and, after Dr Dernburg's departure, skilful propaganda of the German agents, we need hardly be surprised that many Americans are puzzled and confused. We are not speaking here of the peace propaganda, but of the efforts which have been directed to putting the German case in the best light, and to justifying the actions of Germany both in beginning and in carrying on the war. To this propaganda we have failed to oppose any sufficient antidote. Much has been done, but it has not been sufficient, and it has often been misdirected. The Foreign Office, which naturally shrinks from publicity, and has a double dose of British reserve, suffers also from a traditional dislike of journalism and an inherent repugnance to democratic ways. Moreover, the German propaganda at first undoubtedly overshot the mark, and appears to have done the German cause more harm than good. Anxious to avoid this mistake, the Foreign Office fell into the opposite extreme. Wishing not to do too much they have done too little, and have failed to reach the masses of the American population, especially in the West and Middle West. Private efforts were discouraged and even prohibited. Our case, especially with regard to matters of International Law, was not presented as it might and ought to have been. There is reason to believe that the subordinates did what they could; it was the direction that was at fault. It would not be proper to enter further into the matter here; it must be sufficient to note that the utter inadequacy of our efforts has frequently been a subject of comment in the friendly American press, and is no little to blame for the change of sentiment which has taken place.

Other things have contributed to this result. The vagaries, to use no harsher term, of the censorship have caused great annoyance, especially in the early period of the war. Americans could understand the need of

secrecy in military matters; they could not understand the effort to conceal unfortunate facts which could be, and were, disclosed by other agencies. Instances of this will recur to every one. The 'wireless' at Sayville constantly provided intelligence which could not be published in England and was not allowed to be sent from here. The futility of this conduct has provoked scathing remarks in American papers, and produced an impression that things were going worse with us than they actually were. This impression was aided by the surely superfluous secrecy maintained with regard to certain of our successes, for instance in regard to submarines. The distrust thus aroused has also undoubtedly been increased by the unfortunate practice in our daily press, almost without exception, of habitually exaggerating our successes and minimising our failures—a practice encouraged by a Government afraid of its public, and only anxious that it should not be disheartened. It is not the way of the British people to lose courage easily; the conspiracy of silence—for such it has been—is distasteful to it. It wants to know the worst as well as the best; and many indispensable things might have been done far sooner had it been allowed to know. In America such knowledge would have established a confidence the lack of which has produced unfortunate results, among others the widespread notion that the war is 'a draw,' that neither side can win, and that we must accept the *fait accompli*. The effect of such a notion on people already thirsting for peace need hardly be pointed out.

To these conditions of American society and more or less negative causes must be added various positive results of the war which have tended to alienate sympathy across the Atlantic. It is not necessary to do more than refer to the friction that has arisen through the interference with American trade—the seizure or delay of shipping, the black-list, and especially the examination of mails. This interference has, in the main, been inevitable and justifiable, and friendly American opinion has generally recognised this. None the less it has been a constant source of widespread irritation, and an obvious cause of the desire to stop the war.

The Economic Conference held in Paris last summer

appears also to have caused much dissatisfaction in the trading community of America. Protectionists themselves, American traders object to their business being hampered by the 'international boycott' which appeared to be threatened against enemy states. Pacifists of all shades condemned 'the war after the war' which was foreshadowed. German agents seized the opportunity of enforcing their contention that the war had been begun by us out of jealousy of German trade, just as they pitted our 'navalism' against German 'militarism,' and asserted that, if their army dominated by land, our fleet was the tyrant of the ocean. To superficial minds, caught by a phrase, and not precisely knowing what they meant by the 'freedom of the seas,' the comparison seemed good enough.

Similarly, the territorial policy of the Allies was declared to be equally aggressive with that of the Central Powers. England could not be charged with the desire of territorial conquest in entering the war; trade jealousy had been her motive; but what about the German colonies, Egypt, and Mesopotamia? Similar annexationist intentions have been, rightly or wrongly, charged against our allies. And Americans, subtly worked on, and forgetful or regardless of the origin of the war, have evidently been somewhat staggered by these suggestions. This is no conjecture; such thoughts have latterly appeared in American papers, notably in the friendly 'Tribune' and in the 'New Republic.' The great issues are thereby confused or obscured.

Again, the Irish rebellion produced a great revulsion of feeling, and gave the enemy a precious opportunity which he was not slow to seize. The fact that the rebellion was allowed to break out, the events accompanying its suppression, and the abortive negotiations which followed, were equally condemned. The executions were regretted by many of our best friends. A Boston paper went so far as to say that between us and the Germans there was not much to choose. All advices from the other side tend to show that no occurrence during the war has done our cause so much harm as this lamentable affair. It not only threw the Irish-Americans, important as they are from their cohesion and voting-power, into the arms of the German-born,

but among our friends it lowered our reputation for political wisdom and clemency.

Among the popular motives working for intervention must be reckoned the feeling of dissatisfaction with their own Government engendered among certain sections of the American public by the President's policy during the war. To this feeling eloquent expression has been given by Mr Fullerton in his book on 'The American Crisis and the War.' Mr Fullerton has a right to criticise, for he is an American, writing for Americans. We do not attempt to follow him, but merely note the fact. It is true that the malcontents were not a majority; the votes of Nov. 7 showed that, while many who disapproved his foreign policy, like Dr Eliot, supported him on other grounds, the bulk of the nation were thankful that he 'had kept them out of war.' But even among these there was manifested an uneasy sense that the United States had hardly played the part of a great Power during the last two years; while the commercial community pressed for more energetic action against the maritime restrictions of the Allies. The powers of retaliation conferred upon the President by the vote of Congress on Sept. 4 are a notable sign of this feeling. Pacific intervention would, it was hoped, remove the danger of being dragged into the war, and at the same time satisfy the patriotic aspirations of those who desired to see their country play a more than passive part in the great struggle. Moreover it seemed to such persons that the United States should be represented in the Peace Congress, both in order to safeguard her interests, and because the national dignity demanded that in so great a business America should not be left out.

Finally, there is the occult power of *haute finance*, to which the 'Tribune' and other authorities attribute (Nov. 25) a potent influence working for peace. The 'Tribune' went so far as to say that 'American finance has definitely joined other influences which are playing upon the President to induce him to mediate. The movement, it considered, is likely to become more serious than any of its predecessors, and the President may yield to it.' The reasons which may move financiers to desire peace are not difficult to understand; and their power—as is said to have been the case in 1911—may be decisive.

We may perhaps be justified in attributing to the influence of Mr Schiff and his pacifist friends the action of the Federal Reserve Board in warning American bankers, on Nov. 30, against locking up their money in foreign loans. The more recent action of the Board, in appointing the Bank of England their agents abroad, may perhaps be taken as showing a revulsion of feeling in that body.

Against all this are of course to be set the enormous profits made in the United States by the export of munitions and other supplies to the belligerents. But these profits are, after all, not widely distributed. The manufacturers gain hugely; their workmen get high wages; but the rest of the community suffers, or thinks it suffers, from the war. The rise of prices, especially in food-stuffs, is as remarkable in the United States as in this country. It may be, and doubtless is, largely due to the general shortage of food throughout the world; it is popularly attributed to the demands of the belligerent peoples, and, in a secondary degree, to the lack of freight due to the mass of exports travelling on the railways. This feature of the situation led last summer to protests in Congress, and, only the other day, to a demand that an embargo should be laid on food-stuffs. The coincidence of such a proposal with the constant pressure, on the part of pro-Germans, open or secret, for a stoppage of munitions, is obviously calculated to strengthen the peace-campaign. Owing to these causes, a large number of Americans, at first sympathetically interested in the success of the Allies, have come to regard the war as 'an unmitigated nuisance'; and their sentiments, being based on real grievances, no President can ignore. In connexion with this feeling, it may be noted that Mr Stone, who holds the important position of Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, said, on Dec. 14 last, at St Louis:

'I cannot escape the view that a neutral nation, suffering on so large a scale the evils of war, is not obligated, from any just point of view, to stand helplessly aloof. . . . On the contrary, I hold that, whenever a neutral nation, or any group of neutral nations, becomes the unoffending victim of any war, it or they, acting singly or in concert, can, as of right, make representations to the nations at war, to discuss

the questions at issue and strive for a basis upon which honourable peace may be restored to the world. . . . If you ask what the neutral nation or nations might do if their approachment should be resented as offensive, I answer that that would be a question for after consideration. . . . Various things might be done if any or all belligerents persisted in a course which might be regarded as not only offensive but hurtful to neutral nations offering their friendly services.'

The foregoing analysis of the conditions and motives which presumably influenced Dr Wilson in his recent action does not pretend to be exhaustive, and the problem is necessarily somewhat obscure; but we may at least claim to have shown that many potent forces have gradually come to converge on one point. That opinion in the States has of late undergone a remarkable change is clear. A year ago, the 'Tribune' warned us that, unless we altered our ways, Germany would master American sentiment. The other day, referring to its forecast, it remarked that this had now been done. We cannot help thinking—though an American paper ought to know—that the process has not yet gone quite so far; but, that considerable progress has been made, there can be little doubt. And if influential American opinion has not become as a whole pro-German—which it certainly has not—it has become largely pro-peace.

An American President in his second term is perhaps the most autocratic ruler in the world. Not having to think about re-election, he can afford, to some extent, to act independently of public opinion. Still, not even an American President in his second term is altogether independent. In his recent action Dr Wilson clearly has public opinion, on the whole, behind him. That there is a considerable body of disapproval is also clear. The fate of the Hitchcock resolution in the Senate, the opposition of Senator Lodge and others, and the substitution of a resolution merely approving the request for information, show reluctance to support blindfold anything the President may do. Many Americans doubtless agree with Mr James M. Beck, who in a recent speech declared that 'the cause of justice is higher than that of peace.'

On the President's personal motives it is not for us to speculate. The reasons he gives for intervention are

three: (1) the desire to see arrangements for permanent peace made before it is too late; (2) the anxiety lest neutral nations should find their situation intolerable—in other words, lest they should be drawn into the war; and (3) the fear that irreparable injury may be done to civilisation. It is perhaps rash to surmise which of the reasons ranks first in the President's mind; but it is clear that, while the first and the last are humanitarian, and must be balanced against the loss to humanity from a premature peace, the second is the practical and really pressing one. That the danger is felt to be serious was shown by Mr Lansing's remark, that 'the situation was critical' and that 'we are drawing nearer to the verge of war.' His subsequent intimation that the Government had no intention of abandoning the policy of neutrality could not remove the impression produced by his original words.*

When we come to the statements in the Note as to Dr Wilson's lack of information respecting the objects of the belligerents, we are on surer ground. It must be observed that the President does not say that the objects on both sides *are* identical, but that they are so 'as *stated* in general terms' by statesmen on each side. This may be true with regard to such vague and general statements as those touching the wish to be secure in future against the recurrence of war. But we are not aware that responsible British statesmen have disapproved the formation of alliances to maintain the balance of power (as Dr Wilson says), or that German statesmen have expressed any desire to make small states secure against aggression. At any rate, even if the President can refer to any such statement as having been made by Germans, their acts have given the lie to their words, whereas the efforts of the Allies to rescue Belgium from the clutches of Germany have proved their words true. To attach equal credence to such statements might seem the very pedantry of neutrality, and would be incomprehensible in a man of fair mind and sane judgment, did not the conditions under which Dr Wilson spoke afford some excuse. It is obvious that, if he wished to

* It is possible that Mr. Gerard's remarks in Berlin on Jan. 6 (see daily papers, Jan. 10) were made with a view to removing this impression.

elicit from Germany some declaration of its objects which would satisfy America, or to pin down German statesmen to a profession of their intentions which would compel them to do justice to Belgium and Serbia, he had to accept these statements at their face value.* This may be regarded as some justification for remarks which, to say the least, are so expressed as to be liable to misinterpretation.

Later remarks about the objects of the belligerents, however, have not even this excuse. Dr Wilson says that the 'concrete objects' for which the war is being waged 'have never been definitely stated'; and, again, that authoritative statesmen on either side have never avowed the precise objects which would satisfy them. This, indeed, makes us rub our eyes. Has not Mr Asquith repeatedly stated that our objects are the emancipation of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro from the German yoke, reparation for the wrongs done, and the overthrow of German military domination in Europe? And have not all our Allies repeated these demands over and over again in practically the same words? Mr Lloyd George has expressed the same views in the shorter phrase, 'restitution, reparation, and guarantees.' This may not be 'precise' enough for Dr Wilson, but, explained in the light of previous utterances, its meaning is clear.

The fact that each of the Allies has, or may have, some particular interest or aim does not invalidate this statement. It is a special and vital interest for us to expel the Germans from Belgium. France longs to recover Alsace-Lorraine. Italy believes the possession of the Trentino essential to her safety. Serbia and Montenegro desire to combine with their fellow-slavs in a Jugo-Slav State. Roumania aims at emancipating her co-nationals in Transylvania. Russia is compelled by economic necessities to secure control of the Straits. But these things do not conflict with the major and

* Mr. Bell (of the 'Chicago Daily News') has written letters to the 'Times,' arguing that this is Dr Wilson's intention, but when he goes further and asserts that the President is anxious to join the Allies in the war, it appears to us that all Dr Wilson's antecedents, besides other considerations mentioned above, and the contents of the note itself, show this assumption to be untenable.

universal aims. They have been plainly announced. Were they not 'concrete' enough for Dr Wilson?

So much for one side. On the other, we have the statements of the German Chancellor, quoted above, which not only make it clear that the German Empire is bent on territorial annexations, but hint, not obscurely at where those annexations are to be made. Prince von Bülow is not at present 'responsible,' but he is certainly 'authoritative'; and he has made German ambitions still clearer than the Chancellor. The many other statements by important groups and individuals which we have mentioned in the earlier part of this article may be dismissed by Dr Wilson as irresponsible utterances, but by anyone who is really looking for light they cannot and should not be ignored.

Not long ago Dr Wilson told an American audience that 'with the causes and objects of this war we are not concerned.' He has changed his mind with regard to the objects; we may fairly recommend him to study the causes. The objects of a war may, as we have said, develop as to details during its course; but the main objects are always and of necessity determined by its cause. What were the causes of the Revolutionary War in America, or the War of 1812, or the Civil War, or the Cuban War? It is surely unnecessary to remind Dr Wilson that, in every one of these cases, the causes of the war determined its objects. And so with other wars. To ignore their origins is to be ignorant of their objects. Moreover, to ignore the origin of this war is to deprive it of all ethical significance, and is an insult to the nations concerned and especially to the brave men on both sides who have fought and died for what they conceive to be a holy cause. Loathing the German methods as we do, condemning their ambitions as disastrous to human peace, and their principles as fatal to true progress, we cannot refuse to them the credit of forming a great and tempting, though, we believe, a monstrous ideal—that of a world dominated by German force and German ideas. We, on our side, are resisting them with all our strength in order to achieve another ideal—that of a free world, in which every nation, great and small, shall be able to develop, with due respect to its neighbours, and make its own contribution to the civilisation

of the whole. In the conflict of these two ideals the war originated; and to ignore this origin is not only, as we have said, an insult to the combatants, but also a grave and dangerous misapprehension. Unwittingly, therefore, Dr Wilson assisted the cause of our opponents. The alacrity with which the German Government, on Dec. 26, welcomed his suggestion shows the use to which they saw it may be put. Moreover, his statement as to the obscurity of our designs, and his reference, even with the safeguard 'as stated,' to the objects of the two sides as identical, are calculated to confuse a clear issue and mislead the masses of the ignorant. As if the liberation of Belgium and Serbia were identical with their conquest and enslavement! As if the Germans really showed, whatever they may say, any regard for the rights of small nations! As if German security, which, being interpreted—by themselves—means universal domination, were the same as the security of their neighbours to live freely without that domination! Yet, that there is little or nothing to choose between us is an inference which many will infallibly draw.

Finally, we have to look at the American Note in connexion with the German, and the effect of their practically simultaneous delivery. Dr Wilson is concerned to show that there is no connexion, and assures us that his suggestion had long been independently in his mind. We can well believe this. It was probably in his mind some time before the Presidential election*; no sooner had that event taken place than American papers began to hint that some step of the kind was probable. The Swiss Government, in its reply to the Note, stated that it had been in communication with the President five weeks before, which would take us back to within a week of the election; and Switzerland is not likely to have been the only neutral to whom such information was vouchsafed. The secret was evidently known to several persons in the States; and it could hardly have remained hidden from the German Government. If so, it seems probable that Germany would be

* A recent statement (Dec. 22) by the 'League to enforce Peace' finds the origin of the Note in Dr Wilson's address to the League at Washington on May 27, 1916.

anxious, by anticipating the President, to gain the credit—among pacifists of all shades and countries—of being first in the field, and to be in a position to utilise the support of the United States. It was of course possible that, when the German Note appeared, the President would have paused, out of fear that his action, immediately following that of Germany, might seem to argue collusion, and might therefore be regarded as unneutral. This fear is referred to in the Note; but on the other side was the consideration that, the subject of both Notes being the same, they might be considered together. What may be assumed to have weighed equally with the President was the further consideration that, had he delayed till the Allies had delivered their reply to the German Note, he might have been met by a *fait accompli*. If the Germans—as we may be sure—knew of his intention, they may well have reckoned on this motive as likely to hasten the action on which he had determined; and, if so, they reckoned rightly.

Whatever Dr Wilson may say as to the independent origin of his Note—and we need hardly say we give full credence to his statement—the coincidence in time is a matter of fact; and there can be no question that, in some respects, the support which his honourable suggestion gives to the dishonest German offer has increased the difficulties of the Allies. We do not believe that such is his intention, but such is the result. To the German Note, couched in menacing terms and based on two false assumptions, we could return but one reply; for conditions of peace based on those assumptions would evidently be intolerable. We were thus placed in the dilemma of having either to tell our enemies indirectly—the futile suggestion of confidential communications was of course dismissed—what we have refused to tell them directly, or to decline the request, couched in friendly terms, of a neutral state, connected with us by peculiar ties. The Allied Governments have adopted the former alternative, and have published a statement which has the great merit of declaring their objects in fuller detail than might have been expected, even in the United States. We have laid our cards on the table; can the German Government and its allies afford to do the like? In so doing, we have shown the high value that we set upon the opinion

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of the American people and its President, and our trust in the soundness of their judgment, and their perception of the community of our vital interests. But, whatever happens, our duty is clear. We must persevere to the end, and secure the peace which justice and the future of civilisation alike demand.

